Yeah, taking Sicily (to seal the Med) and Corsica for future landings is one thing but as long as any air and Naval assets on Sardinia have been annihilated it's probably best just blockaded. Plenty of more important targets on offer after all...
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
If the terrain is as mountainous as others have made it out to be, it probably wouldn't.
Sardinia's interior is mountainous, but several coastal areas are flat. In particular, the area around Cagliari in the south is a relatively large flat plain. The airport there became an airbase in 1940, first for Italy, then Italy and Germany, then USA, and now Italy again. During WWII its runways were about 2000 meters long and ran NE-SW. Those runways were removed after WWII and replaced with two modern heavier ones running generally N-S, of 3000 meter length.
The military base is large enough that it also includes gunnery and bombing ranges at safe distances from the active airfield's traffic patterns.
There are also coastal commercial airports in the northwest between Alghero and Sassari, and the northeast near Olbia. I think both of those existing during the 1940s, though they were smaller than the airbase near Cagliari. But, room existed to expand them if that had been needed. In modern times, they're both lengthened to be more than ample to handle modern jet airliner traffic. So while perhaps during WWII they might not have been suitable for overloaded B24s, they probably would have been fine for medium bombers.
The military base is large enough that it also includes gunnery and bombing ranges at safe distances from the active airfield's traffic patterns.
There are also coastal commercial airports in the northwest between Alghero and Sassari, and the northeast near Olbia. I think both of those existing during the 1940s, though they were smaller than the airbase near Cagliari. But, room existed to expand them if that had been needed. In modern times, they're both lengthened to be more than ample to handle modern jet airliner traffic. So while perhaps during WWII they might not have been suitable for overloaded B24s, they probably would have been fine for medium bombers.
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Good points
Even if it proved impossible to support a large bomber force there, were port logistics inadequate, it could still have an emergency landing field and host a fighter escort force.
Like Iwo Jima in the Pacific. But hopefully easier to occupy.
The benefit of taking Sardinia would be in the required response from the Axis. With Sardinia in Allied hands the entire west coast of the Italian peninsula and the south Coast of France could be targeted for further landings. This would require considerable numbers of troops to defend against.
It also puts the allied forces in Sardinia comfortably within range of the axis air forces.
Considering the allies were looking to destroy the Axis air forces anything that brought them out to fight would be welcomed. Especially if they came to fight in allied radar coverage and over allied territory.
Donald Reaver
Donor
A lot farther to get back over open water to an Axis base with a damaged aircraft than Britain.
True, though depending on your target, it could mean much less time over actual enemy airspace.
Of course, Sardinia would be very much a secondary objective, a way of drawing off Axis forces, rather that a place to build up for an eventual liberation of Europe.
Yep. Add in Southern Italy and Greece to that (both of which will seem like highly viable targets, given the closeness of Allied bases), and you're going to give the German planners a case of hives.
You are correct, also this work calls for medium bombers (B-25 / B-26) and long range fighters like the P-51, not heavy bombers. Given the terrain, attacks on the few rail links between Germany and Italy, should make the German Planners tear out their hairs....
We've been around the Sardinia bush a few times in this thread. As the TL stands (April 1942):
- Sardinia is closer to the Italian mainland than to any airbases the Allies currently have.
- Even if the Allies occupy Tunisia, Northern Sardinia is still closer to Rome than to Tunis.
- The Luftwaffe is very much not defeated and the RA still has significant strength.
- The Allied forces in the Med do not have access to the armada of fleet carriers that OTL crushed Japanese island bases in 1944-5.
- Said islands also did not have mainland airbases within 200 miles.
- The RM also retains significant strength and while it's customary to scoff at the Italians afloat, remember that they wrote the book on coastal warfare.
- Sending a major invasion convoy into waters where you can't guarantee air superiority and have to worry about naval attack is a no-no.
- Sardinia is sufficiently large that you can't simply land and secure the key points in a couple of days (like Rhodes). You'd be committing to a multi-division campaign lasting probably weeks.
- Sardinia is rugged and has poor infrastructure, which aids the defence.
- It's also populated by Italians, who are less likely to be friendly than the Greeks.
- Running supply convoys for a major military campaign through waters subject to air and naval interdiction is an even bigger no-no than invading in the first place.
- Sardinia, annoyingly, is sufficiently close to Italy to be in range of air cover from the Italian mainland, but sufficiently far away from everywhere to be pretty useless as a logistic staging post to anywhere except maybe Corsica. (If you're planning to land in Rome, Genoa or Toulon from Sardinia you may as well start from Gibraltar, the logistics are probably easier).
- For those of you dreaming of massed bombers flying from bases in Sardinia
- The massed USAAF bomber squadrons don't exist yet (it's April 1942!)
- Ask Malta command how much fun it is trying to support an air force when the enemy can interdict your supply lines.
Sardinia would come after Sicily, as an alternative to an attack on the mainland.
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Hello,
Maybe before any invasion takes place, German intelligence can be wrongfooted...
The War on Paper: Operation Mincemeat
Operation Mincemeat was a deception conceived by British Intelligence to fool the Germans regarding the true target for the Allied invasion of Sicily. Behind the well-known battles and campaigns of the Second World War lies a secret history.
Also, there is a need to locate this person...
So are these options valid ITTL?
9 May 1942. Washington DC. USA.
allanpcameron
Donor
9 May 1942. Washington DC. USA.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff was still a new organisation, just formed in February 1942. Made up of the senior officers of the American forces, it was chaired by Admiral William Leahy, the Presidential Military Advisor. Modelled to some degree on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, Leahy was working with General George Marshall (Chief of Staff of the US Army), Admiral Ernest King (Chief of Naval Operations and C-in-C of the US Fleet) with General ‘Hap’ Arnold (Chief of the Army Air Forces).
General Marshall had spent some time in England in April and had come back with different appreciation of what the American Army would be able to do, at least in the short term. The idea of an invasion of mainland Europe in September of 1942, the idea he had taken to the British, had received short shrift, but in a very polite manner. Just crossing the ocean was a problem, with the losses to shipping. All he had to offer in 1942 was about two and a half Divisions, spearheaded by the 1st Armored Division which was due to go overseas later this month.
Admiral King’s response showed that Marshall was under pressure to go on the offensive in the Pacific too. The build up of American forces in Australia, (41st and 32nd Infantry Divisions were on route) with a view at some point to being able to liberate the Philippines and knock out the Japanese, was again a problem of shipping. There had been a couple of indecisive contacts between the USN and the IJN around the Solomon Islands. The expansion of the Japanese from Rabaul had been continuing slowly, and the USN had managed to put in a few blows, for the cost of one aircraft carrier. The island-hopping campaign that Nimitz was looking for, would be a problem primarily for the Navy and Marines. The loss of the Philippines and MacArthur had been disastrous, worse probably than Pearl Harbour.
Admiral Leahy, after speaking with the President, reiterated the ‘Germany First’ strategy. Like the aircraft manufacturers, the Navy would soon be able to boast a great number of aircraft carriers, which could take the war to the Japanese over the Pacific. The situation in the Pacific and South East Asia didn’t look totally desperate with British holding the Japanese in Thailand, and the Dutch, with support, holding line south of Borneo and Celebes.
General Arnold knew it would be sometime before the B17 squadrons to be dispatched to England would be significantly strong enough to make the kind of impact they could do. If the Army wanted to land in France, at this point, the Army Air Force wouldn’t be in a position to really support them.
That very day, Leahy informed the others, the Vichy authorities on Martinique were being given an ultimatum that the French West Indies had to be neutral, ie, not supporting German U-Boats, or else. Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, didn’t want a repeat of what happened to St Pierre and Miquelon, with de Gaulle sending a war party, violating the Munroe Doctrine. Leahy reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Vichy regime had already been warned that if they actively collaborated with the Germans, all bets were off regarding American recognition of the Vichy Regime. The fact that Petain had still appointed Laval as Prime Minister seemed to suggest that the French hadn’t listened.
Marshall noted that in his discussions, the British were adamant that clearing the North African coast would free up a million tons of shipping which currently had to go around the south of Africa. The Vichy French in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were non-combatant, but could become allies. Syria and Madagascar and the other French overseas colonies would also fall into line. The downside would be that the Germans would likely just occupy the rest of France. Arnold mentioned that that at least would tie down some more German divisions that might otherwise be in Russia.
The President had been trying to woo General Weygand over to the allied cause, and if his reading of Weygand’s response was correct, then if the American Army arrived in force at Morocco, Weygand would have no choice but to switch sides. The question was whether the American forces could send a sufficiently strong enough force to Casablanca to make that happen. Leahy had asked the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) to examine the question.
As he handed out their report, all the others already knew that it was being looked at, but were surprised at how far along the JSSC had managed to get. Using Gibraltar as a staging point, the planners believed that an Infantry Division, with Ranger and Airborne support could capture Oran, allowing the Armored Division to be unloaded through that port. A landing at Casablanca had been considered too risky due to the Atlantic swells, and Algiers too far from allied air support.
The immediate response from Marshall and King was negative, American forces needed to get to grips with the Germans, and basically that meant a landing in France. Arnold could see the advantage of having a large French army from North Africa as part of the invasion of France in due course. Leahy knew that the President really wanted this to happen, he had made that quite clear.
To get 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Division trained and prepared, to gather the necessary shipping and aircraft, was not going to be quick. It was already May, a realistic timetable would likely be late summer, probably September, perhaps August with more help from the British. With some reluctance Marshall agreed to this, though King was quite negative. It was only the fact that the President would otherwise order him to do so, made King grudgingly agree to accepting for the plans to be fully worked out, hoping it would become something that would be rejected in the course of time.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff was still a new organisation, just formed in February 1942. Made up of the senior officers of the American forces, it was chaired by Admiral William Leahy, the Presidential Military Advisor. Modelled to some degree on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, Leahy was working with General George Marshall (Chief of Staff of the US Army), Admiral Ernest King (Chief of Naval Operations and C-in-C of the US Fleet) with General ‘Hap’ Arnold (Chief of the Army Air Forces).
General Marshall had spent some time in England in April and had come back with different appreciation of what the American Army would be able to do, at least in the short term. The idea of an invasion of mainland Europe in September of 1942, the idea he had taken to the British, had received short shrift, but in a very polite manner. Just crossing the ocean was a problem, with the losses to shipping. All he had to offer in 1942 was about two and a half Divisions, spearheaded by the 1st Armored Division which was due to go overseas later this month.
Admiral King’s response showed that Marshall was under pressure to go on the offensive in the Pacific too. The build up of American forces in Australia, (41st and 32nd Infantry Divisions were on route) with a view at some point to being able to liberate the Philippines and knock out the Japanese, was again a problem of shipping. There had been a couple of indecisive contacts between the USN and the IJN around the Solomon Islands. The expansion of the Japanese from Rabaul had been continuing slowly, and the USN had managed to put in a few blows, for the cost of one aircraft carrier. The island-hopping campaign that Nimitz was looking for, would be a problem primarily for the Navy and Marines. The loss of the Philippines and MacArthur had been disastrous, worse probably than Pearl Harbour.
Admiral Leahy, after speaking with the President, reiterated the ‘Germany First’ strategy. Like the aircraft manufacturers, the Navy would soon be able to boast a great number of aircraft carriers, which could take the war to the Japanese over the Pacific. The situation in the Pacific and South East Asia didn’t look totally desperate with British holding the Japanese in Thailand, and the Dutch, with support, holding line south of Borneo and Celebes.
General Arnold knew it would be sometime before the B17 squadrons to be dispatched to England would be significantly strong enough to make the kind of impact they could do. If the Army wanted to land in France, at this point, the Army Air Force wouldn’t be in a position to really support them.
That very day, Leahy informed the others, the Vichy authorities on Martinique were being given an ultimatum that the French West Indies had to be neutral, ie, not supporting German U-Boats, or else. Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, didn’t want a repeat of what happened to St Pierre and Miquelon, with de Gaulle sending a war party, violating the Munroe Doctrine. Leahy reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Vichy regime had already been warned that if they actively collaborated with the Germans, all bets were off regarding American recognition of the Vichy Regime. The fact that Petain had still appointed Laval as Prime Minister seemed to suggest that the French hadn’t listened.
Marshall noted that in his discussions, the British were adamant that clearing the North African coast would free up a million tons of shipping which currently had to go around the south of Africa. The Vichy French in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were non-combatant, but could become allies. Syria and Madagascar and the other French overseas colonies would also fall into line. The downside would be that the Germans would likely just occupy the rest of France. Arnold mentioned that that at least would tie down some more German divisions that might otherwise be in Russia.
The President had been trying to woo General Weygand over to the allied cause, and if his reading of Weygand’s response was correct, then if the American Army arrived in force at Morocco, Weygand would have no choice but to switch sides. The question was whether the American forces could send a sufficiently strong enough force to Casablanca to make that happen. Leahy had asked the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) to examine the question.
As he handed out their report, all the others already knew that it was being looked at, but were surprised at how far along the JSSC had managed to get. Using Gibraltar as a staging point, the planners believed that an Infantry Division, with Ranger and Airborne support could capture Oran, allowing the Armored Division to be unloaded through that port. A landing at Casablanca had been considered too risky due to the Atlantic swells, and Algiers too far from allied air support.
The immediate response from Marshall and King was negative, American forces needed to get to grips with the Germans, and basically that meant a landing in France. Arnold could see the advantage of having a large French army from North Africa as part of the invasion of France in due course. Leahy knew that the President really wanted this to happen, he had made that quite clear.
To get 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Division trained and prepared, to gather the necessary shipping and aircraft, was not going to be quick. It was already May, a realistic timetable would likely be late summer, probably September, perhaps August with more help from the British. With some reluctance Marshall agreed to this, though King was quite negative. It was only the fact that the President would otherwise order him to do so, made King grudgingly agree to accepting for the plans to be fully worked out, hoping it would become something that would be rejected in the course of time.
allanpcameron
Donor
So the Philippines was really interesting, and yes a good holiday.
So I wrote the above before I went, and based it a bit on Alan Brooke's diary of the meetings between him and Marshall. An earlier, all American Torch, puts the US Army on foreign soil, albeit North Africa. The pressure to have an early attack on France comes from Stalin's desperate calls for a second front. Brooke knows this is too dangerous, and that the American Army won't be big enough to contribute until at least 1943. With things settled in North Africa, the attack on Rhodes, and holding Singapore and Burma, the British aren't looking like they are as desperate for Uncle Sam to pull their fat out of the fire as perhaps IOTL. From my point of view, getting the yanks into North Africa, and then training them and Free French up with the victorious 8th Army beats sending the 1st Armored Division to Northern Ireland, as happened OTL.
Hope that makes some kind of sense.
Allan.
So I wrote the above before I went, and based it a bit on Alan Brooke's diary of the meetings between him and Marshall. An earlier, all American Torch, puts the US Army on foreign soil, albeit North Africa. The pressure to have an early attack on France comes from Stalin's desperate calls for a second front. Brooke knows this is too dangerous, and that the American Army won't be big enough to contribute until at least 1943. With things settled in North Africa, the attack on Rhodes, and holding Singapore and Burma, the British aren't looking like they are as desperate for Uncle Sam to pull their fat out of the fire as perhaps IOTL. From my point of view, getting the yanks into North Africa, and then training them and Free French up with the victorious 8th Army beats sending the 1st Armored Division to Northern Ireland, as happened OTL.
Hope that makes some kind of sense.
Allan.
Welcome back! Good strategic appreciation overall. The bit I’ve quoted above just looks weird though, it’s a strange link to make?