You do know the some later OTL Cromwell's, due to weight saving as they were welded, had a maximum frontal armour thickness of 102mm? 4 inch is therefore very possible.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
The tone of your post doesn’t really show that though:
I don’t think you mean to, but you come across quite patronising when you volunteer to edit a sentence, as well as being demanding when you don’t agree with how something is written.
Oh… than... i am sorry to anyone if I sounded patronizing… I will try to be better.
I think I could start off by being less aggressively direct
Last edited:
2 May 1942. Kedah, Malaya.
allanpcameron
Donor
2 May 1942. Kedah, Malaya.
4/10th Baluch Regiment, like the rest of 10th Indian Brigade, was once again part of 5th Indian Division. For one particular NCO of the Regiment there had been a particularly warm reunion with 11th Bn RTR’s Lieutenant Stan Alden. While protecting Alden’s tank, Naik Fazal Ullah had been wounded, and the British officer had taken particular interest in Ullah’s recovery.
Promoted to Havildar, Ullah’s platoon had been attached to Alden’s troop of three Matilda II tanks, as protective infantry. Ullah’s devotion to Alden, fuelled partly by the chocolate that Alden shared from his rations, was not unquestioning. While Alden, and his crew, had been in a good few battles, the Indian NCO was still concerned about the way in which the British tanks could make themselves vulnerable to Japanese Infantry attacks. Though these attacks tended to be suicidal, the destruction of a tank was seen by the Indian troops as a stain on their reputation.
As most of Ullah’s platoon were a mixture of old hands and newly arrived novices, training with the tanks was necessary, and Alden was aware of just how far his own training had been honed by experience. The concept of the Infantry tank for which the Matilda II had been designed was being pushed to its limit in the fighting in Malaya. The lack of an HE round for the main gun and absence of a hull machine gun were well known deficiencies, but tanks’ presence was having an inordinate influence on the battles, some would argue they had saved Singapore.
Since the Indian III Corps had taken over from the Australians on the front line, Lieutenant-General Heath had made it clear that the enemy was to have no respite. While there was no overall Corps attack, the two forward Indian Divisions (5th & 11th) had been making raids, pushing forward wherever and whenever possible.
10th Brigade, with the support of a Squadron of 11th Bn RTR, including Alden’s troop, had been probing to the east of Alor Setar, looking for weak points in the Japanese positions. Earlier in the month a raid from Victoria Point had destroyed the railway and much of the road around Chumphon in Thailand. The British and Indian troops had also destroyed some Japanese supply dumps in the area before withdrawing. The intelligence gathering believed that the Japanese on the front line were in a poor position in terms of food and ammunition.
The horrors visited on the local Malays by the Japanese meant that information about Japanese positions and patrols was being fed regularly to the British forces by locals. Alden’s troop were looking to exploit some of that information. The Sungai Padang Terap formed much of the front line in the area, and a place where the tanks could ford the river safely had been made known. The information was that the area wasn’t particularly well defended by the Japanese. During the previous night the whole of 5th Indian Division had been making all sorts of noises and movements all along the front line, hiding the obvious sounds of tanks moving forward.
During the night Alden and Ullah had walked the path the tanks would take at dawn. The ford had been confirmed by earlier reconnaissance, by Alden wanted to check it from the point of view of the suitability for his tanks. He noted a couple of places that could cause problems and drew a sketch map to give to each of the tank drivers. Ullah agreed to have three of his men stay in position at points where the changes in direction would need to be taken. A platoon of the Baluch assault Company were already across the river, waiting to silence the few Japanese positions at the signal.
The Corps’ artillery gave its usual morning offering to the Japanese, and the RAF put on a show closer to the sea. The assault Company moved up quietly and when signalled that the Japanese positions had been silenced, moved across the river. Alden’s own tank led the other two down the path, and the three Baluch soldiers were present with red torches to mark the route. The depth of the ford was just at the limit of what the Matilda II could manage, and praying that there wouldn’t be any rain had been part of the build up to this morning’s movement.
All three tanks safely negotiated the crossing and set off in support of Battalion as it attempted to roll up the flank of the Japanese positions north of the river. After an hour Alden realised that none of his tanks had fired a shot. Progress had been unimpeded, except for a couple of points on the trail which had taken a few minutes to open up the path for the tanks. Alden reckoned they’d travelled about three miles from the ford, and when he came up to a Company HQ he jumped off the tank to find out what was happening. The Company Commander was an old India hand, who confirmed that the Battalion wasn’t finding anything more than a few manned outposts. It looked as if the main Japanese line had been pulled back, leaving just enough men to keep the illusion of being defended.
As the day progressed it became clear that the Japanese line, which was believed to be manned by a full Infantry Division was in fact only held by a Regiment, the equivalent of a British Army Brigade. Under the circumstance, Lieutenant General Heath ordered 5th Indian Division to expand its incursion and probe northwards towards the Thai frontier.
4/10th Baluch Regiment, like the rest of 10th Indian Brigade, was once again part of 5th Indian Division. For one particular NCO of the Regiment there had been a particularly warm reunion with 11th Bn RTR’s Lieutenant Stan Alden. While protecting Alden’s tank, Naik Fazal Ullah had been wounded, and the British officer had taken particular interest in Ullah’s recovery.
Promoted to Havildar, Ullah’s platoon had been attached to Alden’s troop of three Matilda II tanks, as protective infantry. Ullah’s devotion to Alden, fuelled partly by the chocolate that Alden shared from his rations, was not unquestioning. While Alden, and his crew, had been in a good few battles, the Indian NCO was still concerned about the way in which the British tanks could make themselves vulnerable to Japanese Infantry attacks. Though these attacks tended to be suicidal, the destruction of a tank was seen by the Indian troops as a stain on their reputation.
As most of Ullah’s platoon were a mixture of old hands and newly arrived novices, training with the tanks was necessary, and Alden was aware of just how far his own training had been honed by experience. The concept of the Infantry tank for which the Matilda II had been designed was being pushed to its limit in the fighting in Malaya. The lack of an HE round for the main gun and absence of a hull machine gun were well known deficiencies, but tanks’ presence was having an inordinate influence on the battles, some would argue they had saved Singapore.
Since the Indian III Corps had taken over from the Australians on the front line, Lieutenant-General Heath had made it clear that the enemy was to have no respite. While there was no overall Corps attack, the two forward Indian Divisions (5th & 11th) had been making raids, pushing forward wherever and whenever possible.
10th Brigade, with the support of a Squadron of 11th Bn RTR, including Alden’s troop, had been probing to the east of Alor Setar, looking for weak points in the Japanese positions. Earlier in the month a raid from Victoria Point had destroyed the railway and much of the road around Chumphon in Thailand. The British and Indian troops had also destroyed some Japanese supply dumps in the area before withdrawing. The intelligence gathering believed that the Japanese on the front line were in a poor position in terms of food and ammunition.
The horrors visited on the local Malays by the Japanese meant that information about Japanese positions and patrols was being fed regularly to the British forces by locals. Alden’s troop were looking to exploit some of that information. The Sungai Padang Terap formed much of the front line in the area, and a place where the tanks could ford the river safely had been made known. The information was that the area wasn’t particularly well defended by the Japanese. During the previous night the whole of 5th Indian Division had been making all sorts of noises and movements all along the front line, hiding the obvious sounds of tanks moving forward.
During the night Alden and Ullah had walked the path the tanks would take at dawn. The ford had been confirmed by earlier reconnaissance, by Alden wanted to check it from the point of view of the suitability for his tanks. He noted a couple of places that could cause problems and drew a sketch map to give to each of the tank drivers. Ullah agreed to have three of his men stay in position at points where the changes in direction would need to be taken. A platoon of the Baluch assault Company were already across the river, waiting to silence the few Japanese positions at the signal.
The Corps’ artillery gave its usual morning offering to the Japanese, and the RAF put on a show closer to the sea. The assault Company moved up quietly and when signalled that the Japanese positions had been silenced, moved across the river. Alden’s own tank led the other two down the path, and the three Baluch soldiers were present with red torches to mark the route. The depth of the ford was just at the limit of what the Matilda II could manage, and praying that there wouldn’t be any rain had been part of the build up to this morning’s movement.
All three tanks safely negotiated the crossing and set off in support of Battalion as it attempted to roll up the flank of the Japanese positions north of the river. After an hour Alden realised that none of his tanks had fired a shot. Progress had been unimpeded, except for a couple of points on the trail which had taken a few minutes to open up the path for the tanks. Alden reckoned they’d travelled about three miles from the ford, and when he came up to a Company HQ he jumped off the tank to find out what was happening. The Company Commander was an old India hand, who confirmed that the Battalion wasn’t finding anything more than a few manned outposts. It looked as if the main Japanese line had been pulled back, leaving just enough men to keep the illusion of being defended.
As the day progressed it became clear that the Japanese line, which was believed to be manned by a full Infantry Division was in fact only held by a Regiment, the equivalent of a British Army Brigade. Under the circumstance, Lieutenant General Heath ordered 5th Indian Division to expand its incursion and probe northwards towards the Thai frontier.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The Japanese assault on Malaya has failed, and their inability to provide the reinforcements and supplies their forces require, is really beginning to show. Other than local counter attacks, they are now in no condition to be a threat to the British in the region, and are basically going to be on the defensive from now on. However the British are not yet strong enough to take full advantage of the situation, nor are their intelligence agencies militarily and civilian developed enough to provide the full picture of what is happening. It’s going to take time and a lot of training to provide the equivalent of a Far Eastern LRDG, a Long Range Reconnaissance Group able to send patrols deep into Japanese held territory and send back information, on Japanese forces their positions, condition, and supply situation. At the same time there needs to be established a civilian equivalent established made up of police officers, former district officials and former planters/miners who can reach into the civilian population and extract similar information to that gathered by the LRRG, plus details of the Japanese administration, and potential spies who might be left behind in the event of a future advance. It’s going to take time and a lot of effort, but by the end of the year the British should have a very accurate picture of everything within 50 miles of the front line, and information on the general throughout the region up to the Chinese border.
RR.
RR.
The Japanese are discovering that no amount of Bushido Spirit can overcome poor logistics
Well....
The fact that the rate British advances seems to be slowed down, especially when compared to the advances made back in February, at least shows that the Japanese are competent enough to put some emphasis on its frontline defense here... and
as @Ramp-Rat put it...
P/s:
Yeah...I am pretty sure that is the most pro-British action the local people (which is usually apathetic at best, and fully opposed the British at worst) had done so far....
Or: the Imperial Japanese are discovering that no amount of Bushido Spirit can overcome the warrior spirit of Indian Army troops. This would allow the Imperial Japanese to continue to believe that logistics are a purely tertiary concern. Blaming the enemy for being too fiercesome is so much more convenient than having to revise one's policies and philosophies concerning logistics in the middle of a war to construct an Imperial Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Well, if sufficient Bushido Spirit can overcome any material inferiority, then clearly, the IJA is simply demonstrating insufficient Bushido Spirit.
Or, to put it another way, it's a skill issue.
Or a quantity issue... If the Indian Army is twice as fiercesome as the IJA, then clearly (to those in Tokyo looking to avoid having to inspect other issues) the IJA simply needs three times as many troops...
Why can't they just muster sufficient Bushido Spirit?
Was this raid conducted by the troops mentioned? Seems a hell of a distance for them to go.
Yamashita is probably the one IJA General sensible enough to know when to retreat and competent enough to execute it.