The Battle at Dawn: The first battle between the United States and Japan December 7-10, 1941

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Driftless

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Mrstrategy said:
so if the pacific fleet was destroyed or could not help them they had no other plans?
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To borrow from the USMC: Improvise, adapt, overcome....

Basically, with much of the heavy units of the Pacific fleet sunk or severely damaged and we still had the war in the Atlantic to fight as well; it really shifted the focus over to the few carriers in the Pacific to keep the fight going until more ships came into service or back from repair.

The core "Island Hopping" part of the plan was essentially retained, just delayed
 
Mrstrategy

Mrstrategy

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corditeman said:
Famous old joke...

...In the United Kingdom, 'Will' is the shortened form of the masculine forename 'William'. To 'Fire at Will' is to shoot poor Will.

Got it? Good! *Heaves a sigh and goes back to sleep...zzz...zzz...*
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83c864128a517cd7ad5a32dba3900b44.jpg
 

ExScientiaTridens

Mrstrategy said:
why so little ships ?
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Check the following reference to see Pacific, Asiatic and Atlantic fleet.

lhttp://www.niehorster.org/013_usa/_41_usn/_usn.html

The Asiatic fleet reflects both logistic realities and war plans (as noted). What you see is primarily a submarine force; in fact the " most modern" boats available. Neither Guam nor the Philippines had the port facilities to support the battle fleet, and had long supply lines. Which either had to traverse the Mandates (Japanese) or divert south. In case of war with Japan the clear expectation was that the Asiatic fleet could not be sustained in the PI. Only McArthur believed the PI could be held and nobody believed Guam would survive.

Bottom line is that the Asiatic was as big as it could/should be, and was constructed in a way that made the most sense operationally.
 

zert

corditeman said:
Famous old joke...

...In the United Kingdom, 'Will' is the shortened form of the masculine forename 'William'. To 'Fire at Will' is to shoot poor Will.

Got it? Good! *Heaves a sigh and goes back to sleep...zzz...zzz...*
Click to expand...

For what it is worth, I did get it. Had a nice laugh as well. :)
 

eltf177

Does Dougout Doug get his air force blasted on the ground like OTL? Or have Dougout Doug do the same thing he did in OTL - tried to blame the Navy for "lack of support" - but this time his higher up's don't ignore it but use it as the excuse to get rid of him?
 

King Augeas

longtimelurkerinMD said:
Subject for a whole another thread, but I'm not convinced the BB was any more vulnerable or obsolete just by air power alone - if properly protected by the right AA and part of a task force - any ship is vulnerable by itself or in a small group.
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The vulnerability of the battleship wasn't the problem. DK Brown had it right:

It is often said that the battleship died because it was vulnerable. This is incorrect; it was replaced by the fleet carrier which was much more vulnerable. The battleship died because it was far less capable than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy.
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Butchpfd

ExScientiaTridens said:
Check the following reference to see Pacific, Asiatic and Atlantic fleet.

lhttp://www.niehorster.org/013_usa/_41_usn/_usn.html

The Asiatic fleet reflects both logistic realities and war plans (as noted). What you see is primarily a submarine force; in fact the " most modern" boats available. Neither Guam nor the Philippines had the port facilities to support the battle fleet, and had long supply lines. Which either had to traverse the Mandates (Japanese) or divert south. In case of war with Japan the clear expectation was that the Asiatic fleet could not be sustained in the PI. Only McArthur believed the PI could be held and nobody believed Guam would survive.

Bottom line is that the Asiatic was as big as it could/should be, and was constructed in a way that made the most sense operationally.
Click to expand...

I believe part of the Asiatic Fleet's surface ships mission was escorting shipping out of the P.I., and covering blockade runners in and helping keep lines of communication open as long as possible and combine with allied surface units. The PT's were for close defense of Manila Bay area, the submarines could have done much more damage if Cavite had not been destroyed (Thanks General..Sarc.) the 300 torpedoes with at least half MK 10s for the S-Boats, lost was devastating. Admiral Hart was a long term (40years) friend of the MacArthur family and it is stated in biographies that he had serious doubts about the Generals mental competemnce.
 

sloreck

From the early 20s (if not before) War Plan Orange basically saw the PI as not being able to last too long against the Japanese for the reasons outlined here - too close to Japan, too far from the USA, and Japanese held islands astride the direct line of communications. If the Southern PI are not surrendered, and if Japan does not take the DEI (which was not considered in initial WPO thinking), then connecting at least to the Southern PI via the long approach near Australia is possible. This, obviously was not the case OTL.

In this scenario where the USA has begun preparations before 12/7 on an expedited basis and where the attack is not a surprise, one can hope that Doug does not go all funk and keep the USAAF on the ground in the PI.
 

KACKO

corditeman said:
Famous old joke...

...In the United Kingdom, 'Will' is the shortened form of the masculine forename 'William'. To 'Fire at Will' is to shoot poor Will.

Got it? Good! *Heaves a sigh and goes back to sleep...zzz...zzz...*
Click to expand...
15 year ago while in England I heard hat for Willy or Willy hat. Took me a while till I got it. :D
 

galveston bay

Driftless said:
USN - Asiatic Fleet - Dec 7, 1941

Note: PT-41 (John Bulkely's boat) at Cavite

Also, note the number of submarines (but I believe the torpedo problem largely negated their presence)
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no change from the historical forces in the Philippines.. Richardson doesn't control the Asiatic Fleet except indirectly in his role as CINCUS, but really it is more under direct command of the CNO and SecNav

Obviously he has no authority or influence over the US Army or Philippine Army...the Pacific Fleet only extends as far as Guam

as to why too few.. the Asiatic Fleet is in part the leftovers of a Colonial police force (all the gunboats), a show the flag force (the USS Houston), a tripwire force (the destroyers and light cruisers), and defense force (the PTs, submarines), plus the support needed for that. Concentration of force under Mahan calls for the battle fleet to be concentrated (the best 12 battleships were in the Pacific until 3 were sent to reinforce the Neutrality Patrol), plus the scouting force (cruisers and carriers), and the support for them.

In short, the Asiatic Fleet is supposed to be, to put it in Cold War terms, a tripwire and deterrent. It was always assumed it would it would die in place while bleeding the Japanese as much as possible.

I for one hold the men and ships of the Asiatic Fleet in very high regard for their bravery and determination
 

galveston bay

Unknown said:
Just curious: when's the next update?

BTW, if you want to find some way to get rid of MacArthur, do what Fearless Leader did in his TL and somehow kill him off early in the battle...
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next couple of days... working longer than usual hours this week but the preliminary outline for the 1st Wave is done
 
Dispositions of varous groups December 7 just after midnight
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    • galveston bay

    well after looking at some maps, finding one that would show were all the various task forces are AND would fit as an attachment in this forum didn't work out

    so sorry folks, you will have to rely on the locations I post and put them on a map that you might have... I am reasonably certain everyone has access to a reasonably good map somewhere, online if nothing else

    this one is pretty good for the Hawaiian Islands and it still doesn't cover the entire operational area involved
    https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/hawaiian_islands.jpg

    (the Tropic of Cancer is 157 miles north on Honolulu, so the Gamble was sunk around the 28th Parallel, the Japanese launch point is around the 26th Parallel, second launch point just below that and recovery point is about 30 miles north of the Tropic

    The American Carriers (Brown and Halsey) are approaching Laysan Island to meet up with Fletcher and the oilers as of the early morning of December 7 (Brown and the Lexington/Yorktown from the southwest, Halsey and the Enterprise from the Northwest, and Fletcher from the East)

    the Leary task group is just off the harbor of Honolulu, along with the fleet auxiliary Antares

    http://www.theodora.com/maps/new9/principal_hawaiian_islands.jpg

    The Japanese Midway Attack Force (cruisers, escorts and transports) are 150 miles east northeast of Wake Island steaming NNE at 10 knots (best speed of the transports and support ships) on a direct course to Midway (which is still 1000 miles, or 100 hours away) which means the American carriers are a lot closer to them than the Japanese carriers are

    https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/pacific_area_1942.jpg
     
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    • Driftless

    Driftless

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    galveston bay said:
    well after looking at some maps, finding one that would show were all the various task forces are AND would fit as an attachment in this forum didn't work out

    so sorry folks, you will have to rely on the locations I post and put them on a map that you might have... I am reasonably certain everyone has access to a reasonably good map somewhere, online if nothing else

    this one is pretty good for the Hawaiian Islands and it still doesn't cover the entire operational area involved
    (snip)
    Click to expand...

    Excellent choice of maps - informative and they have the right feel for the time.

    The first, showing the great span of the Hawaiian Chain from Kure to Midway to French Frigate Shoals on down to the main islands we are most familiar with, gives a great sense of the essential connectedness of that chain.

    The last map puts the key WW2 historic island groups into spatial perspective. Mentally I always put Wake closer to Japan than it is and Guam closer to Hawaii than the Philippines - just the reverse of reality.

    A good map tells a story
     
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