the british don't care about anything past hong kong and mostly care about South East Asia they'll give up the pacific and prob China command but Def not SEA Command
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
ABDA Command exists and is going to remain British led though I hope it gets renamed, but this whole discussion kicked off with where next after Malaya is cleared and I stand by my argument that politics will dictate that the next step will be to clear Borneo so as to provide a stepping stone to the Philippines.
Hm, Bataan held out until early-mid April OTL, so I really can't see it falling faster here, and given that it's only the middle of February thus far, I could see more Japanese formations being pulled out to try to stem the British Tide. that, combined with potentially somewhat working American torpedoes might allow MacArthur to hold on a bit longer.
There's a potential wrinkle here - OTL almost no-one expected the Central Pacific "Island hopping" strategy to be as successful as it was, and there was a general belief that large-scale amphibious operations were impractical without control of a major port in the vicinity. Hence, lots of pre-war US plans focussing on China, as the only place with major ports in range of the Japanese home islands. There was at least one plan circulated for the US offensive against Japan to start in Burma, advance to join up with the KMT in southern China, then continue all the way up the Chinese coast to Manchuria, finally invading Japan from Korea!
OTL, of course, the loss of Burma, KMT failures in southern China and the sheer logistical impossibility of sustaining a useful force over "the Hump" from India kyboshed that plan, and meanwhile the USN was finding that it could sustain a drive across the Central Pacific, building new facilities as it went. TTL, if Burma is secure, the British are advancing into Thailand and the US has the prospect of cutting out the Burma Road and running convoys to Bangkok, there will be a much stronger push for a major US Army deployment to SE Asia (particularly if there's no active front in Europe for the US Army to go to). Which (among other things), could complicate command issues quite a bit.
OTL, of course, the loss of Burma, KMT failures in southern China and the sheer logistical impossibility of sustaining a useful force over "the Hump" from India kyboshed that plan, and meanwhile the USN was finding that it could sustain a drive across the Central Pacific, building new facilities as it went. TTL, if Burma is secure, the British are advancing into Thailand and the US has the prospect of cutting out the Burma Road and running convoys to Bangkok, there will be a much stronger push for a major US Army deployment to SE Asia (particularly if there's no active front in Europe for the US Army to go to). Which (among other things), could complicate command issues quite a bit.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The Philippines and American strategic ITTL, a personal opinion.
Prior to the outbreak of the war and going right back to the origins of War Plan Yellow, the Philippines had been a problem. It was recognised by America that to defend the Philippines would require substantial investment, both in country and in the USN. And this was an investment that the American government wasn’t prepared to make, they failed to develop a substantial naval base like the British did in Singapore. Nor did the invest in the Philippine Army, and create an airforce and the facilities it would need. There was also a decided tension between the USN and the US Army, the Navy saw any campaign against Japan, as essentially a naval one, with a thrust from Hawaii through the Central Pacific to the Japanese Home Islands. Which saw the Philippines as an expensive diversion on the way, as they proved little that the Navy wanted. And once the idea of capturing bases to enable a strategic bombing campaign to be initiated against Japan, the Philippines given the available technology were to far away. The initial plan before the deployment of the B-29, was to capture a number of Japanese offshore islands and base the bombers out of there, along with possibly bases in China and Korea. At no time was basing bombers in the Philippines to attack Japan considered, the B-17’s that were based in the Philippines were there to attack Japanese forces in FIC.
The American Army, wasn’t interested in playing second fiddle to the Navy, it wanted to be involved in a major high technology campaign in Europe. A campaign were it was in the driving seat, and the USN was playing second fiddle. Both the British Army and the American Army had seen the majority of the funds available for military expenditure post war and especially post the Wall Street crash, spent on their respective Navies. However the British Army had an advantage over the American Army, it did have a major role to preform, that of colonial policing. This meant that in addition to the various low cost experiments it was able to conduct in Britain, its officers gained limited experience commanding troops on active service. And the British army establishment made the decision in 1936 to get rid of its horses and replace them with mechanical units. It was only in a small number of colonial areas such as Palestine that cavalry remained in service beyond 1939. Were as the American army was still in 1940 trying to integrate horse cavalry with mechanical cavalry. By 1941 the penny had finally dropped and the American army was dedicated to building an all mechanical force, and it was the very large American automobile industry that allowed it to do so, while in addition supporting the Soviets, British and Chinese with mechanical arms.
ITTL more than IOTL, the Philippines will become a backwater campaign, with only MacArthur being its campion. The USN doesn’t need the Philippines to persecute its campaign against the Japanese, the United States Army has better things to do, and the USAAF, wants bases that are much closer to the Japanese homeland. The British see no reason to be involved in the Philippines, as it will only distract from their efforts in Malaya, Thailand and FIC, and once they have advanced into Thailand, their submarines and aircraft will be easily able to deal with any threat from there. Nor are the British going to allow an American to be placed in charge of their forces in the Far East, especially one who made a complete balls up of the defence of the Philippines. Anglo American efforts in the war against Japan, will be divided primarily in two, an American campaign in the Central Pacific, lead by the USN. And a British campaign in the Far East, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and FIC, with a smaller subsidiary campaign to the South of Singapore, in compassing the DEI, Borneo and the British, French, and Australian possessions between Singapore and Australia. I would expect that this region might have some American input, but the overall command will be British. As up until the question of an invasion of the Philippines is tabled, the overwhelming majority of personnel involved will come from British Dominion/Empire and Dutch resources. With possibly a significant contribution by the USN of their second line units, which are unsuitable for use in the Central Pacific or Atlantic. Remember that without the Dutch and British oil fields, the Japanese Navy will be increasingly short of oil for their fleet, and what little they have will be prioritised for the main fleet in the Central Pacific.
RR.
Prior to the outbreak of the war and going right back to the origins of War Plan Yellow, the Philippines had been a problem. It was recognised by America that to defend the Philippines would require substantial investment, both in country and in the USN. And this was an investment that the American government wasn’t prepared to make, they failed to develop a substantial naval base like the British did in Singapore. Nor did the invest in the Philippine Army, and create an airforce and the facilities it would need. There was also a decided tension between the USN and the US Army, the Navy saw any campaign against Japan, as essentially a naval one, with a thrust from Hawaii through the Central Pacific to the Japanese Home Islands. Which saw the Philippines as an expensive diversion on the way, as they proved little that the Navy wanted. And once the idea of capturing bases to enable a strategic bombing campaign to be initiated against Japan, the Philippines given the available technology were to far away. The initial plan before the deployment of the B-29, was to capture a number of Japanese offshore islands and base the bombers out of there, along with possibly bases in China and Korea. At no time was basing bombers in the Philippines to attack Japan considered, the B-17’s that were based in the Philippines were there to attack Japanese forces in FIC.
The American Army, wasn’t interested in playing second fiddle to the Navy, it wanted to be involved in a major high technology campaign in Europe. A campaign were it was in the driving seat, and the USN was playing second fiddle. Both the British Army and the American Army had seen the majority of the funds available for military expenditure post war and especially post the Wall Street crash, spent on their respective Navies. However the British Army had an advantage over the American Army, it did have a major role to preform, that of colonial policing. This meant that in addition to the various low cost experiments it was able to conduct in Britain, its officers gained limited experience commanding troops on active service. And the British army establishment made the decision in 1936 to get rid of its horses and replace them with mechanical units. It was only in a small number of colonial areas such as Palestine that cavalry remained in service beyond 1939. Were as the American army was still in 1940 trying to integrate horse cavalry with mechanical cavalry. By 1941 the penny had finally dropped and the American army was dedicated to building an all mechanical force, and it was the very large American automobile industry that allowed it to do so, while in addition supporting the Soviets, British and Chinese with mechanical arms.
ITTL more than IOTL, the Philippines will become a backwater campaign, with only MacArthur being its campion. The USN doesn’t need the Philippines to persecute its campaign against the Japanese, the United States Army has better things to do, and the USAAF, wants bases that are much closer to the Japanese homeland. The British see no reason to be involved in the Philippines, as it will only distract from their efforts in Malaya, Thailand and FIC, and once they have advanced into Thailand, their submarines and aircraft will be easily able to deal with any threat from there. Nor are the British going to allow an American to be placed in charge of their forces in the Far East, especially one who made a complete balls up of the defence of the Philippines. Anglo American efforts in the war against Japan, will be divided primarily in two, an American campaign in the Central Pacific, lead by the USN. And a British campaign in the Far East, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and FIC, with a smaller subsidiary campaign to the South of Singapore, in compassing the DEI, Borneo and the British, French, and Australian possessions between Singapore and Australia. I would expect that this region might have some American input, but the overall command will be British. As up until the question of an invasion of the Philippines is tabled, the overwhelming majority of personnel involved will come from British Dominion/Empire and Dutch resources. With possibly a significant contribution by the USN of their second line units, which are unsuitable for use in the Central Pacific or Atlantic. Remember that without the Dutch and British oil fields, the Japanese Navy will be increasingly short of oil for their fleet, and what little they have will be prioritised for the main fleet in the Central Pacific.
RR.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Sir it’s not so much that the Philippines are expendable, it’s more that they don’t have a place in the USN’s plans for the defeat of Japan. Which is very focused on a progress towards Japan through the Central Pacific, and other than their relief from Japanese occupation. Which was as was the occupation of Hong Kong, anticipated prior to the outbreak of the war. And they serve no use in British plans, which focused on the defence of Malaysia especially the Fleet Base of Singapore. And thus are seen very much as an American problem, and one that has very little interest for the British. Additionally there have been some comments about the British providing some of their Fast Fleet minelayers of the Abdiel class to run relief supplies to the Philippines. While this may be a good idea, it is very dependent on the British releasing them from their designed role of placing mines outside enemy bases. I would expect there to be some very serious discussion between the British administration and the Americans in regards to this question.
RR.
the Philippines are a political more than a strategic one. They need to show that the US is still wanting to help them but at the same time need to take care of the rest at a higher priority. If the US was able to secure a place like Mindanao Island to build the bases to interdict the Japanese, they don't need the rest of the Islands initially and would be able to at least say we are attacking them to liberate you.
As far as I see it, Malaya very much matters to the UK and the Allied side generally, given the tin and rubber outputs of the region. It provides vital raw materials which make the production processes of Allied vehicles and weapons much less of a potential headache than they could be otherwise.
(With Malaya still online for the Allied cause, for example, not so much of a need to divert construction and research into building artificial rubber production plants, or spend effort spinning up the rubber industry in Brazil again.)
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The security of Malaya is part of the UK's existential battle against Germany, it seems to me.
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That, and the fact that there's thousands of American troops there who could be really useful in other places.
Malaya is absolutely a vital region, that's why losing it was so disastrous in OTL, Sarawak and French Indochina aren't. Once the immediate threat to the vital British interest (Malay Peninsula and Singapore) in the region is gone I'm sure Britain will be happy to follow the American lead on "what's next", in return for concessions on strategy in Europe of course.
I wonder how much more “Reverse Lend Lease” there will be if Malaya can still export rubber to the USA.
Britain needs all the help it can get in getting its dollar debt down.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
There are rubber plantations in Burma, Malaya and the DEI’s, along with a host of other resources, one in particular that is often forgotten, is the Quinine plantation in the DEI. The loss of which IOTL had a serious detrimental effect on the allied war effort, its replacement wasn’t as good and had some unpleasant side effects. It should be noted that this Time Line has now diverged so far from our own, that applying the logic of ours is foolish. Britain is in a much stronger position, and will up until late 1943, be much more equal in its relationship with the United States.
RR.
RR.
Could not speak for the whole island, but Sarawak's economy is some orientation toward the mining industry rather just the agriculture industry, but there is few rubber plantations here and there (and in contrast to British-owned industrial size plantations in Malaya, is comprised mostly of native (or Chinese) owned smallholding plantations). Meanwhile in
TLDR: Rubber (but in a different way, especially in progressive Sarawak) but there are also other stuffs.
While we are talking about a possible campaign in Borneo which I am on the fence in regards to supporting (which could probably meant reducing the tensions when Sarawak eventually officially had to be ceded to the British, due to the Brookes being... broke.) or not (since the hypothetical campaign, especially looking at the big picture, is probably a heck of unnecessary resource sink, troop and material wise), would the Americans in response of the possible rejection of a Borneo campaign, giving notice to transfer the administrative power of some islands between North Borneo and the Phillipines to the United States?
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Quinine was originally native to Peru where it was originally used to treat shivering which was brought on my Malaria in it's febrile form. By 1940 it was overtaken by other more efficient drugs which were used to treat Malaria.
Dont worry about Borneo Focus as soon as the commandos from UK & Australia on the island and head hunting made legal its not going to be a fun time for the japan army they be stuck on the coast. RAF / RAAF to bomb shipping ad the oil fields Borneo going to be hell on earth for Japan .
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