Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

[Cryhavoc101]

There's a decent video out there from Lindybeige about why he considers the Crocodile the most effective weapon in the war, primarily because it could induce the enemy to surrender without actually engaging in combat. In short, Germans would see one of those fire-breathing monsters trundle up and just NOPE right out of the area or surrender without fighting. That has significant value although it's very difficult to measure fights avoided statistically. I can see why Crocs were retained for Korea beyond the regular utility of a giant flamethrower in the anti-fortification role.

Yes they used to make a 'demonstration' outside of a German village or town before asking the defenders if they would like to surrender

If they did not then the Crocs played little part as the problem of the said town/village would be handed off to the Royal Artillery FC

 

[Cryhavoc101]

One thing is quite clear from the memoirs of Churchill crews - they really liked their tanks

I recall one account of a TC inspecting a captured Panther and concluding that other than the gun it was inferior to his own tank

I was also 'learned' many years ago when I suggested to a Churchill crew veteran that the design was unreliable and was told 'in no uncertain terms' that it was very reliable - with his own tank going from Tunisia to Italy without a rebuild till they accidently let it roll down a steep hill.

The story of the crew dropping it off a mountain pass road is quite funny - don't have half the crew servicing the brakes with the other half deciding to service the clutch at the same time thinking the other system will keep the tank from rolling down the hill.

The crew then had to spend the weekend getting a replacement ready for the next op (while the rest of their unit had liberty) - only to see their 'destroyed tank' in the hands of another crew a week later looking absolutely fine!

 

[MattII]

Yes they used to make a 'demonstration' outside of a German village or town before asking the defenders if they would like to surrender

If they did not then the Crocs played little part as the problem of the said town/village would be handed off to the Royal Artillery FC

The issue of course being that, as noted in the video, they were only sent against areas that didn't (or at least, were suspect not to) have AT guns to back them up.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The issue of course being that, as noted in the video, they were only sent against areas that didn't (or at least, were suspect not to) have AT guns to back them up.

An AT round in the Crocodile's fuel filled trailer would be a bad thing. The Churchill itself was well protected.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Can the Japanese ITTL capture Singapore.

The Japanese ITTL are running six days behind their schedule IOTL, and at present seem to have no chance of catching up this lost time and momentum. All things being equal, even if they were able to get back on track, and advance south at the same place that they did IOTL, very unlikely. They will run out of artillery ammunition six days before they get to Singapore, and be very low on small arms ammunition as well. As is their chance of causing a British collapse, and storming down the peninsula are little to none, and once the two battle hardened devisions enter the fray, they stand a good chance of a collapse themselves. Such as the Japanese forces did in Burma after the failure of their 1944 offensive to invade India. While the British will not be able to take advantage of such a collapse in the way they did in Burma, they lack the resources to carry out especially mobile warfare in jungle conditions, that the 14th Army of OTL did. And note they were very lucky, getting to Rangoon hours before the weather broke, and the monsoon started, and thus able to supply the Army through Rangoon. Had they failed to capture Rangoon before the monsoon started, they would have been unable to supply themselves over the increasingly degraded supply lines. However the British will if the Japanese collapse, be able to get back to the Thailand border, before the monsoon breaks ITTL, and get themselves set for an advance into Thailand after the monsoon.

So any hope that the Japanese have of reaching Singapore and capturing it is basically over ITTL, and thus any hope they had of capturing Java and Sumatra, is gone too. And this will have a massive impact on the post war world, and the conduct of the war going forward. The Dutch will be able to exert some control over the DEI, for a significantly longer period, probably up until the late fifties early sixties. The British will have a very different relationship with India which will get its independence, but not again until nineteen fifty, as more time will be taken to work out the inevitability partition, with hopefully less death and destruction. Burma and Malaya will too get their independence, but again later than they did IOTL, however the dominance of the lowlanders in Burma, might be reduced. And without the occupation of Malaya and Singapore, and the formation of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, mostly made up of Chinese Communists. There will be significantly less motivation for the attempted communist insurgents post war, which will reduce the cost to the British government of imperial policing. And yes once the British have stabilised their position in Malaya, that wonderful old fool and former Calvary man Winston, will want to do everything possible to aid the brave Americans trapped in the Philippines. It will take all the powers of persuasion of the top military and navel men in Britain, to prevent him ordering something stupid.

RR.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Can the Japanese ITTL capture Singapore.

The Japanese ITTL are running six days behind their schedule IOTL, and at present seem to have no chance of catching up this lost time and momentum. All things being equal, even if they were able to get back on track, and advance south at the same place that they did IOTL, very unlikely. They will run out of artillery ammunition six days before they get to Singapore, and be very low on small arms ammunition as well. As is their chance of causing a British collapse, and storming down the peninsula are little to none, and once the two battle hardened devisions enter the fray, they stand a good chance of a collapse themselves. Such as the Japanese forces did in Burma after the failure of their 1944 offensive to invade India. While the British will not be able to take advantage of such a collapse in the way they did in Burma, they lack the resources to carry out especially mobile warfare in jungle conditions, that the 14th Army of OTL did. And note they were very lucky, getting to Rangoon hours before the weather broke, and the monsoon started, and thus able to supply the Army through Rangoon. Had they failed to capture Rangoon before the monsoon started, they would have been unable to supply themselves over the increasingly degraded supply lines. However the British will if the Japanese collapse, be able to get back to the Thailand border, before the monsoon breaks ITTL, and get themselves set for an advance into Thailand after the monsoon.

So any hope that the Japanese have of reaching Singapore and capturing it is basically over ITTL, and thus any hope they had of capturing Java and Sumatra, is gone too. And this will have a massive impact on the post war world, and the conduct of the war going forward. The Dutch will be able to exert some control over the DEI, for a significantly longer period, probably up until the late fifties early sixties. The British will have a very different relationship with India which will get its independence, but not again until nineteen fifty, as more time will be taken to work out the inevitability partition, with hopefully less death and destruction. Burma and Malaya will too get their independence, but again later than they did IOTL, however the dominance of the lowlanders in Burma, might be reduced. And without the occupation of Malaya and Singapore, and the formation of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, mostly made up of Chinese Communists. There will be significantly less motivation for the attempted communist insurgents post war, which will reduce the cost to the British government of imperial policing. And yes once the British have stabilised their position in Malaya, that wonderful old fool and former Calvary man Winston, will want to do everything possible to aid the brave Americans trapped in the Philippines. It will take all the powers of persuasion of the top military and navel men in Britain, to prevent him ordering something stupid.

RR.

The other difference here is that the IJA have not shattered 2 of the 7 Commonwealth Brigades and have themselves suffered heavy losses well above what was suffered OTL

They themselves only had 6 or 7 regiments groups (Brigades) initially and one of those has likely been a compete loss of the 56th Infantry Regiment and 18th Division supporting units (over 5000 troops) at the failed landings at Kota Bharu and some of the repulsed river crossings have very likely seen other regiments and supporting units of the 5th and 18 Divisions reduced significantly as well.

Granted they have the Imperial Guards Division as well but this took some time to deploy and was the least experienced division of 25th Armys main formations

And with Matilda II and M3 Stuart present, no chance of a Slim River 'blitzkrieg' type victory being inflicted on the Commonwealth forces especially as the IJA tank forces have probably developed Matilda fever by now

 

[kelgar04]

It will take all the powers of persuasion of the top military and navel men in Britain, to prevent him ordering something stupid.

I recommend have someone behind him with something heavy and hit him with it every time he tries.

 

[yulzari1]

Is there any source on the logistics of the Japanese amphibious landings? We hear folk talking in assorted threads about how much special kit and experience is needed for major amphibious landings but I cannot find anything useful about how prepared the Japanese were. For the actual landings, the establishment of a beachhead with supplies and any following waves. They obviously achieved the task but I have no idea of how and it was across a significant ocean distance. Presumably the same applies to the Philippines and DEI.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

And yes once the British have stabilised their position in Malaya, that wonderful old fool and former Calvary man Winston, will want to do everything possible to aid the brave Americans trapped in the Philippines. It will take all the powers of persuasion of the top military and navel men in Britain, to prevent him ordering something stupid.

By the time the British have enough forces in Malaya/D.E.I. to even contemplate intervening in the Philippines they'll already have fallen.

 

[allanpcameron]

22 December 1941. Gurun. Malaya.

4th Bn 10th Baluch Regiment had been keeping watch over the Ledge, to foil Japanese attempts to repair the road. There had been a number of Japanese attempts at infiltration around the Indian positions, but nothing that had seriously threatened their position. Once it became clear that the main Japanese efforts were now against 9th Indian Division at the River Kelantan, the 4th Battalion were withdrawn back into Malaya to work with the rest of 10th Indian Brigade.

Lieutenant Stan Alden was happy to see the men of the Baluch Regiment back, they’d worked well with his troop of Matilda II tanks during the invasion of Thailand. It was also becoming clear to Alden that they were going to need every man and machine available in the coming days. The men of 6th and 15th Infantry Brigades had done brilliantly slowing the Japanese advance, but it had taken a terrible toll on them. They had now passed through the lines and were somewhere south trying to sort themselves out. They had passed through the positions of 28th Brigade at Gurun, while 10th Brigade covered the possible outflanking routes to the east of the coast road.

28th Gurkha Infantry Brigade was made up of three Battalions that hadn’t had a great deal of training before arriving in Malaya, but the efforts of the other two Brigades in 11th Indian Division had given them time to create a very strong defensive position with good depth. Because 10th Brigade was a bit more mobile, and had more experience, their job of protecting the Gurkha’s flank was crucial to the next battle. Interestingly the Japanese had paused for two days, and from what intelligence could be gathered, a new formation was moving into the line. The Imperial Guards Division was taking over from 5th Division, whose casualties had left them very weakened. When Alden had heard about the Guards Division his immediate thought was to compare them to the British Guards Regiments. From what could be gleaned from whatever intelligence existed, there was some truth to the statement, but it was believed that the three Regiments that the Division consisted of had no combat experience.

Alden had managed to talk to a few of the tank crews which had be attached to 8th and 15th Brigades. They’d warned Alden and his men about some of the things that they should be aware of and complained about the lack of HE shells for the 2-pdr. There had been Japanese tanks along with the infantry, and for those the 2-pdr was more than adequate, but Alden was warned to bring as much MG ammunition as possible. The Quartermasters back in Singapore were tearing their hair out at the quantities of 7.92mm ammunition and BESA barrels being used by the tanks. A desperate call for more ammunition to be sent from Middle East Command had been made, and it was hoped for this to arrive by air. The good news was that there was plenty of captured German ammunition there but getting it to Singapore and then putting it into the 225 round belts, and then up to the tanks themselves was a worry.

The Australians were also becoming aware that the M3 Stuart tanks that their Cavalry Regiments were using in Malaya would suffer from a similar problem. The American built tank had the capacity to use five Browning M1919A4 machine guns. The co-axial and bow mounted guns had been retained, as had the machine gun on the turret roof, which was meant to be used in an anti-aircraft role. The decision had been made in Australia not to use the two side sponson positions, as the crew would have enough to do. While the M3 Stuart had the advantage of two forward firing machine guns over the Matilda II’s one, the M5 37mm gun was very similar to the 2-pdr, but did have the fixed HE shell M63, with a bursting charge of 0.085lbs (38.5g). Better than nothing, it wasn’t exactly powerful. With the way in which the British tanks had been going through ammunition, the supply of .30 MG ammunition was being looked at. Since it was coming from the United States via Australia, more was being requested as a matter of urgency. The Australian quartermasters were sending cables to Canberra to expedite more ammunition to be sent as quickly as possible.

For Lieutenant Stan Alden among the other things he had learned from the tankies involved so far, was to try to keep his troop together. When the tanks had been working individually if one was disabled, throwing a track for example, there wasn’t any help to tow the tank out. The whole of 11th Bn RTR, which arrived with 58 A12 Infantry Tanks Mark II, was now committed to the fray. Even the tanks held back on Singapore Island had been brought forward. Because the Australian Cavalry Regiments had more M3 Stuart light tanks, Lt Col Hedderwick had agreed to his Battalion being used entirely by 9th and 11th Indian Divisions. Even then, the remains of the squadron with 9th Division was being withdrawn as it was becoming ineffective.

The fear of the tanks being used up in penny packets had been realised, and now Hedderwick insisted on the tanks being used in Troops of three exclusively. No longer single tanks were be used and each troop commander and tank commander had written orders to this effect. The temptation for infantry officers to have tank support for their particular effort against the Japanese would wear out the tank battalion too quickly.

Lieutenant Alden’s Squadron Commander, Major Howard Laver, was particularly keen on keeping to this tactic. He had made it clear to the 10th and 28th Brigade Commanders (Brigadiers ‘Pete’ Rees & William Carpendale) that they each had three Troops of three tanks. He had reorganised his own HQ Troop, so that he had one CS tank and Alden’s troop had the other. Laver was working with the Gurkhas on the main road defences, while Alden stayed with 10th Brigade. Each Battalion in both Brigades therefore had a troop of three tanks assigned. Alden was back with the Baluch Regiment, on the right flank of the defensive line around Gurun.

The fight between the Gurkhas and the Imperial Guard on the main road was a bloody affair. There was little room for the Japanese to manoeuvre around the Gurkha’s positions, and since it was their normal tactic, the Gurkhas were well prepared for it. Since there was no room nearer the sea, it came as no surprise when elements of 4th Guards Regiment started appearing in the area that the Baluch Regiment were defending. Alden and his troop were with the Battalion HQ, where with C Company in reserve, they would be able to respond to whichever threat was identified as being the greatest danger.

The route the Japanese took brought them up the valley of the River Padang Terap. Baluch Regiment’s CO (Lt Col William Dean) believed that the Japanese would try to use the river to threaten either to move east to bypass Sungei Patani or west to hit the Gurun position from the rear. If they did this, they’d meet 2nd Battalion HLI to deal with. Dean had placed his main force of A and D Companies, along with the mortar platoon just where the first elements of the Japanese troops arrived. After a brief fire-fight, the Japanese retired, seemingly doing reconnaissance by fire. B Company, along with the carrier platoon, were further to the east, nearer the River Muda in case the Japanese tried a flanking movement in that direction. HQ Company and C Company, along with Alden’s tanks, were about 800 yards back along the road beside the River Muda. If B Company’s positions lost control of the River Muda crossing at Jeniang, Alden’s tanks would have nowhere to cross the river.

Firing from the HLI positions told Alden that the Japanese were probing to the west, but the firing was sporadic, which he presumed meant that it was again simply a reconnaissance probe. The firing from B Company’s position began in earnest. B Company’s OC used the field telephone system to report that a strong Japanese force was coming at him, including at least five tanks. Each of the rifle companies had one Boys anti-tank rifle, and while they were capable of disabling a Japanese tank, the range to do so usually was a bit close for comfort. Within a few moments A and D Companies also opened fire, and again the OC informed Lt Col Dean that a strong force was also attacking his positions, again with tanks.

Dean wasn’t keen on committing his reserve too quickly. B Company had the carrier platoon, and it was armed with another four Boys anti-tank rifles, and during their time at the Ledge, the men had become quite adept at using the .55-inch rifle to hit Japanese equipment at a distance. The firing continued from all three forward Companies, and again the sound of fire from the HLI positions increased. The Brigade had the support of two batteries each of 4th and 144th Field Regiment RA, and their Forward Observer Officers soon had the power of thirty-two 25-pdrs bearing down on the Japanese forces. The timely intervention of the artillery gave A and D Companies, along with the mortar platoon, a breather, allowing the men to replenish and improve positions. B Company were struggling, even with the assistance of the artillery. The heavy fire of the multiple Vickers-Berthier guns certainly caused the Japanese problems, but B Company’s position was compromised by a small group of Japanese troops with two tanks that had split the B Company’s platoons.

When informed of this Lt Col Dean believed it was time to commit his reserve, and order Alden and C Company forward. They were given strict instructions to counter-attack the enemy, allow B Company to sort itself out, then return to HQ. The half mile along the ‘road’ only took fifteen minutes to cover, C Company marching alongside the three tanks. 15 Platoon was to stay with the tanks, while 13 and 14 Platoon would lead the counter-attack, with the tanks and 15 platoon operating as a base of fire. There was a pause just shy of B Company’s positions while Lieutenant Alden and the Captain of C Company made contact with B Company’s OC to get the lay of the land and where exactly the counter-attack was needed. Alden could see why the Japanese tank was causing so many problems, and knew that destroying that tank was the first order of business. Once that was done, the infantry should be able to sort out the rest.

Alden gave a quick report to the other two tank commanders with a simple map of where things were, and how he wanted to engage the Japanese tank. Alden had learned that the Japanese were using two tanks which they called Type 95 and Type 97, the first a ‘light tank’ and the second a ‘medium tank’. To Alden’s gunner they were still just tin cans, but the one giving B Company trouble was a Type 97 with a 57mm gun which was mostly for infantry support, not unlike the CS Matilda II’s 3-inch gun. Alden knew that his gunner could take out the Japanese tank quite easily, if he could get to a good position. The two gun tanks would approach the Japanese position while the CS tank would use its HE capacity to support the infantry counter-attack.

Sometimes it could feel as if tank against tank engagements were a matter of stalking a foe, other times it was a melee. This was more like stalking, as Alden guided his driver to a position where the gunner could engage the Japanese tank. With all the firing and with bullets banging off the Japanese tank, Alden hoped that the tank commander would be deaf to the sound of the three Matilda II diesel engines approaching. Sure enough, his gunner reported that he was ‘on’ the Type 97 and both he and the other tank gunner fired almost simultaneously. The sudden death of the Japanese tank was the signal for the infantry to begin the counter-attack. With the CS tank and then the two gun tanks crashing into view, 13 and 14 Platoons advanced with bayonets under the cover of the many VB light machine guns from the carrier platoon. Alden spotted another Type 97 and a Type 95 on B Company’s flank. The gunners’ had 2-pdr shells flying at them within seconds of them being spotted. Another Type 95 was burning, presumably the victim of an anti-tank rifle, but the gunner fired another 2-pdr round into it, ‘just to be sure.’ The co-axial machine guns added to the fire power from B and C Companies, and the Japanese attack withered under it. Alden called a halt when the three tanks reached the road. They continued firing, supporting C Company as they pushed the Japanese back the way they had come.

Over the radio came a message from Lt Col Dean to say that A and D Companies were also requesting tank support. Alden acknowledged the order and searched out C Company’s OC. It took about ten minutes to get C Company reorganised, and for B Company to reform itself. The report from A and D Companies was that it was a very strong Japanese force attacking, so Lt Col Dean authorised for the carrier platoon to support C Company and the tanks. As they set off, one section of carriers went ahead to scout, while the tanks, carriers and infantry followed.

A few minutes later Alden saw that one of the carriers was burning and that the other two had withdrawn. The Subaltern, second-in-command of the platoon, who had gone ahead with the first three carriers jumped up onto Alden’s tank to give him a quick briefing. They waited for a couple of moments until C Company’s Captain arrived to hear what was going on. As the three carriers had rounded a bend, there was a roadblock, with some kind of anti-tank gun covering it. The first carrier hit a mine, and then was hit by the anti-tank gun and there were at least two light machine guns also in action. The other two carriers had reversed back around the bend and the VB guns were covering the sides of the road in case of Japanese infiltration.

Mines were a worry, and the chances of throwing a track on the roadblock was obviously not something he wanted to do. He outlined an idea to the infantry Captain who was a bit surprised, but happy to agree. Alden gathered his two tank commanders and gave them their orders. The CS tank was to approach the bend and begin laying a combination of smoke and HE rounds on the roadblock, a few VB teams from the carrier platoon and a platoon of C Company would join them to keep the Japanese’ heads down.

When they had stalked the Japanese tank, Alden had found that the ‘jungle’ while thick wasn’t really a hinderance to the Matilda II. He would take his tank off the road and towards the roadblock position from the left-hand side, the other gun tank would go off on the right. Each tank would have a platoon of C Company following the tank through the jungle and then attack the roadblock from the flank. Alden thought that about 100 yards off the road would be sufficient to give the Japanese a real problem.

With the carrier burning in the centre of the road there was already something of a smoke screen. The CS tank approached the burning carrier until one side of the roadblock was visible and began lobbing HE shells at it. The infantry closed up with the CS tank and began rapid firing towards the Japanese positions.

Lieutenant Alden, remembering the stories from the Great War, walked in front of the tank for the first 100 yards making sure that there weren’t any problems hiding in the undergrowth. He was pleased to have a very large Naik and four sepoys walking with him as he guided the tank driver through the jungle. Once he had paced off 100 yards he ordered the tank to turn, and with the NCO and half a section still proceeding the tank they set off towards the Japanese. Alden watched from the turret as the tank crushed the bushes and small trees out of the way. The five soldiers kept their distance ahead of the tank, occasionally holding up a hand to halt the tank. A few times the men from the Baluch Regiment chose an easier path, but it didn’t take long for them to come upon the Japanese outpost protecting the roadblock’s flank. As soon as the sepoys and the Japanese started trading fire, Alden ordered the driver to advance with as much speed as he could, the gunner opened fire with the co-axial and Alden noted that the men of 14 Platoon supporting him were fanning out on either side of the tank, moving through the jungle, pausing only to fire and keep moving.

Alden had guessed right. The distance of 100 yards off the road wasn’t the thickest jungle, and the Naik who had led them had brought them to a perfect position to attack the roadblock from the flank. The gunner identified the Japanese anti-tank gun and covered it with a ten second burst from the BESA, followed by a 2-pdr shell which actually managed hit the axle of the gun. As Alden’s tank pulled into the road the Japanese troops were in full retreat but being picked off by the fire from the tank and infantry. About three minutes later the second gun tank arrived, but the roadblock had already been overwhelmed by then. Signalling back to the CS tank, the rest of C Company and the carrier platoon moved forward, having carefully checked for more mines, and the men cleared the trees and other material the Japanese had used to create the roadblock.

There was a flurry of communications through Alden’s tank radio with Lt Col Dean and the C Company OC. The latest news from A and D Companies remained grim, artillery support was helping, but they were being pushed back by superior numbers. Dean wanted the tanks and infantry to hit the Japanese in the flank as quickly as possible. Both Alden and the Captain of C Company knew that their attack on the roadblock would have alerted the Japanese that they were coming down the road and would likely have put out a further flank guard. Alden wondered about doing the same again. Having the three tanks crash through the jungle off the road, with the infantry and carriers following in their wake. The Japanese generally seemed to think, with reason, that the British were tied to the roads. Giving them a taste of their own medicine seemed like a good idea. Alden’s experience of having the half section walking the route ahead of the tank was probably slower, but more likely to avoid getting stuck.

The C Company Captain agreed but wanted a larger arrowhead of men ahead of the tanks. He ordered 14 Platoon to take the lead, with the Naik who’d previously led Alden’s tank leading his rifle section at the point of the arrowhead, the other two rifle sections to left and right. The Platoon commander would ride on the back of Alden’s tank, trying to keep an eye out for any trouble. Once more Alden walked with the Naik and his section guiding his driver about 100 yards off the road on the left hand side, moving westwards towards the Japanese flank. At about 100 yards the jungle did start to thicken, so Alden got back on his tank, but not before shaking the hand of the Baluch Naik, and wishing him well.

The going was tough, but they kept to a decent walking pace of about three miles an hour, which brought them to the edge of the battle within ten minutes. The three tanks had been travelling in single file, with the carrier platoon behind them taking advantage of the flattened undergrowth. When they drew near the leading section held up their hands to stop the tanks. Alden ordered the driver to switch off the engine and ordered the other tanks to do the same, the carriers followed their example so that the jungle had gone silent. 14 Platoon’s commander went forward, with Alden, joined presently by the Captains of C Company and the carrier platoon. They decided the easiest way to advance would be for the three tanks to go line abreast, with the carriers following, and when the jungle thinned, for the carriers to go out on the flanks to provide crossfire with their VB light MGs. Each of the three rifle platoons would support one tank each, and work alongside it. Alden put the CS tank in the centre, while he would go to the left and the other gun tank to the right, with spacing between them of no more than thirty yards. Once everything was agreed, they agreed they would start off in ten minutes to let everyone be told what their job was, and to get in place.

When ten minutes had crawled by on his watch, Alden ordered the driver to go, and keeping to marching pace, led the counter-attack into the Japanese flank. His guess had been right, the Japanese had prepared another roadblock and had the strength of about a company of men to hold it, along with anti-tank guns and three Type 97 tanks. The route Alden and 14 Platoon took brought them out at the rear of the roadblock, where the gunner made short work of the tanks, and the infantry, with a couple of carriers in support put the Japanese troops to flight. One of the anti-tank guns managed to get a round off which left a groove in the armour on the side of the turret and a loud ringing noise in Alden’s turret. The co-axial MG made short work of the Japanese gun crew. With the roadblock neutralised, Alden brought his tank back into line with the rest of the troop and began to roll up the flank of the Japanese attacking force. ‘Like a hot knife through butter’ was the gunner’s opinion. While he was firing away, he and the loader got into an argument about just how many tin cans the gunner had killed so far.

As they were still doing the jobs, Alden didn’t intervene, but opened the hatch to focus on what was going on around him. The big Naik who’d led the tank was marching alongside, firing a VB from the hip. Alden motioned for him to come up onto the back of the tank, and fire over the turret. The smile he received in return was something to behold, and soon the big man on beside him, his number two alongside with reloads for the VB. Alden ducked down inside so he would be deafened by the fire and wondered if he’d done the right thing. Tanks were bullet magnets, and riding on the back would expose the big man. Alden couldn’t second guess himself, and the Naik seemed keen to take up the position, so Alden left him to it.

One of the problems of being a Troop Leader was that not only was he responsible for fighting his own tank, he also had to keep an eye out for the other two tanks in the troop. The large explosion close to the CS tank brought him back to his role. A Japanese field gun had been turned to fire on the tanks, and if there was one field gun, there was probably a battery of them. Sure enough, the three tanks found themselves facing four guns that looked a bit like Indian mountain artillery guns.

Once again the mantra of the first to see, first to fire, first to hit was the key to success. The range between the tanks and the guns was only about 5oo yards, and all three tanks opened up with their co-axial MGs, the CS tank putting an HE round into the ground just in front of the gun that had fired previously. The explosion knocked the gun and crew over, but that crew had been in the process of reloading. The other three guns were firing over open sights, and for direct fire artillery under pressure they came very close, one was just over the CS tank in the middle, the other gun tank was pelted with shrapnel and mud from a near miss just in front of the tank. Alden’s tank was rocked as the shell missed by about ten yards, and he feared for the two men on the back of the tank as the sound of shrapnel rang off the armour.

All four guns were put out of action before they could fire again. When Alden opened the hatch he found only blood stains where the Naik had been. He could see the two Indian lying on the ground, but he couldn’t tell if they were dead or just badly injured. The ground beyond the guns cleared somewhat and the carrier platoon extended the flanks of the counter-attack which broke the Japanese. It transpired that the tanks had overrun a Regimental HQ which had been using the four guns as a last resort. The fighting wasn’t over by a long chalk, but C Company were soon linked with A and D Companies of 4/10th Baluch Regiment, and then Alden’s troop met the troop of tanks supporting the 2nd Bn HLI who had been advancing from the other flank.

Alden wanted to get back to the Battalion HQ where a truck with petrol, oil and ammunition was waiting. Lt Col Dean noted that the counter-attack had been successful, the Japanese were fleeing into the jungle and that his Battalion was once more in control of the situation. Alden ordered the driver to lead the troop back to HQ but as he did so he found the 2nd Lieutenant commanding 14 Platoon and asked after the Naik who’d been blown off his tank. The good news was that the Naik was alive, though with some extra holes from the shrapnel, the bad news was that the number 2 was dead, he’d taken the worst of the explosion and saved the Naik’s life. Alden asked for his best wishes to be conveyed to the Naik and promised to send him the chocolate from his rations in gratitude for his work.

 

[MattII]

An AT round in the Crocodile's fuel filled trailer would be a bad thing. The Churchill itself was well protected.

The later models. a 7.5 cm Pak 40 with PzGr. 40 ammunition could hole Marks I through VI from 500m or more, even at angles of 30°.

Is there any source on the logistics of the Japanese amphibious landings? We hear folk talking in assorted threads about how much special kit and experience is needed for major amphibious landings but I cannot find anything useful about how prepared the Japanese were. For the actual landings, the establishment of a beachhead with supplies and any following waves. They obviously achieved the task but I have no idea of how and it was a toss a significant ocean distance. Presumably the same applies to the Philippines and DEI.

They had good landing craft to be sure. The Daihatsu-class landing craft f.e. was where Andrew Higgins drew his inspiration from for a series of landing craft, including the LCVP.

On the latest story post, it looks like another victory for the defenders, at heavy cost to the Japanese, especially in armour.

 

[Atrophied]

Also nice updates we have been getting lately .

hmm , sending a tank brigade or even a division of churchills mainly to far east might be a thing to pursue i guess to get good use out of them since they probably arent very good outside infantry support roles and would do well there i think if the engine is decent enough. Then there is the option of sending a valiant divison or brigades to reinforce the far east since 42 will be pretty peaceful till the sicily invasion in late summer i think is my estimation for armored forces atleast. I imagine there isnt much appetitite for sending many british infantry divisons , but armored forces and air forces and most of the modern navy seem just like the things to send and they arent as manpower intensive.

If they are kept mainly as infantry support role then they will still be useful in europe i guess , ideally it would be like a brigade is assigned per division for the invasion at the start and have the victor divisons be in the more traditional armored role?

Im not so sure that a week or two delay compared to otl is enough to gurantee singapore not falling , i know japanese supply situation was pretty horrific even in otl . But if the army doesnt get distracted with taking java and instead uses those resources to reinforce the malaya invasion they might scrape togheter enough supplies to give the invasion a 2nd wind i guess is my thought currently .

 

[MattII]

hmm , sending a tank brigade or even a division of churchills mainly to far east might be a thing to pursue i guess to get good use out of them since they probably arent very good outside infantry support roles and would do well there i think if the engine is decent enough. Then there is the option of sending a valiant divison or brigades to reinforce the far east since 42 will be pretty peaceful till the sicily invasion in late summer i think is my estimation for armored forces atleast. I imagine there isnt much appetitite for sending many british infantry divisons , but armored forces and air forces and most of the modern navy seem just like the things to send and they arent as manpower intensive.

If they are kept mainly as infantry support role then they will still be useful in europe i guess , ideally it would be like a brigade is assigned per division for the invasion at the start and have the victor divisons be in the more traditional armored role?

Im not so sure that a week or two delay compared to otl is enough to gurantee singapore not falling , i know japanese supply situation was pretty horrific even in otl . But if the army doesnt get distracted with taking java and instead uses those resources to reinforce the malaya invasion they might scrape togheter enough supplies to give the invasion a 2nd wind i guess.

Remember, the British have reinforcements coming through too though.

 

[Paulo the Limey]

Fantastic update Allan, really enjoying the combat descriptions.

 

[MattII]

I wonder how many tanks the Japanese lost here.

 

[kelgar04]

Well damn that was a very nice update and given the way the Japanese just got rolled that must have been a nasty kick in the bollocks.

Looking at it from a tactical level they just got blocked and then had their usual o methods turned on them by rather adhoc force that had better armour and more motivated troops that pretty much mulched their flank and turned their attack into a full on route which will probably lead to more than a few officers in the IJA requesting to use the garden and some poor bastard to be their seconds.

Strategically from the limited picture I see this is a victory that has hit the Japanese hard and forced them to pause at least for a few days maybe even a week if we are lucky so it's gives the Commonwealth and British Forces time to get their breath and more supplies to get to them. They also have taken heavier losses which in the broader picture of the war they are taking a beating they can't afford to with their limited manpower reserves.

Logistically the Japanese are in deep troubles even if we don't have an accurate count they just lost a load of its tanks, a couple of field guns, some anti tank guns and have expended a goodly chunk of their shells and other munitions on this attack that just got driven off, this will hurt them more in the long and short term than anything else because they don't have the industrial method or the supply base to replace losses quickly or train up replacements.

 

[Orry]

Don;t have my books to hand butI seem to recall that a lot of regular officers thought of the IG as parade ground soldiers rather than real fighter

To hear that they ram awau from the enemy......

 

[kelgar04]

Don;t have my books to hand butI seem to recall that a lot of regular officers thought of the IG as parade ground soldiers rather than real fighter

To hear that they ram awau from the enemy......

I expect more than a few of the IG officers will be using the garden

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I recommend have someone behind him with something heavy and hit him with it every time he tries.

Simply surround him with 'no men' who were happy to bark 'no Winston'

ABC and Allanbrook where such men

In fact Winston did try to get someone else other than Cunningham to replace Pound but every other Admiral approached refused saying that ABC was the best choice placing the needs of the service above themselves etc

When visiting Monty in the Desert just before Alam Halfa Winston was critical of Brian Horrock's and suggested that Monty sack him and was told rather bluntly 'Mind your own business'

 

[MattII]

Hm, Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, Mussolini... Is it just me, or are national leaders are more of a benefit to their enemies than their own side?