Simba Roars

16. To Life
Chapter 16

To Life

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On February 11, 2004, snowflakes drifted gently to earth, coating the National Mall in a blanket of powdery white. Across the river, in Arlington, an ambulance quickly made its way to the home of an important public figure, its lights flashing brightly through the wintry mix and its sirens echoing through neighborhoods. The paramedics arrived and put the septuagenarian onto a stretcher. He strained to sit up, coughing harshly and depositing mucus mixed with blood into his hand. He was wheezing severely. About three hours after he was wheeled into the ambulance, White House Chief of Staff Mike Murphy phoned the president, waking him up in the dead of night.

When he heard the news, the president groaned into the receiver – unsure why he was being woken up when so little information about the situation existed. He rolled over and went back to bed. He woke up around 6:30 that morning and trudged into the bathroom, showering and brushing his teeth, before joining his wife for breakfast.

“Have you seen this?” she asked, gesturing the remote toward the television. Katie Couric narrated the events in Arlington from the night before. “His condition remains unclear,” the anchor said ominously.

McCain nodded. “Mike called last night,” he told his wife.

Two days later, the news some had anticipated became official. The president was in the Oval Office meeting with Murphy and National Security Adviser William Ball. Mark Salter interrupted.

“Mr. President,” he said, “Chief Justice Rehnquist died about 30 minutes ago.”

The president nodded solemnly. “Alright,” he said. “Mark, you’re going to need to get whatever sonofabitch we nominate through the Senate. I want you to lead this process. Meet with the Counsel’s office and get a list of names. We’ll start going from there.”

Ball sat quietly – his meeting hijacked by breaking news. Salter nodded, taking notes on his hand as the president rattled off bits and pieces of the types of people he wanted on the list. He gave Salter only one specific name. “Make sure we vet Gonzales.”

“Alberto?”

“Yes. We should revisit the files from a few years ago and see what needs to be added.” Salter nodded, scribbling down the reminder. “And I need to call Rehnquist’s children.”

Across Pennsylvania Avenue, Senate Minority Whip Harry Reid called the caucus’ leader, Tom Daschle of South Dakota. “We can’t let McCain make this appointment.”

“Rehnquist?” Daschle asked, confused.

“Yes.”

“What do you mean?”

“Tom, we’re nine months away from a presidential election. Who knows what could happen? Whether it’s Kerry or Wellstone – we might have a Democratic president come January, and they could fill the seat. I think we can argue that this is an election year – no one’s ever appointed a justice, let alone a Chief Justice, during an election year – and that we should let the American people pick the next Chief Justice.”

“I don’t know, Harry. The Court has never animated the left the way it has the right.”

“This is an opportunity for us. If I were you, I would go out there right now, and I would say: Whoever wins in November can replace Rehnquist.”

“Jesus, Harry – the man’s body is still warm.”

“We can’t waste any time with this, or it won’t work.”

Daschle agreed to float the idea by others. His first call was to Ted Kennedy, the powerful Democrat from Massachusetts who had stopped the Bork nomination years earlier. He ran Reid’s idea by him. “I think it’s brilliant,” he said. “Let’s take our chances. Worst case scenario, McCain gets to fill it in his second term. We have the votes to filibuster a nomination,” Kennedy said. He brought Chris Dodd, his friend from Connecticut and the former presidential contender, to his side.


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Senators Ted Kennedy and Harry Reid wanted to block any nominee to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist until after the 2004 presidential election.

Ironically, two of the most vocal opponents of the idea in the caucus were from the top presidential contenders. Neither Kerry nor Wellstone nor John Edwards wanted the Democrats to leave the seat open. Having the Supreme Court on the ballot in such a pronounced way only excited the Evangelical right – McCain’s weakest bloc. It was possible that they might have suppressed turnout in November because McCain had not been their strongest ally. If that were the case, it was possible for Democrats to pull off an upset. If Democrats kept the seat open, they would turn out in droves.

Other Democrats also opposed the idea. Recently elected moderates like Chet Edwards and Harold Ford, Jr., decried the norm-breaking behavior. Had any previous nomination been held open that long? They thought the idea was politically foolish. Others, like Hillary Clinton, opposed the idea because it was so brazenly political. “This is the kind of shit they’d have pulled against Bill,” she said to Daschle. “We’re better than they are, and we shouldn’t stoop to their level.”

About three hours after Rehnquist’s death became public, the rumors that Democrats would block McCain from filling the seat trickled into the mainstream conversation. And so, Daschle had to make a decision. He walked into the Senate press room and told reporters that while the caucus had “examined the precedent around an election-year appointment,” they had “no intention” of blindly filibustering any nominee to replace Rehnquist. The Senate Democrats were committed, he said, to their role of advise and consent. Should the president appoint an unqualified or unfit justice, they would do their part to prevent such a nominee from taking the bench. But they would not hold the seat open. And so the Daschle precedent was set: A president could appoint a Supreme Court Justice during an election year.

The entire idea of filibustering whatever nominee McCain chose, regardless of who it was, seemed bizarre to the White House, and Mike Murphy was in disbelief that Democrats had even considered the idea. The White House certainly hadn’t. With the rumors and drama laid aside, the White House conducted its review of candidates. In the meantime, the nation came together to bury one of the most influential Supreme Court Justices in history – and a champion of the modern conservative movement.


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The president's initial shortlist included Alice Moore Batchelder, Edith Brown Clement, Alberto Gonzales, and Michael McConnell (from left to right).

A list of 11 candidates was brought down to a final four: Alice Moore Batchelder, Edith Brown Clement, Alberto Gonzales, and Michael McConnell. The early favorite for the seat was Batchelder. The president was excited to name the first woman Chief Justice – which he believed would help cement his legacy. Those on his team who reviewed her opinions were impressed with her writing skills – and her opinions. Batchelder was a decidedly conservative jurist. She dissented in a landmark case that upheld affirmative action, took a restrictive view of the Commerce Clause, and in United States v. Chesney (1996) – a gun control case – she voted to invalidate a part of the Gun Control Act that had been upheld by 10 other circuit courts of appeal. In McCain’s mind, she was the strongest choice – both to cement support on the right and to gather popular support from the rest of the political spectrum. She was also Kellyanne Conway’s top choice. Conway believed that Democrats would be mum on their opposition to the first woman Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. She was wrong.

After Batchelder traveled to Washington to meet with the president, the story broke, and reporters began delving into her record. The Washington Post ran a front-page story about an issue they had previously covered – Batchelder had ruled in five lawsuits involving Wal-Mart and Bristol Myers Squibb – companies that her husband’s retirement account was heavily invested in. As a judge, she should have recused herself from those cases, she argued. In an interview on CNN, Senator Kennedy said that kind of conflict was “exactly the kind of thing” that would disqualify one of McCain’s appointees. Fearful of a difficult confirmation fight, the president and his team moved on.

Two of the people on McCain’s short list hailed from the Fifth Circuit Court, which was not usually a place from which presidents chose Supreme Court Justices. The first was Edith Brown Clement, whom the president had appointed in 2001. She was more ideologically nuanced than Gonzales, and some on the right feared what she meant when she told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Supreme Court “has clearly held the right to privacy … includes the right to have an abortion.” Supporters of hers said that the statement was merely a statement of fact and not endorsement. Detractors worried that, if given the chance, she would not overturn Roe. There was little known about Brown, which raised the question that she may be another David Souter – whom President Bush had appointed only to realize he was more liberal leaning in his ideology. The Federalist Society had, however, endorsed her 2001 nomination.

Gonzales’ 2002 appointment was an attempt to mollify the Bush wing of the Party. Appointing him to the Supreme Court would be a more overtly political choice. He had served as Governor George W. Bush’s counsel in Austin before Bush appointed him to be Texas Secretary of State and then Associate Justice on the Texas Supreme Court. Like Clement, he had largely avoided controversial cases during his two years on the Bench, but while that would help Clement, it hurt Gonzales. Because so much of Gonzales’ tenure had been political, Democrats would be able to more easily pin him as an ideological selection. Additionally, he had one fewer year on the federal bench, and it would be easier to paint him as unqualified for the role.

Michael McConnell was appointed by McCain to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in 2001, and he was the preferred choice of judicial academia – having broad support from conservatives and liberals alike. He had argued before the Supreme Court and spent years as a law professor, researching, publishing, and editing many volumes of legal work. In 1996, he signed a statement supporting a Constitutional amendment to ban abortion, but he had not ruled on the issue since joining the bench. It was unclear whether he’d be willing to go back on judicial precedent. A sober individual, he did little to excite the president and did even less to excite Conway. He was, however, Salter’s preferred choice.

As the inner circle reviewed the final three names on the list, Conway decided to add a fourth: Antonin Scalia. Appointed to the Supreme Court by Ronald Reagan, Scalia was seen as the premiere conservative mind on the Bench. His nomination would excite the right and while the left would be opposed, the White House agreed he’d be confirmed with Democratic votes. At first, the suggestion was seen as a joke, but Murphy soon began to like the idea while Salter remained hesitant. The glaring issue with Scalia was his age. At 69 years old, it was doubtful that Scalia could serve long on the Court (which had become a key factor in appointments). “Does the guy have 15 years in him?” Murphy asked at one of their discussions.


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The White House began to consider promoting Associate Justice Antonin Scalia to the position of Chief Justice.

“Fifteen?” Salter scoffed. “Does the guy even have 10?”

McCain, too, was worried about Scalia’s age. The nomination of a young Chief Justice who could set the direction and pace of the court for the next 20 years enticed McCain, who wanted to leave his mark on history. Murphy, however, started to change his mind on a Scalia nomination. The problem with the current list was that after eight years of Clinton nominations, the Bush appointees were too old, and the McCain appointees were too inexperienced. Nominating Scalia as a placeholder Chief Justice gave McCain the chance to replace him with one of these other candidates, who could serve as an Associate Justice and then replace Scalia at the center of the bench when Scalia was done serving. He was 69 years old, but he wasn’t seen as someone in failing health. It was conceivable that he could serve another 10-12 years, enough time for Clement, Gonzales, or McConnell to be his obvious successor. Or, that president could appoint one of McCain’s Court of Appeals nominees who would have fifteen years of experience by that point.

McCain’s biggest concern, however, was that it would be impossible to guarantee that Scalia was replaced by a Republican president. It was simply too big of a risk. McCain was stuck between three imperfect nominees: Clement, who would become the nation’s first woman Chief Justice, Gonzales, who would become the first Hispanic Chief Justice – or justice, for that matter, and McConnell, who, while not history-making, would likely encounter the least opposition from the left. The president met with all three and then made his decision.

At a Rose Garden ceremony on April 5, 2004, the president nominated Edith Brown Clement to serve as the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Quickly, Republican senators expressed their support for the nomination as “ground-breaking.” The Federalist Society, though cautious about her previous comments on choice, believed Clement was an “acceptable” choice, and the Democrats were largely quiet – praising the historical nature of McCain’s choice. The lack of a considerable paper trail left little to attack her on other than a perceived lack of qualification to serve as Chief Justice, but no Democrat wanted to be seen as accusing the first woman nominated for Chief Justice as being “unqualified.”

Her nomination hearings took place in June as the Court wrapped up its term. Poised and collected, Brown Clement answered numerous questions from the Judiciary Committee with the kind of evasiveness that had become typical of the process. There were no scandals or flashy dissents in her record – she was a safe pick because her paper record was so scarce. And so, in July of 2004, the Senate voted 96-4 to confirm her nomination to the Supreme Court. Senators Daniel Akaka of Hawaii, Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, Kennedy, and Reid voted against her nomination. Edith Brown Clement became the 17th person and the first woman to serve as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
 
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Gonna be interesting to see what the Democrats run on since they can’t run on not being Bush like that they did in 2004 in real life.
 
I stop checking this TL for a couple of weeks and then there are loads of posts for me to catch up on and enjoy! Great job Vidal!

I particularly liked the Rolling Stone article about Wellstone. A McCain-Wellstone contest would certainly be very interesting to see, but if Kerry wins the nomination instead and loses to McCain, I suspect the Democrats would course-correct and go for a more liberal candidate in 2008.

Just about a year away from the UK General Election if it follows OTL schedule. Without Iraq and with the economy going strong, I'd expect Labour to potentially do better than OTL.
 
17. We Have a Nominee
Chapter 17

We Have a Nominee

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Senator John Kerry (D-MA) was the front runner for the 2004 Democratic nomination.

Winter in Iowa and New Hampshire is unforgiving, and so, too, were the results of the first caucus and first primary held in 2004. As their dates emerged, the competition was between four primary contenders: John Edwards, the young North Carolina senator who was inching up in the polls after persistent messaging and some commanding debater performances; Dick Gephardt, the Washington insider who only remained in competition because of support from special interests and his home state proximity to Iowa; John Kerry, the Massachusetts senator and 2000 vice presidential candidate who was running on a foreign policy platform aimed at rivaling the president’s; and Paul Wellstone, the progressive Minnesota senator who was inspiring the liberal base with his “Do More” message of going beyond the current political moment.

On January 19, 2004, Iowans turned out to participate in their local caucus. Kerry was the favorite going in, thanks to the last Des Moines Register poll, though some pundits and talking heads speculated that voters should “anticipate” a surprise comeback from Dick Gephardt, the Missouri Congressman with local roots. “Iowans know Dick,” they repeated, over and over. Larry King pressed them on if that really mattered, and they said it did. But they seemed to forget that Iowa shared a border with Minnesota – the home of Paul Wellstone. The Wellstone campaign was happy to have these sleepy expectations. They knew what their grassroots machine was capable of achieving, and now they waited to see if it worked.

In an unusual twist, the Register poll had missed the mark. It had underestimated Wellstone’s college campus campaign, and while it had accurately predicted his strength in union strongholds, it was off by enough that Wellstone’s first-place finish shook the political establishment. The Kerry team was blindsided, certain that the numbers would even out and Kerry would regain his lead. They never did. Wellstone won with 40% - a commanding lead that had him ahead of Kerry by nearly eight points. Gephardt finished third. Edwards fell to a disappointing fourth place finish. And then, overnight, the candidates were off to New Hampshire.


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Wellstone's Iowa victory legitimized his campaign and made the Kerry camp nervous.

Kerry was now in a bind. He needed the comeback narrative of New Hampshire, but he was the overwhelming favorite there. In the political realm, for Democrats, New Hampshire was seen as a mere extension of Massachusetts. It would be like winning his home state. To underscore this narrative, both Gephardt and Edwards skipped it – heading straight to South Carolina. Wellstone knew he had to compete there to show he was a front runner and a serious candidate, but he would be lucky to come within the eight-points he’d beaten Kerry by in Iowa.

The New Hampshire primary is sometimes known by its dramatic moments – Muskie’s tears or Reagan’s bark, “I paid for this damn microphone!” at a famous Granite State debate, for example. No such event happened in the 2004 Democratic primary, but there was an unintended consequence from Gephardt and Edwards’ decision to skip town. Their voters went elsewhere. First-in-the-nation voters take their job seriously, and if a candidate slights them, they have no problem slighting that candidate. And so it was that Edwards voters pulled the lever for Wellstone and Gephardt voters moved en masse to Kerry. Edwards’ early departure helped Wellstone close some of the gap with Kerry, losing to the Massachusetts senator by just five-points.

The pundits on CNN were aflutter. “We have just assumed that Kerry would be the nominee. There was this idea that he was invincible. Now what?!” Wolf Blitzer asked his panel. They didn’t have answers because they had been the ones to make that assumption. Kerry was the obvious nominee. He looked the part. In 2000, he had essentially played the part. He was the only one who could rival McCain’s military experience – perhaps even neutralizing it. And in a post-9/11 world it seemed impossible that voters in the Democratic primary would turn away from a war hero who had turned his time in Vietnam to activism against that very war. He was, on paper, the perfect Democratic candidate.

It was off to Nevada and South Carolina, where the candidates drew a tie. Nevada went to Wellstone while Kerry took South Carolina. Both Gephardt and Edwards ended their campaigns, leaving the primaries to a two-man showdown heading into Super Tuesday. Kerry believed that in a one-on-one fight, he’d beat Wellstone. There was one debate that featured just the two of them and both sides speculated it would decide the race. The momentum was on Wellstone’s side, but it was Kerry who could neutralize that with a strong showing. It was the most watched of the 2004 primary debates.

The debate underscored the difference between the two campaigns. Kerry was on-message, touting his war record, promising he could “handle complex global affairs,” and speculating that Wellstone’s “pie-in-the-sky” approach would alienate general election voters. It was the final remark – the suggestion that Wellstone’s ideas were fantastical – that brought about his sharpest rebuke. “I am tired of politicians telling us that we have to play by their set of rules. I am tired of politicians telling us that affordable health care for every American is unrealistic. I’m tired of being told that a fair tax code – one that asks millionaires to hold up their end of the social contract – is burdensome. I’m tired of men from Cambridge telling men and women in Cleveland that their desire for a hand-up is the equivalent of panhandling. This is the Democratic Party – if we’re not here to help people, if we’re not running this race to make people’s lives better – well, I just don’t know what we’re doing.” Kerry, looking down at his notes, knew the war had been lost.

On Super Tuesday, Kerry won only Georgia and his home state of Massachusetts. He dropped out of the race the next morning, congratulating Wellstone on an impressive primary victory. Wellstone’s decisive victories in California, New York, and Ohio made a comeback impossible. The Democrats had nominated a Midwestern populist with multiple sclerosis as their nominee. Some speculated this was the “Bartlet-effect,” but even if they publicly projected confidence, the Wellstone campaign knew that they needed to assuage concerns about Wellstone’s health by picking a strong running mate – which would mean convincing their boss to choose someone using his head rather than his heart.


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A stunned John Kerry concedes the Democratic nomination to his Senate colleague, Paul Wellstone.

Wellstone’s dark horse victory gave his campaign an enthusiasm and momentum that carried into the general election matchup. Polls showed him closing the gap on John McCain, though most believed they would return to Earth in short manner. To capitalize on their momentum, the Wellstone campaign knew they needed to execute a flawless general election strategy. It would begin with the selection of a vice presidential candidate. His team assembled a list of 44 possible running mates and asked Wellstone to choose 15 people to be vetted by the campaign’s firm. Of those 15, 12 agreed to be vetted. California congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, Delaware senator Beau Biden, and former New Hampshire governor Jeanne Shaheen declined the vetting process. Biden’s removal from the process leaked in the press – ironically to the senator’s benefit.

The Veepstakes is a highly competitive and secretive endeavor, and for that reason it fosters nearly endless speculation in print and television media. For more than a week, the only news was that Beau Biden didn’t want to be vice president – and it prompted praise from everyone, creating a narrative that the Delaware senator was “humble” and on his way to following in his father’s footsteps – that of a senator who did the work and put in the years. Said one New York Times article, “One can imagine a future in which Senate Majority Leader Beau Biden, well into his seventies, continues his titan grip on the world’s greatest deliberative body. It may be a legacy that puts Lyndon Johnson’s Senate tenure to shame.” The opinion piece was both a result of and a contributing factor in the nation’s fascination with the Boy Wonder Senator, who had taken over for his father after falling victim to the grisliest terrorist attack.

For the remaining 12 candidates, the vetting process was an extensive review of their taxes, public statements, years of schedules, and interviews with friends and neighbors. Wellstone wanted to meet with five contenders for interviews. The staff struck two of the candidates after vetting, leaving the candidate with 10 semi-finalists. Wellstone requested to meet with Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana, Governor Phil Bredesen of Tennessee, Senator Bob Graham of Florida, former Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, and Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico. He met first with Mary Landrieu, after a fundraiser in Georgetown. She was appearing as a special guest along with Hillary Clinton at a reception with women donors. After the event, she and Landrieu spoke in the host’s kitchen. Wellstone was impressed with Landrieu’s policy positions and her breadth of experience.


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Senator Paul Wellstone's VP shortlist was: Senator Evan Bayh (IN), Governor Phil Bredesen (TN), Senator Bob Graham (FL), fmr. Senator Mary Landrieu (LA), and Governor Bill Richardson (NM).

The next day, he appeared at a joint event in Miami with Senator Bob Graham. Then, they talked for an hour in the car ride to the next event. Graham was not a particularly charismatic choice, but Wellstone liked that he may be able to deliver Florida for the Democratic ticket.

The meeting with Evan Bayh was the most elaborate. Wellstone was home in Minnesota and Bayh was flown in on a private plane, donning a hate and sunglasses so he’d go unrecognized by the press. The pair met for an hour before Wellstone thanked his Senate colleague for his time. After Bayh left, Wellstone told his staff to cancel the remaining interviews with Bredesen and Richardson – he wanted to call Bob Graham.

His staff was elated – taking it as a sign that Wellstone had made up his mind and wanted to make the offer. He and Graham spoke by phone for another 40 minutes. They talked about health care and other potential priorities in a future administration. When the call was over, Wellstone left the room and his staff looked on eagerly. “Well?” David Axelrod asked the candidate.

“It’s Mary.”

The news stunned his team, who had been anticipating a Wellstone/Graham ticket. “Bob doesn’t share my vision, and I don’t think Evan does, either,” Wellstone explained. “Mary’s young – she’s got a great mind. We disagree on some things, but she shares my general vision. She’s the one.” The staff was worried – mostly about Landrieu’s gender. They doubted that a woman would assuage concerns about Wellstone’s health or add weight to his foreign policy credentials. Finally, an exasperated Axelrod let out, “She just makes no sense, senator.”

“You’re telling me Bob Graham – who is on his fifth heart attack – does more to assure voters about my health?” he asked. It was slightly hyperbolic. “I don’t want to hear another sexist implication like that coming from our team again. She’s going to hear enough of it from the press.” It was clear there was no convincing Wellstone to change his mind, though they tried. What about Richardson? He was also an historical pick – he’d served in the Clinton cabinet. People would trust his experience. Not to mention he had won when he was on the ballot in 2002, as opposed to Landrieu. It was no use.

On July 8th, the Wellstone entourage traveled to Independence Hall for an enormous outdoor rally at which the presumptive nominee made his shocking announcement. The press had no idea that Landrieu was in serious consideration. In their mind it had come down to Bayh and Graham. Early speculation about Richardson ended when the governor said he had not gotten an interview. Moments before Wellstone walked on stage to make his announcement, the press broke the news about the pick – tipped off when staffers started handing out “Wellstone/Landrieu” signs.


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At the Democratic National Convention in Boston, Mary Landrieu became the second woman to run on a major party ticket.

In his remarks, Wellstone praised Landrieu as a “hard worker” who had spent her time in Washington fighting for the underdog. “When she refused to play by the rules,” he said, “they sent her home,” as if Washington insiders – not the Louisiana voters – had kicked Landrieu to the curb. It was masterful spin. He introduced her to the crowd, who roared their approval. Suddenly, the Landrieu pick seemed to make sense. She was electrifying voters. Some in the press thought she was a Hail Mary choice – much like Geraldine Ferraro had been in 1984 – but the Wellstone camp was adamant that she was chosen because she was the “best choice for the job.” In fact, unlike in 1984, the camp said, the candidate did not enter the process intending to choose a woman. Instead, he reviewed three finalists and picked his favorite.

In her speech, Landrieu introduced herself to the audience as a “stay-at-home Mom” who had spent years in public service only to see herself fall victim to rich donors who flipped her Senate seat from blue to red. She praised Wellstone, whom she said, “would be a president who is willing to lead, who will cut through the red tape and serve the American people.” “Paul and I never really fit in Washington,” she said, “and that’s why I’m excited to go back there with him – to fight for the American people.”

Days later, Democrats came together for their National Convention in Boston. When it was done, the newly-nominated Wellstone/Landrieu ticket had closed the gap – polling even with the president for the first time in the campaign. A confident Axelrod turned to his team, “Maybe Paul should be running the campaign himself!”
 
Great update! I definitely like the balance with Wellstone/Landrieu. Should make for some interesting debates with President McCain.
 
Agree with the comments above - really enjoyable read! I also expected Kerry to win but I can see how Wellstone’s message cut through and won him the nomination. A really compelling Democratic ticket, looking forward to the main election campaign!
 

dcharles

Banned
Chapter 17

We Have a Nominee

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Senator John Kerry (D-MA) was the front runner for the 2004 Democratic nomination.

Winter in Iowa and New Hampshire is unforgiving, and so, too, were the results of the first caucus and first primary held in 2004. As their dates emerged, the competition was between four primary contenders: John Edwards, the young North Carolina senator who was inching up in the polls after persistent messaging and some commanding debater performances; Dick Gephardt, the Washington insider who only remained in competition because of support from special interests and his home state proximity to Iowa; John Kerry, the Massachusetts senator and 2000 vice presidential candidate who was running on a foreign policy platform aimed at rivaling the president’s; and Paul Wellstone, the progressive Minnesota senator who was inspiring the liberal base with his “Do More” message of going beyond the current political moment.

On January 19, 2004, Iowans turned out to participate in their local caucus. Kerry was the favorite going in, thanks to the last Des Moines Register poll, though some pundits and talking heads speculated that voters should “anticipate” a surprise comeback from Dick Gephardt, the Missouri Congressman with local roots. “Iowans know Dick,” they repeated, over and over. Larry King pressed them on if that really mattered, and they said it did. But they seemed to forget that Iowa shared a border with Minnesota – the home of Paul Wellstone. The Wellstone campaign was happy to have these sleepy expectations. They knew what their grassroots machine was capable of achieving, and now they waited to see if it worked.

In an unusual twist, the Register poll had missed the mark. It had underestimated Wellstone’s college campus campaign, and while it had accurately predicted his strength in union strongholds, it was off by enough that Wellstone’s first-place finish shook the political establishment. The Kerry team was blindsided, certain that the numbers would even out and Kerry would regain his lead. They never did. Wellstone won with 40% - a commanding lead that had him ahead of Kerry by nearly eight points. Gephardt finished third. Edwards fell to a disappointing fourth place finish. And then, overnight, the candidates were off to New Hampshire.


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Wellstone's Iowa victory legitimized his campaign and made the Kerry camp nervous.

Kerry was now in a bind. He needed the comeback narrative of New Hampshire, but he was the overwhelming favorite there. In the political realm, for Democrats, New Hampshire was seen as a mere extension of Massachusetts. It would be like winning his home state. To underscore this narrative, both Gephardt and Edwards skipped it – heading straight to South Carolina. Wellstone knew he had to compete there to show he was a front runner and a serious candidate, but he would be lucky to come within the eight-points he’d beaten Kerry by in Iowa.

The New Hampshire primary is sometimes known by its dramatic moments – Muskie’s tears or Reagan’s bark, “I paid for this damn microphone!” at a famous Granite State debate, for example. No such event happened in the 2004 Democratic primary, but there was an unintended consequence from Gephardt and Edwards’ decision to skip town. Their voters went elsewhere. First-in-the-nation voters take their job seriously, and if a candidate slights them, they have no problem slighting that candidate. And so it was that Edwards voters pulled the lever for Wellstone and Gephardt voters moved en masse to Kerry. Edwards’ early departure helped Wellstone close some of the gap with Kerry, losing to the Massachusetts senator by just five-points.

The pundits on CNN were aflutter. “We have just assumed that Kerry would be the nominee. There was this idea that he was invincible. Now what?!” Wolf Blitzer asked his panel. They didn’t have answers because they had been the ones to make that assumption. Kerry was the obvious nominee. He looked the part. In 2000, he had essentially played the part. He was the only one who could rival McCain’s military experience – perhaps even neutralizing it. And in a post-9/11 world it seemed impossible that voters in the Democratic primary would turn away from a war hero who had turned his time in Vietnam to activism against that very war. He was, on paper, the perfect Democratic candidate.

It was off to Nevada and South Carolina, where the candidates drew a tie. Nevada went to Wellstone while Kerry took South Carolina. Both Gephardt and Edwards ended their campaigns, leaving the primaries to a two-man showdown heading into Super Tuesday. Kerry believed that in a one-on-one fight, he’d beat Wellstone. There was one debate that featured just the two of them and both sides speculated it would decide the race. The momentum was on Wellstone’s side, but it was Kerry who could neutralize that with a strong showing. It was the most watched of the 2004 primary debates.

The debate underscored the difference between the two campaigns. Kerry was on-message, touting his war record, promising he could “handle complex global affairs,” and speculating that Wellstone’s “pie-in-the-sky” approach would alienate general election voters. It was the final remark – the suggestion that Wellstone’s ideas were fantastical – that brought about his sharpest rebuke. “I am tired of politicians telling us that we have to play by their set of rules. I am tired of politicians telling us that affordable health care for every American is unrealistic. I’m tired of being told that a fair tax code – one that asks millionaires to hold up their end of the social contract – is burdensome. I’m tired of men from Cambridge telling men and women in Cleveland that their desire for a hand-up is the equivalent of panhandling. This is the Democratic Party – if we’re not here to help people, if we’re not running this race to make people’s lives better – well, I just don’t know what we’re doing.” Kerry, looking down at his notes, knew the war had been lost.

On Super Tuesday, Kerry won only Georgia and his home state of Massachusetts. He dropped out of the race the next morning, congratulating Wellstone on an impressive primary victory. Wellstone’s decisive victories in California, New York, and Ohio made a comeback impossible. The Democrats had nominated a Midwestern populist with multiple sclerosis as their nominee. Some speculated this was the “Bartlet-effect,” but even if they publicly projected confidence, the Wellstone campaign knew that they needed to assuage concerns about Wellstone’s health by picking a strong running mate – which would mean convincing their boss to choose someone using his head rather than his heart.


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A stunned John Kerry concedes the Democratic nomination to his Senate colleague, Paul Wellstone.

Wellstone’s dark horse victory gave his campaign an enthusiasm and momentum that carried into the general election matchup. Polls showed him closing the gap on John McCain, though most believed they would return to Earth in short manner. To capitalize on their momentum, the Wellstone campaign knew they needed to execute a flawless general election strategy. It would begin with the selection of a vice presidential candidate. His team assembled a list of 44 possible running mates and asked Wellstone to choose 15 people to be vetted by the campaign’s firm. Of those 15, 12 agreed to be vetted. California congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, Delaware senator Beau Biden, and former New Hampshire governor Jeanne Shaheen declined the vetting process. Biden’s removal from the process leaked in the press – ironically to the senator’s benefit.

The Veepstakes is a highly competitive and secretive endeavor, and for that reason it fosters nearly endless speculation in print and television media. For more than a week, the only news was that Beau Biden didn’t want to be vice president – and it prompted praise from everyone, creating a narrative that the Delaware senator was “humble” and on his way to following in his father’s footsteps – that of a senator who did the work and put in the years. Said one New York Times article, “One can imagine a future in which Senate Majority Leader Beau Biden, well into his seventies, continues his titan grip on the world’s greatest deliberative body. It may be a legacy that puts Lyndon Johnson’s Senate tenure to shame.” The opinion piece was both a result of and a contributing factor in the nation’s fascination with the Boy Wonder Senator, who had taken over for his father after falling victim to the grisliest terrorist attack.

For the remaining 12 candidates, the vetting process was an extensive review of their taxes, public statements, years of schedules, and interviews with friends and neighbors. Wellstone wanted to meet with five contenders for interviews. The staff struck two of the candidates after vetting, leaving the candidate with 10 semi-finalists. Wellstone requested to meet with Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana, Governor Phil Bredesen of Tennessee, Senator Bob Graham of Florida, former Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, and Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico. He met first with Mary Landrieu, after a fundraiser in Georgetown. She was appearing as a special guest along with Hillary Clinton at a reception with women donors. After the event, she and Landrieu spoke in the host’s kitchen. Wellstone was impressed with Landrieu’s policy positions and her breadth of experience.


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Senator Paul Wellstone's VP shortlist was: Senator Evan Bayh (IN), Governor Phil Bredesen (TN), Senator Bob Graham (FL), fmr. Senator Mary Landrieu (LA), and Governor Bill Richardson (NM).

The next day, he appeared at a joint event in Miami with Senator Bob Graham. Then, they talked for an hour in the car ride to the next event. Graham was not a particularly charismatic choice, but Wellstone liked that he may be able to deliver Florida for the Democratic ticket.

The meeting with Evan Bayh was the most elaborate. Wellstone was home in Minnesota and Bayh was flown in on a private plane, donning a hate and sunglasses so he’d go unrecognized by the press. The pair met for an hour before Wellstone thanked his Senate colleague for his time. After Bayh left, Wellstone told his staff to cancel the remaining interviews with Bredesen and Richardson – he wanted to call Bob Graham.

His staff was elated – taking it as a sign that Wellstone had made up his mind and wanted to make the offer. He and Graham spoke by phone for another 40 minutes. They talked about health care and other potential priorities in a future administration. When the call was over, Wellstone left the room and his staff looked on eagerly. “Well?” David Axelrod asked the candidate.

“It’s Mary.”

The news stunned his team, who had been anticipating a Wellstone/Graham ticket. “Bob doesn’t share my vision, and I don’t think Evan does, either,” Wellstone explained. “Mary’s young – she’s got a great mind. We disagree on some things, but she shares my general vision. She’s the one.” The staff was worried – mostly about Landrieu’s gender. They doubted that a woman would assuage concerns about Wellstone’s health or add weight to his foreign policy credentials. Finally, an exasperated Axelrod let out, “She just makes no sense, senator.”

“You’re telling me Bob Graham – who is on his fifth heart attack – does more to assure voters about my health?” he asked. It was slightly hyperbolic. “I don’t want to hear another sexist implication like that coming from our team again. She’s going to hear enough of it from the press.” It was clear there was no convincing Wellstone to change his mind, though they tried. What about Richardson? He was also an historical pick – he’d served in the Clinton cabinet. People would trust his experience. Not to mention he had won when he was on the ballot in 2002, as opposed to Landrieu. It was no use.

On July 8th, the Wellstone entourage traveled to Independence Hall for an enormous outdoor rally at which the presumptive nominee made his shocking announcement. The press had no idea that Landrieu was in serious consideration. In their mind it had come down to Bayh and Graham. Early speculation about Richardson ended when the governor said he had not gotten an interview. Moments before Wellstone walked on stage to make his announcement, the press broke the news about the pick – tipped off when staffers started handing out “Wellstone/Landrieu” signs.


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At the Democratic National Convention in Boston, Mary Landrieu became the second woman to run on a major party ticket.

In his remarks, Wellstone praised Landrieu as a “hard worker” who had spent her time in Washington fighting for the underdog. “When she refused to play by the rules,” he said, “they sent her home,” as if Washington insiders – not the Louisiana voters – had kicked Landrieu to the curb. It was masterful spin. He introduced her to the crowd, who roared their approval. Suddenly, the Landrieu pick seemed to make sense. She was electrifying voters. Some in the press thought she was a Hail Mary choice – much like Geraldine Ferraro had been in 1984 – but the Wellstone camp was adamant that she was chosen because she was the “best choice for the job.” In fact, unlike in 1984, the camp said, the candidate did not enter the process intending to choose a woman. Instead, he reviewed three finalists and picked his favorite.

In her speech, Landrieu introduced herself to the audience as a “stay-at-home Mom” who had spent years in public service only to see herself fall victim to rich donors who flipped her Senate seat from blue to red. She praised Wellstone, whom she said, “would be a president who is willing to lead, who will cut through the red tape and serve the American people.” “Paul and I never really fit in Washington,” she said, “and that’s why I’m excited to go back there with him – to fight for the American people.”

Days later, Democrats came together for their National Convention in Boston. When it was done, the newly-nominated Wellstone/Landrieu ticket had closed the gap – polling even with the president for the first time in the campaign. A confident Axelrod turned to his team, “Maybe Paul should be running the campaign himself!”

Why in the world would a true-blue progressive like Wellstone pick an oil and gas shilling, conservative Democrat like Landrieu as a VP? She was basically a Republican.
 
Would this be too far though?

While her record on drilling is outside the mainstream of the Democratic Party, Landrieu was not as far right as many other Southern Democrats. She never wavered on abortion, was a comparatively earlier supporter of same-sex marriage, had a mixed bag on tax policy — putting her in the ideological center of her party. There were plenty in the caucus to her right and plenty to the left. An examination of the ACA debate shows her opposition to the public option was tactical — not ideological. Unlike Joe Lieberman, who did not believe the public option was good policy, Landrieu got on board after exacting concessions for Louisiana. Sure, it’s not boldly progressive, but it also shows she thought the public option was a reasonable public policy — she just needed something to sell to voters back home. Again, there were plenty to her right within the Senate Democratic caucus.

There was simply no way for Wellstone to pick a running mate who “matched” him perfectly and maintain electoral viability. Landrieu is younger and more exciting than some of the other center-left options available. As mentioned, Bayh was sort of lackluster and Graham inspired little. Sure, he could have found someone who was closer to him than Landrieu and gotten away with it, but I think we often underestimate the power of the personal connection in choosing a running mate. The 2004 Veepstakes list was a pretty boring bunch, and I think it’s conceivable that Wellstone would come away personally impressed enough by Landrieu that he was willing to look over a major ideological difference on environmentalism and some other fraying around the edges.
 

dcharles

Banned
While her record on drilling is outside the mainstream of the Democratic Party, Landrieu was not as far right as many other Southern Democrats. She never wavered on abortion, was a comparatively earlier supporter of same-sex marriage, had a mixed bag on tax policy — putting her in the ideological center of her party. There were plenty in the caucus to her right and plenty to the left. An examination of the ACA debate shows her opposition to the public option was tactical — not ideological. Unlike Joe Lieberman, who did not believe the public option was good policy, Landrieu got on board after exacting concessions for Louisiana. Sure, it’s not boldly progressive, but it also shows she thought the public option was a reasonable public policy — she just needed something to sell to voters back home. Again, there were plenty to her right within the Senate Democratic caucus.

There was simply no way for Wellstone to pick a running mate who “matched” him perfectly and maintain electoral viability. Landrieu is younger and more exciting than some of the other center-left options available. As mentioned, Bayh was sort of lackluster and Graham inspired little. Sure, he could have found someone who was closer to him than Landrieu and gotten away with it, but I think we often underestimate the power of the personal connection in choosing a running mate. The 2004 Veepstakes list was a pretty boring bunch, and I think it’s conceivable that Wellstone would come away personally impressed enough by Landrieu that he was willing to look over a major ideological difference on environmentalism and some other fraying around the edges.

I'm actually from Louisiana. I voted for Mary and Mitch more than once. You are the first person that I know of to call her "exciting." Lol. As far as all this stuff about her being in the "center of the party," I've seen no evidence of it. Mary was always a fairly conservative Democrat, much to my own chagrin. I mean, she basically voted like Olympia Snowe or Susan Collins. (I think she even formed a caucus with those two at one time. "The centrist's caucus" or some similarly silly thing.) Pro abortion, willing to move with the times on issues like gay marriage (sort of, she defended Louisiana's constitutional ban on gay marriage), but otherwise, there's not much there in the way of liberalism or leftism. I mean, she bitched about Obama raising the Federal minimum wage to $10/hour. You contrast her favorably with other people on Wellstone's shortlist, but I don't think any of those people would have been on Wellstone's shortlist. If he wanted to pick a Southern Democrat, he would have picked Edwards.

It's not, to me, a plausible ticket. Its like Elizabeth Warren picking Jon Bel Edwards--just wouldn't happen. They're worlds away from each other policy-wise.
 
Fair enough, and I definitely respect your opinion and admit that I did have some trouble pairing Wellstone with a running mate. My hesitation about him picking Edwards was the idea of doubling down on a strictly populist message. It seemed hard to believe that 2004 was an election where America was ready for that — especially when the McCain Administration is more centrist than its OTL counterpart.

I definitely appreciate your feedback and will try and incorporate some of your concerns into the next update. You clearly raise valid points. I hope you’ll keep reading!
 

dcharles

Banned
Fair enough, and I definitely respect your opinion and admit that I did have some trouble pairing Wellstone with a running mate. My hesitation about him picking Edwards was the idea of doubling down on a strictly populist message. It seemed hard to believe that 2004 was an election where America was ready for that — especially when the McCain Administration is more centrist than its OTL counterpart.

I definitely appreciate your feedback and will try and incorporate some of your concerns into the next update. You clearly raise valid points. I hope you’ll keep reading!

Without commenting either way of whether America was "ready" in 2004 for two populist Senators, that sort of unapologetic populism was Wellstone's brand--he voted against the Iraq war powers resolution when he was in a tight race with Coleman about a month before election day, and was very much ready to defend the vote. He was a rhetorical judo practitioner. Rather than running away from what he believed, or attacking the other guy, he would listen to what the other people had to say and then whole-heartedly stand up for what he thought was right. He died far too young.

If he had won back in 2002, I honestly think he would have been the nominee at some point between 2004 and 2020. If everything had pretty much gone the same as it did between then and 2016, I think he would have run and beat Clinton. He had that same honest mystique as Bernie does, but he was a happy warrior and more naturally charismatic.
 
Without commenting either way of whether America was "ready" in 2004 for two populist Senators, that sort of unapologetic populism was Wellstone's brand--he voted against the Iraq war powers resolution when he was in a tight race with Coleman about a month before election day, and was very much ready to defend the vote. He was a rhetorical judo practitioner. Rather than running away from what he believed, or attacking the other guy, he would listen to what the other people had to say and then whole-heartedly stand up for what he thought was right. He died far too young.

If he had won back in 2002, I honestly think he would have been the nominee at some point between 2004 and 2020. If everything had pretty much gone the same as it did between then and 2016, I think he would have run and beat Clinton. He had that same honest mystique as Bernie does, but he was a happy warrior and more naturally charismatic.

I don’t dispute that! I do think that when you come so close to the presidency, it becomes easier to do what’s necessary to get you there. Of course, we’ll never know. I think there are convincing arguments on both sides.
 
I could see Wellstone picking Landrieu, esp in the politics of 2004. Wellstone was progressive but he was a Democrat, wanting party unity. Not sure it is the most likely choice but veep picks can go all sorts of directions.
 
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