Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
China ITTL both during the remainder of the present conflict and the post war world.

The present conflict for China can be said to have started in 1937, with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and this along with the ongoing internal conflict, between the Nationalists, Communists and various War Lords. Meant that China was in a mess, long before the outbreak of the larger conflict in the region, between the Japanese and Western powers, particularly America and the British Empire. IOTL the capture of Burma along with all of the ports along the Chinese coast, meant that China was effectively cut off from the world. Yes small amounts of aid were flown in from India at enormous cost, and Joe sent very limited assistance to Mao and the communists. The Free French received three times the amount of LL that the Chinese did, and by being delivered by sea and not by air, were able to receive it at a much lower cost. There was no way IOTL that you could send a Sherman Tank to China, and anything larger than a 75 mm pack howitzer was a problem. Trucks had to be cut up and welded back together, as did any heavy machinery, fuel had to be sent on a deadicated aircraft or shipped in drums. Whereas ITTL, with the Burma Road remaining open, and possibly a fuel pipeline running along side, more and heavier equipment, supplies can be transported to China. If FIC can be liberated and the Haiphong to Kunming railway brought back into operation, tonnages that can be transported will increase exponentially. It should be possible to move ten freight trains a day in each direction, which if carrying 500 tons each would mean 5,000 tons daily and 150,000 tons a month. If the road can carry 500 tons a day plus however many gallons of fuel through a pipeline, that’s 15,000 tons a month, close to three times the aim for the airbridge, which would have a major impact on the war in China, then a combination of the road and this railway would be devastating to the Japanese war effort.

Unfortunately for China both of its potential leaders are fundamentally corrupt, and very much more interested in their ongoing political and military conflict against each other. Instead of what is best for the population or the nation, or the persecution of the war against the Japanese invaders. In an ideal world both Mao and Chiang would be removed from their respective positions, and be replaced by people who are more interested in the welfare of the people, and only mildly corrupt. However if Chiang can be forced to devote half of the supplies he is receiving, to the war against the Japanese, and not squirrelling the majority away for the post war conflict against the Communists. And with a larger American air component, the Japanese are in a world of hurt, as they find themselves in a three way battle between the Americans in the Pacific, the British in South East Asia, and the Chinese in China. The ongoing conflict between the Army and Navy over the limited resources available, will only intensify, as the Army is forced into two conflicts with stronger military forces. As for the Chinese especially Chiang, the much better performance of the British in SEA, is going to divert a significant portion of the Japanese Armies efforts into repulsing their assault in Indochina. This could led to one of three options in my opinion, first Chiang is extremely lucky and by the conclusion of the war has gained two thirds of the country, including Hong Kong and Macao, and the communists have been forced back into the northern third of China. Second Chiang has prosecuted a successful campaign and now has control over half of the nation, though the British have managed to get Hong Kong back and in the process liberate Macao, Chiang has declared that all other foreign concessions such as in Shanghai are over, and the communists and Japanese control the remainder of the country. There will subsequently be a major scramble once the Japanese surrender, with Chiang supported by the Americans gaining the majority of the coastal cities and ports. Finally come the end of the war, the nationalists under Chiang hold a third of the nation, the Japanese hold another third along with Manchuria, and the communists and some warlords control the remaining third. The British have liberated Hong Kong, Macao and the various international concessions in Shanghai.

In all cases there will be an extended Civil War in China after the Japanese surrender, and the Soviets will have invaded Manchuria. Depending on just how much the Americans are prepared to commit to a Nationalist victory, will determine how long it lasts. Should they go all in, highly unlikely, and provide major air and naval support, along with boots on the ground, it should all be over within a year or two. However this is the least likely scenario, the American people are just as determined to see the boys brought home as the British were. More likely is that the Americans provided limited naval support, mostly to keep the Soviets out, and other than training and major supplies, keep themselves basically out of the conflict. They might be prepared to donate surplus material to the Nationalists, they do have millions of dollars worth of equipment that has had one previous owner and is now surplus to requirements. But they are going to be extremely reluctant to commit any personnel especially draftees to the ongoing conflict in China. While the British are definitely going to sit this one out, as they have enormous commitments in Germany and at home. However the death of FDR and his replacement by Truman, means that any prediction is very much predicted on the American China Lobby being able to convince him to buy into their version of events. Should he decide that he wants as little as possible involvement in the Chinese Civil War, Chiang and the Nationalists could find themselves in a very sticky situation, only receiving the bear minimum of what they need to conduct a successful campaign against the Communists. The various changes that have occurred ITTL, especially in the East are going to have significant implications for the Post War era, and any predictions are very much dependent on the events that happen in SEA, China and the Pacific region over the next few years. If the Americans are forced to implement an invasion of Japan, and develop land bases in China in support of their invasion, this could substantially change their attitude towards China. Everything is very much up in the air for now, and nothing is going to become clear for a significant time, what if the attempt to assonate Adolf succeeds, could Winstons stroke while he was at a conference with FDR, be totally debilitating, might FDR die earlier or later. All of this we will have to wait for our author to decide.

RR.
 
Ramp Rat you also have to figure how much is Stalin willing to help Chiang instead of Mao and thats what it comes down to Chiang vs. Mao. If Mao still is going his own way and articulating it to the Soviets, Stalin, then he is going to be getting less support from Stalin and might even have to content with only having Manchuria or not receive any support at all and have someone else become the head of the CCP voluntarily or not. Stalin was perfectly happy with supporting Chiang over Mao pre war even when they were beating the CCP and having Chiang happy with supporting the Soviets in Manchuria over Mao might help also.
 
One thing that is assumed is that Japan lasts longer than Germany. In TL like this where the Japanese suffer early set-backs that is no longer assured.
A much stronger Nationalst China (direct lend lease rather than the "hump") and a collapsing Japanese Indo-China / Southern China could see a material bomber threat to the Home Islands by 1944. Not nukes but firebombing killed more than the two nukes combined.
It is possible that Japanese Manchuria may collapse well before USSR has a chance to invade as the small issue of Berlin is still the focus of their attention.
 
I think a lot of the far-east hinges on FIC. If the allies can grab FIC in '42/43, they can open a broad front on Japan's other continental possessions.
 
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There were some remarkable climbing achievements OTL by M3's on the hills around Imphal, most famously the 3rd Carabiners at Nunshigum. Possibly Churchills could have done even better
The M3 Grant that dominated the Tennis court battle was literally dragged up the hill - an epic feat that I imagine involved a lot of kind words - and tipped the balance in favour of the British/Indian forces fighting for the Tennis court and subsequently the recapture of the Deputy Governors Bungalow (things were already bad for the Japanese infantry and I can only imagine that an M3 turning up was the last thing they needed).

The Churchill however was renowned for its climbing ability - At Longstop Hill during the Tunisian Campaign the relatively light losses incurred by the 78th Divisions attacks on a series of heavily defended ridges is largely due to the "Metal Mules" ability to climb gradient's as steep as 1:3 ratio which was very impressive for the day (very impressive now!) out flanking the German defenders and inflicting 'tank shock' on them and its 'trench crossing' design would make it very useful in SEA.
 
I do have to wonder what the post-war effect on Thailand is going to be. The Northern Line railway runs through Nakhor Sawan, so 'd expect a lot of work will go into modernising the stretch between there and Bangkok, plus a good, all-weather road between there and the Burma border. And all free-of-charge to the Thai government. Oh, and another road stretching from the Malay border northwards.
 
I wonder how hard it will be to supply a force across Thailand to where the Frontline will Settle on French Indochina? I mean I know knocking Thailand out of the war removes a threat to both British Malaysia and Burma as well as opening the ports but where will the frontline fall a lot of that area is going to be hard-going jungle for both sides, so will we see a more solid front line across the coast between what would be the Cambodian-Thai border with British and Commonwealth Forces having something like a Patrol and Fire Base set up in the more dense rainforest areas?
 
I wonder how hard it will be to supply a force across Thailand to where the Frontline will Settle on French Indochina? I mean I know knocking Thailand out of the war removes a threat to both British Malaysia and Burma as well as opening the ports but where will the frontline fall a lot of that area is going to be hard-going jungle for both sides, so will we see a more solid front line across the coast between what would be the Cambodian-Thai border with British and Commonwealth Forces having something like a Patrol and Fire Base set up in the more dense rainforest areas?
I'd guess a narrow-gauge railway gets built along the original surveyed route... (the one they planned, before the French threatened them)
 
Whereas ITTL, with the Burma Road remaining open, and possibly a fuel pipeline running along side, more and heavier equipment, supplies can be transported to China. If FIC can be liberated and the Haiphong to Kunming railway brought back into operation, tonnages that can be transported will increase exponentially.
I've said it before in these sort of threads and I'll say it again - don't oversell the Burma Road. It is a single lane, unsurfaced track, impassable in the monsoon, winding through some extremely tough terrain with minimal infrastructure. And anything sent there has to come through the small, unmodernised port of Rangoon, which is also supplying Slim's army in Thailand. And far from building pipelines on the Burma Road, right now every pioneer, labourer and piece of construction equipment the British can get their hands on will be somewhere around Myawaddy on the Burma-Thailand border, where Slim's army is currently dangling at the end of a single unsurfaced road over the border hills, with the monsoon coming on. This is where the Japanese built the Burma-Siam railway OTL, and the Brits may well have to do the same thing in the other direction, if they want to push into Thailand.

It's not at all guaranteed even that Chiang will get as much LL support TTL as he did OTL. The British have nothing to spare, and the Americans, with active fronts in far more accessible places, may decide that supplying China/basing bombers in China is not a high-priority objective.

The biggest service the Allies can do for Chiang is to draw off enough IJA strength from China that Ichi-Go never happens. Without the catastrophic loss of the Southern Chinese cities in 1944, the KLMT will be in a much strong position in the post-war.

If the road can carry 500 tons a day plus however many gallons of fuel through a pipeline, that’s 15,000 tons a month, close to three times the aim for the airbridge
500 tons is 200 deuce-and-a-half trucks, per day. Are there even that many trucks in Burma? And how many of them can be spared from supporting the fight in Thailand?
Only the Americans can afford the sort of logistical effort that would be needed to upgrade the Burma Road and run a major supply effort across it - and if they do it will be (as OTL) primarily to support USAAF operations in China, with only a small fraction to the Chinese.

Incidentally, even once the Ledo Road opened in 1945 OTL, the monthly tonnage moved on it never reached that carried by the airlift.

I think a lot of the far-east hinges on FIC. If the allies can grab FIC in '42/43, they can open a broad front on Japan's other continental possessions.
If the Allies can take even southern Indo-China, the war is basically over since Allied air/naval forces basing out of Saigon or Cam Ranh Bay can cut off any Japanese attempts to get oil home from whatever parts of Borneo they still hold. At which point the IJN is immobilised, Japanese air power is crippled, Japanese industry shuts down and what's left is mop-up. Basically it's the US submarine offensive of 1944-5 come early.
 
I do have to wonder what the post-war effect on Thailand is going to be. The Northern Line railway runs through Nakhor Sawan, so 'd expect a lot of work will go into modernising the stretch between there and Bangkok, plus a good, all-weather road between there and the Burma border.
As in repairing and potentially double tracking the railway between Nakhon Sawan and Bangkok perhaps...fair enough, the railway will need repair IOTL and ITTL anyway, whether those works could satisfy the British higher up remains to be seen.. and if those are not enough there perhaps still a need for a proper railway linking Burma and Thailand ITTL, which makes me wonder, is the reason the Death Railway was built along the chosen alignment due to the fact that it is the alignment that need the least engineering works or because there are also other factors as well...
And all free-of-charge to the Thai government. Oh, and another road stretching from the Malay border northwards.
Huh, there really isn't much information in regards to the OTL road development other than that the construction was completed in 1950 (and presumably inferred by the namesake of the road and Thai road naming scheme, started in 1946?)...

In any way, the consequences of an earlier construction of the road linking Bangkok to the Malayan border (and later the lack of Communists lurking around the countryside) meant that the Malay-Thai border area could have a potentially booming (war tourism) economy after the 40s...

with absolutely nothing that could stop them...right...?/s



P/s:
I've said it before in these sort of threads and I'll say it again - don't oversell the Burma Road. It is a single lane, unsurfaced track, impassable in the monsoon, winding through some extremely tough terrain with minimal infrastructure. And anything sent there has to come through the small, unmodernised port of Rangoon, which is also supplying Slim's army in Thailand. And far from building pipelines on the Burma Road, right now every pioneer, labourer and piece of construction equipment the British can get their hands on will be somewhere around Myawaddy on the Burma-Thailand border, where Slim's army is currently dangling at the end of a single unsurfaced road over the border hills, with the monsoon coming on.
The biggest service the Allies can do for Chiang is to draw off enough IJA strength from China that Ichi-Go never happens. Without the catastrophic loss of the Southern Chinese cities in 1944, the KLMT will be in a much strong position in the post-war.
With the potential labour shortage that would only ease after the war(but the demobilization could be dramatic)...perhaps the Burma Road could (at the very best) actually be playing a much greater role in the Civil War and the decades after that...?
 
yh the Japanese are fucked with the monsoon season here the british are only going to get stronger while the Japanese are going to feel the pinch of supplies without those captured british supplies OTL
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The Burma Road IOTL and ITTL.

The Burma Road was constructed without planning or surveys in 1937/38, by hand through some of the most remote and difficult terrain in the world, which was notorious for disease and hostile climatic conditions. Was a desperate attempt by the Nationalist Chinese to maintain a safe route to the outside world after the Japanese had conquered the majority of its ports. It was at best a muddy track that wound its way up and down mountainous terrain and around any and all obstacles, with at best primitive bridges, constructed from local timber. The vital importance of the road to the Nationalists only increased after the fall of France and the Japanese occupation of the north of Indochina, and their complete closure of the railway running between Indochina and China. It was the existence of this road that was one of the principal reason for the Japanese invasion of Burma, as they wanted it closed permanently. The capture of Burma and the subsequent occupation saw the road closed, and the Allies desperate to maintain contact between themselves and the Chinese, institute the air bridge. Which was very costly, in men, materials and equipment, airfields had to be built in India and China, and a route established to get the supplies from the underdeveloped and restricted ports in India, to the airfields. A route that was also being used by the British to support their ongoing campaign against the Japanese along the border with Burma. As Singapore and the DEI had been captured there were well founded fears that the Japanese Navy could interfere with shipping operations in the Indian Ocean. The aircraft selected to fly the supplies along the route to China, probably through some of the worst flying conditions in the world at the time. Were basically inadequate for the role, being adapted civil airliners and not deadicated military transports. It was only post war that the British and Americans developed deadicated military transport aircraft like the, Fairchild Flying Boxcar and the Blackburn Beverly, which had the ability to carry heavier cargo and vehicles without them having to be cut up and reassembled in China. And this operation distracted the Airforce from providing the British ground forces with air support, and the ability to transport troops from their bases to the combat zone, while evacuating wounded to hospitals. Yes the latter developed Ledo Road never managed to carry a higher tonnage than the well developed air bridge, before the need for it and the air bridge was removed by the Japanese surrender. But it was only in operation for a number of months and hadn’t really bedded in.

ITTL, things up until the failure of the Japanese to conjure Burma are essentially the same as the were IOTL, and the Burma Road is still basically a mud track winding its way to China. However the British will now have an opportunity to take measures to improve both the road and the management of it, some small and others requiring major investment in manpower and or materials. With Uncle Bill having successfully repulsed the attempted Japanese invasion of Burma and now as a result of his counterattack in Thailand at the end of a fragile supply line, he is going to be left alone to sort out the mess that are his logistics and prepare for the upcoming campaign after the monsoon season. While back in Burma the British will do what they do best establish four committees, each tasked with solving a particular issue. First and foremost is one deadicated to overseeing improvements to the Port of Rangoon, the second to improving the rail link between Rangoon and Myitkyina the start of the road, so that the increased tonnage and the supplies to support improvements and the workforce needed. Can be moved without major disruption to the vital services that need to be continued, such as support for the strategic exports, rice, rubber, minerals and timber. The third will look into the establishment of an air bridge from Myitkyina to Kunming in China, we are not talking about a major operation like the hump was, but rather using available local resources to supplement the road, and reduce the wastage of high value items carried on the road. Finally will be an oversight committee, to coordinate the work of a number of sub committees looking into ways of improving the Burma Road. Why subcommittees, because there are multiple factors that have to be examined, and the people involved require different skills. One of the first requirements is a quick and dirty survey of the road, both on the ground and from the air, we are not talking about teams of surveyors with theodolites, measuring poles and tape measures. While photo reconnaissance aircraft fly overhead taking reams of pictures to be assembled and plotted with added contour lines. Rather using local available resources, mostly light aircraft, and hand held cameras, basic pictures can be taken of the trace of the road and its immediate surrounds.

Why do this, the road was built without planning or any surveys, basically following existing tracks and smugglers routes, and with no consideration of substantial engineering work. It might be that looking at a picture of a section of the road, a mile or two to the left or right, is a very steep valley that could be crossed with a simple bridge, that saves miles of track that winds its way into and out of the valley. Or it could be that by diverting the road a short distance, and building two bridges at point A and B across narrow but steep valleys, a long section of ridge line could be accessed saving miles of road. And enabling this section to be two way, and have a rest stop included. The ability to improve the basic route and the road itself, will significantly impact the ability to use it. Add to this setting up a management system that insures that trucks setting out are fit and the drivers have some basic driving skills. Getting better control over the operation of the road, movements along it, and the dispatch of vehicles, and monitoring their progress, will go a long way towards better utilisation of the road. In addition the laying of a simple 6 inch pipe line alongside the road will reduce the amount of fuel that has to be transported along it, and increase the amount of fuel delivered to China. Thus freeing up capacity on the trucks for other goods, and increasing overall the amount of supplies delivered to China. At the same time more effort needs to be placed into securing loads for the return journey, especially vital strategic minerals. A sub committee should look into the availability of earth moving equipment in Burma, and acquiring more from the USA, the older equipment will be needed for the improvements of the railway and the Port of Rangoon, while the newer equipment should be divided between Slims requirements to improve his logistics infrastructure and road, with the majority going to Slim. Just five modern bulldozers will do wonders for the work required, and along with a couple of steam rollers, help to improve it tremendously. Acquiring more trucks is mostly just a question of time and awaiting their delivery from the US as US industry builds up its production capacity. Labour can be sourced locally and from India and China, thousands of Indian coolies sailed across each year to work in the Rangoon docks, and India as does China has a massive labour pool available. By early 1943, with suitable improvements to all of the areas involved, Port, Railway and Road, China should be receiving far more supplies than it did from just the air bridge IOTL. And while the road is not the ideal method of supplying China, capturing and reopening ports in China is number one, and capturing and reopening the railway between Indochina and China is second. Until this occurs the road is the best option available and every effort should be made to improve it.

RR.
 
On Burma Road versus the "Hump"

The Hump eventually did as much as Burma Road was originally projected to do (c. 10,000 tonnes per month) and even more towards the end of the war but with far greater dedication of resources, men and machines than a road link would require.

It's not going to completely change the war in China but an open (and as Ramp Rat says, improving) Burma road will strengthen the Nationalists and free up valuable transport aircraft for operations elsewhere in SE Asia (Indochina?)
 
Even building a narrow gauge railway alongside or on another route will enable more to be transported to China. Build it as much as possible to a standard gauge RR and then it would be less of a problem to upgrade it. You can also build a pipeline along side when you do the building of the railroad.
 
Even building a narrow gauge railway alongside or on another route will enable more to be transported to China. Build it as much as possible to a standard gauge RR and then it would be less of a problem to upgrade it. You can also build a pipeline along side when you do the building of the railroad.
The Burma-Yunnan railway was a thing. It never got finished iotl, with the fall of Burma, but here it would. That would significantly increase the tonnage to China.
Narrow gauge, certainly, but presumably all weather.

 
Holding Burma and the Port of Rangoon certainly does allow for the continued use of the Burma Road. Hopefully an improved and more weather resistant Road. Add in a shit ton of deuce and a half trucks and we'd have a big increase in tonnage carried. But holding Burma also means positive implications also for the Hump Airlift. Consider if the Hump Airlift could have been conducted under better conditions.


An idea of mine for a less costly Hump Airlift. Even better what if the transports were instead flying out of the British airfields near Rangoon. Shorter distance and better flying conditions. Just have to keep any Japanese fighters away.
 
There are many things that could be done to improve communications between Burma and China, whether it's improving the Burma Road, building a better road, building a railway or whatever. The issue is that, for the moment, the British are going to be focussing all their infrastructure efforts on improving communications from Burma to Thailand, to supply their army for the northern prong of the drive on Bangkok. And once Thailand is liberated, are the British (who never really cared about the Chinese) going to burn resources on a road they aren't using, just so the US can send more supplies to China?

The US could do it if they wanted to, but in this timeline, is the US going to devote the same level of resources to China-Burma-India as OTL, and even if they are, will they see breaking ground on a major construction project with a projected time to completion of maybe 18 months a worthwhile use of resources? Or will they decide that by the time the Burma-China link is open, they won't need it because they'll have bomber bases in the Philippines or Indochina and can resupply China more efficiently via Haiphong or Guangdong?

I don't think people appreciate just how far this timeline had diverged. We're in late May 1942. OTL, the Philippines, Singapore and the East Indies had all been lost, the British were being chased out of Northern Burma, the Australians were in a state of full-blown invasion panic and the Battle of Coral Sea had been fought to protect Port Moresby.
TTL, the British are on the offensive in Burma-Malaya-Thailand and it looks like ABDA may well hold the line at Java-Flores-Timor. This changes the US picture quite a lot. If the US has resources, especially airpower, available to deploy to South East Asia, the obvious place for it is on the Java line, not at the far end of a logistical nightmare in China. The East Indies, after all, are where the Japanese are making their major effort. If they can be stopped, well, going from Surabaja to Celebes to Mindanao to Manila, land-based air cover all the way, looks a lot more attractive than hopping from tiny atoll to tiny atoll, all the way across the Central Pacific. And if the Americans are planning to be in Manila or even Haiphong or Formosa by the end of 1943, what's the point of a New Burma Road that won't be ready until 1944?
 
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