Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Disagree. The Ordinace QF 2-pounder was adequate for only the AT task. A 3"/75mm HV tank gun, with both AT & HE rounds would have been better. They had AA guns available that could have been developed into these. As for the French 75, the Yanks did eventually use that for their tanks.
Doesn't matter what the best gun available is, you have to be able to fit the damn thing in the turret.

Again, see my above comments. Build enough tanks with 3" guns during the 1930s and you wouldn't need a bodged together conversion because the 3"/75mm would be standard. The backwards step to 40mm was an idiotic move based on flawed doctrinal thinking.
Sure, if you have a huge industry in place to support it, and the money to finance it. Unfortunately, most countries at the time had neither.

Yes, I do. I also know that the 3" guns they used in WW1 were capable of being developed into a far better tank gun than the Ordinace QF 2-pounder.
Requiring a bigger turret, and thus a bigger, and much more expensive tank.

Agree. Flawed doctrine, including using the gunners shoulder to stabilize the gun
Shoulder-stabilised worked with the 2-pounder, and was faster than adjusting the weapon mechanically.

Not missing the point at all. Bad political & financial decisions, including a combination of a lack of finance, post-war austerity, entrenched conservatism and accepting German trade goods in reparations, resulted in a detrimental loss of capacity in British industrial production. These decisions were compounded by the Great Depression, which was itself made worse by government austerity cuts, which further starved needed funds from both British industry and the military. Austerity policies always worsen an economic crisis. Something along the lines of the US New Deal could have injected much needed cash into the economy, rebuilt degraded infrastructure (such as railways that were too narrow), and allowed the military to modernize earlier. This is because a cash economy requires cash to be in circulation, in order to grow.
It's not as easy as spending money to buy your way out of poverty.
 
It is difficult to give a firm answer, Chamberlain & Ellis British and American Tanks of WW2 says yes to co-axial, as does Tanks Encyclopedia. The Official Australian History however says the coaxial was eliminated. Now, that may have been in the AC1 trial of the 25-pdr, it doesn't mention it in AC3. I was thinking that since the Aussies are getting Stuarts and Grants, that they might move to a .30 Browning, just as the Canadians did with the Ram. I would imagine the Browning would take up less space than the Vickers as originally used.
Allan.
The official history is wrong in that respect, it is not too surprising as it is a higher level "story of the war" a minor mistake here and there is understandable. The AC3 carries something like 2,500 rounds of belted .303, there's no use for that other than in a coax Vickers. There's another 900 rounds for the Bren in magazines.

I don't recall seeing anything about Australian production of .30 cal ammunition, If you really want to use a Browning maybe go with the .303 version for Australia? The RAAF were using them.
 
Everyone had a hatful of untested (and mostly bad) theories for tank design and deployment in the 1930s and not enough money or resources to test them.
The British plan for infantry/cavalry tanks was no worse than most, even though (with hindsight) they were planning on refighting 1918 with 1938 kit.
Where I do hold them guilty is not updating the doctrine in the early war when it was clear it wasn't working. That they were still ordering slow, heavily armoured infantry support tanks with no HE capacity in 1942-3 is baffling, as is their failure to ever develop an assault gun on German/Soviet model.

Requiring a bigger turret, and thus a bigger, and much more expensive tank.
And just as important, a bigger engine to push it. When your best available engine tops out around 200hp, it's a case of speed, armour, firepower, pick one.
Sure, with 20/20 hindsight they missed a major trick not researching high-capacity diesels in the early 1930s.

Shoulder-stabilised worked with the 2-pounder, and was faster than adjusting the weapon mechanically.
Fire-on-the-move was one of those ahead of its time ideas that looked great in exercises and failed to pan out in practice. By the time tank suspensions had become good enough to make it practical, tank guns had grown enough to make automatic stabilisation essential.

It's not as easy as spending money to buy your way out of poverty.
For all the hype surrounding the New Deal, Britain recovered from the Great Depression significantly faster than the US - the economy returned to growth (and unemployment began to fall) in 1932, though recovery was patchy. Unemployment was back to pre-Depression levels by 1937 - before serious rearmament began. And hence rearmament was was hampered by shortages of factory capacity and skilled labour.
 
Conventional Economic wisdom in the interwar period to deal with depressions and recessions was to cut back on Govt spending, not spend more. The idea of a balanced budget was paramount. It took a long while before Keynesian economics was accepted as even a possible way out and even then there was a huge group of nay-sayers.
And of course, the war to end wars was only a few years in the past, and the League of Nations was going to solve all problems without any military action needed.
And in the UK the ten year rule applied.

To which it could be responded that conventional economics should have resulted in a single universal tank mass produced to generate economies of scale, instead of a myriad of small batch specialized cruiser and infantry tanks.
 
To which it could be responded that conventional economics should have resulted in a single universal tank mass produced to generate economies of scale, instead of a myriad of small batch specialized cruiser and infantry tanks.
Maybe, but there wasn't an obvious conflict in the early part of the decade, Japan's taking of Manchuria notwithstanding, so why waste money on a frippery you don't need when you have a thousand seemingly better things you could do with that money?
 
Last edited:
As has been said the problem was a combination of poorly designed armoured vehicles and outdated doctrine. Unfortunately the doctrine was written and promoted by both staff officers and general officers who for the most part were either Guards, Artillery or they were 'Donkey Whoopers' This is the disparaging phrase used by the Royal Tank Regiment which was the only technically minded armoured troops that the British Army had for the Cavalry. The Cavalry were also the main proponent of the use of light tanks and cruiser tanks and we know where that led!!
 
For all the hype surrounding the New Deal, Britain recovered from the Great Depression significantly faster than the US - the economy returned to growth (and unemployment began to fall) in 1932, though recovery was patchy. Unemployment was back to pre-Depression levels by 1937 - before serious rearmament began. And hence rearmament was was hampered by shortages of factory capacity and skilled labour.

Mainly helped by the fact that unlike the US the UK didn't kneecap itself with Smith-Hawley Act style tariffs and as a result had a reasonably swift all things considered trade based recovery. The New Deal only worked in the US because it was the only game in town.
 
Except they DID have wartime experience on the need for good HE throwers. Its why they built 'male' tanks in WW1.
No they built male tanks because they did not know what they needed , they found female ones ( MG only ) were more useful for attacking trenches. Only when German tanks turned up did they need an anti-armour version ( hence hermaphrodite tanks being created by swopping a sponsion ).
 
**** INBOUND RANT **** NO OFFENSE INTENDED **** INTENDED TARGET ARE THE MORONS OF A 100 YEARS AGO ****

I have NEVER understood why a tank designed for infantry support would be fitted with a gun that had no practical HE round. And a 40mm main gun was a step backward, although a 40mm auto-cannon might have made some sense. But the WW1 tanks had 3" guns, which meant they had the damn technology, so WHY didn't they build the damn tanks with a 3"/75mm-ish main gun (in a turret, NOT a sponson), and issue both high velocity AP rounds and lower velocity HE rounds. If they had, then they would have had a tank capable of actually supporting the damn infantry against tanks, entrenched positions, bunkers and artillery. And screw the "but our rail network won't allow a wider turret ring" argument. There was a depression on. Spend some damn money, stimulate the economy, employ some navvies & upgrade that damned rail network.

Back to the thread:

As for the arguments that the 2 pounder is/was all that was needed to kill Japanese tanks, and that anything else was overkill... who effing cares? I don't, and for two very good reasons.

1) In war, overkill is a good thing.
2) The Japanese built extremely effective bunkers (as did the Germans). As mentioned above, I want a tank that can also smash bunkers and trenches apart to make life easier for the infantry. A solid shot 2lbs AP round ain't doing shit against those, and neither is a 40mm HE round that is basically a grenade.

**** apologies for the rant. I really needed to get that out of my system. ****
The Treasury had released money to fund an excellent new anti tank gun for the infantry ie the 2 pounder. There were no production tank guns in hand in Britain and the army did not have the priority to get a new one but could get a tank version of the 2 pounder off the production line and it was a period excellent tank killer. The close support alternatives were howitzers which, like mortars, used a high angle low velocity delivery. Near impossible to hit a moving target or one with uncertain range unless one is very close. Try throwing a piece of gravel at a small can 5 metres away compared to hitting it with an air rifle. Hence the normal round for the close support gun was smoke which could be delivered with ease and could support infantry or armour by either blinding defence or concealing one’s own position or movement. In the jungle situation the howitzer is right up close to the target so it can deliver HE quite adequately. The difference is also shown by British HE 2 pounder rounds being nose fused to explode as they hit an anti tank gun emplaced in the open or in light woodland. The Australian one was base fused to penetrate a dug in protected position and then explode inside. Both were right answers to different problems. For anti tank guns the AP round was recommended to be aimed to hit just in front of the anti tank gun as the ricocheting solid shot spinning wildly into the gun/crew was thought to be at least as effective as the small HE charge would have been. Whether that advice was sound I leave to others. The later 95mm CS gun was an attempt to maximise the HE round from a 25 pounder breech with minimum recoil force and movement so it still functioned as a howitzer.

I think that people tend to think of the 3” and 3.7” CS howitzers as if they were SP field guns. They are more akin to mortars and suffer the same limitations. Not to mention being able to stow far fewer rounds than 2 pounder ones. Given the financial constraints and existing production availability, the army built a doctrine around what they could have. Smoke is a far more useful option in action than people think but needs training to maintain the screen and uses up horrendous amounts of ammunition to keep it up. I do wonder if a larger proportion of CS tanks (and resupply to hand) with aggressive use of smoke, together with Littlejohn adaptors and ammunition would have made the doctrine work better than IOTL. With appropriate training for officers of squadron rank upwards. It might have filled in the gap until the 6 pounder arrived.

My Yeomanry forebears in their Daimler armoured cars did not see the 2 pounder HE round as an AT gun killer. That was for the co ax to suppress whilst you ran away screened by smoke. The HE was for soft targets. The Littlejohn rounds being fired without the screw on adaptor so that HE could be fired as required. The AP round was for enemy light armour. For AT gun one ran away and called up the support squadron, mortars or RAF. But this was 1945 not 1939.
 
Last edited:
As has been said the problem was a combination of poorly designed armoured vehicles and outdated doctrine. Unfortunately the doctrine was written and promoted by both staff officers and general officers who for the most part were either Guards, Artillery or they were 'Donkey Whoopers' This is the disparaging phrase used by the Royal Tank Regiment which was the only technically minded armoured troops that the British Army had for the Cavalry. The Cavalry were also the main proponent of the use of light tanks and cruiser tanks and we know where that led!!
Actually the tank requirements were set by tank fanatics such as Hobart.
 
The difference is also shown by British HE 2 pounder rounds being nose fused to explode as they hit an anti tank gun emplaced in the open or in light woodland. The Australian one was base fused to penetrate a dug in protected position and then explode inside. Both were right answers to different problems.
There's no available evidence that such an Australian round exists. The solution Australia arrived at for which there is evidence is all but identical to the British, a nose fuzed 2 pounder HE shell.
 

marathag

Banned
The 2lb 40 mm high velocity gun was perfect for the infantry AT task.

The 57mm naval gun was a better gun with a useful HE round for the inter war period. The 57mm could be improved easily and if the Naval Nordenfeld gun is to be believed the muzzle Velocity should be over 700m/s. this is sufficent to be a good early war hole puncher.

The French 75 is really the yardstick by which HE capacity should be measured. WW1 57mm guns......WW2 37mm/40mm/47mm/50mm etc. this is going backwards.
37mm/40mm had the theoretical advantage of being an accurate, flat shooting piece that was light and handy as a towed AT gun, for the crew manhandled it around or even move it short distances without a Prime Mover near. Ammunition was similarly portable, each round similar in size and weight to a Soda bottle.
But once you have a mobile chassis to move a gun around, the weight savings from a 37mm sytem to a 50 or 57mm is hardly worth it.
Or with the UK, the 2 pdr was a good gun for punching hole in plate, but had a heavy and expensive 360° mount, and then the choice to avoid HE rounds, as HE was for Artillery, not Infantry or Armored groups.
Even as the US decided to go with the new 37mm, some in Ordnance were testing the short, low velocity 75mm field gun, and found regular HE was devastating to light AFVs, literally tearing them apart rather than punching neat 1.5" holes thru them. It did have accuracy issues, from the short barrel and overall low MV.

So to me, almost criminal that making field guns mobile were ignored so much in the 1930s.
The Soviets were in the lead here, with having both a 45mm with AP and usable HE, with larger tanks with a 76mm.
 

marathag

Banned
Requiring a bigger turret, and thus a bigger, and much more expensive tank.
The US M1 Medium of 1928, 21 tons, 3 man turret.
mediumtankm1front.jpg

57mm gun, coax 30 and cupola with a .30 for the TC.
Then the US got dazzled by Walter Christie and his super fast lightly armored and armed tanks, and went down that rabbit hole for the early 1930s.
 
Actually the tank requirements were set by tank fanatics such as Hobart.
Hobart was Commander of the Mobil Experimental force in 1934, then when that was disbanded by War Office he was appointed Deputy Director of Staff Duties (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) yet he was responsible for formulating and then inspecting armoured vehicle training not the actual vehicle design or procurement. He had to fight for resources which were in short supply. Remember the army in this time is personnel heavy , yet equipment light. The vast majority of military expenditure is spent in the inter-war year on the RN , RAF and then the Army in that order.
 
24 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 23
24 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 23

The Italian Army had planned to send an Expeditionary Corps to support Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The losses in East and North Africa had left Mussolini’s military advisors arguing that Libya needed to be reinforced rather than sending ill-equipped troops to Russia. With a great deal of reluctance, Mussolini agreed, and despite the losses in shipping across the Mediterranean, most of the men two Divisions (50th Regina, 52nd Torino Infantry Divisions) arrived to reinforce the remaining Italian troops. Not all their heavy equipment had arrived, and very little fuel had made it through the British blockade.

When the new troops arrived, they had been immediately placed in the defensive line stretching from Homs on the coast to Tarhuna inland. The remains of the German Afrika Corps, based around Tarhuna, provided the only mobile force on that flank. The 25th Bologna Division was dug in around Homs, while the two newly arrived Divisions were spread out over the very long front. The Border Guard units that had previously faced west against the French in Tunisia had been stripped and sent east to bolster the line that had to protect Tripoli. The Blackshirts’ 1st and 2nd Libyan Legions were also part of the defensive line, and the Italian army units on either side of them looked on their flanks with dismay.

The men who had arrived in Libya immediately picked up the sense of defeatism that had infected Libyan High Command. General Ettore Bastico, Commander-in-Chief North Africa was still trying to exude confidence, but without any real hope. Desertions were mounting, especially among the Libyan troops, and large numbers of Italian families that had come to Libya to colonise it were desperate for any places on ships bound for Italy, despite the danger of the crossing.

The remaining German forces had been informed that they could expect no more reinforcements, even if it were possible to send them over the Mediterranean. It was clear to Berlin that there would be no point throwing good money after bad. Plans to send an infantry Division to join the remainder of 5th Light and 15th Panzer Divisions had been cancelled. The needs of Operation Barbarossa now took precedence over everything else. To confirm just how serious this was, the Luftwaffe contingent in North Africa had been ordered to fly their remaining aircraft to Sicily. The ground contingent were to move to Tripoli and use whatever ships they could commandeer to follow the aircraft back to Europe.

The possibility of withdrawing all German units from North Africa had been debated in Berlin. Some specialists were flown out in a series of secret flights, people whose skills would be difficult to replace. The wounded were also airlifted out. The senior German General, Johann von Ravenstein, commanded the newly formed 21st Panzer Division, a name that was somewhat ironic. The survivors of 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division together weren’t even as strong as a Light Division. 21st Panzer Division was made up of just over one Battalion of Panzers, with only a handful of Panzer IVs and twenty Panzer IIIs, the rest made up of Panzer IIs. The Infantry Regiment, while officially still with three battalions, was under strength, and many replacements had been scoured from ancillary units. The one strength was the Reconnaissance Battalion, which had two armoured car companies, instead of one, and the motorcycle Reconnaissance Company had an extra platoon.

Von Ravenstein and his senior officers had met to look at what to do in the event of an Italian collapse, or rather, when there was an Italian collapse. The extra motorcycle Reconnaissance platoon had been detached to scout a route that any surviving German forces would take towards the Tunisian border.

General Weygrand, the French Governor of Algeria, and Commander in Chief of French North Africa, had increased the French colonial army in North Africa from 30,000 to 180,000 men, not all, but many were fully equipped with tanks, machine guns, trucks, and artillery. He had plans to increase the army further by raising a large number of Senegalese troops. When informed of this through channels, Hitler had been pressurising Petain to stop the plan, preferably by demoting Weygrand and bringing him back to Metropolitan France. In the light of what was happening to the Italians in Libya, the Vichy officials had been slow to follow Berlin’s demand. Notification had reached Weygrand of his impending change of circumstances, but as yet the order to return had not yet been issued.

Von Ravenstein expected that should the German troops arrive at the Tunisian border, pressure from Berlin on Vichy would be enough to make sure that they were treated with honour and sent home. No one in the German command structure was quite sure what to expect, but having a plan to extricate themselves from the Italian incompetence and failure was a relief. This was particularly the case due to increasing pressure coming from the direction of Beni Ulid.

Initially it was believed that this was just a British flank guard, but the reconnaissance battalion had managed to capture a few prisoners, who turned out to be from 4th Indian Division. This indicated that another British force was aiming for Tarhuna. The storm of the past few days had diminished, leaving many wadis still flowing with water, and some ground waterlogged. The fact that the Indians were still approaching in these conditions gave Von Ravenstein grave concerns.

Having spoken to General Bastico, Von Ravenstein who had one of the Blackshirt Legions immediately on his flank, ordered his Division to stand ready. He had requested permission from Bastico to make a spoiling attack on the Indians, which had been refused. His Reconnaissance Battalion was making every effort to impede the Indian advance, but the German troops were finding that the Indians were moving slowly and steadily, and were obviously well trained and experienced. Almost no aerial reconnaissance had been flown, so one element of the Reconnaissance Battalion had taken a long detour to get around the side of the Indians to see what, if anything, was following on behind them. Their last radio signal before they went off the air, was that there was a British panzer Division moving up the road towards Tarhuna.
 
Bad times for the axis all round and given that Mussolini isn’t sending an expeditionary force to Russia isn’t much of a change but it seems like the Axis is pretty much done in NA. Early crack in the Axis in Europe too as well as Italian spirit's getting its teeth kicked in will mot serve anyone well on this front and will effectively kill Italian war industry even further heck their troops moral is in the WC already how long till they are dealing with issues with troops in Italy proper/

General Weygrand, the French Governor of Algeria, and Commander in Chief of French North Africa, had increased the French colonial army in North Africa from 30,000 to 180,000 men, not all, but many were fully equipped with tanks, machine guns, trucks, and artillery. He had plans to increase the army further by raising a large number of Senegalese troops. When informed of this through channels, Hitler had been pressurising Petain to stop the plan, preferably by demoting Weygrand and bringing him back to Metropolitan France. In the light of what was happening to the Italians in Libya, the Vichy officials had been slow to follow Berlin’s demand. Notification had reached Weygrand of his impending change of circumstances, but as yet the order to return had not yet been issued
This bit stands out though I have to wonder how exactly this will play out though, depending what happens hitler may kick off an earlier take over.
 
**** INBOUND RANT **** NO OFFENSE INTENDED **** INTENDED TARGET ARE THE MORONS OF A 100 YEARS AGO ****

I have NEVER understood why a tank designed for infantry support would be fitted with a gun that had no practical HE round. And a 40mm main gun was a step backward, although a 40mm auto-cannon might have made some sense. But the WW1 tanks had 3" guns, which meant they had the damn technology, so WHY didn't they build the damn tanks with a 3"/75mm-ish main gun (in a turret, NOT a sponson), and issue both high velocity AP rounds and lower velocity HE rounds. If they had, then they would have had a tank capable of actually supporting the damn infantry against tanks, entrenched positions, bunkers and artillery. And screw the "but our rail network won't allow a wider turret ring" argument. There was a depression on. Spend some damn money, stimulate the economy, employ some navvies & upgrade that damned rail network.

Back to the thread:

As for the arguments that the 2 pounder is/was all that was needed to kill Japanese tanks, and that anything else was overkill... who effing cares? I don't, and for two very good reasons.

1) In war, overkill is a good thing.
2) The Japanese built extremely effective bunkers (as did the Germans). As mentioned above, I want a tank that can also smash bunkers and trenches apart to make life easier for the infantry. A solid shot 2lbs AP round ain't doing shit against those, and neither is a 40mm HE round that is basically a grenade.

**** apologies for the rant. I really needed to get that out of my system. ****
Hate to be picky, but the biggest gun the Brits mounted on a tank in WWI was 57mm.
 
Last edited:
So much for Vichy French North Africa. Weygrand wasn't a conviction anti-Fascist of any sort, he was happy to collaborate when it looked like a good idea but he's not going to imperil his position to save the remnants of the 21st Panzer Division.
 
So much for Vichy French North Africa. Weygrand wasn't a conviction anti-Fascist of any sort, he was happy to collaborate when it looked like a good idea but he's not going to imperil his position to save the remnants of the 21st Panzer Division.
So if he is to jump ship it will more than like be to save his own skin.
 
Top