In Search of a Modern China: The Second Chinese Civil War
The CNS Zongren docked to receive the Democratic Socialist leadership, April 2022
Since the foundation of the Fourth Republic in 1953, Chinese politics had been dominated by the Progress and Development Party and the Democratic Socialists. Progress and Development had traditionally been thought of as a soft nationalist party of the centre-right but with a strong emphasis on economic protectionism and supporting local businesses, which critics charged soon became little more than a fetish for nationalisation and a corruption nexus between the managers of these nationalised industries and government figures. The Democratic Socialists, on the other hand, belied the general description of them being on the centre-left by being very open to influxes of foreign credit and business to bring in jobs and capital to use for Chinese purposes. In this sense Chinese politics did not map neatly onto the centre-left and centre-right contests seen elsewhere in the world, with the Democratic Socialists being considerably less statist and the Progress and Development being notably more so than their brother parties in other countries.
This approach, typified by the presence of Finance Minister-turned-Premier-turned-Finance Minister-turned-Premier-again Deng Xiaoping at the top of government over the two decades of Democratic Socialist dominance of the Yuan between 1973-93, certainly had many successes. As we have seen, in 1997, China overtook the United States to become the second largest economy in the world, a position they had held since then. Similarly, few visitors could walk around cities such as Guangzhou, Shanghai or the capital Nanjing without seeing enormous wealth and confidence in its well-educated citizens. But, go 100 miles inland from those cities, and the picture could look quite different. Indeed, outside of certain points in southern and eastern China, the majority of the country remained extremely poor and underdeveloped. Furthermore, critics charged that, while Commonwealth banks and Brazilian factories (among others) had opened up branches in China since the 1970s, it had done so at the expense of crowding out native Chinese industries (and, in particular, non-Han industries). Of particular note was the fact that much of China’s nuclear industry used technology rented from the SWF and its railways system was built almost entirely by Commonwealth companies and Commonwealth managers. Combined with concerns about just how much of its issued bonds were owned by SWF proxies, many worried that this gave the Commonwealth a potentially vice-like grip over China if needs be.
While the first past the post structure of the Yuan allowed the Democratic Socialists to gain majorities off the back of strong urban support, their popularity in the wider country was a bit more shakey and the Progress and Development Party had consistently won presidential elections since the 1970s, with most presidents serving two terms before the other party won two terms for themselves. For the 2005 election, the party nominated Zhou Yongkang, a man with close ties to the business community. He successfully won two terms in office (2005-2013) but frequently came into conflict with the Democratic Socialists in the Yuan (which they controlled 2003-08) over questions of tax cuts and other assorted legislation. What followed was a period of rapid party polarisation, with the 13 years after 2008 seeing 10 years where one party controlled the Yuan and the other the Presidential Palace, resulting in legislative paralysis.
While an older generation of Chinese were relaxed about the government not being able to do things, given the experience with the Kuoumintang, that was less true of the younger generations born several decades after the foundation of the Fourth Republic. Following three years of unified Democratic Socialist control, China returned to divided government in March 2021, with the election of Wu Yajun to the presidency. Wu was widely disliked within the Democratic Socialists for a number of reasons, not least of which was her extensive business career and reasonably well-known (if unprovable) corruption. (Some also suggested her gender played a significant role.)
In the first year of her tempestuous presidency, Wu was engaged in a near-constant media war with Liu Yunshan, the Democratic Socialist Premier. He point-blank refused to table her legislative agenda for a vote and she, in turn, vetoed a record number of bills passed by the Yuan in her first year in office. Going into the 2022 Yuan elections, Wu campaigned hard on the promise of using any majority Progress and Development won to force through constitutional changes that would provide for more unified government. However, heavily gerrymandered urban districts allowed for the Democratic Socialists to retain a small majority. But Wu and the rest of the Progress and Development Party had not been idle.
In April 2022, Wu vetoed the budget approved by the Yuan, with Wu demanding a new budget be approved with vast increases in military expenditure which she knew would be impossible for the Democratic Socialists to agree to. She was supported by General Zhang Shengmin, the Chief of the General Staff, who argued that the Democratic Socialists were playing politics with Chinese national security. In response, two days later the Yuan passed a bill removing Zhang from office and replacing him with Admiral Pan Chin-lung, who was known for his (relatively) liberal leanings. The majority of the Chinese Navy sided with the Democratic Socialists in the Yuan who, the day after Wu (predictably) vetoed Zhang’s dismissal, issued the Proclamation of Dismissal, declaring that Wu should be removed as President and the constitution amended to create less divided government. (Ironically, these were fundamentally the same reforms that Wu had championed only months previously but few were in the mood to note that.) Following the declaration, the Democratic Socialist leadership in the Yuan boarded the CNS Zongren (the navy’s flagship, ironically named after the former Progress and Development President) and demanded the loyalty of the remainder of the armed forces.
With the majority of the army remaining loyal to the President, China descended into a low-level civil war with most of the fighting taking place along the coastal areas but neither side being able to gain a decisive upper hand. International opinion would be scandalised, however, in November 2022 when Wu’s men rounded up the Democratic Socialist members of the Yuan who had not managed to escape with the leadership on the Zongren (and who had since been under in a relatively luxurious house arrest) and publicly executed them without trial in the Central Stadium. A week later, a naval detachment sailed up the Yangtze to the army base at Yangzhou. A series of coordinated air strikes and bombardments caused serious damage to the army infrastructure, resulting in over 2,000 casualties and effectively opening up the river to Wu’s government in Nanjing.
Despite the navy suffering their own casualties (including damage to the Zongren that rendered her inoperable for the rest of the conflict), they managed to march on Nanjing and occupy it on 12 December 2022. Wu and her allies fled to the Brazilian legation. Over the next three months, negotiations took place between the two sides with the Brazilian government acting as intermediaries. On 18 March 2023, the new constitution of the Fifth Republic was promulgated, providing for unified federal executive and legislative government along the American model (albeit with an electoral college involved that most people judged gave an advantage to the Democratic Socialists). The following day, Wu committed suicide, on the grounds that she would not receive a fair trial, but an amnesty was otherwise issued to all of her allies and the presidential and legislative elections on 30 June were certified by UN observers as free and fair.