The Anglo-Saxon Social Model

Black January, 2008
  • The Suicide of Postwar Europe, Part Three: More Money Than God

    In January 2008 international finance and currency markets were thrown into chaos when a series of apparently unconnected entities began vast and quick sell-offs of French government bonds. £629,000,000,000 worth of bonds were dumped in that month, resulting in an immediate spike in French borrowing costs and a tidy profit for the entities that had begun the sell-off. This was accompanied by a smaller move to dump Soviet bonds. Ahead of their third-quarterly all-parties meeting in June 2008, the board of the SWF confirmed that several subsidiary entities had engaged in a targeted “slimming down” of their total portfolio of foreign government bonds and currency.

    Even before it was known who was behind the dumping, the sudden shorting of the Franc caused immediate problems for the Sixth Republic, which was not only having to deal with its vast military commitments in Yugoslavia but which had also managed to hold down domestic discontent through a mixture of an expensive internal security apparatus and extremely low levels of taxation. Combined with a general economic slow-down caused by the ongoing crisis in Yugoslavia, the French economy tipped into recession in the first and second quarters of 2008. With borrowing costs rising, the government was forced to turn to the World Bank as its main supplier of credit but the board, chaired by the American Timothy Geithner, was unwilling to extend loans unless they came with stringent conditions attached. This, in turn, only made matters worse if France sought further credit on international markets.

    In October 2008, matters were exacerbated by, firstly, a series of seemingly-coordinated denial of service attacks that crippled the French banking system and, secondly, the discovery of a malicious computer worm inside the French military SCADA systems that is believed to have caused substantial damage to the communication and coordination of the armed forces and internal security service. The hand of the Commonwealth behind this was suspected, of course, but never proven. In a joint meeting of the French cabinet, senior generals and financial regulators, Le Pen ordered the carpet bombing of London in retaliation for the SWF’s actions. However, Chief of Staff Jean-Louis Georgelin refused to obey the order and instead ordered Le Pen’s immediate arrest. With Le Pen’s daughter Marine siding against her father, he was removed and she proclaimed president in his stead the same day. (Georgelin’s role in this has come under scrutiny in the years since, with unreconstructed National Front hardliners throwing conspiratorial glances at his previous associations with more moderate Republican figures.)

    Marine Le Pen’s first action as president was forced on her: ordering the Bank of France to impose a partial deposit freeze. While this was necessary to prevent the flight of hard currency, this unfortunately meant that France was now no longer meeting its obligations under its World Bank loan, and Geithner took great pleasure in putting the pressure on. At the end of October, in a climate of severe political and social unrest, France defaulted on its World Bank obligations, followed by a general default on its debt and the formal abandonment of the convertibility of the Franc two weeks later.

    The ensuing economic and political crisis was arguably worse than the ill-fated period of the Fifth Republic only a decade previously. By the end of 2008, the economy had contracted by 20% since 2003. Since the Monuments Bombing in June 2005, French output had fallen by more than 15%, the Franc had lost three-quarters of its value and unemployment exceeded 25%. Income poverty had grown to 55% of the population at the time of the default. This was simply not a sustainable level in a democracy (even though the Sixth Republic could only very generally be described as democratic) and widespread social unrest erupted across the country. The riots soon escalated to include property destruction, often directed at banks. Confrontations between the police and rioters were common, with Marine Le Pen claiming that they were all wreckers paid by British and Jewish interests (which wasn’t totally untrue, in fact, as the British government had provided sanctuary for French dissidents since 1996 and the Five Eyes Agency began to arrange for their return to France in the winter of 2008/09). A particularly violent incident occurred in the Place de la Republique on 20 and 21 January 2009, in which 39 people (including 6 children) were killed by police and 227 injured.

    The following day, 22 January 2009, an estimated 40,000 people, calling themselves ‘La France Insoumise’ and led by the dissident politician Jean-Luc Melenchon, marched on the Élysée Palace. At the sight of the mob, the guards surrendered without firing a shot and, when the mob entered the palace, they found that it had been abandoned by the government. Le Pen and her circle emerged three days later in Petrograd but by that point things were too late. Melenchon propagated a new constitution on 23 January and the following day his skeleton government received a delegation of Commonwealth diplomats. In response, the internal security and police forces effectively went on strike in order to drown the new government in civil unrest.

    However, they had miscalculated. Whatever conservative support might have existed for the overthrow of socialism in 1995 and 1996 had now withered under the harsh conditions imposed by the Sixth Republic. The business community were repulsed by Le Pen’s rhetorical attacks on ethnic minorities, not to mention the support he gave to the semi-regular pogroms organised by ‘off-duty’ policemen. Many fled to the Department of the Maghreb, which - with the safety of the Mediterranean between it and mainland France - had become something of a haven for certain tolerated dissidents. The small-town ‘France profonde’ which had been so crucial in bringing Le Pen to power now also abandoned him due to a combination of economic chaos and a disastrous foreign policy that had done the exact opposite of fulfilling Le Pen’s promise to restore French international prestige. Instead of collapsing into chaos, French public life became dominated by peaceful sit-ins around the country, which grew from simple protest movements to become informal communities in public spaces. Critics of the new French regime were furious when the press revealed that two members of the Commonwealth delegation were Sir Crispin Odey and Sir Mark Carney, the chairman and deputy chairman, respectively, of the SWF. In short order, the SWF had arranged for a fresh line of credit to be extended to the new French government, the fund having made a significant profit on its shorting of the French sovereign debt only a year previously.

    A referendum on 2 February returned a 96.4% vote in favour of the new constitution (critics noted that this was almost exactly the same percentage as Napoleon III had won in 1852) and the Seventh French Republic was declared the following day. With all assembly members from the Sixth Republic proscribed from election, the Seventh Republic was an immediate and radical repudiation of the majority of France’s economics and politics since 1945. Among its most notable moves was Melenchon’s order to immediately withdraw French troops, weapons and money from Yugoslavia, calling for peace talks. Oskar Lafontaine also returned to government as the Foreign Minister and immediately set out to fix where he had failed in 1996: declaring the French Union at an end and urging democratic elections in the other members. Unlike in 1996, on this occasion the other members of the French Union chose not to intervene militarily, perhaps put off by the sight of senior Commonwealth diplomats standing on the steps of the Élysée shaking hands with the new regime.

    The political response in the Soviet Union was scarcely as dramatic but was by no means less important. The lower level of financialisation of the Soviet economy meant that the economic problems caused by the shorting of its bonds did not create as serious an issue for the country. However, borrowing costs did rise and this put pressure on its ability to keep up its military commitments in Yugoslavia. In March 2009, Gennady Yanayev was gently eased out of his position as Premier (he spent the remaining year of his life as Chairman of the Soviet Tourist Board) and was replaced by Vladimir Putin. Putin used his room to maneuver to agree an armistice with NATO which came into force on 1 June 2009.

    Following the armistice, secret negotiations were held in Stockholm, hosted by the Nordic Union and chaired by the UN. This was followed by a public peace conference the following month in Kirkuk. This resulted in the United Nations Agreement on the Former Yugoslavia (commonly known as the “Kirkuk Accords”), which appeared in November 2009. A lengthy and complicated document, the main point of the Accords was to effectively abolish Yugoslavia as a country, order the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory and place it under the governance of a UN board (made up of a representative of every permanent member of the Security Council and 15 members selected from the other members of the General Assembly) which would manage the territory in advance of a series of referendums to determine its future direction.

    The whole Yugoslav War was a sorry affair: conceived in the tragic murder of innocents by terrorists, it had turned into a bloodbath where, by the end of it, few people were left sure of what they were fighting for. What could be said for NATO was that, under the Kirkuk Accords, it did secure the extradition of the Yugoslavian masterminds of the Monuments Bombings (along with Lyndon LaRouche, who was implicated as an influence in the attacks but who would later be acquitted at trial). When the extradited individuals were later put on trial for murder in a Philadelphia courtroom, many praised it as a victory for the decency and the process of American justice. But over 16,000 American soldiers, sailors and pilots had died in the killing fields of Yugoslavia, as well as nearly 3,000 from other NATO countries. Was that a fair trade? It seemed at least debatable.

    Similarly, the white supremacist neoliberal regime in France had wandered decisively into its own suicide, killing over 4,000 of its sons and giving birth to an explicitly socialist regime that repudiated everything it stood for. In the Soviet Union, things hadn’t gone as badly as it had for France, and many (including Putin) could congratulate themselves on finessing a reasonably elegant exit from Yugoslavia, considering where they had been in the middle of 2008. But few could deny that it was another embarrassing bloody nose for the regime. Even the governing classes of Brazil and China, who attracted praise for their skilful diplomatic containment of the war, were now looking closely at their bond spreads to try and gauge precisely how much was owned by the Commonwealth or the SWF.

    And it was the Commonwealth and the SWF that were about the only entities who came out of this fiasco well, with their true power now laid bare for the world to see. A Nordic academic paper, published in 2010, suggested that the SWF now owned 10% of all issued shares in the world. This was probably an exaggeration but, after all, who would know?

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    Commonwealth Leaders, 1953-2010
  • So we're going to take another quick break from the main narrative to provide updated lists of world leaders. I already gave an update covering Latin American updates about a week ago so this week we'll be covering European, American, Asian and African leaders since 1976. Lists of leaders for the period 1945-76 can be found here (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...xon-social-model.458146/page-34#post-19224909) for those who are interested. We start with Commonwealth institutions themselves and will cover individual member states tomorrow.

    Presidents of the Commonwealth Cabinet (1953-2010)

    Usually referred to as the 'chairman' in order to avoid confusion with an elected head of state, the president is chosen by the member states by consensus. Each president can serve a maximum of two five-year terms, with the second term usually being a formality. The president chairs the Commonwealth Cabinet, a quasi-executive body made up of 18 other departmental secretaries (one from each member state). Each department secretary heads up a regulatory department, effectively like a cabinet minister in national governments. Which country gets to pick which departmental secretary is a matter of significant negotiation between national governments. In practice, the Big Four generally manage to sew up the four most important departments (Security, Energy, Migration and Employment) between themselves.

    Each departmental secretary has the ability to propose regulations within their purview, which are then agreed on by consensus of the Cabinet as a whole. If agreed, these are then passed into law as Commonwealth Acts. Commonwealth Acts tend to be general statements rather than specific laws and require domestic parliaments to legislate to put the intentions of the Acts into law. Departmental secretaries also chair the relevant select committees of Commonwealth Assembly Members, ensuring close alignment between the Cabinet and the Assembly. The president also chairs the prime ministers' conference.

    The role of the president is thus what the holder makes of it and individuals' approaches have varied. Winston Churchill, for example, took a hands-off role and saw himself as a soft power figure, promoting the Commonwealth around the world. When Quintin Hogg was president in the 1980s, however, he took an active role in policy-making, working closely with the speaker Michael Manley to produce a raft of important reforms on matters such as the single currency. By convention, the holder of the role of president alternates between figures on the political centre-left and centre-right.
    1. Winston Churchill; United Kingdom; June 1953 - June 1960*
    2. Robert Menzies; Australia; June 1960 - June 1970
    3. Lester B. Pearson; Canada; June 1970 - December 1972**
    4. Peter Shore; United Kingdom; December 1972 - June 1980***
    5. Quintin Hogg; United Kingdom; June 1980 - June 1990
    6. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; Pakistan; June 1990 - April 1999**
    7. Jean Chretien; Canada; April 1999 - June 2000****
    8. Hubert Ingraham; Bahamas; June 2000 - June 2005*****
    9. Tony Tan; East Indies; June 2005 - June 2010
    10. Gordon Brown; United Kingdom; June 2010 - present
    *First term was June 1953 - June 1955
    **Died in office
    ***Formerly the speaker's chief of staff - stepped into the role on an interim basis before being confirmed by a prime ministers' vote in January 1973.
    ****Chosen by an emergency prime ministers' vote.
    *****Voluntarily turned down a second term to return to domestic politics.

    Speakers of the Commonwealth Assembly (1953-2010)

    Often referred to as a parliament, the Assembly has enlarged its role greatly over the decades. The main work of the assembly involves drafting and passing Commonwealth Regulations, which are technical pieces of legislation which, when passed, immediately become the domestic law of every member state. Prime ministers' conferences may unanimously vote to repeal or amend particular Commonwealth Regulations, although this is rare. The process of drafting Regulations is lead by the Assembly's various select committees. After a five year break between the first and second election the timing of Assembly elections was fixed at every seven years.

    The speaker is often colloquially referred to as the 'Commonwealth prime minister' but in practice their powers are very different from that of prime ministers in westminster systems. Notably, the speaker does not have a cabinet and has only informal influence over the makeup of the Commonwealth Cabinet. Instead, the speaker's main power derives from his power to decide the Assembly's legislative and voting timetable. Thus, speakers can, and have, killed potential regulations they don't like by simply not allowing votes to be held on them.

    The vast majority of Assembly Members ("AMs") fit into one of five groupings: Socialists (centre-left), Liberal Democrats (centre-right), Conservative (conservative but not necessarily right wing), Green (environmentalist with a notable far-left tinge) and Nationalist (Anglosceptic). After each election, the largest grouping will nominate a candidate for the speakership, who is then voted on by the Assembly, which by convention will allow the largest party their choice of speaker. However, this should not be taken to imply that the largest party operates with a majority of the AMs as the diversity of the Commonwealth means that majorities are unlikely. For example, while the Socialist grouping is said to have 'won' the first five elections, they never won an actual majority. The Assembly thus accidentally became a far more consensual body than its adversarial Westminster origins, with regulations only passed if they could command cross-party support. As such, speakers have tended to be consensual figures.
    1. Michael Collins; non-partisan; June 1953 - June 1962* **
    2. Anthony Crosland; Socialist; June 1962 - June 1981
    3. Michael Manley; Socialist; June 1981 - May 1988
    4. Ali Hassan Mwinyi; Socialist; May 1988 - May 1995
    5. Ken Clarke; Liberal Democrat; May 1995 - May 2009
    6. Morgan Tsvangirai; Socialist; May 2009 - present
    *During Collins' tenure, the Assembly was an unelected body.
    **Although formally a non-partisan figure, Collins had been a Liberal in British domestic politics.
     
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    Commonwealth Prime Ministers (1976-2010)
  • Australia
    1. Malcolm Fraser; Liberal-National; May 1975 - March 1980
    2. Gough Whitlam; Labor; March 1980 - November 1990
    3. John Button; Labor; November 1990 - December 1994
    4. Andrew Peacock; Liberal-National; December 1994 - March 1999
    5. Jan Burnswoods; Labor; March 1999 - March 2004
    6. Meg Lees; Liberal-National; March 2004 - March 2009
    7. Martin Ferguson; Labor; March 2009 - present

    Bahamas

    1. Henry Milton Taylor; Progressive Liberal; July 1973 - December 1980
    2. Lynden Pindling; Progressive Liberal; December 1980 - March 1994
    3. Janet Bostwick; National; March 1994 - December 1999
    4. Perry Christie; Progressive Liberal; December 1999 - December 2004
    5. Frank Watson; National; December 2004 - August 2005
    6. Hubert Ingraham; National; August 2005 - present

    Belize

    1. George Cadle Price; People's United; June 1981 - June 1993
    2. Manuel Esquivel; United Democratic; June 1993 - July 1998
    3. Said Musa; People's United; July 1998 - present

    Canada

    1. Pierre Trudeau; Liberal; June 1970 - May 1979
    2. Flora MacDonald; Progressive Conservative; May 1979 - February 1981
    3. Jean-Luc Pepin; Liberal; February 1981 - September 1988
    4. Jean Chretien; Liberal; September 1988 - November 1995
    5. Gary Doer; Liberal; November 1995 - October 1999
    6. Sheila Copps; Liberal; October 1999 - June 2002
    7. Gary Doer; New Democratic; June 2002 - November 2009
    8. Belinda Stronach; Liberal; November 2009 - present

    Ceylon
    1. Sirimavo Bandaranaike; Freedom; February 1974 - April 1984
    2. Ranasinghe Premadasa; United National; April 1984 - May 1991
    3. Tissa Wijeyeratne; Freedom; May 1991 - September 1994
    4. Ranil Wickremesinghe; United National; September 1994 - May 1999
    5. Chandrika Kumaratunga; Freedom; May 1999 - February 2004
    6. Gamini Dissanayake; United National; February 2004 - present

    East Africa

    1. Milton Obote; Socialist; June 1974 - December 1978
    2. Hugh Cholmondeley; Democrat; December 1978 - November 1981
    3. Julius Nyere; Socialist; November 1981 - November 1989
    4. George Saitoti; New Africa; November 1989 - October 1993
    5. Benjamin Mkapa; Socialist; October 1993 - December 2004
    6. Thomas Cholmondeley; Democrat; December 2004 - September 2009
    7. John Magufuli; Socialist; September 2009 - present

    East Indies
    1. Lim Chong Eu; People's Alliance; December 1975 - October 1978
    2. Lee Kuan Yew; People's Action; October 1978 - September 1986
    3. J.B. Jeyaretnam; Worker's; September 1986 - August 2003
    4. Kho Tsu Koon; People's Action; August 2003 - September 2007
    5. Low Thia Khiang; Worker's; September 2007 - present

    Hong Kong
    1. Martin Lee; Democratic; July 1997 - October 2007
    2. Allen Lee; Liberal; October 2007 - present

    New Zealand

    1. Robert Muldoon; National; August 1974 - October 1984
    2. Jim Anderton; Labour; October 1984 - March 1999
    3. Don Brash; National; March 1999 - April 2005
    4. Sandra Lee-Vercoe; Labour; April 2005 - present

    Newfoundland
    1. John Crosbie; United; January 1973 - May 1989
    2. Brian Tobin; Liberal; May 1989 - July 2003
    3. Danny Williams; United; July 2003 - November 2010
    4. Kathy Dunderdale; United; November 2010 - present

    Pacific Islands
    1. Kamisese Mara; Alliance; June 1970 - July 1980
    2. Mahendra Chaudhry; Democratic; July 1980 - June 1995
    3. Kamisese Mara; Alliance; June 1995 - June 1999
    4. 'Akilisi Pōhiva; Democratic; June 1999 - March 2004
    5. Aho’eitu Tupou; Alliance; March 2004 - present

    Pakistan

    1. Yaqub Ali Khan; Liberal; July 1976 - October 1980
    2. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; Pakistani People's League; October 1980 - April 1985
    3. Muhammad Khan Junejo; Liberal; April 1985 - January 1993
    4. Manmohan Singh; Liberal; January 1993 - February 2003
    5. Benazir Bhutto; Pakistani People's League; February 2003 - present

    Papua New Guinea
    1. Michael Somare; Centre; September 1975 - August 1984
    2. Paias Wingti; Democratic; August 1984 - January 1985
    3. Julius Chan; Progress; January - December 1985
    4. Michael Somare; Centre; December 1985 - June 1986
    5. Julius Chan; Progress; June 1986 - October 1990
    6. Michael Somare; Centre; October 1990 - March 1994
    7. Julius Chan; Progress; March 1994 - June 1997
    8. John Giheno; Progress; June 1997 - March 1998
    9. Mekere Morauta; Democratic; March 1998 - November 2000
    10. Peter Yama; Labour; November 2000 - November 2008
    11. Peter O'Neill; People's; November 2008 - present

    Puerto Rico

    1. Ruben Berrios; New Progressive; November 1976 - September 1981
    2. Carlos Romero Barcelo; Conservative; September 1981 - December 1982
    3. Rafael Hernández Colón; Democratic; December 1982 - March 1988
    4. Ruben Berrios; New Progressive; March 1988 - February 1991
    5. Carlos Romero Barcelo; Conservative; February 1991 - March 1996
    6. Ralph O'Neil; Democratic; March 1996 - April 2001
    7. D. Orlando Smith; New Progressive; April 2001 - November 2007
    8. Pedro Rossello; Conservative; November 2007 - October 2010
    9. Juan Dalmau; New Progressive; October 2010 - present

    Rhodesia
    1. Abel Muzorewa; Liberal; June 1976 - May 1979
    2. Joshua Nkomo; Labour; May 1979 - August 1990
    3. Orton Chirwa; Labour; August 1990 - October 1997
    4. Michael Sata; United Federal; October 1997 - June 2007
    5. Guy Scott; United Federal; June 2007 - June 2010
    6. Hakainde Hichilema; Labour; June 2010 - present

    Sarawak

    1. Stephen Kalong Ningkan; Alliance; September 1963 - August 1976
    2. Stephen Yong Kuet Tze; United; August 1976 - June 1983
    3. Abdul Taib Mahmud; Alliance; June 1983 - July 1988
    4. George Chan Hong Nam; United; July 1988 - October 2010
    5. Sebastian Ting Chiew Yew; Alliance; October 2010 - present

    United Kingdom

    1. Margaret Thatcher; Liberal; June 1976 - May 1981
    2. William Rodgers; Labour; May 1981 - February 1991
    3. David Steel; Liberal; February 1991 - March 1996
    4. Margaret Beckett; Labour; March 1996 - June 2005
    5. Bertie Ahern; Liberal; June 2005 - present

    West Indies
    1. Michael Manley; Labour; June 1972 - April 1977
    2. Eugenia Charles; Conservative; April 1977 - June 1989
    3. Michael Manley; Labour; June 1989 - March 1992
    4. P.J. Patterson; Labour; March 1992 - May 1997
    5. McKeeva Bush; Conservative; May 1997 - March 2001
    6. Owen Arthur; Labour; March 2001 - November 2006
    7. Portia Simpson-Miller; Labour; November 2006 - present
     
    European Political Leaders (1976-2010)
  • As with my update on the Commonwealth prime ministers, this update follows on directly on this update (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...xon-social-model.458146/page-35#post-19234216) on western Europe and this update (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...xon-social-model.458146/page-35#post-19235827) on German successor states. The basic structure of the governments described there (parliamentary republics, constitutional monarchies and so forth) has continued mostly unchanged, although, as you can tell from some of these lists, there has been some rather dramatic changes to the politics and the political cultures of the various countries over the past 34 years. If you want any further details then feel free to ask.

    Kingdom of Austria

    Monarchs
    1. Otto; November 1912 - July 2011; December 1945 - July 2011
    2. Karl; January 1961 - present; July 2011 - present
    Chancellors
    1. Josef Taus; Christian Democratic; May 1975 - May 1978
    2. Bruno Kreisky; Social Democratic; May 1978 - November 1985
    3. Hannes Androsch; Social Democratic; November 1985 - October 1992
    4. Joze Pucnik; Constitutionalist; October 1992 - January 1997
    5. Alexander Van der Bellen; Social Democratic; January 1997 - October 2006
    6. Helmut Sohmen; People's Party; October 2006 - present

    Republic of Baden-Wurrtemberg

    Presidents
    1. Jurgen Brandt; Security Watch; January 1971 - April 1979*
    2. Werner Maihofer; Democratic Movement; April 1979 - December 1980
    3. Joschka Fischer; People's Congress; December 1980 - July 1985
    4. Klaus Kinkel; Public Safety Committee; July 1985 - January 1986*
    5. Erwin Teufel; National Resistance Movement; January 1986 - present
    *Military government

    Kingdom of Bavaria

    Monarchs
    1. Albrecht; May 1905 - July 1996; August 1955 - July 1996
    2. Franz; July 1933 - present; July 1996 - present
    Chancellors
    1. Franz Josef Stauss; Christian Social Union; October 1969 - March 1983
    2. Hans-Jochen Vogel; Social Democratic; March 1983 - May 1991
    3. Helmut Kohl; Christian Social Union; May 1991 - October 1998
    4. Renate Schmidt; Social Democratic; October 1998 - September 2006
    5. Ludwig Stiegler; Social Democratic; September 2005 - October 2008
    6. Horst Seehofer; Christian Social Union; October 2008 - present

    Benelux Union

    Supreme Head
    1. Pakubuwono XII; Surakarta; January 1975 - January 1980
    2. Muhammad Mushin; Maluku; January 1980 - January 1985
    3. Syarid Yusuf Alkadrie; Pontianak; January 1985 - January 1990
    4. Beatrix; the Netherlands; January 1990 - January 1995
    5. Albert II; Flanders and Wallonia; January 1995 - January 2000
    6. Henri; Luxembourg; January 2000 - January 2005
    7. Hamengkubuwono X; Yogyakarta; January 2005 - January 2010
    8. Pakubuwono XIII; Surakarta; January 2010 - present
    Prime Ministers
    1. Gaston Egmond Thorn; Liberals and Democrats; December 1976 - September 1979
    2. Suharto; People's Party; September 1979 - May 1981
    3. Wilfried Martens; Liberals and Democrats; May 1981 - July 1984
    4. Suharto; People's Party; July 1984 - November 1990
    5. Suryadi; People's Party; November 1990 - August 1993
    6. Harmoko; Liberals and Democrats; August 1993 - August 1995
    7. Hamzah Haz; Liberals and Democrats; August 1995 - July 2001
    8. Jean-Claude Junker; People's Party; July 2001 - October 2010
    9. Joko Widodo; Radical; October 2010 - present

    France

    Presidents of the Fifth Republic
    1. Oskar Lafontaine; Union for a Popular Movement; September 1993 - January 1996

    Presidents of the Sixth Republic
    1. Jean-Marie Le Pen; National Front; January 1996 - October 2008
    2. Marine Le Pen; National Front; October 2008 - January 2009

    Presidents of the Seventh Republic
    1. Jean-Luc Melenchon; Unbowed France; January 2009 - present

    United Kingdom of Hanover

    Monarchs
    1. Ernst August IV; March 1914 - December 1987; January 1953 - December 1987
    2. Ernst August V; February 1954 - present; December 1987 - present
    Chancellors
    1. Willy Brandt; Social Democratic; October 1960 - July 1976
    2. Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Christian National; July 1976 - November 1990
    3. Gerhard Schroder; Social Democratic; November 1990 - August 2003
    4. Ursula von der Leyen; Christian National; August 2003 - present

    Grand Duchy of Hesse

    Grand Dukes
    1. Philipp; November 1896 - October 1980; May 1968 - October 1980
    2. Mortiz; August 1926 - present; October 1980 - present
    Chancellors
    1. Monika zu Solms-Laubach; non-partisan; December 1972 - May 1992
    2. Wolfgang-Ernst von Ysenbeurg und Budingen; non-partisan; May 1992 - June 2008
    3. Prderick-Leopold von Stolberg-Stolberg; non-partisan; June 2008 - present

    Kingdom of Italy

    Monarchs
    1. Umberto II; September 1904 - March 1983; June 1946 - March 1983
    2. Victor Emmanuel IV; February 1937 - present; March 1983 - June 2006
    3. Emmanuel Philip; June 1972 - present; June 2006 - present
    Presidents of the Council of Ministers
    1. Enrico Berlinguer; Communist; October 1969 - October 1982
    2. Aldo Moro; Christian Democracy; October 1982 - May 1988*
    3. Ugo La Malfa; Liberal Democrat; May - July 1988
    4. Giulio Andreotti; Christian Democracy; July 1988 - November 1998
    5. Romano Prodi; Communist; November 1998 - October 2005
    6. Corrado Passera; Christian Democracy; October 2005 - present
    *Assassinated

    Republic of the Rhineland

    Presidents
    1. Rainer Barzel; Rhenish National Union; December 1963 - August 1984
    2. Bernhard Vogel; Rhenish National Union; August 1984 - December 2002
    3. Franz Muntefering; Party of National Unity; December 2002 - present

    Republic of Spain

    Presidents
    1. Jose Maldonado Gonzalez; Socialist Workers'; May 1975 - May 1982
    2. Gabriel Cisneros; Liberal Republican; May 1982 - May 1989
    3. Gregorio Peces-Barba; Socialist Workers'; May 1989 - May 2003
    4. Manuel Fraga; Liberal Republican; May 2003 - May 2010
    5. Javier Marias; Socialist Workers'; May 2010 - present
    Prime Ministers
    1. Mario Navarro Rubio; Liberal Republican; July 1972 - May 1977
    2. Felipe Gonzalez; Socialist Workers'; May 1977 - January 1983
    3. Adolfo Suarez; Conservative Republican; January - December 1983
    4. Manuel Fraga; Liberal Republican; December 1983 - December 1985
    5. Felipe Gonzalez; Socialist Workers'; December 1985 - January 1989
    6. Manuel Fraga; Liberal Republican; January 1989 - May 1990
    7. Felipe Gonzalez; Socialist Workers'; May 1990 - May 1997
    8. Jose Maria Aznar; Liberal Republican; May 1997 - November 1999
    9. Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba; Socialist Workers'; November 1999 - present
     
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    Popes (1846-2010)
  • Just because I mentioned it as a sidebar in another update, I thought I'd post the list of Popes I've had in my files since I started this TL. The basic idea is that John XXIII lives longer than OTL, meaning that Vatican II isn't curtailed by his successor as in OTL and instead lasts for a few more years and brings Liberation Theology into the heart of the Vatican through the influence of various Latin American theologians and (later on) Cardinals. After John's death, Paul VI (OTL John Paul I) lives longer and has more time to present the Vatican's humane face to the world, which is then built on by his successors. The corollary of this is that you don't have the hardcore anti-communism of OTL as exemplified by OTL John Paul II.

    As ever any comments/queries/abuse are welcome.

    Popes since 1846 (papal name; birth name; dates of papacy)
    1. Pius IX; Giovanni Ferretti; June 1846 - February 1878
    2. Leo XIII; Gioacchino Vincenzo; February 1878 - July 1903
    3. Pius X; Giuseppe Sarto; August 1903 - August 1914
    4. Benedict XV; Giacomo Chiesa; September 1914 - January 1922
    5. Pius XI; Achille Ratti; February 1922 - February 1939
    6. Pius XII; Eugenio Pacelli; March 1939 - October 1958
    7. John XXIII; Angelo Roncalli; October 1958 - June 1973
    8. Paul VI; Albino Luciani; June 1973 - September 1992
    9. Benedict XVI; Basil Hume; October 1992 - June 1999
    10. Innocent XIV; Gustavo Gutierrez; July 1999 - present
     
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    African and Asian Political Leaders (1976-2010)
  • What is the situation in southern India these days?

    Ask and ye shall receive...

    * * *
    Kingdom of Arabia

    Kings
    1. Hussein II; November 1935 - February 1999; July 1972 - February 1999
    2. Abdullah II; January 1962 - present; February 1999 - present
    Prime Ministers
    1. Salah al-Din al-Bitar; Renaissance Party; July 1968 - June 1977
    2. Michel Aflaq; Renaissance Party; June 1977 - June 1978
    3. Hafez al-Assad; Renaissance Party; June 1978 - February 1979
    4. Jamal al-Atassi; Workers' Party; February 1979 - May 1996
    5. Hafez al-Assad; Renaissance Party; May 1996 - June 1997
    6. Jamal al-Atassi; Workers' Party; June 1997 - January 2000
    7. Yasser Arafat; Workers' Party; January 2000 - August 2002
    8. Ahmad Jarba; Tomorrow Movement; August 2002 - present

    Republic of China

    Presidents
    1. Yen Chia-kan; Progress and Development; March 1973 - March 1981
    2. Zhao Ziyang; Democratic Socialist; March 1981 - March 1989
    3. Lee Yuan-tsu; Progress and Development; March 1989 - March 1997
    4. Wei Jingsheng; Democratic Socialist; March 1997 - March 2005
    5. Zhou Yongkang; Progress and Development; March 2005 - present
    Premiers
    1. Zhou Enlai; Democratic Socialist; March 1973 - January 1976*
    2. Deng Xiaoping; Democratic Socialist; January 1976 - September 1982
    3. Hu Yaobang; Democratic Socialist; September 1982 - April 1989*
    4. Deng Xiaoping; Democratic Socialist; April 1989 - March 1993
    5. Zhu Rongji; Progress and Development; March 1993 - March 2003
    6. Wen Jiabao; Democratic Socialist; March 2003 - March 2008
    7. Ma Ying-jeou; Progress and Development; March 2008 - present
    *Died in office

    Sultanate of Egypt

    Sultans
    1. Faud II; January 1952 - present; March 1965 - present
    Prime Ministers
    1. Fouad Serageddin; Wafd; November 1972 - November 1983
    2. Saad Eddin Ibrahim; Liberal Constitutional; November 1983 - August 1992
    3. Mustafa Kemal Murad; Wafd; August 1992 - May 1994
    4. Farag Foda; Liberal Constitutional; May 1994 - October 2002
    5. Numan Gumaa; Wafd; October 2002 - September 2007
    6. Ayman Nour; Liberal Constitutional; September 2007 - present

    Empire of Ethiopia

    Ethiopia finished the World War in a relatively exalted position: recognised as an important member of the Allies (whose troops had lead the line in the war in eastern Africa) and, along with Egypt, the most important African countries. After the war, the country prospered under the Lismore System as a series of economic plans grew domestic industries and opened the economy up to outside trade. A new constitution was promulgated in 1955 adopting a parliamentary system. In practice, however, the monarch retained a tight control over executive matters and the government was generally autocratic and illiberal. For a long time, resentment was held down by economic expansion but this became harder when an economic recession hit in 1971. Haile Selassie conceded free elections in 1973, resulting in the election of the socially democratic People’s Union under the leadership of Mikael Imru, a relative of the royal family. Following Haile Selassie’s death two years later, his successor, his grandson Zera Yacob, cooperated on the drafting of a constitution in 1976, which further curtailed the powers of the monarchy. While the Emperor remained head of state, the remainder of his political power was removed.

    Emperors (Solomonic Dynasty - Sewan Line)

    1. Menelik II; August 1844 - December 1913; March 1889 - December 1913
    2. Iyasu V; February 1895 - November 1935; December 1913 - September 1916
    3. Zewditu I; April 1876 - April 1930; September 1916 - April 1930
    4. Haile Selassie I; July 1892 - August 1975; April 1930 - August 1975
    5. Zera Yacob I; August 1953 - present; August 1975 - present
    Ministers of the Pen
    1. Abebe Aregai; independent; November 1955 - November 1957
    2. Kassa Hailu; independent; November 1957 - April 1961
    3. Aklilu Habte-Wold; independent; April 1961 - March 1973
    4. Mikael Imru; People’s Union; March 1973 - July 1976
    5. Endelkachew Makonnen; Homeland Union; July 1976 - September 1987
    6. Mikael Imru; People’s Union; September 1987 - April 1991
    7. Abdulahi Mohamed Sa'adi; Homeland Union; April 1991 - August 1995
    8. Kifle Wodajo; People’s Union; August 1995 - March 1997
    9. Abdiqasim Salad; People’s Union; March 1997 - March 1999
    10. Ermias Sahle Selassie; Homeland Union; March 1999 - January 2002
    11. Tewelde Ghebreselassie; Reform; January 2002 - April 2003
    12. Ermias Sahle Selassie; Homeland Union; April 2003 - April 2005
    13. Debretsion Gebremichael; People’s Union; April 2005 - March 2014
    14. Ermias Sahle Selassie; Homeland Union; March 2014 - November 2016
    15. Ably Ahmed; People’s Union; November 2016 - present

    Republic of India

    Prime Ministers of India
    1. Indira Gandhi; INC; March 1972 - July 1976
    2. Balasaheb Deoras; People's; July 1976 - November 1984
    3. Indira Gandhi; INC; November 1984 - November 1988
    4. L.K. Advani; People's; November 1988 - June 1992
    5. Rajiv Gandhi; INC; June 1992 - May 1996
    6. L.K. Advani; People's; May 1996 - May 1999
    7. Rajiv Gandhi; INC; May 1999 - February 2001
    8. H.V. Sheshadri; People's; February 2001 - November 2004
    9. Narendra Modi; People's; November 2004 - February 2009
    10. Uddhav Thackeray; People's; February 2009 - present

    Imperial State of Iran

    Shahs
    1. Mohammad Reza; October 1919 - July 1980; September 1941 - July 1980
    2. Reza II; October 1960 - present; July 1980 - present
    Prime Ministers
    1. Ali Shariati; Democratic; March 1966 - April 1976
    2. Ali Amini; Democratic; April 1976 - May 1979
    3. Jamshid Amouzegar; New Iran; May 1979 - November 1980
    4. Ebrahim Yazdi; Democratic; November 1980 - June 1984
    5. Dariush Homayoon; New Iran; June 1984 - April 1992
    6. Habibollah Peyman; Democratic Party; April 1992 - May 1996
    7. Shahriar Shafiq; New Iran; May 1996 - June 2001
    8. Mir-Hossein Mousavi; Democratic; June 2001 - May 2009
    9. Reza Moridi; Democratic; May 2009 - present

    Empire of Japan

    Prime Ministers
    1. Kasuga Ikko; Social Democratic Party; August 1974 - April 1976
    2. Takeo Fukuda; Constitutional Democratic Party; April 1976 - April 1980
    3. Tetsuzo Fuwa; Social Democratic Party; April 1980 - April 1992
    4. Shintaro Ishihara; Constitutional Democratic Party; April 1992 - April 2000
    5. Yoshihiko Noda; Social Democratic Party; April 2000 - April 2008
    6. Shinzo Abe; Constitutional Democratic Party; April 2008 - present

    Democratic Republic of Kerala

    A parliamentary republic with a symbolic president selected by the legislature every five years. Executive and legislative power is held by the prime minister. The Communist Party was dominant for the first six years until it lost the 1990 elections to the National Front, a coalition of parties largely made up of former INC members.

    Prime Ministers
    1. E.K. Nayanar; Communist; April 1984 - November 1990
    2. Vayalar Ravi; National Front; November 1990 - May 1996
    3. E.K. Nayanar; Communist; May 1996 - October 2003
    4. V.S. Achuthanandan; Communist; October 2003 - May 2004
    5. A.K. Antony; National Front; May 2004 - present
     
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    American and Soviet Political Leadership (1976-2010)
  • United States of America

    Presidents
    1. Nelson Rockefeller; Republican; January 1973 - January 1979
    2. John B. Anderson; Republican; January 1979 - January 1981
    3. Robert F. Kennedy; Progressive; January 1981 - January 1989
    4. Howard Baker; Republican; January 1989 - January 1993
    5. Hilary D. Rodham; Progressive; January 1993 - January 2001
    6. Condoleezza Rice; Republican; January 2001 - January 2005
    7. John Edwards; Republican; January 2005 - January 2009
    8. Colin Powell; Republican; January 2009 - present

    Vice Presidents
    1. John B. Anderson; Republican; January 1973 - January 1979
    2. E. Frederic Morrow; Republican; January 1979 - January 1981
    3. Martin Luther King, Jr.; Progressive; January 1981 - January 1989
    4. Benjamin Hooks; Republican; January 1989 - January 1993
    5. Ann Richards; Progressive; January 1993 - January 2001
    6. John S. McCain III; Republican; January 2001 - January 2005
    7. Howard Dean; Progressive; January 2005 - January 2009
    8. John S. McCain III; Republican; January 2009 - present

    Speakers
    1. Pete McCloskey; Republican; January 1973 - January 1981
    2. Tip O'Neill; Progressive; January 1981 - January 1989
    3. Robert H. Michel; Republican; January 1989 - January 1993
    4. Dick Gephardt; Progressive; January 1993 - January 2001
    5. Rick Lazio; Republican; January 2001 - January 2005
    6. Nancy Pelosi; Progressive; January 2005 - January 2009
    7. J.C. Watts; Republican; January 2009 - present

    Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    Premiers of the Politburo
    1. Leonid Brezhnev; June 1968 - November 1982
    2. Yuri Andropov; November 1982 - February 1984
    3. Eduard Shevardnadze; February 1984 - August 1991
    4. Gennady Yanayev; August 1991 - March 2009
    5. Vladimir Putin; March 2009 - present
    General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Speaker of the Supreme Soviet
    1. Valentina Tereshkova; July 1975 - July 1985
    2. Nikolai Ryzhkov; July 1985 - August 1991
    3. Vladimir Kryuchkov; August 1991 - July 1995
    4. Leonid Kravchuk; July 1995 - July 2000
    5. Nursultan Nazarbayev; July 2000 - July 2005
    6. Alexander Lukashenko; July 2005 - present
     
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    First Ahern Ministry (2005-2009)
  • Britain's Celtic Tiger: Ahern and the Liberals in Power, 2005-2009


    Despite serving as the first Irish prime minister since the Earl of Shelburne (1782-83), Bertie Ahern would find most of his first ministry overshadowed by the War in Yugoslavia. Not that that was necessarily a problem, of course, as he was able to surf a relatively benign domestic economic and political environment. This was not to say that there were not teething problems in the first six months, though. In July, only three months after Ahern took office, former Defence Secretary Charles Haughey gave evidence to the Hutton Inquiry on corruption, confirming that he had received over £200,000 in bribes from the business community during his time in office, 1976-81. As Ahern had once been a noted protege of Haughey’s this may have been expected to backfire on the prime minister but, in practice, this damaged Haughey’s reputation more than the government’s.

    On the strictly domestic front, Ahern’s ministry was quiet. The most notable programmes he passed was a widespread upgrade of the motorway and railway system. In 2006, the government also banned smoking in pubs and workplaces. On the economic front, Ahern appointed David Laws as his Chancellor. Although hardly a Thatcherite, Laws had been a consistent advocate of cutting taxes and spending. However, with the government’s miniscule majority, Laws kept himself largely on the path of moderation even as he used what limited room he had to pursue his agenda. The government maintained a significant surplus by forecasting tax takes which were lower than average. Simultaneously, Laws implemented a tax-cutting programme while there were also major increases in health, education and pension spending. Unemployment fell to 2.2%, inflation fell steadily to just over 2% by 2007 and real GDP averaged just over 4% per quarter. Capital Gains Tax was also cut steadily, standing in 2009 at just over half of what it had been when Ahern took office.

    The fact was that Ahern’s Liberal government governed boringly, in a way that often makes it hard to talk about. But, as Vernon Bogdanor said at the time, running a boringly efficient government in both foreign and domestic affairs is something that the Liberal party had arguably failed to do since the days of Dilke or Lloyd George’s first ministry. The only downside of this level of boring efficiency was that it suddenly became hard for Ahern to really defend his ministry on its merits. The rules of political gravity indicated that the Liberals would lose seats at the next election, which would surely mean a lost majority. One of the problems, from the Liberals’ point of view, was that British public opinion still seemed to hold that only Labour could campaign on a ‘steady as she goes’ message.

    In this context, Ahern might have counted himself thankful for his enemies. Having successfully enjoyed two terms in power under each of Bill Rodgers and Margaret Beckett, the Labour selectorate turned once again to a man who they believed to be a competent party manager, with Eamon Gilmore squeaking over the line ahead of James Purnell in the internal leadership election of October 2005. Gilmore was respected in the party due to his work on human rights and as undersecretary in the Foreign Office during Beckett’s premiership. But, on the other hand, he failed to communicate his personal charisma to the public, who seem to have taken against him early on in his leadership. One particular scandal was a newspaper story digging up comments he had made in his youth which seemed to express sympathy with the Cornish nationalist paramilitary the Cornish National Liberation Army. Although few could have seriously thought that Gilmore still held those views, the impression of him stuck with the public and was a permanent drag on his leadership and the subsequent electoral campaign when Ahern went to the country in the summer of 2009.

    As well as the problems afflicting Labour, the Conservatives had leadership troubles of their own. With Sumption being driven from office in January 2006 following revelation of his past support for eugenicist programmes, the Conservatives had turned to Oliver Letwin to lead them. Liberal-adjacent in his worldview, Letwin attracted praise from Ferdinand Mount (still the doyene of Conservatives) as “a one-man think tank” but, like Gilmore, he failed to communicate that to the public.

    2009.JPG


    In the end, the result wasn’t too bad for the Liberals. A loss of 19 seats meant that Ahern lost his majority but it still left them the largest party in the Commons and the first cab off the rank (so to speak) to form the next government. Following a meeting between the leaders of the three parties, Ahern announced that he would continue with the Liberals as a minority government. In its own way it was a quietly momentous event: the first Liberal prime minister to serve more than one consecutive term since David Lloyd George.
     
    Second Ahern Ministry (2009-2011)
  • The Boom and Bust of the Celtic Tiger: The Leveson Inquiry

    Mahon.jpg

    Ahern arrives to give testimony to the Leveson Inquiry, September 2010

    It would later emerge that Ahern had effectively signed his own political death warrant before the moment of his greatest political triumph (while it may seem odd to call and election where they lost their majority, any second consecutive term, even a minority, was regarded as a plus). Six months prior to the election in 2009, a minor scandal had been broken in the pages of the ‘Daily Telegraph’ regarding under the counter payments made to Charles Haughey by arms manufacturers during his time as Defence Secretary under Margaret Thatcher. In order to take the political sting out of the scandal, Ahern ordered a public inquiry into the matter, headed by Lord Justice Leveson and assisted by Justices Alan Mahon and David Neuberger.

    The rationale behind setting up the inquiry was two-fold. In the first place, Haughey was not only long out of active politics but also somebody who had served a suspended sentence in a prosecution following the Hutton Inquiry into corruption. Any political blowback that Ahern might face, then, was assumed to be priced in already. Secondly, the belief in Liberal circles was that various Labour politicians had had - must have had - their noses in the trough for much of their various lengthy times in office. (As the more unimaginative Liberal MPs and activists sometimes wondered, how else could one explain how Labour ideology had become so deeply embedded in the military, financial and business communities?) In theory, an inquiry into defence procurement was a good way to try and embarrass a few senior Labour politicians (David Owen, following his 1981-91 tenure at the Defence Ministry was often spoken of as a particular target) and damage the party in the public eye.

    But things did not go as smoothly as planned. In the first place, an inquiry into the defence industry caused immediate concern from other Commonwealth member states. One month after the election, General Pervez Musharraf held a number of meetings with Ahern also attended by other figures whose names have been redacted from the record. Although Number 10’s official record of the meetings say that they concerned routine briefings on the Commonwealth military, in the light of subsequent revelations few don’t suspect that they concerned at least some aspect of the Leveson Inquiry. Shortly after these meetings, the scope of the Inquiry was hurriedly redrawn to restrict its scope solely to domestic British matters. Musharraf, meanwhile, quietly and comfortably retired in September 2010.

    Somewhat accidentally, Ahern had thus turned an attempt to embarrass David Owen into an investigation of government corruption. Even at this stage, however, things might have petered out without harm to him had it not been for an incident involving David Laws. Two weeks after the meetings with Musharraf, the ‘Telegraph’ published another story, this time detailing £40,000 of misclaimed expenses by the Chancellor. During this time, Laws had been claiming expenses for the upkeep of a home in London (which he subsequently rented out), all the while he and his husband rented a flat in a separate property. Ahern unceremoniously sacked Laws, reportedly telling him to “take some time out to rediscover what it is like to be a human being.”

    Thus spurned by his party, Laws immediately began to cooperate with the Leveson Inquiry when they contacted him about becoming a witness. In April 2010, Laws delivered explosive testimony alleging that Ahern had received secret payments from unnamed businessmen while he was Defence Secretary between 1993 and 1996. Ahern defended himself on television saying that the payments were a loan (although he admitted that he had so far not made any repayments) but this was contradicted by subsequent testimony of his former assistant, who refuted Ahern’s assertion that the loan had come from old friends. Under public pressure, Ahern repaid the payments (with interest) in June.

    Over the summer however, fresh allegations emerged against Ahern, this time in reference to alleged payments made to Ahern by a property developer in his former Dublin constituency. Ahern eventually consented to appear before the Leveson Inquiry in September, where he delivered four days of testimony. Although this generated a storm of controversy from his opponents in Labour and the press, the Liberal party by and large rallied around Ahern and he managed to stay in office. On 21 September, Ahern delivered a statement in front of Number 10 declaring that the Leveson Inquiry was largely concluded and saying that he looked forward to reading the final report.

    Such confidence would prove short-lived. On 2 October, Ahern’s former partner Celia Larkin gave testimony to Leveson in which she claimed that money donated to Ahern’s constituency party had later been used to buy a private property for the pair. Ahern was forced to return to Leveson ten days later, during which he admitted that he had not been entirely truthful in his previous testimony to the Inquiry and gave a dissembling performance during which he mostly denied knowledge of many of the important facts in question. Following this second testimony Ahern forcefully asserted in Parliament that he had answered all questions that would be asked, only to be contradicted in February 2011, when Leveson issued a further request for testimony, this time in relation to tax paid on the 1990s payments.

    Following a third testimony in March, opinion polling found that over 80% of the British public believed that Ahern was personally corrupt. His position finally became untenable and on 1 April he announced that he would resign as Prime Minister and leader of the Liberals once the party had had the chance to elect a successor.
     
    Clegg Ministry (2011-2014)
  • Nick and Olly: The Premiership of Nick Clegg
    Nick and Dave.jpg

    Nick Clegg talking to 'Daily Mail' political editor Dave Cameron for a profile, November 2011


    With most of the Liberal parliamentary party somewhat shell-shocked by the revelations surrounding Leveson, there was far from a crowded field to take the leadership. (Not least, many suspected, because whoever did would also have their heads shot off by the Inquiry.) In the end, Nick Clegg put his hand up. Relatively well known in the public for his work as Education Secretary (2005-08), Environment Secretary (2008-09) and Foreign Secretary (2009-11) and liked amongst his parliamentary colleagues, in many ways he seemed the natural choice. Paul Marshall, from the party’s right, attempted to launch a leadership campaign in response but failed to gain enough nominations from MPs to have his candidature put to the membership. Clegg was thus crowned as leader (and prime minister) without a vote.

    In response, Labour, under its new leader Yvette Cooper, immediately tabled a vote of no confidence and the Liberals entered into hurried negotiations with the Conservatives. Although he attracted criticism from his own backbenches for this decision, Letwin agreed to support the government on a confidence and supply basis going forwards. At a special conference of his MPs, Letwin was able to face down his internal opponents and Clegg’s government survived the vote, albeit with a few Conservative rebels.

    Clegg got a lot of credit, particularly amongst more liberal newspapers such as the ‘Daily Mail’ and the ‘Herald,’ for holding his nerve and dragging the Liberals through the crisis. For his troubles, his discussions with the Conservatives had produced a substantial policy agenda. Although the Conservatives did not formally join the government, everybody understood the nature of the quid pro quo that Clegg and Letwin had agreed between themselves. Most notably, the Liberals all of a sudden found themselves adopting (or at least partially adopting) a number of policies regarding electoral and campaign finance reform that had been Conservative hobby-horses for many years.

    Following the Queen’s Speech in September 2011, the centrepiece of the government’s agenda was the Campaign Finance Bill. In the first place, the bill set up a ‘Register of Lobbyists’ and put in place a raft of measures to put chinese walls between lobbying and MPs. Beefed up regulations were instituted around the Register of Members’ Interests and regulations put in place preventing officials and ministers from meeting with MPs on issues on which the MP in question is paid to lobby. To compensate, MPs were given an above-inflation pay rise. Backbench MPs would now earn £800,000, shadow ministers £1,000,000, ministers £1,400,000 and the Prime Minister £1,800,000 (in all cases plus expenses). In addition, the voting age was lowered to 16. Finally, a limit of £10,000 was placed on individual annual political donations. Initially drafted so as to include cooperatives, companies and the trades unions, this proposal was watered down in committee by Labour MPs who simply would not play ball on this. On the tax front, the government raised the minimum allowance before taxation to £20,000.

    Perhaps the most dramatic proposal, however, regarded voting reform. In 2011, the government set up the Gove Commission on Electoral Reform, chaired by the Conservative Michael Gove and made up of representatives from the three national parties and the four nationalist parties. The report was eventually published in January 2013, suggesting a change to the UK’s electoral system to STV. Following a review of the Gove Report in committee, it was agreed that the proposed change to the electoral system would be put to a public referendum in the summer, ahead of an election some time in either the winter of 2013/14 or the spring of 2014.

    The referendum itself was a quietly revolutionary moment in British politics. Referendums had been held in various other Commonwealth countries for a number of reasons - the most politically contentious and famous being the 1975 referendum in Pakistan over the legalisation of civil partnerships - and, during the run of admissions to the Commonwealth in the ‘60s and ‘70s, a referendum in the soon-to-be former-colony became the accepted capstone on that nation’s accession to full membership of the Commonwealth. But there had never been one in the UK itself before, even though they had been proposed many times on any number of topics, from civil partnerships, the single currency and even the expansion of the internet. While constitutional lawyers and judges grumbled about it, most people seem to have been relaxed about the vote’s implications for the future.

    From April 2013, Labour shadow ministers, MPs and donors began to come out against the change of electoral systems, providing a united front in contrast to the divided opinions in the Liberals and Conservatives. Labour’s campaign for a ‘No’ vote sought to play on the unpopularity of the Liberals, who, despite a Clegg bounce following his appointment, had lagged firmly behind in the polls since then, with there being particular controversy surrounding the wage rises for MPs. The Labour First Minister of Greater London Ed Miliband described the referendum as an opportunity to punish the Liberals at the polls.

    Controversy was aroused, in June, when the No campaign claimed that implementing STV would cost over £200,000,000, a figure which included the cost of holding the referendum in the first place as well as speculative calculations of the cost of voting machines. This injected a degree of rancor into the referendum that would have shocked outside observers who had assumed, at the outset, that this would be a rather sedate affair. In a particularly bizarre incident, Home Secretary Chris Huhne went so far as to threaten legal action against the Shadow Chancellor (and prominent ‘No’ campaigner) Ed Balls for spreading what he called “lies” about the costs of changing the voting system. Elsewhere, much of the public debate centred around questions of the desirability of coalition governments (the British government was divided on this, despite the reasonable performance of the Steel-Mount coalition in the 1990s) and how many safe seats would be removed under the potential new system.

    2013 (STV referendum).JPG


    However, the debate failed to electrify the public discourse and was conducted in a fractious atmosphere that was devoid of much serious debate. It was a disappointing moment for Britain’s political reformers, setting back the cause of electoral reform by at least another decade. The referendum also did much to poison the atmosphere between Labour and the other parties in the Parliament, with Labour’s underhand and vicious electioneering causing a great deal of frustration and private anger amongst Liberal and Conservative MPs. There was some loose talk amongst the leadership of the Liberals and the Conservatives that they might try and push electoral reform through Parliament regardless of the referendum but, in reality, the votes just weren’t there to make it work: both parties had notable numbers of MPs who were opposed to reform and both had even more who thought it was mad to so openly reject the verdict of a referendum; and that was without facing up to the problem of trying to pilot it through the Lords, with its in-built Labour majority.

    The Liberal minority government continued in place for just under another year, managing the government reasonably well without really accomplishing much. They failed to recover their position in the polls, however, and, despite a reasonably thorough record of domestic reform, few Liberals had any great confidence when Clegg dissolved Parliament and went to the country in July 2014.
     
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    The General Election of 2014
  • The Laws of the Game: Liberal Failures in 2014
    2014.JPG



    2014 was bruising for the Liberals but hardly unanticipated. A well-run Labour campaign hammered at the standard Liberal failings - their tax cuts for the rich, lack of competence in administration, awarding themselves a large pay rise (although Labour notably didn’t promise to reverse these) etc. - but were able to add to this concerns about the divisions in the party over the STV referendum. The Liberal campaign in response was weirdly apathetic, with Clegg cutting a stoical but strangely apathetic figure on the campaign trail. Strangely enough for someone who had achieved the highest political office in the land (albeit in unusual circumstances), Clegg revealled himself to be a man of remarkably poor political instincts, simply expecting people to appreciate him for making what he believed to be the tough but fair long-term political choices without him actually really making the case for them.

    Many Liberal true-believers - especially in light of what would happen to the party in subsequent years - would argue that this was a missed opportunity: Labour’s campaign was slick and well managed, as always, but never quite caught the public imagination as previous ones had. If only, some said, Clegg had pulled his finger out then he could have continued, maybe this time in a more formal coalition with the Conservatives. From there on in, many of these arguments devolved into the kind of fantasies of uniting the Whigs and the Tories into a grand anti-Labour alliance that had been common currency across much of the British political discourse for some time (including on the centre-left - some of Mount’s Conservatives being notably more left wing on many points than some technocratic Labour MPs).

    In truth, the poorness of the Labour campaign can be overstated. After Gimore’s resignation in 2009, Yvette Cooper had been elected leader, another technocratic manager in the mould of Rodgers and Beckett. She was not the most intelligent, but she was sharp enough. She was not the most charismatic, but she could get her ideas across and hold a room. Many ascribed this continued preference for the managerial and competent (the more unkind might say ‘dull’) to a kind of hereditary mistrust of Ramsay MacDonald’s cult of personality in the 1920s. The analytical reality of this assertion can certainly be questioned by historians - Hugh Gaitskell and Barbara Castle were nothing if not, in their own ways, tub-thumping socialist rabble-rousers of the old school, a fact now conveniently forgotten - but there certainly was something distinct about the internal culture of the Labour Party (and, by extension, the political culture of the country it so-often governed) which meant that it resisted the general television age (and, increasingly, internet age) impulse towards charismatic ‘vibes’ candidates over the dull technocrat.

    Something else which lessened the chance of a continued anti-Labour alliance was the way that Liberal and Conservative relations had been poisoned by the surprisingly bitter referendum campaign in 2013. Although the Conservatives had dutifully voted through the government’s confidence and supply motions, few bothered the deny the extent of the distance between the parties by the time Clegg called the election. Letwin, in particular, was furious that Clegg had reneged on what Letwin, at-least, thought had been a promise that the Liberals and Conservatives would campaign together in favour of electoral reform. According to more than one source he had to be talked out of bringing the government down over the Autumn Statement of 2013. (The truth is a little more complicated than this partisan story: Clegg was privately in favour of electoral reform but could not take a firm position in order to overcome potential splits and preserve unity amongst his own MPs.)

    Whatever the subsequent ‘what ifs,’ the result was boringly predictable. As the campaign closed, Labour weaponised the Leveson Report to remind everybody of Ahern’s resignation and paint the Liberals as the party of sleaze and graft. A gain of 65 seats gave Cooper a workable(ish) majority of 15. It was hardly the stuff dreams are made of but it was the kind of lead Labour had worked with before. The Conservative vote held up reasonably well too, with a few people disappointed that Letwin didn’t join the government formally causing the party to lose five seats at the margins. Nevertheless, this left them, with 57 seats, ahead of where they had been even under the legendary leadership of Ferdinand Mount.

    For the Liberals, a loss of 58 seats was quietly devastating. Although they remained above the psychologically significant number of 299 (just), there was no doubt that the verdict from the British people on the Clegg ministry had been one of repudiation. They were back near the levels they had been in 1981, in the aftermath of the Thatcher disaster, or in the 1950s, when they had flailed around in response to Labour’s sudden hegemony. What was all the more depressing about this repudiation is that it did not come after a period of economic disaster. Thatcher’s government had bungled the response to the ongoing Sterling crisis. Steel’s coalition had been unfortunate to have to deal with a recession towards the end of their term. In slightly different ways, their subsequent defeats were understandable.

    In the case of 2014, what really was there to cause such repudiation? Sure, there was the simmering scandal around Ahern’s corruption. But that was, comparatively, ages ago and by 2014 Ahern was gone and so were his closest cronies. The truth was, things didn’t seem fair anymore. Labour had suffered scandals before: one of their officials in the 1960s had even turned out to be a spy! But none of it seemed to stick. On top of this, Labour always seemed to manage to style out the economic downturns they faced whereas they always killed a Liberal government. Most sighed and put their shoulders to the wheel once more, promising themselves that next time they would be better and things would be different. But others did not.
     
    Liberal splits (2014-2016)
  • Death of a Party: The Noisy End of Liberal England


    By the second decade of the 21st century, it had become a kind of common knowledge (unspoken but nevertheless basically understood) that the best argument for remaining in the Liberals was the presence of first past the post (albeit in its modified form). As we have seen, the installation of list MPs had not broken the stranglehold of the big three parties over politics on the Westminster level, even if it had shaken up the politics of the devolved assemblies to a certain extent. The example of the Liberal Democrats would always come up, bidden or unbidden, whenever Liberal MPs or activists entertained too many loose words or thoughts about defection. Although that particular gang of four had been popular amongst activists and a certain kind of intellectual, when they had defected from the Liberals in 1983 over the abandonment of Thatcherite policies they had failed to gain a significant popular following and had been annihilated in the 1986 election: who nowadays has heard of Nigel Lawson or Norman Tebbit?

    But in the post-Clegg world things began to look very different. If first past the post was no guarantee of protecting even a moderately competent Liberal government (albeit one tainted by an historic corruption scandal) then was there any point in sticking with the party at all? As many now saw it, they were dead outside the Liberals but dead inside them too. That being the case, did it matter in whose company you were dead with? Finally, it seemed that people were thinking about this question and coming to the conclusion that, no, it did not matter.

    In a chronological sense, the immediate catalyst was the fallout of the Liberal leadership election of 2015. Clegg remained as leader after the 2014 election, with the initial assumption being that he intended to lead his party into the next election. Unfortunately, for him, the party had other ideas and he was dogged by persistent leadership rumours until he announced in July 2015 that he would be resigning following a completed leadership election in September.

    As was expected by insiders, Leo Varadkar immediately stood for the role. Varadkar had been a chameleon-like politician, closely associated with Ahern until that became a liability and subsequently one of Clegg’s closest allies in the Cabinet. Having only entered Parliament in 2005, Varadkar had served as Minister of Transport (2008-11), Health (2011-13) and Social Security (2013-14) before then serving as Shadow Chancellor in Clegg’s shadow cabinet after the 2014 election. Nimble-footed in his alliances and personable in his human relations, as the journalist Stephen Bush commented at the time, he was exactly the kind of politician that the Labour selectorate would have gravitated towards had he been in a different party. He was instantly seen as the frontrunner, with the only real doubt being about his age.

    But Varadkar was never going to be allowed to stand unopposed. Apart from anything else, that wasn’t the Liberal way and many were uncomfortable about the circumstances of Clegg’s coronation in 2011. The party’s remaining Gladstonians had lost the various internal battles since the end of Thatcher’s government but a few still remained, a caucus of a couple of dozen MPs who became more or less restive at moments of heightened division but who mostly accepted their role as being on the economic hard right of British politics and voted their conscience only when it didn’t really harm the party for them to do so. One of Steel’s, Ahern’s and Clegg’s strengths had been their ability to tell the Gladstonians, politely and effectively, to shut up at key moments. However, one of the important times that they would not listen to such orders was internal leadership elections and they usually managed to put up their own candidate. On this occasion, Kwasi Kwarteng emerged as the preferred figure, a similarly young and telegenic candidate who could compete on equal terms with Varadkar.

    However, while Kwarteng was generally thought to be popular (for a Gladstonian, at least) amongst his fellow MPs, he was a divisive figure and his strident defence of free market economics particularly repelled the caucus of MPs on the left of the party commonly referred to, at least by themselves, as progressives. Since their arrival in Parliament in force in 2009, Kwarteng and a coterie of Liberal MPs around him, such as Dominic Raab and Priti Patel, had become bogeymen for the progressives. Usually the progressives would have put up a candidate to make the contest a three-way race but on this occasion all the potential candidates stood aside in a bid to make prevent them splitting the non-Gladstonian vote.

    2015 Liberal Leadership.JPG


    In the rather complicated Liberal electoral college - in which the votes of members counted for 25% of the vote, the votes of elected AMs for 10% and the votes of Westminster MPs for the remaining 65% - Varadkar eventually triumphed with a comfortable-looking near-60% of the College. But this concealed a vastly different story under the bonnet, so to speak. Most notably of all, he had only managed to secure 35% of the voting members. In the various televised hustings during the campaign, Kwarteng had proven an articulate and convincing performer, convincing the membership that the compromise Varadkar seemed to be preaching could be tossed aside. Varadkar failed to convincingly articulate the virtues of the moderation he preached beyond simple cynicism. The fact that Kwarteng ended up with 90 MPs supporting him (a number well greater than the Gladstonian caucus in Parliament) was taken as a severely negative note on Varadkar’s campaign.

    Such was Kwarteng’s popularity among Liberal activists that, the day after the election, a crowd of members gathered outside the Reform Club and, bizarrely, seemed to be attempting to enforce a picket line outside the building, preventing MPs from entering unless they proclaimed their loyalty to Kwarteng. In the end, they were only dispersed when Varadkar and Kwarteng appeared together on the steps of the Reform, with Kwarteng pledging his loyalty to the leader and Varadkar, in turn, granting Kwarteng the key post of Shadow Chancellor.

    The journalist Marina Hyde, watching the farce unfold on Pall Mall, commented that she could hear the laughter emanating from Grosvenor House from where she was standing.

    Despite his professions of loyalty, working with Varadkar could not be further from Kwarteng’s mind. Almost immediately he began to pick public fights over the ideological make-up of the shadow cabinet, demanding posts for his cronies. Behind the scenes, the Leader of the Opposition’s office and the Shadow Chancellor’s office were never on speaking terms, although some attempt to patch things up was made through intermediaries in the parliamentary party. With Raab installed as Shadow Supply Minister and Patel as Shadow Foreign Secretary, the three senior Gladstonians would depart into their own little huddle after Shadow Cabinet meetings.

    What was hidden, mostly, from public view was the war for donors which was being waged between the three major factions. It later emerged that Raab was spending most of his time contacting donors and party workers to bring them onside with what was revealed, in December 2015, to be the foundation of a new party. Calling themselves the Libertarian Party, the party debuted with 20 MPs and rapidly grew over the course of December and January into a caucus of 62, making them larger than the Conservatives. To nobody’s surprise, Kwarteng was chosen as their leader. It was a high number, much higher than the number of MPs who had traditionally been counted as Gladstonians and reflected both Kwarteng’s success in wooing those who had voted for him in the leadership campaign and the continued disintegration of the ‘Liberal’ label as a locus of loyalty.

    As in Newtonian mechanics so too in politics, this development necessitated an equal and opposite reaction from the progressives. Two days after the first Libertarians defected, a coterie of progressive MPs held a meeting with the remaining members of the shadow cabinet, demanding a strategy from Varadkar in response. However, the talks were a complete failure, with the senior progressive leader Sarah Teather delivering a thunderous press conference on the steps of the Reform Club, in which she denounced Varadkar’s strategy as simply pandering to Libertarian sensibilities and threatening Britain’s cherished welfare state (this was always a contentious issue as it is doubtful how genuinely destructive Libertarians’ aims were towards the welfare state - it seems unlikely that their views would have been as popular amongst the Liberal grassroots had people believed that that was the case). After spending the Christmas and New Year in furious discussion, the 46 MP-strong caucus of progressives voted unanimously to secede from the Liberals in January 2016, taking, rather unimaginatively, the name Progressives.

    On one level, British politics had been fundamentally reconfigured and it looked like it would never be the same again. But, on another, Labour continued governing with a workable majority.
     
    End of the French Union (2008-2014)
  • The Final Idea of France: The Seventh Republic and the African Spring
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    Protesters in Brazzaville, October 2014


    For those who cared about such things, the two and a half decades since the Credit Crunch in 1991 had been tough for notions of French national greatness. In the first place, the neoliberal Fourth Republic had collapsed in cowardice as their leaders fled the country. Then, the Fifth Republic had failed to establish itself in the most catastrophic manner, alienating even many of its supporters before falling prey to a coup. The Sixth Republic, on its part, had been probably the greatest humiliation of all: a regime built on the nationalist lionisation of traditional French martial and cultural values but which nevertheless could only maintain itself in power through an invasion of Rhinelander and African soldiers and vast internal repression. Its collapse had been particularly humiliating, with the Commonwealth pulling the rug from under a regime that displeased it and making a nice profit in the process.

    The new constitution fundamentally restructured the relationship of people to the economy, effectively nationalising the economy and ending the distinction between public and private property. Many at the time said that this was ‘communism’ but, in truth it went far deeper than the heavily-regulated state-dominated socialism of the Soviet economy since the 1920s. Despite initially taking a loan from the SWF, the French government quickly changed tack and adopted a highly protectionist position, levying high taxes against foreign imports and urging self-sufficiency on its population. Where trade was necessary, the government used the sale of food and drink to create a trade balance over the long term. In the short term, the government stabilised itself through the sale of excess military and internal security supplies: in 2010 Melenchon announced cuts which effectively scrapped France’s independent navy and air force, selling the parts off either whole or as scrap to a variety of countries including Greece, Italy, Arabia and India. A combination of these sales and the SWF loan was enough to provide economic stability during the Seventh Republic’s rocky early years. At the same time, France formally resigned from its permanent seat in the Security Council, although it remained a member of the UN.

    As can be imagined, this caused no end of concerns amongst the French business community. An attempted coup lead by a combination of military and business interests and disgruntled members of La France Insoumise was disrupted in July 2014. After that, what remaining opposition there was tended to emigrate, with thousands leaving. Immediately upon declaring the dissolution of the French Union in August 2008, Lafontaine had also unilaterally declared that the Maghreb would no longer be an integral Department of France. Lafontaine ordered the former Department to join with Saharan Africa but, in practice, his writ ran for little at this point. The Maghreb thus continued its existence in a state of weird limbo until the fallout from the failed coup of 2014, at which point it became the destination for the majority of French exiles. Over the next few years, the Maghreb’s economy would be revitalised, with Oran rapidly staking a claim as a major financial centre as well as a major entrepot for Mediterranean trade.

    The territory would eventually complete its transition to a full nation state in 2017, when it was admitted as a full member of the UN (France by this time was too isolationist in its posture to raise an objection even if it had wanted to) under the name of the Republic of Wahran. Its constitution set it up as a constitutional parliamentary democracy with a figurehead president. This relatively liberal arrangement was the result of a number of converging trends in Wahrani politics and culture. In the first place, since the fall of the Fifth Republic Oran and its environs had become something of a haven for dissidents, semi-tolerated by the Sixth Republic because of the shield of the Mediterranean. Secondly, those who fled the communism of the Seventh Republic were not so much the white nationalists of the National Front - they were either dead or had retreated into sullen and monitored silence - but the powerful neoliberal business community who had always been somewhat ambivalent about the Le Pen regime. In that context, they were willing to make a number of liberal concessions regarding instituting democracy and even a welfare state which rivalled that of Spain, Catalonia and Italy. In return, these business elites got a lightly-regulated corporate environment for them to bustle in. The Social Democratic party won the first democratic elections in 2017 and Arnaud Montebourg became the first Prime Minister.

    The fraught politics that had given birth to Wahran were also played out over the rest of the former French Union. Since the creation of that institution in 1958, various French governments in coalition with a Francophilic elite in the former African colonies had managed the entity’s different territories. In practice, this involved an alliance between white French businessmen and local African elites. The other corollary to this was the creation of large federal states out of the former colonies that would, in theory, balance competing clan interests with an overarching federal structure that would work well with the interests of French business. As a result, local strongmen would be installed, or install themselves, at the heads of these governments albeit never in quite as ‘strong’ a position as they might have seemed to outsiders. Below them was an ever shifting confederation of clan interests that was, just about, kept in check by a mixture of canny diplomacy and, ultimately, the threat of military force from the other members of the FU.

    With that no longer in place, many expected that there would be an immediate fracturing of the eight other members of the FU but this did not occur. Helped by a generally buoyant global economy in 2008-10, as well as crackdowns on dissent across all of the countries, they all managed to ride out the initial shocks of the collapse of the Sixth Republic and dissolution of the FU. Nevertheless, the economies of these eight countries - Morocco, Tunisia, Saharan Africa, West Africa, Equatorial Africa, Djibouti, Madagascar and Cochincina - had all been geared around exports (and, what’s more, exports to France, a country that was now pursuing an explicitly protectionist and self-sufficient policy) and so they all faced persistent balance of payment problems that caused recurrent headaches.

    Over the course of 2014, bad harvests combined with general economic malaise to start a series of food riots in Tunisia in August 2014 that resulted in the overthrow of the Husainid dynasty (which had been in power since 1705) the following month. But things did not end there: the government of Ali Bongo in Equatorial Africa and of Faure Gnassingbe in West Africa both fell in October 2014 and they were joined by the government of Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya in Saharan Africa in November. A year later, in October 2015, Ismail Omar Guelleh’s regime in Djibouti would fall and the royal government of the Alaouite Dynasty in Morocco only managed to survive by promulgating a liberal(ish) constitution in December 2014.

    Hopes for lasting democracy in the region were not to be fulfilled, however, and civil wars almost immediately began in those countries as different clan groups competed for primacy. A new conflict had begun, which would variously known as the African Seven Years War, the Francafrique War or, probably more realistically, the African Wars for Independence.
     
    First Cooper Ministry (2014-2018)
  • Servants of the People: The Remaking of the British Working Class?
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    Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Bank of England Deputy Chairman Philip Hammond put on a brave face for the cameras after an allegedly furious row over fiscal policy, January 2018


    Despite an increasingly chaotic international situation, notably the ongoing African Wars of Independence but also the continuing carnage of the Second Yugoslav War, Cooper was fortunate to preside over a relatively pacific domestic scene. Perhaps the most significant aspect of her premiership came in 2015, when it was announced that the UK had, five years ahead of the schedule in the Shanghai Protocol, achieved a fully carbon neutral economy. The UK was not the first Commonwealth country to do so - for reasons of self-preservation, the Bahamas, the West Indies and the Pacific Islands had taken the lead on the issue within the Commonwealth - and the three words ‘full carbon neutrality’ should be taken with a pinch of salt - the government’s carbon capture scheme and repurposing of abandoned coal mines as ‘carbon dioxide storage facilities’ was especially controversial - but it was nevertheless taken as an important step for one of the permanent members of the Security Council to have meet their obligations this quickly.

    On the domestic front, the main reforms of the period were driven by the Commonwealth Assembly. The most pressing problem that was emerging was one of over-productivity: simply put, Commonwealth economies were becoming too efficient at producing goods with the concern that they would soon be producing consistently too much stuff for the world, let alone the Commonwealth, to consume. The initial drive under the Ken Clarke speakership had been to decrease working hours, theorising that this would hold down the amount to goods that could be produced and, at the same time, increase demand for leisure goods and services to be utilised during this increased time off work. This had been a stopgap but macroeconomists in the Bank of England remained concerned about the direction of the economy. The political journals of the chattering classes in London, Ottawa and Karachi were filled with articles speculating about the future crisis of over-productivity. In 2016, the New Zealand futurist Alan Marshall published a celebrated book arguing that the Commonwealth was approaching the limits of what was possible with a terrestrial market economy and that its citizens would have to develop new modes of relating to each other.

    The response of political elites, however, was altogether less theoretical. Following a prime ministers’ conference in late 2014, the Commonwealth Assembly passed the Updated Commonwealth Working Time Directive 2015, which reduced the length of the maximum working week to 25 hours, with the promise of a review in 2029-30 to decide whether there might be further reductions to the working week, with a limit of 15 hours being mooted. At the same time, the Bank of England announced a tightening of interest rates, cutting Commonwealth growth rates over the course of 2016 and 2017. Pakistan tipped into negative growth in the last quarter of 2017, prompting a furious Nawaz Sharif to demand a change of course. This lead to a loosening of fiscal policy, even as the general course remained unchanged.

    Outside of economics, perhaps the largest challenge that faced the Commonwealth was the response to Hurricane Maria, which devastated Puerto Rico and the West Indies in September 2017. Cooper was closely involved in the Commonwealth relief effort, which was praised for its speed and effectiveness.

    Other British domestic changes in this period included minor constitutional tinkering. Most notable was a reform to the rules surrounding the appointment of the Speaker, requiring that the MP elected to the role would cease to be an active MP. If he or she was a constituency MP then there would be an immediate by-election and if they were a list MP then the person next on the relevant party’s list would become an MP. This ensured that, not only did it mean that no longer would one party would effectively lose an MP (not to mention constituents potentially lose their representation) but also that the Speaker could continue in their role even more insulated from party pressures. Elsewhere, there was a significant advance in space, with the Maui VII blasting off in January 2018, containing the first manned mission to one of the moons of Saturn.

    In February 2016, the SWF facility at Bletchley Park was finally closed, with the apparatus and inhabitants moving to a newer facility in Cork, pursuant to an announcement made in 2011. Originally the site of the British codebreaking team during the World War, Bletchley Park had been purchased by the SWF in October 1948 and turned into the world’s foremost industrial research centre. As well as serving as the cradle for much of the British computing industry (Keynes allegedly ordered the purchase of the site after a discussion with Tommy Flowers about his Colossus computer) that had exploded into life in the 1950s and ‘60s, research done at Bletchley is credited with making major advances on transistors, lasers, mobile phone technology and digital signal processing. Its closing (albeit that the research continued, just elsewhere) was the end of an important chapter in British industrial history and the event was commemorated with a wide range of events, including documentaries detailing life at the facility and its associated breakthroughs.

    Throughout this time, Labour had largely stood aside - periodic jokes at PMQs aside - as the Liberal Party imploded on the other side of the aisle. As such, many pined for Labour to take a tougher, more radical stance and there began to be mutterings on the backbenches about Cooper’s apparent timidity. Nevertheless, she continued to chart her moderate, calm course until 2018, when a series of propitious local county elections in England and Ireland encouraged her to dissolve Parliament and go to the country in the summer.
     
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    The Maui Missions
  • Surface Details: The Maui Missions, 2001 - 2020s
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    Photograph of the surface of Callisto taken by the crew of the Maui VII, April 2019

    The work of the Commonwealth Space Agency (“CSA”) had moved in fits and starts since the Megaroc Shock of 1953, with fallow periods being interspersed by bursts of frenetic development usually brought on by the intensification of superpower soft power conflict. By the turn of the 21st century, however, the CSA had no serious competition in space: the Soviets were progressively scaling back their funding commitments and the Americans, for the time, seemed happy to play the role of junior partner. The most recent Soviet space station had been scrapped in 2006 and the Americans had not built another one since the scrapping of the Space Station Liberty in 1998, instead sending astronauts to conduct research on CSA stations.

    For their part, the CSA’s space operations were based around a single orbital space station, two off-world bases, a fleet of six ‘Space Shuttles’ and countless satellites and other disposable rockets. The single space station was, as of 1 January, the space station Gaia, although she was due to be scrapped during the year and the parts for the replacement station, Gaia II, were already being launched and prepared. In practice, Gaia was by this point a joint CSA-NASA operation and the Gaia II was being funded directly by both the Commonwealth and the US. Humanity’s two off-world bases, the Cook on the Moon and the Drake on Mars, were very much all-CSA affairs, however, and their internal workings were left far more opaque to the outside world.

    From the 1990s onwards, almost all of the agency’s missions became covered by a shroud of secrecy that left many people unclear what it was that the CSA actually did. The first unmanned probes were sent to the asteroid belt in 2001 with the intention of prospecting and mining minerals but no usable material was returned to Earth until 2008 and, even then, it would be some time before they became economically relevant. While the existence of Drake and Cook promised a future of off-world colonies and exploration, by the second decade of the 20th century that had not yet eventuated: the bases remained populated largely by military and scientists and a full pregnancy and birth off-world had yet to be attempted. Indeed, the organisation came to only appear in the public eye at times of disaster or near-disaster, the most prominent one being an incident in 1995 when the astronaut Julie Payette was stranded on the surface of Mars and subsequently rescued, in the process becoming (by necessity) the first person to successfully grow crops outside of the Earth and its satellites.

    At the beginning of the new millennium, however, mining operations in the Asteroid Belt were not the only project the CSA was pursuing. In fact, its most ambitious program, known as the Maui Program, was a plan to explore and land on one of the Jovian Moons. Using VASIMR engines, unmanned probes were sent to the moons in October 2001 and October 2004, resulting in Callisto being identified as the target. Two more unmanned probes conducted further exploration of the moon, leading to the identification of a landing site which was tested with the soft landing of the Maui V on the surface in January 2015.

    The Maui VI, launched October 2014, performed the first manned orbit of Callisto and observed the landing site of the Maui V. With things moving smoothly, the Maui VII was chosen to be the first attempted manned landing on Callisto. The mission blasted off from the CSA base in Woomera in January 2018, carrying with it a team of six astronauts drawn from the UK, Canada, Pakistan, East Africa and the West Indies. The mission landed on Callisto in April 2019, with Timothy Peake being the first human to set foot on the surface. The team remained on Callisto for 30 days, operating drones on the moon’s surface and collecting samples for transportation back to Earth. The Maui VII returned via a stop-off at the Cook Base, eventually landing back on Earth in August 2020, after 32 months in space. The mission left behind them a reusable nuclear power plant and plans for future exploration of the Jovian system.

    As with previous exploration breakthroughs, the landing of the Maui VII was both the culmination and a launching pad for future developments. Subsequent missions to Callisto conducted research on both that moon and Jupiter’s other moons (notably proving the thick ice model of Europa’s composition), with a permanent Maui base being planned for construction in the late 2020s.

    Crew of the Maui VII:
    1. Camille Alleyne
    2. Saira Batool
    3. Charles Lutaaya
    4. Timothy Peake
    5. David Saint-Jacques
    6. Jenni Sidey
     
    Great African War (2014-2021)
  • Crucible of War: The Great African War and the Fate of Nations


    The ins and outs of the African Wars of Independence are out of the scope of this work, deserving far more detailed treatment elsewhere. We will instead focus our attention to the Commonwealth’s role in the wider conflict, in particular its protection of its allies in the south, west and north of the continent. But first, let us consider the headlines facts of the conflict. The war is generally dated from August 2014, the start of the protests against the Tunisian royal government but in practice the fighting had not fully spread across the continent until midway through 2016. By this time the conflict was no longer just a story of protest and counter-protest but a strategic fight between hastily-organised standing armies. The war is generally held to have been ended by the Damascus Accords of 28 December 2021 but, again, “generally” is very much the operative word here. The Damascus Accords were vital in that representatives from every African country signed a piece of paper confirming the recognition of every other country and began the process of accession to the UN. But in truth the continent would be the home to sporadic protests and rebellions for some time, even if its borders were now stable. The conflict saw the widest and most dramatic geographical changes on any continent during the modern era: on 1 January 2014 Africa was home to 35 nations (if we include the French Departments of the Maghreb and Reunion); on 31 December 2021 it was home to 89.

    Other than that, the casualty figures of the conflict make for grim reading. 6,577,000 people are estimated to have been killed on all sides, with another approximately 580,000 civilian casualties, although as many have noted, the distinction between civilian and military deaths was notional at many points and in many theatres during the conflict. In addition, nearly 13,000,000 people were displaced during the conflict, either as refugees (causing serious internal instability in Italy, Spain and Arabia) or internally. It was a grim and bloody conflict without parallel since the end of the World War.

    Commonwealth interests in the conflict were focused on protecting allies and the territorial integrity of the two member states on the continent. Despite some concerns, there was relatively little internal unrest in either East Africa or Rhodesia, a testament to the half-century long process of nation building in both of those countries. (Although largely a forgotten figure nowadays, Garfield Todd’s two decades in power in Rhodesia, turning it from the road to becoming South Africa into a multi-racial democracy probably makes him one of the great democratic heroes of the 20th century.) Commonwealth ‘peacekeepers’ were also deployed, following both consultation with the other members of the Security Council and the requests of the local governments, in Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Katanga. However, Commonwealth forces worked hard to remain confined to these countries and did not venture over the border into the wider conflict.

    The other theatre in which Commonwealth citizens, if not the military formally, were deeply engaged was the Sahara. Here, a series of Commonwealth military advisors and adventurers (others might say mercenaries but the difference is largely semantic) became deeply embedded in the struggles of the various Tuareg clans to create their own nation. A particularly prominent figure was Rory Stewart, who was intimately involved in the Tuareg rebellion almost from the moment of its beginning in late 2014. In 2019, he conducted a wide-ranging tour of the Commonwealth, raising money for the Tuaregs and attempting to push the Commonwealth into more active support. What Stewart’s precise relationship was with Commonwealth governmental and security forces remains unclear, with persistent rumours abounding of him being a Five Eyes agent. It is certainly true that, following the signing of the Damascus Accords, the Tuareg Republic of Azawad had notably friendly relations with the Commonwealth, with a number of contracts being signed allowing Tuareg-Commonwealth joint ventures to begin the construction of solar battery plants in the Sahara over the course of the 2020s.

    In the south of Africa, there was remarkably little territorial change, certainly when compared to the rest of the continent. The former South African province of South West Africa (already independent since 2003) was further divided into the republics of Hereroland and Namibia in September 2020. In South Africa, a process of political polarisation resulted in the Bantu Nationalist Party of Julius Malema winning a narrow majority in parliamentary elections of 2019. Malema announced that the country would change its name to the Republic of Bantuland from 1 January 2020.

    Elsewhere, the two countries which came out of the conflict relatively well were Ethiopia and Egypt. Ethiopia successfully helped Djibouti transition to a multi-party, if flawed, democracy and negotiated a customs union with Somalia and Djibouti, the culmination of a long-term aim of the Ethiopian diplomatic elite. Egypt lost territory during the conflict, with the non-Arab populations of Darfur and Sudan seceding. But the secessions happened with the minimum of armed conflict and Egyptian diplomats are regarded as having played a major role in bringing all the parties together at Damascus.

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    Political maps of Africa before the beginning of the protests against the Tunisian monarchy in August 2014 (left) and following the signing of the Damascus Accords in December 2021 (right)

    It was far from a perfect map and it remained to be seen what the survivability of the peace would be. The commentator Timothy Garton Ash described the 89 delegations in Damascus as representing “not so much the 89 nation states on the continent as they were the 89 groups who could afford the transportation and accommodation costs.” In particular, the Republic of West Arabia existed as a strange diagonal between Morocco and Azawad, connecting the Arab communities on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts via a thin strip of the Sahara without natural borders. It existed mainly under the sufferance of Azawad and Morocco with the looming threat of a cryptic remark made by Arabian Prime Minister Khaled Khoja that the country would “protect our West Arabian cousins should the timing be right.”

    Nonetheless, the borders as they now existed at least approximated the continent’s ethnic divisions and many post-colonial scholars argued that only now could the continent face the future fully independent.
     
    The General Election of 2018
  • The Way of the Weird: The Return of Multi-Party Politics


    Since the fracture of the Liberals in December 2015, the main psephological development for Labour had been to find parliamentary management somewhat easier. Sarah Teather’s 46 Progressive MP’s became effectively an annex to the Labour caucus, regularly voting with the government on most measures and only picking fights on hot button issues (notably non-Commonwealth immigration) on which Labour found themselves united and could force through on the backs of their majority anyway. Meanwhile, the Libertarians and the Liberals seemed mostly interested in blasting chunks out of one another. The Conservatives were also concerned about the Libertarian threat: not only did they eventually grow to outmatch the number of Conservative MPs (62 to 57) but they also took on a number of socially and culturally libertarian positions that the Conservatives had traditionally thought to be their territory.

    The viciousness of the opposition parties’ assaults on one another was probably made worse by the bleak polling outlook for all of them: Cooper’s government was riding high in the polls and didn’t look like giving up that position at any stage. At one point the leader of Sinn Fein, Michael D. Higgins, was spotted having lunch with Ed Balls, the Chancellor and Cooper’s husband, and was asked by a journalist what the contents of their discussion was. Higgins replied: “we were just discussing administrative parliamentary matters, considering that Sinn Feinn are going to be the main opposition after the next election.”

    Higgins was, of course, joking but his comments revealed much about the buoyant mood in the four nationalist parties, which foresaw in the Liberal split the possibility for a breakthrough. Even in Cornwall, where Mebyon Kernow had basically functioned as a slightly kooky branch office of the Liberals for many years, there was renewed hope of serious political gains.

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    2018 Part ii.JPG


    The results were brutal for the Liberals: to follow up from the 108 MPs they lost to the Libertarians and Progressives in December 2015 and January 2016, they lost another 58 MPs to crash to their lowest ebb since the topsy turvy politics of the 1920s and 1930s. Labour helped themselves to another 24 seats, stressing the success of Cooper’s governing record and hammering the Liberals, Progressives and Libertarians for their ill-discipline. The Conservatives gathered together another 5 seats to return to the highest level they had obtained under Letwin a decade previously. But, with results elsewhere, this would be of little comfort to them.

    As well as being a traditional general election, 2018 was also a battle for the soul of British politics, over whether its spirit was progressive or reactionary. And the answer to that question turned out to land firmly in favour of the former, with the Progressive Party picking up 23 seats to ensconce itself as the third party. They appealed to people of a basically left wing perspective but who didn’t trust Labour’s more statist instincts. The academic David Runciman defined their appeal as to “the kind of people who like the memory of Lloyd George, didn’t vote for Thatcher in 1981 and prefer Steel over Beckett.” For a period during the campaign there were serious suggestions that they might knock out the Liberals into second.

    The Libertarians lost 10 seats from their pre-election number, something that could plausibly be called a failure even if 52 seats for a newly-founded party was generally seen as positive. They did particularly well in areas which had formerly had a large number of Liberal activists who defected on-mass in December 2015. But, despite their successes in surviving, the results, and where they were based, suggested that there was now a hard cap on their electoral success.

    The Liberals remained the second largest party in the Commons (and by some distance too) but it certainly didn’t feel like that. Varadkar stepped down the morning after the election, precipitating a leadership election that was resolved at the annual conference in October. The contest was dominated by discussions of what the Liberals were for. On the one hand, they could portray themselves as the party which could successfully straddle Britain’s libertarian and progressive traditions but that raised the question: if one was of progressive inclinations, why be in a party with a libertarian wing, or vice versa? The eventual victory of Heidi Allen as leader did not promise an easy answer to those questions.
     
    Second Chinese Civil War (2022-2023)
  • In Search of a Modern China: The Second Chinese Civil War
    Zongren.jpg

    The CNS Zongren docked to receive the Democratic Socialist leadership, April 2022


    Since the foundation of the Fourth Republic in 1953, Chinese politics had been dominated by the Progress and Development Party and the Democratic Socialists. Progress and Development had traditionally been thought of as a soft nationalist party of the centre-right but with a strong emphasis on economic protectionism and supporting local businesses, which critics charged soon became little more than a fetish for nationalisation and a corruption nexus between the managers of these nationalised industries and government figures. The Democratic Socialists, on the other hand, belied the general description of them being on the centre-left by being very open to influxes of foreign credit and business to bring in jobs and capital to use for Chinese purposes. In this sense Chinese politics did not map neatly onto the centre-left and centre-right contests seen elsewhere in the world, with the Democratic Socialists being considerably less statist and the Progress and Development being notably more so than their brother parties in other countries.

    This approach, typified by the presence of Finance Minister-turned-Premier-turned-Finance Minister-turned-Premier-again Deng Xiaoping at the top of government over the two decades of Democratic Socialist dominance of the Yuan between 1973-93, certainly had many successes. As we have seen, in 1997, China overtook the United States to become the second largest economy in the world, a position they had held since then. Similarly, few visitors could walk around cities such as Guangzhou, Shanghai or the capital Nanjing without seeing enormous wealth and confidence in its well-educated citizens. But, go 100 miles inland from those cities, and the picture could look quite different. Indeed, outside of certain points in southern and eastern China, the majority of the country remained extremely poor and underdeveloped. Furthermore, critics charged that, while Commonwealth banks and Brazilian factories (among others) had opened up branches in China since the 1970s, it had done so at the expense of crowding out native Chinese industries (and, in particular, non-Han industries). Of particular note was the fact that much of China’s nuclear industry used technology rented from the SWF and its railways system was built almost entirely by Commonwealth companies and Commonwealth managers. Combined with concerns about just how much of its issued bonds were owned by SWF proxies, many worried that this gave the Commonwealth a potentially vice-like grip over China if needs be.

    While the first past the post structure of the Yuan allowed the Democratic Socialists to gain majorities off the back of strong urban support, their popularity in the wider country was a bit more shakey and the Progress and Development Party had consistently won presidential elections since the 1970s, with most presidents serving two terms before the other party won two terms for themselves. For the 2005 election, the party nominated Zhou Yongkang, a man with close ties to the business community. He successfully won two terms in office (2005-2013) but frequently came into conflict with the Democratic Socialists in the Yuan (which they controlled 2003-08) over questions of tax cuts and other assorted legislation. What followed was a period of rapid party polarisation, with the 13 years after 2008 seeing 10 years where one party controlled the Yuan and the other the Presidential Palace, resulting in legislative paralysis.

    While an older generation of Chinese were relaxed about the government not being able to do things, given the experience with the Kuoumintang, that was less true of the younger generations born several decades after the foundation of the Fourth Republic. Following three years of unified Democratic Socialist control, China returned to divided government in March 2021, with the election of Wu Yajun to the presidency. Wu was widely disliked within the Democratic Socialists for a number of reasons, not least of which was her extensive business career and reasonably well-known (if unprovable) corruption. (Some also suggested her gender played a significant role.)

    In the first year of her tempestuous presidency, Wu was engaged in a near-constant media war with Liu Yunshan, the Democratic Socialist Premier. He point-blank refused to table her legislative agenda for a vote and she, in turn, vetoed a record number of bills passed by the Yuan in her first year in office. Going into the 2022 Yuan elections, Wu campaigned hard on the promise of using any majority Progress and Development won to force through constitutional changes that would provide for more unified government. However, heavily gerrymandered urban districts allowed for the Democratic Socialists to retain a small majority. But Wu and the rest of the Progress and Development Party had not been idle.

    In April 2022, Wu vetoed the budget approved by the Yuan, with Wu demanding a new budget be approved with vast increases in military expenditure which she knew would be impossible for the Democratic Socialists to agree to. She was supported by General Zhang Shengmin, the Chief of the General Staff, who argued that the Democratic Socialists were playing politics with Chinese national security. In response, two days later the Yuan passed a bill removing Zhang from office and replacing him with Admiral Pan Chin-lung, who was known for his (relatively) liberal leanings. The majority of the Chinese Navy sided with the Democratic Socialists in the Yuan who, the day after Wu (predictably) vetoed Zhang’s dismissal, issued the Proclamation of Dismissal, declaring that Wu should be removed as President and the constitution amended to create less divided government. (Ironically, these were fundamentally the same reforms that Wu had championed only months previously but few were in the mood to note that.) Following the declaration, the Democratic Socialist leadership in the Yuan boarded the CNS Zongren (the navy’s flagship, ironically named after the former Progress and Development President) and demanded the loyalty of the remainder of the armed forces.

    With the majority of the army remaining loyal to the President, China descended into a low-level civil war with most of the fighting taking place along the coastal areas but neither side being able to gain a decisive upper hand. International opinion would be scandalised, however, in November 2022 when Wu’s men rounded up the Democratic Socialist members of the Yuan who had not managed to escape with the leadership on the Zongren (and who had since been under in a relatively luxurious house arrest) and publicly executed them without trial in the Central Stadium. A week later, a naval detachment sailed up the Yangtze to the army base at Yangzhou. A series of coordinated air strikes and bombardments caused serious damage to the army infrastructure, resulting in over 2,000 casualties and effectively opening up the river to Wu’s government in Nanjing.

    Despite the navy suffering their own casualties (including damage to the Zongren that rendered her inoperable for the rest of the conflict), they managed to march on Nanjing and occupy it on 12 December 2022. Wu and her allies fled to the Brazilian legation. Over the next three months, negotiations took place between the two sides with the Brazilian government acting as intermediaries. On 18 March 2023, the new constitution of the Fifth Republic was promulgated, providing for unified federal executive and legislative government along the American model (albeit with an electoral college involved that most people judged gave an advantage to the Democratic Socialists). The following day, Wu committed suicide, on the grounds that she would not receive a fair trial, but an amnesty was otherwise issued to all of her allies and the presidential and legislative elections on 30 June were certified by UN observers as free and fair.
     
    Global Ranking of GNP; G3 (2019)
  • I meant to put this up before the last update, seeing as we've gone forward in time past the present day. But anyway, here are the top 10 largest global economies and a brief explanation of the most recent international economics forum/talking shop.

    * * *
    List of Countries by GNP

    Gross National Product ("GNP") is a measure of economic performance kept by the International Clearing Union. It is denominated in Bancors and is a measure of all of the final goods and services from a country in a given year but weighted to take into account the country's balance of trade and strength of its currency. Given these latter two modifiers, GNP is regularly compared to Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") which is a simple measure of the goods and services produced by a country. Most countries' central banks produce regular measures of the country's GDP denominated (usually) in Sterling, Renminbi or Dollars (or all three) and these measures are most often used to determine whether a country has slipped into or out of a technical recession. The Commonwealth, China and the US, which have good balances of trade, do well in measures of GNP but less well (albeit that they remain the top three but with a smaller 'lead' over the countries behind them) in certain measures of GDP. However, GNP remains the most commonly used standard in academic, political and journalistic circles to measure the relative wealth of countries, given that it equalises (to an extent) the purchasing power parity of different currencies and is thought to give a better indication of a country's underlying economic strength and competitiveness than simple GDP.

    Image 15-11-2019 at 19.30.jpg

    N.B. The estimated value of the total assets of the SWF are included here for reference and are not included in the GNP of the Commonwealth.

    The Group of Three

    The Group of Three ("G3") is an international governmental organisation founded in 2001 consisting of the three largest economies in the world: the Commonwealth of Nations, the Republic of China and the United States of America. As of 2019 the three countries represent over 75trillion Bancors in GNP. Primarily created as a response to China's overtaking the Soviet Union as one of the world's largest economies, these annual meetings allow the world's three largest economies to facilitate shared macroeconomic objectives, get to know each other better and generally serve as a bit of a talking shop. By tradition, the hosting duties rotate between the three countries. Since 2013 the finance ministers of the three powers have held separate meetings twice a year, traditionally in Santiago.

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    Commonwealth Standards of Living (2019)
  • Here also is a brief list of Commonwealth member states and their rough OTL equivalents in terms of standards of living in brackets next to them. This shouldn't be taken to mean a simple transposition of GDP levels or the type of economy they have. Even a comparison of standards of living is a bit inexact because of the productivity leaps the Commonwealth has made generally. Nevertheless, they should be useful to give people a general guide when it comes to thinking what living in each member state might be like. As ever, if this doesn't make sense to you or if you have any questions then please let me know.
    1. Australia (Sweden)
    2. Bahamas (the Netherlands)
    3. Belize (Luxembourg)
    4. Canada (Finland)
    5. Ceylon (Belgium)
    6. East Africa (Mississippi)
    7. East Indies (Singapore)
    8. Hong Kong (OTL)
    9. New Zealand (Iceland)
    10. Newfoundland (Faroe Islands)
    11. Pacific Islands (Egypt)
    12. Pakistan (UK)
    13. Papua New Guinea (Poland)
    14. Puerto Rico (Florida)
    15. Rhodesia (Iowa)
    16. Sarawak (Malaysia)
    17. United Kingdom (Norway)
    18. West Indies (Italy)
     
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