88. Progress or Stagnation?
“While the Guangxu Emperor’s massive reforms had shored up the Qing government’s position and restored popular respect and support in the short term, the reforms had both created a large reformist movement and failed to provide a proper outlet for these sentiments. The Qing Empire remained strong and avoided the worst of imperialism, save for the Russian occupation of Manchuria, Europe generally preferred to maintain peaceful trade with the cautiously pro-western Guangxu Court than instigate any conflict. The Great War further distracted Europe from any Oriental adventurism, allowing the Empire to continue the pace of reform and industrialization.
Under the Guangxu Emperor’s reforms, Beijing University had, by the 1920s, established itself as a center for not only innovation, but political radicalism. The army had also undergone a serious overhaul, resulting in an influx of forward-thinking army officers rapidly climbing through the ranks. By the dawn of the 1920s, the Beijing Army was dominated by these reformist officers who had been instilled with modern mindsets. Under the leadership of General Mao Zhanfeng, the New Army was an entirely professional force, structured around the defense of the Empire, which was contrasted with an embrace of both modern tactics and modern, western government.
One key tenet of the reformist program was the eventual introduction of a constitutional monarchy. Three new groups in China, the educated middle class, modern civil service, and politically-minded army officers, all supported democratic evolution. However, while the Emperor did create a weak parliament, the Common Council, in 1913, he proved reluctant to take further action. Also, powerful Imperial officials in the provinces actively resisted government reforms. These officials, often governors of the southern provinces, embraced the technological and economic benefits of modernization, but saw political reform as a threat to their power.
Despite the growing undercurrent of opposition to the Imperial Court, China remained stable throughout the 1910s and early 20s. The westernizing reforms had allowed the economy to expand rapidly, and the Emperor was respected for presiding over such prosperity. Provincial governments in Jiangsu and Anhui provinces were the most progressive in the nation, and spearheaded reforms such as directly electing mayors (Nanjing in Jiangsu and Hefei in Anhui) and introducing the land value tax. The Common Council, while often ignored, was dominated by moderate reformists who refrained from openly challenging Imperial authority.
Three events together upset the Qing Empire’s stability. The first was the 1919 Council elections, which saw the Tongmenghui win a narrow majority. The Tongmenghui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance, often abbreviated TMH), led by the Cantonese lawyer Feng Demin, advocated for parliamentary supremacy and began openly disagreeing with the Emperor on issues such as taxation and naval spending. Second, the Guangxu Emperor died suddenly in 1922. His exact cause of death is still unknown – historians generally agree it was likely some form of cancer, but there are also theories that conservatives poisoned him because he was planning on granting more powers to the Council. His successor, the Zhengsheng Emperor [1], lacked the Guangxu Emperor’s tact in dealing with Feng’s Council and was generally more reactionary and conservative. The Zhengsheng Emperor quickly moved to stymie the reforms of Jiangsu and Anhui, issuing a decree that only he, not the people, could select a mayor, in August 1923.
The disbandment of the local government of Nanjing was deeply unpopular among the educated middle class, and even provoked ire from the newly-politically involved industrial workers of Nanjing and Hefei. 1926 brought the final event that would topple the Qing Dynasty: the Great Famine. Widespread drought struck northern and western China, followed by disease outbreak. While the government responded swiftly to the crisis, lingering civil service corruption delayed the relief efforts and the growth of cities meant that the price of food skyrocketed. As a result, many poor Chinese who flocked to the cities struggled to eat. The New Army was brought in to oversee relief work in the countryside, but the cities continued to fester. On June 14th, 1927, a market in Nanjing announced steep price increases due to the famine, prompting an ugly food riot as hungry, impoverished workers stormed the warehouses to steal food. The appointed mayor, panicking, summoned the provincial Imperial army to suppress the riot.
This culminated in Imperial forces opening fire on the hungry rioters, provoking greater discontent. Workers went on strike in Nanjing, followed by strikes in Hefei and Beijing. In Beijing, the strikes and protests took on a uniquely political tone, with Feng himself addressing the marchers. He called for greater democracy and criticized the Emperor for allowing corruption in the government to fester. It was the unrest in Beijing that worried the Emperor, and so he ordered General Mao to restore order. However, Mao sympathized with the TMH and secretly negotiated with Feng. Shen advised the Emperor that his position in Beijing was unsafe and advised him to leave the city until the army could suppress the protests. The Emperor quickly fled, and the New Army marched into Beijing, only for Mao to renounce Qing authority and recognize the Council as the sole legal authority. In the days after the coup in Beijing, revolution spread to the other provinces. Jiangsu and Anhui’s pro-Imperial leaders were overthrown by a mixture of New Army units and unorganized revolutionaries, while New Army units overthrew the Viceroy of Huguang.
By the end of July, the Viceroyalties of Zhili, Liangjiang, and Huguang were in revolutionary hands, as well as much of the Shandong peninsula. The Emperor fled south, where the loyal Viceroys of Sichuan, Yun-Gui, Liangguang, and Min-Zhe declared their opposition to Feng’s provisional government. Feng perceived this flight as a sign that the Emperor was determined to crush the revolution, and canceled the tentative negotiations with the Imperial Court over a constitutional compromise. On August 19th, he declared a republic and demanded that the Emperor abdicate and his loyalists surrender, or the new Republic of China would suppress the “rebellion” by force. Mao and the revolutionary leadership moved south to Nanjing, Mao in order to be closer to the fighting and the TMH in order to set up their new government in a more revolutionary location.
The revolutionaries convened in Nanjing throughout September and October to draft a new constitution for China. Feng presided over the convention, while Mao served as an informal advisor and occasionally visited the delegates. Operating under the Three Principles of the People (civic nationalism, popular democracy, and popular welfare), the delegates set about remaking China, for the first time without an Emperor. The Common Council and the various noble councils were replaced with the unicameral National Assembly, its representatives to be elected by direct popular vote from single-member districts. The Assembly would in turn select the President and approve his ministers. An American-style bill of rights was included, and Han Chinese was enshrined as the sole official national language. Revolutionary-controlled provinces quickly approved the 1927 Constitution, and as the New Army advanced rapidly south, these newly occupied provinces’ military governments also implemented the constitution.
Within two years, the southern provinces had been totally brought to heel and the Emperor forced into exile in French Indochina. In 1928, with only small pockets of resistance on the mainland, China held its first elections. Feng had stepped down as TMH leader shortly before the elections, and the party selected Mao Zhanfeng as the new leader. He had become close with many revolutionaries during the convention and was popular with the people, and so he resigned from the army and dove into the world of politics. Mao led the TMH to a landslide majority, winning 578 out of 596 seats in the Assembly. As all monarchist parties had been banned and the voting public was broadly supportive of the revolution [2], the remainder of the seats were all independent republicans.
As President, Mao proposed a new program of reform that went far beyond the Guangxu Emperor’s policies. His vision of China called not only for physical modernization, through new railroads, mines, and the massive expansion of the education system, but also cultural modernization. A surname law was passed, banning names associated with royalty like Wang (King) or Hou (Marquis), and ethnic names like Hu (barbarian). Qing-era queues and opium dens were banned, as was the practice of foot-binding. Mao fought against “superstitious” traditions such as herbal medicine, potions, geomancy, the veneration of ancestors and spirits, and what the TMH termed a “village-centric” worldview. He also directed the new education system to discourage certain “backwards” Confucian tenets mainly filial piety, which was seen as an obstacle towards women’s rights and social modernity.
The western calendar was adopted for official use, with the goal of phasing out the old lunar calendar within a generation. These social modernization programs were coupled with the construction of hundreds of rural schools, new railroads, the mass redistribution of land among the peasantry, the creation of an American-style semi-centralized Bank of the Republic, and the modernization of farming techniques. Mao’s ideology, known as Maoism, earned him the new surname of Hanfu (father of the Han), in an act of the Assembly. Even today, he is revered among the Chinese people for his transformational role in their nation’s history and society. 1928-1932 was only the beginning of his reforms, as he attempted to introduce multiparty rule and reach a self-imposed goal of 80% literacy nationwide…”
-From THE RISE OF NEW CHINA by Hannah Kang, published 2012
“The Whig party today stands at a crossroads. Rhetoric and policies that won us elections for decades have lost their shine. Primarily this is due to a shift in what voters care about – today, culture issues dominate national discourse. Up until just a few years ago, talk of trade and tariffs was purely economical, focused on job losses and potential foreign competition. Immigration debate revolved around efficiency and the danger of drug trafficking. Today, analysts and pundits have asked why the new free trade deal or the immigration reform law have aroused such furious debate, because surely the average voter is not very invested in the economics of trade. These people, including even former president Claire Huntington, miss the point. It’s not that people are experts in economics, but that they have come to associate some stance on trade or immigration with the American identity.
There has been an undeniable decline in manufacturing jobs in the six years since the United States’s accession to the North American Common Market. Economists have wrote at length at how this will be outweighed by an expansion of the American tech industry and the fall in the price of consumer goods. However, these points don’t matter to a factory worker from Ohio, for example. The worker is either unemployed or worried about the prospect, and fear motivates his opposition. Farmers out west, even though they benefit from free trade, are nevertheless opposed to it. Both oppose immigration reform. The core, underlying reason for this is that they see protectionism and restricted immigration as a way to preserve their perception of American society.
From the perspective of these voters, who are the traditional core constituencies of the Whigs [3], trade lets in foreign-made goods, destroys jobs and decimates regional prosperity. Immigration does much the same, the newcomers take jobs away from American citizens, and they bring with them new cultural practices. And so, for many Americans, these two policies represent the death of the America they grew up with [4], even if the benefits far outweigh the downsides. The only voters looking out for their self-interests in the current Whig coalition are the urbanites, who overlook the protectionism and anti-immigration stances of the rest of the party because the Whigs are the party of subsidies and welfare. Yet, like the factory worker and the farmer, the urbanite is also motivated by fear – fear of liberal policies.
In the last two presidential elections, the Whigs have run technocratic candidates, who spoke of the issues in dry, almost academic terms. The only exception to the dullness of Ahrendt and Whitney was Ahrendt’s forceful defense of his legalization of same-sex marriage, but this alienated more rural traditionalists than it attracted suburbanites or disaffected progressives. The overall lack of emotion prevented them from standing out next to the equally stiff Charlie Breathitt, and so many party-line Whigs simply stayed home, or left the presidential section of their ballot blank. Last year’s midterms showed the electoral benefits of stoking popular anger. Some 70% of Whig candidates in swing House, Senate, and Gubernatorial races who embraced more pugnacious rhetoric won their races. On the other side, only 40% of those who took a more moderate, even-handed approach won. Those supporting the new way of campaigning point to these races as the reason for the new Whig House and expanded Senate majority [5].
So far, there are just two declared candidates for next year’s convention, and each one represents the two paths our party could take. First, there’s Tom Pepper, who’s been around for decades. He has a wealth of experience, having served as Governor of Florida, Secretary of State, and as Senator. He’s technocratic, moderate on tariffs, and pro-immigration. He’s also reasonably personable on the stump and has come close to the nomination twice: in 2004 against Claire Huntington, and in 2020 against Kate Whitney. There’s just one small problem with Tom Pepper: he’s currently back in court on a pared-down twelve counts of embezzlement, fraud, and bribery. Ignoring the numerous allegations of corruption, he would represent the continued evolution of the Whigs into a cosmopolitan, modern party that represents in policy the sunny optimism that Charlie Breathitt represents in personality [6].
The other candidate is Thad Marshall, the young Senator from Nebraska. He is a proud protectionist, firmly anti-immigration, and a staunch political progressive. He has leaned hard into the populist, identity-focused rhetoric, emerging in the headlines every so often. So far, he has picked a fight with the President over irrigation (and won), attempted to block a Commerce Secretary nominee for being pro-free trade, and, just recently, branded the Democrats a “party of ivory-tower elites with fancy diplomas.” Marshall’s worldview is simple: America is under threat and the Democratic party is too concerned with wealth and their own status to care. He is the kind of politician who mocks someone for having an Ivy-league education or refers to middle America as “real America.” He represents the current trend of the party, as signaled by the midterms.
To nominate Senator Marshall would be a grave mistake. Though Senator Pepper has been dogged by a cloud of scandal for over a year, his brand of optimistic progressivism is what this party needs to promote if we care about a healthy democracy. Senator Marshall draws needless dividing lines through society and has built his brand on vicious attacks and belligerent speeches. He treats education as untrustworthy and sees the word liberal as an insult, not an ideology. We as a party stand at a fork in the road, one path leading to a brighter, more tolerant future and the other down into the mud-pits, towards hatred and fear. We must choose wisely, or we shall all, Whig and Liberal, rural and urban, pay the price together.”
-From A PARTY AT A CROSSROADS by Rep. Edmund Kimberly Swayne, published in The Atlantic, March 15th, 2023
[1] I’m not 100% sure how Chinese era names are crafted, but this is intended to mean ‘righteous prosperity.’
[2] Popular participation in the government will grow, but right now voters are either part of the educated middle class or heavily influenced by them.
[3] The Whigs essentially have three core constituencies since the civil war: factory workers, Plains farmers, and black people.
[4] Curiously, TTL the issue of gay rights is far less salient of a cultural issue.
[5] Because there are a bunch of small Whiggish states, they hold a slight advantage in the Senate.
[6] One key difference in the political spectrum TTL is we have a pessimistic, cynical progressive party and an optimistic conservative party. That helps produce a lot of the political weirdness in the US.