The Battle at Dawn: The first battle between the United States and Japan December 7-10, 1941

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[0] Concur. I think you'd need a more maneuverable airframe to duke it out with surface combatants. A B-17 with both a surface-search radar and the 57mm might be interesting to look for surfaced submarines - the radar to find 'em and the 57 to put a hole in 'em to either sink 'em outright or trap 'em on the surface.

[1] This may require some unfortunate accidents before it's discovered.

The B-17 was actually quite agile at low levels.
If a B-25 can have a 75mm, a 105 won't be a problem on a B-17.
The big thing that hurt the B-17 in the Pacific was the short range vs the B-24

Agile it was perhaps when compared with other 4-engined bombers. When compared with B-25, Ju 88 or Beaufighter, it certainly was not. Problem was also the size, it will take a cross-eyed AAA gunner to miss it. Agreed that B-24 have had more range.

The cannon (like 75mm or even 105 mm) armed bomber does not have the rate of fire to supress the AAA, while bomb-laden bomber will put far more firepower against a ship anyway we look at it.
 
They can kill destroyers, and shred the upperworks of cruisers. Carriers might not like being stitched up with them, either.
Is the 105 a low velocity weapon, or a high velocity one?

The Italian P.108, their equivalent of the B-17, used the 102mm cannon that was used on the decks of submarines, 2789 fps with a 35.3 lb AP round
 
The A-20 got used plenty (some 7,000 units made), often for non-US air forces. It was a very adaptable airframe, so could the US have gotten even more mileage out of it? Especially in the early days after OTL Pearl Harbor, before other better performers came off the assembly lines?

I had to do a bit of reading up on the A-20, but it seems to me with a covered nose and a pair of 20mm and a pair of .50 cals, or the 37mm that was originally used in the P-39...putting the 37mm on the A-20 means it could carry a useful load...

The later versions of the A-20 were capable of carrying, 1st, 540, then 725 gals of internal fuel (good deal in three bomb bay tanks) and 2000 lbs of bombs, along with 6 .50s in the 'solid' nose (plus two in rear turret); range (not radius) of 1530 miles with reserve with 725 gals + 2000 lbs. So basically go for the earlier installation of bigger fuel tankage. Drop tank was also an option. Soviets also experimented with their A-20s outfitted with bomb-bay tanks of their production.
For plinking the submarines, perhaps go with the Army AA gun of 37mm, that possesed much better muzzle velocity for the AP shot to be efficient.
 
Good. He screwed up, let him suffer with his men. The special treatment he got in OTL really burns me...:mad:


Perhaps someone should really pay attention to Tommy Hart. He was a lifelong friend of the MacArthur family and a frequent shipmates of Douglas' older brother. He was sure before the attack that Doug was not all there , and perhaps could have gotten MacArthur before too much damage done, like getting food to Bataan in time.
 
Yes he knew some of the Japanese codes were 'broken', the he did no know details. Had he been inclined he might have revealed the Diplomatic code (Purple) was broken, and a important naval code, tho he had little understanding of which code/encryption was compromised.

At this point I am wonder if any flag rank officers captured placed any code or encryption penetration at risk? The US Brigadier Gen Varnum was captured by the Germans. They completely missed that he was cleared for ULTRA and seems to have understood how the ULTRA system worked. In another case a German working as a British agent in Spain was kidnapped & returned to Germany. The Brits were in a panic as this man understood how the Double Cross system worked and may have understood the German encryption system was compromised. Post war examination of the Gestapo records show the agent was asked nothing on those subjects.

In some ways the Japanese were worse than the Germans, thinking quarterly key changes & bi or tri annual changes of the code it self was sufficient to keep it unbroken.
Thomas Hart knew about and exactly what the Navy codebreakers at station CAST at Cavite, then Corrigidor were doing and what could be inferred.That's why, imo, The Asiatic fleet was not sitting on it's button when the war came.
 
waiting for them to figure out skip bombing, of course it need a fast agile platform, which the lighter twin engine mediums fit
 

Driftless

Donor
We all probably need more patience.... We're only to the end of day on Dec 7 right now, I believe :cool:

Swapping Admiral Richardson for Admiral Kimmel has set more than butterflies in motion - it's kinda like the chain reaction in a pool game, using the old fashioned nitro-cellulose balls.
 
Perhaps someone should really pay attention to Tommy Hart. He was a lifelong friend of the MacArthur family and a frequent shipmates of Douglas' older brother. He was sure before the attack that Doug was not all there , and perhaps could have gotten MacArthur before too much damage done, like getting food to Bataan in time.

I just finished reading FIGHTING FOR MACARTHUR: THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS DESPERATE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES by John Gordon. He says exactly the same thing, pre-war MacArthur and Hart were good friends. But once war started Dougout Doug blamed as many of his problems as he could on the Navy. His dispatchs were pure fantasy and ego, Doug's subordinates were shocked at the total misinformation and outright lies being sent back to the US. 'Skinny' Wainwright had no clue just how bad a shape the men were in until command got dumped on him.

The USN did get much of their food moved, thus the Sailors and Marines fighting on shore had far more and better rations than the Army. Those in the Army who had the good fortune to dine with them were quite shocked.

And Doug's treatment of Hart and Wainwright post-war is nothing short of appalling...
 
The magnetic exploder was a close held secret as was the fact that US torpedoes ran deliberately deeper than set to pass under the target. When US submariners were firing at targets, they set the depth for a good hull hit and the additional programmed depth would take the torpedo under the target. But the exploder didn't work for various reasons and the torpedo simply passed under the target.

This is patently incorrect. There was no "additional programmed depth" set into the weapon. The crew of the submarine firing the weapon made an estimation of the keel depth of the target and set the running depth of the weapon prior to firing so that it would run under the keel. The intention was then for the weapon to run at the depth it was set for. In reality this did not happen. The Mk 14 torpedo ran deeper than set for two main reasons. First, on the few rare occasions in which the weapon was actually tested by BuOrd, it was tested with a water filled exercise warhead which weighed less than the explosive warhead! So the when the heavier explosive warhead was attached the calibration for the depth setting was off and the torpedo ran deeper than set. Incredibly, no one seemed to have caught this obvious problem until the war started! Secondly, the pressure sensor for the depth mechanism was located near the tail of the weapon. Water flow over the sensor created a low pressure eddy that caused the sensor to think that it was at a shallower depth. Thus it sent a correction to the control fins that made it run deeper. This one I can give BuOrd at least a little credit for, as it was a result of an incomplete understanding of fluid dynamics, a science which was in its infancy in the 1930's. However, both of these problems would have been revealed had BuOrd ran a series of tests under realistic conditions during the R&D phase pre-war, which it did not.
 
This is an excellent thread and I am enjoying reading it. However, I do have a nit pick. The long pier at Naval Station Pearl Harbor that runs northeast to southwest is named 1010 Dock, not 110 Dock.

Keep up the good work!
 
another depth problem with the early torpedoes were the few tests were all done in the Atlantic (cold water) in the Pacific's warmer less dense water the torpedoes ran deeper
 
Something that should be mentioned is that all of the losses suffered by the Japanese Carrier Air Wings has not actually effected the Fleet's search capabilities, at all.

The IJN used the Floatplanes from its Cruisers, and Capital ships, to perform reconnaissance missions. In part to cut down on routine wear and tear and preserve its Strike Craft, and also to allow a greater offensive capacity.
And they did locate the US Taskforces at Coral Sea and Midway, just not early enough in the case of the latter. The TL cannot rely on a fortuitous catapult fault aboard the Tone.

See Tully's 2015 article here, "A Question of Estimates" for 1st Air Fleet search doctrine,

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment...-of-Estimates--How-Faulty-Intelligence-D.aspx

Yes, float planes were used, but this was when carrier opposition was not anticipated. When carriers were thought nearby, the carriers did the searching and the pattern was denser.
 
This is an excellent thread and I am enjoying reading it. However, I do have a nit pick. The long pier at Naval Station Pearl Harbor that runs northeast to southwest is named 1010 Dock, not 110 Dock.

Keep up the good work!

thanks for that info... the final version of this will have that correction
 
See Tully's 2015 article here, "A Question of Estimates" for 1st Air Fleet search doctrine,

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment...-of-Estimates--How-Faulty-Intelligence-D.aspx

Yes, float planes were used, but this was when carrier opposition was not anticipated. When carriers were thought nearby, the carriers did the searching and the pattern was denser.

that is my take as well.... the problem at Midway was that the Japanese did not expect carriers to be nearby because their submarines missed the American deployment and the planned aerial recon using French Frigate Shoals had to be cancelled

So the deployment of the floatplanes was just the usual routine scouting and not looking for anything specific with the expectations that carriers might be lurking about
 
that is my take as well.... the problem at Midway was that the Japanese did not expect carriers to be nearby because their submarines missed the American deployment and the planned aerial recon using French Frigate Shoals had to be cancelled

So the deployment of the floatplanes was just the usual routine scouting and not looking for anything specific with the expectations that carriers might be lurking about

Which doesn't change the point that it was the IJN Floatplanes that spotted the US Task-Forces at both Coral Sea and Midway.
(And with Yamaguchi now in tactical command of the 1st Air Fleet we really should expect a more thorough search plan?)
 
Which doesn't change the point that it was the IJN Floatplanes that spotted the US Task-Forces at both Coral Sea and Midway.
(And with Yamaguchi now in tactical command of the 1st Air Fleet we really should expect a more thorough search plan?)

well on December 7 and 8, in this timeline, the two carrier fleets are well outside of the range of the search aircraft they have available (over 800 plus miles). But the Japanese are indeed looking hard, just in case, as the American carriers are a big concern and bringing them to battle is a major objective of the campaign. Halsey too is looking, and so are the PBYs from Midway and Oahu, and the float planes from French Frigate Shoals

No one is in range yet
 
Radar and Search
special notes:
Ships equipped with CXAM Radar as of December 7 (and with the Pacific Fleet)
BB California, West Virginia, Pennsylvania
CV Lexington, Yorktown, Enterprise
CA Pensacola, Northhampton, Chester, Chicago
seaplane tender Curtis

All US destroyers have sonar, none yet have radar

CXAM has a search range of 50 to 100 miles (depends who you ask), but the Lexington picked up a Japanese strike at 65 miles at the Battle of Coral Sea so I am going with that (but assuming 50-60 miles factoring in decision time frames)

No Japanese ships have radar (and will not for some time to come), Japanese destroyers, even the best equipped, only carry 12-20 depth charges and these are set too shallow (for now)


Air Search
The Japanese use float planes from their cruisers (which are in trouble from just about anything else that flies and has guns), and Kates if they are really serious and know American carriers are about. In this timeline they are looking for American CVs, so usually 12 Kates provide additional coverage to the seaplanes aboard the Tone and Chikuma. The BB float planes generally are used for antisubmarine patrols

The Americans use the Dauntless, indeed one squadron is a Scouting Squadron, so up to 18 per carrier is typical. These search aircraft carry bombs (usually a 500 pound bomb as the 1,000 pound bomb reduces their air search time). The float planes are not used for search and indeed spent a lot of time simply being fire hazards (after Savo Island they were flown off right away if a surface action was expected). They did good work in the search and rescue missions.

The Americans still have the overwhelming majority of the PBY force at Oahu (about 65) and Midway (12 or so, plus a couple that were on their way to the Dutch that were kept on December 7). These have an effective search range of 500-600 miles. However it is a big ocean, and while that sounds like a lot of search aircraft, they still miss things.

There are two American submarines off Midway on December 7, and both will remain on station, the Argonaut) whose captain hid below the surface when two Japanese destroyers from the Pearl Harbor attack force shelled that island that evening in OTL) and the Trout, which was on the opposite side of the atoll and thus out of position that evening.

The Japanese submarines are all clustered around Oahu, however a few are heading toward Midway.. However their speed is 22 knots at most, but as they are a long way from home a more conservative 18 knots (high end of cruise) is called for, and they can only do that safely during night time hours. They are thus out of position until around December 9 at the very least (this is a departure from historical in terms of where the submarines went after Pearl Harbor)

The American S boats and fleet boats from the Picket Force have pretty much been left behind. The three submarines at Pearl Harbor that are available will not be able to sortie until December 9 as they were undergoing maintenance at the time of the attack.

MidwayIsland
The AAA batteries and 5 inch batteries are present, and like Wake Island, they are still under manned and there is no radar yet at Midway (its on its way). The airfield is completed, and there are stores, including bombs, present for the VMSB 231 and its Vindicators which were supposed to be flown off on December 7.

There are stores and fuel for the PBYs present (and plenty for any other aircraft). If necessary the PBYs can rebase to French Frigate Shoals, especially as the Curtis is en route there to provide support to PBYs from Oahu that are about to be sent there.

Japanese land based aircraft in the Mandates are busy attacking Wake Island at the moment and are well out of range in any event
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
The Americans know where the Japanese are, the general direction they are taking, and the rough composition of the fleet - the false report of one BB sunk is really irrelevant. They are retreating at 24 kts, and they have no clue as to where any American carriers are. With their markedly reduced air groups they can't fire off scouts willy-nilly, and if they have to alter course to launch/retrieve that means they are losing their lead which they don't want. Also running away from Hawaii at 24 kts means the range of scouts is reduced as they have to make up 50-75 nm to get back to the ships. Since the Japanese don't know where the American carriers are, the first clue they will have is when any ships spot incoming aircraft and not any scouts because they could come from Hawaii. Unless they have planes armed and fueled and spotted on deck or ready in the hanger, going down a reciprocal course will take time to arrange and means reversing course. Of course if they have a strike ready to go, that means any hits will be disasterous - you don't want aircraft armed and fueled on deck or in the hanger deck when you are under attack.

Wouldn't the planes on the cruisers be tasked with recon?
 
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