Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Derek Pullem
Donor
I'm more aligned with Cryhavoc101. Essentially the British army follows a Vickers route seven years earlier than TTL.
The starting point is the Vickers Model E / 6 tonner in 1928 and the Vickers Light Dragon (1929) and Medium Dragon Mk IV (1932) and their derivatives. The 6 tonner is developed into a lookalike of the Polish 7TP / 9TP with a 2 pdr gun for one version and a pom-pom for the alternate (sound familiar?). It also forms the base for the Medium Dragon Mk IV artillery tractor which goes on to spawn infantry carrier, SPAA and SPG versions. The Vickers Light proceeds as per OTL to deliver the Mk VI light tank and the universal carrier.
By 1937-8 a replacement for the 6 tonner is required and the CryHavoc101's 12 tonner / 6 pdr should be designed and coming in to service in 1940 with the 16 tonner / 3" two years later. Similar to TTL but the Dragon utility vehicles form the basis of a truly mechanised (rather than motorised) force much earlier.
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25 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 24
allanpcameron
Donor
25 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 24
Lieutenant-General Vyvyan Pope congratulated Major-General Frank Messervy (GOC 4th Indian Division) on an outstanding job. Pushing against German troops the Indians had managed not only to push the Germans back, but also, with the Divisional and Corps engineers, improve the road for 2nd Armoured Division and 2nd New Zealand, who would now attack towards Tarhuna.
Major-Generals Freyberg and Harold Charrington (GOCs 2nd New Zealand and 2nd Armoured Divisions) reported that they were ready. Charrington and Freyberg had worked together in Greece and had a good relationship, as did the 1st Armoured Brigade’s men with the New Zealanders. This would be quite a different type of battle from that in Greece. Here they would once again face the Germans, but they were better equipped and would be on the attack.
Originally it had been hoped to begin the attack on 20 November, but the RAF had had problems establishing functional landing grounds due to the storm, and the Royal Engineers had had to redo some of their work which had been washed away by the rain and subsequent floods. A German patrol had been intercepted by 3rd Indian Motor Brigade on the flank of 2nd Armoured Division, and so the hope of surprising the defenders of Tarhuna was presumed lost. The Corps’ artillery, along with the three Division’s Field Regiments had got themselves into position, so when both Pope and Godwin-Austin informed 8th Army that the two Corps were ready, General O’Connor gave the order to go.
The Royal Artillery had had plenty of practice over the last year in the Middle East, and between the two Corps, there were plenty of guns ready to hammer the Italian position and lines. In XXX Corps, 6th New Zealand Brigade led the way, with 1st Armoured Brigade (3rd, 4th Hussars, Kings Dragoon Guards), in close attendance. Advancing under the cover of the barrage, the Valiant I* tanks closed with the German positions at a steady fifteen miles per hour.
A number of German armoured cars were engaged by the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry acting in the reconnaissance role, ahead of the tanks. Major Sutherland, OC A Squadron, was at the forefront, his Squadron made up of Mark VI Light Tanks, universal carriers and some Marmon-Harrington Armoured Cars. Generally, the New Zealanders came off worse in these encounters, the German armoured cars tended to be better armed. Despite these losses, A Squadron did their job of finding the enemy. 24th Battalion of 6th Brigade were hot on the heels of the Cavalry, with A Squadron of Valiant I* tanks from 1st King’s Dragoon Guards supporting. Before long, German anti-tank guns were taking a toll on the advancing tanks, and machine guns and mortars on the infantry.
The men of 24th Battalion, working together with tanks, managed to force the covering force of the Germans back. A lot had been learned about cooperation between infantry and tanks, hard lessons that had cost many lives, but those lessons were paying off. On this occasion the SAAF also played a role, a Tomahawk squadron arrived overhead and plastered the German artillery line, allowing the 24th Battalion to retake the initiative, until they hit the main line of German resistance.
C Squadron of Valiant I* tanks of 1st KDG, with the infantry of 25th Battalion, had swung out to the left, where the Cavalry Regiment had noted what looked like the German flank. C Squadron supported the men of the 25th Battalion who put in an attack on the right flank of the German positions holding up the Brigade’s advance. With 24th and 25th Battalion and two Squadrons of tanks, the German line started to roll up.
The expectation had always been that a counter-attack, possibly with panzers, would be the German’s next move. HQ and B Squadrons of 1st KDG, along with 26th Battalion, with 31st and 32nd batteries of 7th Anti-tank Regiment were ready for just such an eventuality. The Cavalry Regiment’s Major Sutherland’s last act was to radio a waring of panzers moving towards the battle.
The men of 7th Anti-tank Regiment had all their 2-pdrs replaced that had been lost in Greece. Having had that experience there were two main differences to the way they operated now. Firstly, all the 2-pdrs were on portées, which they had exercised with for firing in both in the mounted and dismounted positions. Secondly, each Battery, in addition to the three troops of four 2-pdrs, also had an extra troop of 18-pdrs. These guns, adapted for use in an anti-tank role, were fitted with telescope and open sights. They were rather cumbersome, but because they could fire a HE shell as well as AP shot, provided a useful and versatile addition to the anti-tank resources.
This was the force that the German Panzer Battalion ran into. 24 2-pdr anti-tank guns, and eight 18-pdrs took an immediate toll on the German formation. The men of 26th Battalion’s C, D and HQ Companies, with attached Vickers HMG teams from 27th MG Battalion, protected the gunners who had elected to fire dismounted from the portées. It was the arrival of the 1st KDG’s Valiant I* that turned the battle. The Panzer IIs, which made up the majority of the German force, had no answer to the Valiant I* armour. Realising that he was in danger of losing his entire force, the German commander ordered his panzers to withdraw, which they did. The inclination of the 1st KDG to chase them had been trained out of them. The chances were that the tables would be turned on them as the panzers withdrew behind their own anti-tank screen. Later, thirty disabled panzers were found in the area, the rest having withdrawn in a westerly direction. Losses to the 1st KDG Valiant I* tanks in total were twenty-one, with another six needing simple repairs to get them running again. About half of the twenty-one tanks were complete write-offs, the others, if returned to a properly equipped depot, could be repaired.
The New Zealand 5th Brigade, along with 3rd Hussars would take over the push the next morning, while the men of 6th Brigade and 1st KDG spent the night prepared for another counter-attack which never came.
Lieutenant-General Vyvyan Pope congratulated Major-General Frank Messervy (GOC 4th Indian Division) on an outstanding job. Pushing against German troops the Indians had managed not only to push the Germans back, but also, with the Divisional and Corps engineers, improve the road for 2nd Armoured Division and 2nd New Zealand, who would now attack towards Tarhuna.
Major-Generals Freyberg and Harold Charrington (GOCs 2nd New Zealand and 2nd Armoured Divisions) reported that they were ready. Charrington and Freyberg had worked together in Greece and had a good relationship, as did the 1st Armoured Brigade’s men with the New Zealanders. This would be quite a different type of battle from that in Greece. Here they would once again face the Germans, but they were better equipped and would be on the attack.
Originally it had been hoped to begin the attack on 20 November, but the RAF had had problems establishing functional landing grounds due to the storm, and the Royal Engineers had had to redo some of their work which had been washed away by the rain and subsequent floods. A German patrol had been intercepted by 3rd Indian Motor Brigade on the flank of 2nd Armoured Division, and so the hope of surprising the defenders of Tarhuna was presumed lost. The Corps’ artillery, along with the three Division’s Field Regiments had got themselves into position, so when both Pope and Godwin-Austin informed 8th Army that the two Corps were ready, General O’Connor gave the order to go.
The Royal Artillery had had plenty of practice over the last year in the Middle East, and between the two Corps, there were plenty of guns ready to hammer the Italian position and lines. In XXX Corps, 6th New Zealand Brigade led the way, with 1st Armoured Brigade (3rd, 4th Hussars, Kings Dragoon Guards), in close attendance. Advancing under the cover of the barrage, the Valiant I* tanks closed with the German positions at a steady fifteen miles per hour.
A number of German armoured cars were engaged by the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry acting in the reconnaissance role, ahead of the tanks. Major Sutherland, OC A Squadron, was at the forefront, his Squadron made up of Mark VI Light Tanks, universal carriers and some Marmon-Harrington Armoured Cars. Generally, the New Zealanders came off worse in these encounters, the German armoured cars tended to be better armed. Despite these losses, A Squadron did their job of finding the enemy. 24th Battalion of 6th Brigade were hot on the heels of the Cavalry, with A Squadron of Valiant I* tanks from 1st King’s Dragoon Guards supporting. Before long, German anti-tank guns were taking a toll on the advancing tanks, and machine guns and mortars on the infantry.
The men of 24th Battalion, working together with tanks, managed to force the covering force of the Germans back. A lot had been learned about cooperation between infantry and tanks, hard lessons that had cost many lives, but those lessons were paying off. On this occasion the SAAF also played a role, a Tomahawk squadron arrived overhead and plastered the German artillery line, allowing the 24th Battalion to retake the initiative, until they hit the main line of German resistance.
C Squadron of Valiant I* tanks of 1st KDG, with the infantry of 25th Battalion, had swung out to the left, where the Cavalry Regiment had noted what looked like the German flank. C Squadron supported the men of the 25th Battalion who put in an attack on the right flank of the German positions holding up the Brigade’s advance. With 24th and 25th Battalion and two Squadrons of tanks, the German line started to roll up.
The expectation had always been that a counter-attack, possibly with panzers, would be the German’s next move. HQ and B Squadrons of 1st KDG, along with 26th Battalion, with 31st and 32nd batteries of 7th Anti-tank Regiment were ready for just such an eventuality. The Cavalry Regiment’s Major Sutherland’s last act was to radio a waring of panzers moving towards the battle.
The men of 7th Anti-tank Regiment had all their 2-pdrs replaced that had been lost in Greece. Having had that experience there were two main differences to the way they operated now. Firstly, all the 2-pdrs were on portées, which they had exercised with for firing in both in the mounted and dismounted positions. Secondly, each Battery, in addition to the three troops of four 2-pdrs, also had an extra troop of 18-pdrs. These guns, adapted for use in an anti-tank role, were fitted with telescope and open sights. They were rather cumbersome, but because they could fire a HE shell as well as AP shot, provided a useful and versatile addition to the anti-tank resources.
This was the force that the German Panzer Battalion ran into. 24 2-pdr anti-tank guns, and eight 18-pdrs took an immediate toll on the German formation. The men of 26th Battalion’s C, D and HQ Companies, with attached Vickers HMG teams from 27th MG Battalion, protected the gunners who had elected to fire dismounted from the portées. It was the arrival of the 1st KDG’s Valiant I* that turned the battle. The Panzer IIs, which made up the majority of the German force, had no answer to the Valiant I* armour. Realising that he was in danger of losing his entire force, the German commander ordered his panzers to withdraw, which they did. The inclination of the 1st KDG to chase them had been trained out of them. The chances were that the tables would be turned on them as the panzers withdrew behind their own anti-tank screen. Later, thirty disabled panzers were found in the area, the rest having withdrawn in a westerly direction. Losses to the 1st KDG Valiant I* tanks in total were twenty-one, with another six needing simple repairs to get them running again. About half of the twenty-one tanks were complete write-offs, the others, if returned to a properly equipped depot, could be repaired.
The New Zealand 5th Brigade, along with 3rd Hussars would take over the push the next morning, while the men of 6th Brigade and 1st KDG spent the night prepared for another counter-attack which never came.
Britain was continuously working on a new tank since 1929 anyway, first the Vickers 16-tonner, then A7. That they did not get combat tanks as early as other countries is not because of a lack of development, but rather because the British Army was unable to decide what it wanted and didn't freeze a design to at least get an early small fleet for experiments and minimum combat capacity in the early-mid 30s (Vickers Medium Mk 2 being increasingly obsolete within a couple years of its introduction).
What is interesting is that technically, A9/A10 are an extrapolation of the Vickers Model E with a similar suspension type but a more powerful and better placed and cooled engine, and a larger crew compartment to accept the 3-man 2 pounder turret. Much in the same way the Italian M11 and M13 tanks were evolutions of the Vickers 6ton the Italians purchased for testing. However, the start of development happened following the failure of the A7 Fast Medium (with the turret being derived from the A7 one), which is why the timeline is so late for this vehicle. Having the A9 as a parallel program/successor program to A6 or parallel to A7 with similar requirements could have done a lot to bring the A9 sooner.
So the tankers have learned about not running onto AT gun screens? That's a good lesson to pick up.
Some random thought: what made John Valentine Carden so well-known on this board? Is it due to this thread, the general prevalence of British people on this board (and resulting UK-focused threads) or due to the tragic early death of Carden?
After all, we don't see TLs or comments on Lavirotte, Molinié, Gladeon Barnes, Knox, Porsche, Morozov and co...
After all, we don't see TLs or comments on Lavirotte, Molinié, Gladeon Barnes, Knox, Porsche, Morozov and co...
I'm afraid you're going to have to provide some first names there, as other than Barnes and Porsche, I'm struggling to locate the individual in question on wikipedia (I don't think the two French gentlemen even have pages, while Knox and Morozov are common enough surnames to be associated with hundreds of people).
Carden's early death might help, as might his long association with armoured vehicles (for 10 years prior to his death, including the Carden-Loyd Tankette, and the Vickers 6-ton, both of which were commercially successful, spawning multiple licences, copycat designs, or inspirations).
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Pierre Lavirotte (lead engineer at ARL), Joseph Molinié (lead engineer at AMX between 1936 and the 50s), Alexander Morozov (lead engineer of Kharkov tank factory), Harry or Henry Knox, designer of various components for the US Ordnance in the 30's (designer of VVSS and HVSS namely)
I think the question is, how many vehicles did each of those men design?
With the German forces, which the Italian commanders were conting on as their mobile reserve, now partially rolled up and badly damaged, this very much looks like the the last major battle before someone crosses the border of Outremerine France.
Except is wasn't, a fighting vehicle. It was not designed as one and should never have been used as one. There used to be a question asked British Army recruits, "Is the Universal Carrier an armoured fighting vehicle?" The correct answer was no, it wasn't. It was designed as a general run about with some armoured protection on it and a few weapons but whenever it was employed as an AFV it usually lost the battle. Be it in the western desert, the Balkans or New Guinea, every time it was pressed into being an AFV it was destroyed. It was essentially a tracked "Jeep" with a small amount of armour it.
26 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 25
allanpcameron
Donor
26 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 25
While XXX Corps had been making progress the previous day against German opposition, XIII Corps were fighting a more set-piece battle against the Italians. The previous day had consisted largely of artillery barrages and probing attacks to find weaknesses in the Italian positions.
It was 11th Hussars who found the weakness. As XIII Corps’ dedicated reconnaissance regiment, A Squadron were working about fifteen miles from the coast, they had followed a motor track towards the town of Cussabat. With the Hussars keeping watch, the infantry of 2nd Rifle Brigade, part of 7th Motor Brigade (as the old 7th Support Group had been renamed), moved up during the night. Behind them were 8th Hussars in their Valiant I tanks, along with attached artillery and anti-tank batteries. This force would be the spearpoint for the rest of 7th Armoured Division. For the majority of Operation Crusader, the 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades, with the 7th Motor Brigade had been working with the 6th and 50th Infantry Divisions. Major-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott had argued for the next phase, that his Division should fight as a whole, breaking through the enemy and exploiting the breach. General O’Connor agreed and much of the probing for the last week or so was to find somewhere which could be attacked, broken, and then have the armoured forces run loose in the enemy’s rear.
The town of Cussabat had a wadi that ran out of the hills on the north of the town, and this wadi was what the Italians had used in front of their line from Cussabat to Homs. The wadi was the intersection between two Italian forces. The 2nd Libyan Legion held the town, and the line going towards Tarhuna, while the newly arrived 52nd Torino Infantry Division held the higher ground and part of the line going towards Homs and the sea.
The RAF had been requested to bomb the town in the early morning, and two squadrons of Marylands, with a squadron of Hurricanes escorting them, had indeed turned up at the right time and the right place. The reputation of the RAF among the British soldiers was beginning to improve after the disappointments of the evacuation of Dunkirk and the Greek campaign. As soon as the bombers withdrew, 3rd Royal Horse Artillery Regiment, equipped with the Birch Self-propelled guns, began a barrage, under the cover of which 2nd Rifle Brigade and a squadron (14 Valiant I* and 2 Valiant I*CS) of 8th Hussars tanks moved forward.
Between the bombing and shelling the approach of the British tanks infantry went unnoticed until almost the last moment. The tanks of 8th Hussars roared out of a smoke screen and advanced using the Besa co-axial machine guns to keep the defenders’ heads down. The men of the Rifle Brigade approached alongside the tanks, each of the assaulting platoons working with two tanks, the new phone on the rear of the tank into the turret being particularly useful.
The Blackshirts of 2nd Libyan Legion were basically Militia troops made up of Italian colonists. The approach of tanks that were immune from their anti-tank guns, having had the attentions of the RAF and 24 25-pdrs, was just too much for them. A few fought bravely, but the rest ran, throwing away their weapons to try to move more quickly. The rout of the fascist troops gave C Squadron of 8th Hussars, which was following the first wave of the assault, to swing right behind the hills on which elements of the 52nd Torino Infantry Division were dug in. The 81st Infantry Regiment, holding that part of the line had expected to find that their flank would be vulnerable with the Blackshirts there. General Manzi, (GOC 52nd ID) had deployed extra mortars and artillery support to the Battalion of Fusiliers holding the area.
Major Tim Fitzgeorge Parker (OC C Squadron 8th Hussars) had no infantry support as he passed through the town and headed towards where the Italian artillery lines were expected to be. The speed of the Valiant I* became the vital factor in this, the ground allowing the tanks to spread out and close quickly with the Italians. There were some 47mm anti-tank guns deployed to protect the mortars and artillery positions from just such an eventuality. One managed a hit on a tank’s tracks that stopped it. The other fifteen tanks in the squadron charged on, making liberal use of their co-axial machine guns as they smashed through the Italian defences.
Lt-Col Kilkelly (CO 8th Hussars), when informed by Fitzgeorge Parker that he was making progress, ordered his last squadron to follow up, and arranged that 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps followed the tanks, carried in lorries. The tanks would make a good job of unseating the Italian defenders, but the infantry would be needed to take and hold the ground.
The men of the Rifle Brigade continued to chase the Libyan Legion men, all the while widening the breach in the Italian line. When news of this reached Major-General Gott, he ordered the rest of 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Motor Brigade to move as quickly as possible. 4th Armoured Brigade would follow through, moving north towards the sea, cutting off the rest of Italian forces and opening up the coast road to Tripoli.
While XXX Corps had been making progress the previous day against German opposition, XIII Corps were fighting a more set-piece battle against the Italians. The previous day had consisted largely of artillery barrages and probing attacks to find weaknesses in the Italian positions.
It was 11th Hussars who found the weakness. As XIII Corps’ dedicated reconnaissance regiment, A Squadron were working about fifteen miles from the coast, they had followed a motor track towards the town of Cussabat. With the Hussars keeping watch, the infantry of 2nd Rifle Brigade, part of 7th Motor Brigade (as the old 7th Support Group had been renamed), moved up during the night. Behind them were 8th Hussars in their Valiant I tanks, along with attached artillery and anti-tank batteries. This force would be the spearpoint for the rest of 7th Armoured Division. For the majority of Operation Crusader, the 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades, with the 7th Motor Brigade had been working with the 6th and 50th Infantry Divisions. Major-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott had argued for the next phase, that his Division should fight as a whole, breaking through the enemy and exploiting the breach. General O’Connor agreed and much of the probing for the last week or so was to find somewhere which could be attacked, broken, and then have the armoured forces run loose in the enemy’s rear.
The town of Cussabat had a wadi that ran out of the hills on the north of the town, and this wadi was what the Italians had used in front of their line from Cussabat to Homs. The wadi was the intersection between two Italian forces. The 2nd Libyan Legion held the town, and the line going towards Tarhuna, while the newly arrived 52nd Torino Infantry Division held the higher ground and part of the line going towards Homs and the sea.
The RAF had been requested to bomb the town in the early morning, and two squadrons of Marylands, with a squadron of Hurricanes escorting them, had indeed turned up at the right time and the right place. The reputation of the RAF among the British soldiers was beginning to improve after the disappointments of the evacuation of Dunkirk and the Greek campaign. As soon as the bombers withdrew, 3rd Royal Horse Artillery Regiment, equipped with the Birch Self-propelled guns, began a barrage, under the cover of which 2nd Rifle Brigade and a squadron (14 Valiant I* and 2 Valiant I*CS) of 8th Hussars tanks moved forward.
Between the bombing and shelling the approach of the British tanks infantry went unnoticed until almost the last moment. The tanks of 8th Hussars roared out of a smoke screen and advanced using the Besa co-axial machine guns to keep the defenders’ heads down. The men of the Rifle Brigade approached alongside the tanks, each of the assaulting platoons working with two tanks, the new phone on the rear of the tank into the turret being particularly useful.
The Blackshirts of 2nd Libyan Legion were basically Militia troops made up of Italian colonists. The approach of tanks that were immune from their anti-tank guns, having had the attentions of the RAF and 24 25-pdrs, was just too much for them. A few fought bravely, but the rest ran, throwing away their weapons to try to move more quickly. The rout of the fascist troops gave C Squadron of 8th Hussars, which was following the first wave of the assault, to swing right behind the hills on which elements of the 52nd Torino Infantry Division were dug in. The 81st Infantry Regiment, holding that part of the line had expected to find that their flank would be vulnerable with the Blackshirts there. General Manzi, (GOC 52nd ID) had deployed extra mortars and artillery support to the Battalion of Fusiliers holding the area.
Major Tim Fitzgeorge Parker (OC C Squadron 8th Hussars) had no infantry support as he passed through the town and headed towards where the Italian artillery lines were expected to be. The speed of the Valiant I* became the vital factor in this, the ground allowing the tanks to spread out and close quickly with the Italians. There were some 47mm anti-tank guns deployed to protect the mortars and artillery positions from just such an eventuality. One managed a hit on a tank’s tracks that stopped it. The other fifteen tanks in the squadron charged on, making liberal use of their co-axial machine guns as they smashed through the Italian defences.
Lt-Col Kilkelly (CO 8th Hussars), when informed by Fitzgeorge Parker that he was making progress, ordered his last squadron to follow up, and arranged that 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps followed the tanks, carried in lorries. The tanks would make a good job of unseating the Italian defenders, but the infantry would be needed to take and hold the ground.
The men of the Rifle Brigade continued to chase the Libyan Legion men, all the while widening the breach in the Italian line. When news of this reached Major-General Gott, he ordered the rest of 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Motor Brigade to move as quickly as possible. 4th Armoured Brigade would follow through, moving north towards the sea, cutting off the rest of Italian forces and opening up the coast road to Tripoli.
allanpcameron
Donor
Off on holiday to Crete. So I'm afraid no updates for a couple of weeks.
In case you are wondering, I've been using the New Zealander's official history for some of this, especially this map.:
In case you are wondering, I've been using the New Zealander's official history for some of this, especially this map.:
Even if the Axis forces do make for the Tunisian border, I can't imagine many will have the speed to actually reach it before being rolled up, never mind the potential unreliability of Weygand.
Actually, if Weygand does decided to throw in with the British, that will be a major boost, allowing fast shipping through the Mediterranean almost a year-and-a-half ahead of OTL, which will radically speed up shipping to the Far East.
Oh, and enjoy your holiday!
Actually, if Weygand does decided to throw in with the British, that will be a major boost, allowing fast shipping through the Mediterranean almost a year-and-a-half ahead of OTL, which will radically speed up shipping to the Far East.
Oh, and enjoy your holiday!
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