Sheba's Sons - Haile Selassie goes to Tokyo

[Hagre]

It is funny you mention the imperialist Pan-Arab habit of basically denying the people-hood of other indigenous groups in the region or in some instances claiming other languages are in fact little more then dialects of Arabic (with others accepting even embracing the Arabist imposition / cultural imperialism) whether it be towards the Amazigh, Christians who embrace identities like Lebanese Phoenicianism/etc and others by lumping them all under the umbrella term of Arab (even if it is considered more a continuum rather than a monolithic bloc), when that same argument if applied to other groups would receive a rather cool reception at best were one to boldly claim for example English-speaking Celtic groups like the Irish/Scots/Welsh/etc are in fact English (with others likely having similar sentiment / historical grievances towards the Arabs as the Irish/etc does towards the English or a number of Black people have towards Whites).

Would be refreshing to see historical Arab to Pan-Arab imperialism be held to account instead of the Arab World successfully painting themselves as one if not the main victims of colonialism/imperialism in OTL, yet can understand why a number of Christians and others in MENA embraced Pan-Arabism and became prominent figures in OTL (since the only other commonality in the region would then be based on religion/etc which puts them and others in a vulnerable position).

Overall it seems the Anti-Arab Pan-Africanist Alliance would be one useful component (together with an ATL India under Sardar Patel followed by Rajaji) for a more independent and Right-leaning Anti-Communist equivalent of the Non-Aligned Movement (that is its own distant thing in ATL).

Exactly! The next few chapters will touch on this, particularly concerning the Mali Federation and Maghreb Union.

The Anti-Arab Pan-Africanist Alliance will form a bloc on its own with the sooner establishment of the African Union ITTL and maintain a neutral position on the West-East dispute.

 

[Masked Grizzly]

Exactly! The next few chapters will touch on this, particularly concerning the Mali Federation and Maghreb Union.

The Anti-Arab Pan-Africanist Alliance will form a bloc on its own with the sooner establishment of the African Union ITTL and maintain a neutral position on the West-East dispute.

Understand.

Returning to Casablanca Bloc aligned Nigeria, would we see neighboring Hausa-dominated Niger eventually incorporated into an even more overwhelming Hausa-dominated Nigeria (after the secession of Yorubaland and Biafra). Also how likely would it be for Burkina Faso to join the Mali Federation?

 

[Hagre]

Returning to Casablanca Bloc aligned Nigeria, would we see neighboring Hausa-dominated Niger eventually incorporated into an even more overwhelming Hausa-dominated Nigeria (after the secession of Yorubaland and Biafra). Also how likely would it be for Burkina Faso to join the Mali Federation?

The Nigerians aren't going to be too friendly to anyone in the Monrovia Bloc, even though the Hausa-dominated Niger possesses close ties. As for Upper Volta, it - and the other constituencies - are still a part of the MF proper.

 

[Hagre]

The Rising Sun

Excerpt from A History of African Radicalism by Paul Gilroy ​

Exploiting his executive powers, Kigeli occupied the foremost role in establishing Rwanda as a proper nation. Over the course of the '60s, its foreign relations were expanded as the King sided with the West and declared their opposition to the spread of atheistic communism across Africa, though Rwanda maintained fairly friendly relations with African Socialist regimes in the Congo and Tanzania. Kigali was also fiercely anti-colonialist as a result of the UNAR's ideological program and proclaimed its support for the anti-colonial movements attempting to overthrow the Western yoke. At the same time, the UNAR administration showed interest in the eastern regions of a Congo consumed by civil war, particularly the portions inhabited by both persons of Rwandan descents and a pool of raw materials. Kigali officially proclaimed solidarity with the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge peoples that were suffering in the Congolese Civil War, dispatching financial and material aid to the rebels there. It helped that Parmehutu's Hutu extremists were carrying out hit-and-run attacks with the protection of the border, leading to increased border clashes with Congolese authorities whenever Rwandan forces pursued the fleeing guerrillas into the Congo. The CCW gave the Rwandans the perfect timing.

It was in July 1962 that 3,000 Rwandan troops swept into the province of South Kivu where the Banyamulenge in particular resided, Kigali claiming to provide aid to them. Kigeli announced his intention to protect them when Lumumba fiercely denounced Rwanda in its unlawful invasion of rightful Congolese territory and swore he'd make Rwanda the twenty-second province. However, the grinding war of attrition forced him to shift his focus onto his Katangan opponents to the southeast while defending against Mobutu's repeated offensives, leaving Lumumba's armies spread thin. It would only be in December 1966 that Lumumba's troops defeated the last of Mobutu and his men in Leopoldville but until then, the only thing he do was spare what little supplies it could for Parmehutu. In the meantime, the Rwandan government focused on wipe out Parmehutu guerrillas amongst ethnic Hutu, especially in the Banyarwanda community which had arisen out of the failed 1961 uprising and occupied a foremost base for Parmehutu as a result of its predominantly Hutu descent. Considering the general chaos that Kigali was dealing with in Rwanda's western provinces, the Rwandan military had very little patience for them, even resorting to concentration camps reminiscent of the British in the Boer Wars as they were wiped out.

Rwandan soldiers in South Kivu, July 1962.​

By September, Parmehutu was forced to move house deeper into the Congo with the ruthless counterinsurgency campaigns in South Kivu. They were accompanied by an influx of Banyarwanda refugees fearing that Rwandan occupation would bring about the same violence that led them to flee Rwanda and pleaded with Lumumba for aid. Unfortunately for them, the Congolese Premier's hands were tied with the international community and their rift on who to support in the Congo was split ideologically, leading not just to American and Belgian support for Mobutu but for Rwanda as well. Rwanda's occupation of South Kivu was supported by Washington as moves had been made by Kigeli against a Communist Congo, portraying Rwanda as a pro-Western alternative and ally in the region. Thus, her occupation was justified in the global crusade against Communism and the US could furnish a healthy helping of aid where necessary to the Rwandans who were settling in for the long haul as Kigeli made references to the grand imperial past of the precolonial Rwandan Kingdom and its historic expansion. Rwanda was now being restored to its imperial glory with a dominion extending across the Itombwe Mountains, though it certainly wasn't the only Tutsi Monarchy with a history of expansion around.

In neighboring Burundi, Louis Rwagasore narrowly avoided assassination in October 1961 and led his Union for National Progress (UPRONA) in a landslide victory. They defeated the pro-Belgian Christian Democratic Party's coalition which fractured as the new Prime Minister embraced a position of unequivocal Burundian nationalism with the aim of uniting all Burundians. He looked to the next door Rwandan Kingdom, a nation that was close via shared historical, cultural, and ethnic ties but mostly in that it was a Tutsi-dominated polity attempting to delicately handle the issue of ethnicity. Just like Rwanda, colonial Burundi was subject to the same ethnic stratification and struggled to cope with it as its Monarchy tried to remain apolitical and usher in necessary reforms. And again, just like Rwanda, Burundi achieved independence in July 1962 and with the Monarchy retaining the executive powers it previously enjoyed within a constitutional framework as King Mwambutsa IV focused on ensuring that both Hutu and Tutsi had proportionate representation in Burundian government. However, the Prime Minister contributed his own share to forming a Burundian nation with the sheer ethnic divide, arguably doing more to advocate for Burundian nationalism and eventually turned to the Congo.

Similarly to Rwanda, the Burundians possessed an interest in the Banyamulenge community and the predominantly Tutsi background of the UPRONA administration reinforced this. They observed with interest as 3,000 men of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) penetrated deep into the eastern Congo and struck at Parmehutu guerrillas who were also been attacking Burundian Tutsis and troops. In its counterinsurgency operations, Rwanda aided the Banyamulenge communities coming under attack from either Hutu extremists or local Congolese forces - the latter had been reduced to a skeleton garrison and were easily swept aside. The FAR also started mobilizing its allies amongst the Banyamulenge/Banyarwanda populations in order to strengthen its presence in South Kivu with auxiliary militias and to provide a veneer of legitimacy to de-facto Rwandan annexation. The Burundians had also started to show an interest in deploying its own men to South Kivu, as well as contemplating the ideas of uniting with Rwanda and incorporating the Banyamulenge. Talks started in Kigali first over union and then over the Burundian military supporting their Rwandan counterparts in the eastern Congo against the Communist-backed Lumumba and ended in Mwambutsa agreeing to deploy 5,832 men to South Kivu by mid-1962.

Burundian soldiers guarding Parmehutu and Congolese POWs, September 1962.​

Excerpt from The Land of the Rising Sun: A History of the Biafran Republic by Peter Baxter​

With its secession from Nigeria, the Biafran Republic was established under Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu's leadership which ushered in a legacy of Biafran authoritarianism. Hoping to deter any Nigerian attempts at reconquest, a determined Ojukwu rapidly reformed and reorganized the Biafran Armed Forces in the hopes of safeguarding Biafran independence. Though demobilization left only 20,000 Biafran soldiers in uniform, they were well-trained and well-equipped veterans with experience going as far back as the Second World War. Ojukwu also made appeals to the Monrovia Bloc and proposed a mutual defense pact in the case that any of them came under attack by one or more countries, particularly unrest-ridden Nigeria. This was codified in the Umuahia Pact of May 1971, signed in the Biafran capital in the midst of celebrations of the day that the Biafran Republic proclaimed victory in seceding from the Hausa-dominated Muslim Nigerian north which continued to insist on refusing to concede on the issue of federalism for the Christian south. Alongside Liberia wanting to preserve its hegemony, Lagos made the primary push on a military alliance like that of the East African 1966 Nairobi Pact and wanted to ensure Yoruba independence from the Nigerian north.

In addition to his advocacy for closer military ties, Ojukwu focused on repairing oil extraction infrastructure and reviving the petroleum industry. With Liberian support, the Biafrans breathed life back into its oil industry as its yielded revenues starting flowing in by the millions once exports to other African and Western nations commenced. Aware of how valuable this sector of Biafra's economy was, Ojukwu cracked down on any corruption and an ostensibly concerned Biafran government made sure to redistribute wealth to desperately needed areas in Biafra. Most of this was invested into state-led and state-supported investment in education and development of the noticeably lacking national infrastructure, similarly to Premier Obafemi Awolowo in neighboring Yorubaland. A literacy campaign was carried out into the Biafran countryside, aimed at increasing the 19.2% literacy rate and it was fairly successful with the use of English as a lingua franca. Speaking of English as Biafra's lingua franca, Ojukwu was very aware that Biafra was not an Igbo ethnostate but a multi-ethnic country that now ironically needed to deal with the same pitfalls that the Nigerians had in the midst of its civil war, particularly with the annexation of the Republic of Benin in September 1967.

Although Igbo nationalism was closely linked with Biafran nationalism, Umuahia was also very aware of the need to accommodate ethnic minorities. Well aware of the fact that non-Igbo Biafrans were indifferent at best while joining the ranks of the federal Nigerian military en masse, Ojukwu's Biafra Party sought to resolve any ethnic issues. To alleviate tensions, English had been made a national language and Ojukwu pushed through legislation in Biafran Parliament that contributed to the creation of a tricameral parliament aimed at representing all of Biafra's ethnic groups, faiths, etc. - it may've been the primary inspiration behind South Africa's model. A method used by Ojukwu was introducing mandatory military service to create a pool of trained reservists just in case the Nigerians felt like coming back and to facilitate intergroup cooperation. It worked, albeit after some unrest, as Biafra established the National Reserve and gained the capability to mobilize tens of thousands of able-bodied reservists in case war came. Despite initial hiccups and potholes, Ojukwu's administration was remarkably successful at laying the foundations for a cohesive Biafran identity that was supplemented by a diversifying economy exporting massive amounts of oil regularly across the world.

Biafran reservists being inspected by President Ojukwu, May 1971-72.

Excerpt from A Red Lion's Roar: The Mali Federation, 1960-1991 by Albert Grandolini​

To many, the Mali Federation didn't seem likely to last, even to the optimistic West African nationalist in Monrovia. In spite of the difficulties presented not just by Ivorian-French meddling but with the inherent structure of an admittedly shaky political system, the Mali Federation has stubbornly persisted into the modern day. The Federation's two fathers, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Fily Dabo Sissoko, particularly struggled over the representation of the Federation's states (Senegal, Sudan, Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta) according to their respective populations and whatnot. The prior agreement of parity between Senegal and Sudan were extended to include Niger, Dahomey, and Upper Volta that saw each state send its own delegates to its decided number of seats in the federal assembly. Dahomey was to send 15 deputies, Senegal-Sudan 20 deputies, Upper Volta-Dahomey 25 deputies to this arranged Federal Assembly while a Cabinet of Ministers was to draw all its members from every state in Federation and the African Regroupment Party coalition was to be reorganized into the Parti de la Fédération Mali (Party of the Mali Federation, or PFM) with the aim of ensuring unity from above. Next was the issue of leadership in the Federation.

Senghor being the PFM's President certainly helped to secure his Presidency in the Mali Federation, as did his Senegalese constituency and Premier Sissoko's support. He oversaw the creation of an African Socialist state, one that unabashedly combined Socialist ideology with a Garveyist brand of West African nationalism, as was so common in the Third World. The Mali Federation was witness to a transformation from the initial proposition of the parliamentary democratic system heavily prevalent in the West to a centralized state controlled by Senghor's benevolent PFM dictatorship. Unlike the examples set by Lumumba in the Congo and Samora in Mozambique, this African Socialist state remained surprisingly hands-off in many regards and resembled Maoism in its appeals to Mali's peasantry. Not only was there a constant need to maintain Malian unity by ensuring that the same alliance which made up the basis of the Mali Federation in its various states but that the Mali Federation also lacked the infrastructure to maintain the same totalitarianism of the USSR and Eastern Bloc nations. It resembled Yugoslav socialism in its emphasis on democratic centralism and workers' democracy too, conceding considerable autonomy to workers' cooperatives in the few industrial centers in the Federation.

Senghor is sworn as the Federal President August 1960.
​

At the same time, Senghor maintained a tight grip on the Senegalese constituency and the alliances that made up his following there. It was the same for the other PFM branches in Dahomey, Upper Volta, Mali and Niger in his bid to make sure that the Federation wouldn't simply disintegrate after its formation. Despite his denouncement of French neocolonialism, it wasn't until the Sankara Presidency that the Federation moved towards the idea of a Malian currency, starting to move away from the retained West African Franc to the current-day Malian Franc. Ironically, French aid may've been instrumental in maintaining the coherence of the MF, with Senghor extorting the French government to provide financial aid to states like Dahomey and Upper Volta which were lacking in financial revenues and developed infrastructure in stark contrast to Senegal or Mali. Over the course of the 1970s and up until 1980, Senghor would see to Malian stability through French support and support from the Monrovia Bloc's members as Dakar attempted to secure its independence. Interestingly enough, it was in Fidel Castro of all people that the Federation found a loyal ally to the end in, supporting the Federation with the necessary support, as well as military and financial aid.

The onset of the early 1980s gave rise to all those problems of Senghor's reign when he finally resigned from office and nearly thrust the Federation into civil war. It was only with Thomas Sankara that collapse was staved off.

 

[Hagre]

Sorry that this update took so long. Thoughts?

 

[Hagre]

A Coiled Snake

Excerpt from Over the Itombwe Mountains: Rwanda-Burundi, 1962-1991 by Peter Baxter​

The joint Rwanda-Burundi occupation of South Kivu successfully crushed the last of the resistance in early 1963 and forced Parmehutu to flee to Stanleyville. It, along with many other Hutu refugees, were conscripted into its neighbor's vast army to reclaim the occupied provinces now under Mobutist control and Lumumba made a vague promise to assist them in liberation. For the time being, Lumumba was forced to recognize that South Kivu was now under the control of his smaller eastern neighbors and pressed Moscow for support in retaking South Kivu, as well as Rwanda and Burundi. An end to the last holdout in the Itombwe Mountains by December meant there could finally be a chance to truly consolidate and provide more than the veneer of legitimacy of elected councils and local militias. The successes against Parmehutu saw much fanfare and celebration in Rwanda while Burundi, having only seen Parmehutu in South Kivu and the occasional border raid, boisterously proclaimed its victory over the larger Congolese government in Stanleyville and whipped up patriotism. However, both countries needed to deal with the question of what to do with the occupied South Kivu province, though Kigali suggested something - let it become independent and aligned with both nations.

In addition to their successful Congolese venture, Rwanda and Burundi also saw success back home. A veteran of South Kivu, Juvénal Habyarimana joined the UNAR, campaigned on a populist platform and promises of seeing to the development of Rwanda by extending facilities formerly exclusive to Tutsi aristocrats to the average Rwandan, regardless of faith or ethnicity. Despised by the Tutsi establishment, he was beloved by Rwanda and on the faithful elections of September 1965, he won a landslide and was appointed Prime Minister of Rwanda by Kigeli. Kigeli saw Habyarimana as the perfect obstacle to the Tutsi elite's desire to reinforce the status quo and force a general reform of the Rwandan Kingdom in the process. It helped he occupied an anti-communist and pro-Western position, maintaining amicable relations with Chiang Wei-kuo's China and continued opposition to the PRC's aggressive stance on taking South Kivu. In Burundi, the July 1965 elections ended in yet another decisive victory for Louis Rwagasore and UPRONA as they campaigned on a program of promised reforms and anti-colonialism while also making boisterous promises about conceding South Kivu independence as a Bushi Republic but it was the promises of union with Rwanda that appealed to Burundians.

Having already been united under German and Belgian colonial rule, the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi maintained close cultural, historical, economic, and ethnic ties. Kigeli and Mwambutsa shared similar goals in pushing for a nationalism absorbing their respective ethnic groups and to reduce the influence of the pre-existing Tutsi establishment. Educated Hutus and non-elite Tutsis were slowly but surely gaining ground on the Tutsi elites who were terrified at this perceived encroachment and raged against their respective Kings for being traitors to the Tutsi people. Of course, these accusations were scoffed at and progress continued unabated with each country's government moving toward a union modeled on the United Arab Emirates, though Kigali and Gitegi disagreed on its form. Rwanda possessed a history of centralized governments whereas Burundi was much more oriented to decentralized rule, leading both to debate on how much power would be concentrated in the hands of the federal government and which leader was paramount. After a long back-and-forth between Kigali and Gitegi, they had agreed on the formation of a federation whose government would control foreign affairs, defense, finance and other "national matters." Thus, the Union of Rwanda-Burundi was born in July 1966.

Another country was born in July 1966 - the Bushi Republic. The conclusion of the Bukavu Accords and subsequent withdrawal of Rwandan-Burundian forces was intended to lend legitimacy to this obvious client state but its government would receive no recognition. Even the staunchly anti-communist United States refused to recognize it as an outraged Lumumba compared it as little different from South Africa's Bantustans and swore that their puppet state would be reconquered by the Congolese, leading to a series of border incidents between the Congo and Rwanda-Burundi in North Kivu province. It soon became an unofficial battleground between the two as its difficult terrain provided the perfect defense from encroaching forces from either side and Lumumba begun ramping up commitments to the region. Both countries possessed a large pool of experienced manpower after their respective debacles in South Kivu and Leopoldville but Lumumba seized the opportunity to employ the particularly vengeful Parmehutu. With its trained and experienced paramilitary standing at 20,000 men and with it being able to amass more men from amongst the relocated Banyarwanda community, Kinshasa viewed it as an opportunity to exploit and dispatched them [1] to the South Kivu front.

The undeclared conflict between the Congo and Rwanda-Burundi continued to escalate, exacerbating the Great Lakes wars and later joining the Ugandan Bush War in being one of Africa's bloodiest battlefields as Lumumba's government made plans to decisively reclaim South Kivu, oust the Tutsis, and install his own client state in Kigali. The Kivu War would go off without a hitch in November 1973 as Congolese forces pushed into Bushi.

Congolese soldiers in North Kivu, November 1973.

Excerpt from Our Spear and Shield: The Kenya-Somalia War, 1978-79/80 by Alex de Waal​

Jomo Kenyatta's death in August 1978 led Vice-President Daniel arap Moi to become President of Kenya in October, marking the end of an era. Moi proved popular and in contrast with Kenyatta's backdoor manuevering, this new President ventured out into the country to discuss the issues plaguing them in a popular move. Despite this, Moi was beholden to Kenyatta's system, most notably the Presidency's dictatorial powers and anti-Communist rhetoric which continued to be important themes in Kenyan society and government. However, it was the unexpected invasion of the North Eastern Province by neighboring Somalia - without a declaration of war - that would see a wave of nationalism sweep Kenya as the Somali National Army marched into the predominantly-Somali region under Siad Barre's order to annex it. Caught off guard, Nairobi rushed to mobilize and declared war on their Somali foes while whipping the populace into a frenzy of patriotism as the Kenyan Defense Forces rushed reinforcements to the frontlines. Although Kenyan troops on the border resisted fiercely, it was in vain and did little to stem the Somali tide as the Northern Frontier District Liberation Movement (NFDLM) experienced a sudden revival. Yet, in spite of her unpreparedness, Kenya continued to fight on.

Mobilization was quickly underway as tens of thousands of young men joined and the Kenyan Defense Forces swelled, sending reinforcements to beleaguered Kenyan garrisons. It was at Mado Gashi where the KDF offered a much more organized resistance to the SNA and forced it to halt, combined with the SNA's overextension and slowly being bled dry by encircled Kenyan troops. By September-October, Somali forces occupied a third of NEP's land and the KDF had finally organized a coherent defense and strategy while amassing support from the newly-formed African Union. Although the 1966 Nairobi Pact dictated that the Ethiopians and Juwamans would be an intervening party if Kenya was attacked and vice-versa, neither were eager to get into a war with Somalia and provided close assistance short of outright intervention. Mikael Imru, attempting to remain committed to Kenya's sovereignty as an ally, sent over stockpiles of Soviet surplus and its own domestically produced equipment, as well as advisors to assist in training KDF soldiers. Preoccupied with an undeclared border war with Uganda and its costly support for the Darfuri insurgency in Egyptian Sudan, Juba sent over some medical aid and advisors. Nonetheless, Nairobi would make do with what it had and started planning a counterattack.

Excerpt from A Coiled Snake: A History of Juwama by Ian Campbell​

With the Anyanya Party's consistent line of electoral victory, Aggrey Jaden was widely seen as the father of Juwama and was inheriting a personality cult. The 1960s was witness to the budding results of modernization in this young nation as it continued developing its infrastructure and deal with its hostile neighbors before an important discovery was made - oil. There were considerable reserves of oil in northern and northeastern Juwama as this newfound discovery saw Juba invest significantly in its petroleum industry, as did Ethiopia, Russia, and several other nations. Almost overnight, Juwama's petroleum industry made the national economy deliver high economic growth rates at 7.9-10.5% which provided enough money for Jaden to expend quite a bit on his theoretical public works projects and the expansion of the Juwaman military after a recent series of border clashes with both his traditional enemies in Nasser and Obote. The growth of Juwama's petroleum sector, as well as in the midst of two hostile African Socialist states on either side, made it favorable to curry to an ally in the eyes of the West and a "concerned" Anglo-American alliance who furnished more aid to the Juwamans in the form of generous loans and military equipment. With this, Jaden turned to the issue of the frontiers.

Dealing with a growing insurgency in the restive Darfur region, Cairo increased pressure on its southern neighbor with brazen border raids. Ostensibly pissed at the blatant violations, Jaden warned the Egyptians to stay with the provisions entailed in the 1947 Juba Agreement and to respect Juwaman sovereignty as he expanded the JNA presence to the north. The increasing trend of Egyptian incursions and attempted attacks on the Juwaman oil refineries finally provoked a response as Jaden successfully push through the Mandatory Military Service Act in January 1965 and see to the expansion of the Juwaman military from 10,000 to 23,000 men. The JNA too saw a total of 15,000 volunteers join between January-September with the news of Egyptian raids only serving to whip up patriotism in the country to the point where women also actively tried to enlist. In response to the Egyptian attacks, Jaden ordered the Juwaman National Army and Juwaman National Air Force to commence raids deep into Sudan, particularly against its oil fields. With the elite training of the Ethiopian Air Force, the JNAF was much more successful than the JNA in its attacks against the Egyptians and tensions continued to worsen. However, the Egyptian presence in Sudan was not the only concern - there was also Uganda.

Fearing Jaden's Nilotic Nationalism, Ugandan President Milton Obote aligned himself with Egypt despite this being deeply unpopular with other African nations. With the Nilotic Acholi, Lango, and Luo peoples making up that vital support base Obote needed with his growing unpopularity, Obote made it a priority to maintain a sizable presence in the region and keep up pressure. Maintaining their own better force, the JNA concerned itself with an unprecedented campaign of mobilization in Juwama's southern regions and the commencement of a Juba-backed Nilotic nationalist insurgency. Aware of the abject lack of civilian control and professionalism in the Ugandans that were in the military, the JNA played merry hell with the ragtag army that was the Uganda Army and even contemplated supporting the commander Idi Amin in a coup against Obote but his January 1971 coup ensured the Juwamans didn't have to pull off that mess. It certainly helped when Idi Amin persecuted Uganda's northern Nilotic ethnic groups and drove them into the arms of a mounting insurgency receiving training and weapons from a laughing JNA South Command as Idi Amin made the mistake of pissing off Julius Nyerere's Tanzania and ended up fleeing in April 1979 as Tanzania occupied Kampala. Thus, the north was ripe for the taking.

Nilotic Liberation Front guerrillas on the move, April 1979. ​

Jaden had been forced to concede defeat in the 1973 elections with the Anyanya administration unable to adequately deal with the October 1973 oil crisis. Led by Saturnino Ohure, the Juwaman National Union managed this time to secure victory over the Anyanya Party and adopted a much more reconciliatory stance towards the Arab world, particularly Egypt. This did not mean that the Juwamans were pacifists, continuing to maintain the JNA's sizable numbers at 20,000 with a further 15,000 in reserve and could pressure the Egyptians at will with their presence on the border. This was especially clear with Ohure's decision to turn on Uganda and seize the chance to get revenge on Uganda's attempts at encircling Juwama under Obote and persecuting the Nilotes under Idi Amin. It was in December 1983 that the Nilotic Liberation Front, controlling the Luo-inhabited northern regions and other predominantly Nilotic areas, declared the establishment of the West Nile Republic and shortly after, requested to become a part of Juwama proper. Juba felt that it was of course in no position to refuse and accepted its request to join Juwama as the West Nile province. Although most of Nilotic East Africa remained out of reach, Juba was satisfied with its gains.

Excerpt from The King Alone: The Kingdom of Uganda, 1984-1995 by I.R. Hancock ​

In the aftermath of the Ugandan Bush War, Uganda came under the control of Mutesa's Ugandan National Alliance. It consisted of a coalition of Monarchist organizations that resembled the Kabaka Yekka Party, though these parties resembled KY's neo-traditionalist patriotic factions [2] than its progressive nationalists. These organizations represented the constituent Kingdoms of Rwenzururu, Bunyoro, Busoga, and Tooro, all of which had been a province provided with some sort of constitutional protection in the early post-colonial Uganda but had been subjugated and eventually abolished with Milton Obote's centralist Presidency. After ousting him, Idi Amin was no better than his African Socialist predecessor when he wasn't suppressing the Nilotic north and brought more destruction to the country with the Tanzanian invasion. Finally, with the disintegration of the Ugandan military and Obote's flight to southern Africa by December 1983/84, the Ugandan National Alliance forces swept across what remained of Uganda with reluctant Tanzanian support and Western aid. Mutesa declared an end to Obote and his disastrous brand of African Socialism, as well as the restoration of the constituent kingdoms and their traditional leadership while bringing about a completely new government.

King Mutesa II smiling at being back in Kampala, December 1984.​

Mutesa's 1984 Kampala Proclamation provided the basis for the establishment of a UAE-style government in Uganda. Similarly to the arrangement after Uganda's independence in 1962, the Bugandan King was elected to his former position in the Ugandan Presidency whilst other Ugandan Kings and traditional leaders had it differently. The traditional leadership, with the right property and education qualifications, was to be elected to the Senate and the Ugandan people could elect their own delegates to the House of Representatives. Of course, Mutesa forbade the creation of political parties and any political activity conducted outside of the Kingdom's political arms in the Ugandan National Alliance, effectively making the new Ugandan Kingdom a one-party state - though one still better than its predecessors. Uganda rejoined the East African Community in January 1984, allowing for the Ugandan economy to begin recovering with an influx of investment from wealthier members like Ethiopia and Kenya. Sympathetic to a fellow African monarch, Addis Ababa made moves to establish closer ties with Kampala's new government and allowed for its integration into the embryonic African Union as well. Despite the chaos of Uganda post-1962, it was now on the road to reconstruction.

----
​

[1] They're similar to the Katangan Tigers, Katangan soldiers who went into exile in Portuguese Angola and fought for both Salazar and the MPLA before being sent over to fight in the Congo Wars because of Mobutu's aiding of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgency. See Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa by Jason Stearns for more.

[2] Kabaka Yekka was split between two factions - the traditionalist chiefs and educated progressives. See Patriotism and Neo-Traditionalism in Buganda: The Kabaka Yekka ('The King Alone') Movement, 1961-1962 by I. R. Hancock for more.

 

[PapaCrookman]

Looks like monarchies are more successful in this timeline. Are traditional religions more popular in this timeline too or is their popularity more or less the same? Like do Biafra and Yorubaland consider theirselves to be Christian but tolerant of traditional religions or vice versa?

 

[Hagre]

Looks like monarchies are more successful in this timeline. Are traditional religions more popular in this timeline too or is their popularity more or less the same? Like do Biafra and Yorubaland consider themselves to be Christian but tolerant of traditional religions or vice versa?

I'd wager they're more or less the same and although Biafra and Yorubaland have placed an emphasis on their Christian identity in opposition to Muslim Nigeria, there is tolerance of traditional religions with the historically syncretic nature of Christianity in Africa. As for African monarchies being successful, I thought that'd be an interesting twist with the survival of the Ethiopian monarchy ITTL.

 

[Masked Grizzly]

Is there a map available for this ATL?

Aside from the obvious differences with own my rough ATL map of Africa (for example the area from Ghana to Ambazonia was formerly part of ATL British West Africa via earlier PODs), just wondering how similar the territory of ATL Southern Nigeria plus Ambazonia (known as Benin in map) is to independent Biafra and Yorubaland, etc after breaking away from Nigeria?

 

[Hagre]

Is there a map available for this ATL?

Aside from the obvious differences with own my rough ATL map of Africa (for example the area from Ghana to Ambazonia was formerly part of ATL British West Africa via earlier PODs), just wondering how similar the territory of ATL Southern Nigeria plus Ambazonia (known as Benin in map) is to independent Biafra and Yorubaland, etc after breaking away from Nigeria?

I haven't made a map because I have no idea how to do maps yet.

They're in essence the same as OTL borders, though I will touch on the whole Ambazonia thing next chapter.

 

[Masked Grizzly]

I haven't made a map because I have no idea how to do maps yet.

They're in essence the same as OTL borders, though I will touch on the whole Ambazonia thing next chapter.

My bad.

Cannot recall the exact link for the Blank Map I originally downloaded years back (it has been reputedly updated quite a bit since then) though found the following blank map link here (til someone posts a better blank map). In my own case you only need to save the map to desktop, open with Windows Photo Viewer (or nearest equivalent) and upon opening the file go to paint. Typically use IrfanView to crop copies of my own ATL maps to upload here now and again, though not sure myself how to go about uploading the full world maps.

 

[Hagre]

My bad.

Cannot recall the exact link for the Blank Map I originally downloaded years back (it has been reputedly updated quite a bit since then) though found the following blank map link here (til someone posts a better blank map). In my own case you only need to save the map to desktop, open with Windows Photo Viewer (or nearest equivalent) and upon opening the file go to paint. Typically use IrfanView to crop copies of my own ATL maps to upload here now and again, though not sure myself how to go about uploading the full world maps.

Thanks for the advice! Mind telling me what you think about the last chapter?

 

[Masked Grizzly]

Thanks for the advice! Mind telling me what you think about the last chapter?

Enjoyed the last chapter, admittingly ignorant of the politics and PODs of the region compared to OTL.

Regarding Uganda, what is the fate of Idi Amin in ATL? Does some form of Operation Entebbe still happen or would another African country play host to a similar event under an ATL Amin-like regime?

 

[Alpha-King98760]

Will Bokassa make an appearance?

 

[Hagre]

Regarding Uganda, what is the fate of Idi Amin in ATL? Does some form of Operation Entebbe still happen or would another African country play host to a similar event under an ATL Amin-like regime?

Idi Amin suffers the same fate as OTL and Operation Entebbe still goes ahead, though it does nothing but make the KY/UNL alliance more popular. I thought it'd be interesting to see the constituent kingdoms of Uganda actually surviving in a coherent form, rather than the cultural role they play IOTL.

 

[Hagre]

Will Bokassa make an appearance?

Bokassa's already made his debut during the Equatoria-Libya War and was the Commander-in-Chief of the Equatorian Army.

 

[Alpha-King98760]

Bokassa's already made his debut during the Equatoria-Libya War and was the Commander-in-Chief of the Equatorian Army.

Oh okay. Must’ve forgot.

 

[Hagre]

Spear and Shield

Excerpt from The Okapi and The Leopard: The 1975-76 Kivu War by Tom Cooper ​

Despite Rwanda's occupation of South Kivu, Patrice Lumumba found himself preoccupied with more pressing matters in the 1960s. Most notably was reconstruction, as much of the country was in ruins after the civil war had destroyed it, and of implementing his political program in the process. Nonetheless, Lumumba threw himself fully into the task of rebuilding but he would never forget Rwanda and Burundi with their "intervention." In this, the Congolese Premier focused on building up a presence in North Kivu to crack down on restive elements sympathetic to Rwanda-Burundi and the former's occasional raids. Simultaneously, Lumumba ensured that the Rwandan Hutu expatriates in the Congo received generous state support in their struggle against Tutsi hegemony in Kigeli and Gitegi. After all, they'd proven themselves such good fighters in Katanga and Mobutist territory while their original purpose was rigidly instilled in their frontline troops, organization members, and youth wings - to reclaim their homelands and free the Hutu people from the Tutsis. However, the rise of Laurent-Désiré Kabila over the course of the early 1970s saw to the reinvigoration of the Congolese People's Republic as the Lumumbist veteran [1] came to challenge the MNC's hegemony.

Enlisting in the Congolese Army in September 1962, Kabila fought in Katanga and Leopoldville, participating in the seizure of Mobutu's capital. Kabila's exposure to Lumumbist propaganda had made him a hardline believer of Lumumbism and his charismatic personality, combined with his skillful organization of a mass movement, made him a popular figure. He campaigned on an anti-Tutsi platform in North Kivu, being catapulted to the forefront at the chaos that was Congolese politics after partaking in local politics and establishing the Congolese Socialist Party. A big tent movement, it absorbed all left-wing groups in the Congo and with the 1973 oil crisis that led to his party's rise, Kabila was able to take control of the Congo's Premiership in the1973 elections as Lumumba instead became Deputy Premier in a coalition government. As the new Premier, Kabila brought a new energy to Congo and tackled the economic crisis - stagflation, sudden rise in oil prices, and global decrease in demand for Congolese materials - with overt centralization. Kabila's emphasis on state control and economic centralization gave his government the ability to provide some economic relief with investment in the Congolese welfare state to provide assistance to the Congolese people and ensure that there wasn't too much damage.

Congolese soldiers in Leopoldville/Kinshasa, December 1965.​

Kabila's premiership was also marked by a more aggressive foreign policy, especially on the South Kivu issue as he felt Lumumba had neglected it long enough. Detesting the Rwandan occupation of Congolese territory, Kabila denounced the Western-backed "intervention" by a Tutsi-dominated Rwandan empire that was threatening to expand elsewhere. He pushed for closer relations with Moscow and other African Socialist governments with his emphasis on solidarity against Western neocolonialism and its puppet regimes in Kigali and elsewhere. Simultaneously, there was an expansion of the Congolese military from its relatively small 100,000 to 1.4 million men for the purpose of manning the Congolese frontier, as well as the need to maintain internal stability. It helped that the ANC still had a considerable number of veterans from the civil war who were both loyal to Lumumba and now were wooed by fellow veteran Kabila into joining his ever-growing support base. This was important in the gradual rise of the Congolese People's Republic from a ruined backwater to a regional powerhouse during the 1970s, particularly when it came to the Angolan Civil War and opposing the growing influence of minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa in Central African affairs.

It was in November 1975 that Kabila launched Operation Okapi and oversaw Congolese troops pushing deep into occupied South Kivu. Despite warnings that there'd be an inevitable Congolese attack, Kigali was surprised to see that the Congolese were finally attacking after waiting some time and scrambled to prepare their defenses. Kigeli and Mwambutsa called for national mobilization against the Congolese colossus, even managing to secure the promulgation of the Compulsory Military Service Act in December as 100,000 men were called up for service in the puppet Bushi state. Even though the population of Rwanda-Burundi was less than pleased at serving for a year in the Congolese jungles, though many feared the possibility of the aggressive Kabila going on to annex their country. It yielded thousands more men and halted the Congolese advance after they'd seized the mountains in a similar fashion to the Rwandan seizure back in 1962, forcing the two nations into a temporary stalemate as the ANC focused on consolidation and reinforcement of its battered spearheads. Rwanda-Burundi instead made the decision to withdraw in a coordinated fashion to the more defensible former border with the Congo, hoping to force a permanent stalemate to begin peace talks.

Congolese armor rolls through Bukavu, December 1975/76.
​

Abroad, both the Congolese and Rwandan-Burundians were currying favor to gain support for their respective causes. Kabila had received quite a bit of support from the Eastern Bloc in reorganizing and refitting the ANC for its war in South Kivu, with Brezhnev praising the so-far unbroken streak of Congolese victories. Kigali was attempting to curry more favor with the West and South China too, hoping to scrape up some heavy material support to supplant what had been lost in the encirclements of November and December so that their men could bleed the Congolese horde dry if it moved into Rwanda-Burundi proper. Kigeli was approached by Pretoria for possible material support and the latter was flatly refused for fear of having the same reputation that Jonas Savimbi's Angola had. However, by January, the Congolese advance was renewed and the rest of South Kivu that hadn't been occupied in the first few months would be reclaimed completely as Kabila announced the avenging of 1962. Hurriedly, Kigali secured support from fellow members in the East African Community and more importantly, would finally acquire heavier equipment from the Ethiopians and Kenyans to barely replace what they'd lost. Soon enough, the war finally descended into a permanent stalemate.

Although there were successful company-level raids across the border, the war was going nowhere for the cost of hundreds of casualties. Lumumba pressured Kabila into entering peace talks mediated by Julius Nyerere as its participants went at each other incessantly with their demands, much to Tanzania's annoyance. The Rwandan-Burundians demanded that Kinshasa provide financial compensation for its casualties while Kabila demanded the former provide their own reparations as the two seized the chance to build up their presence on the frontier, upping the tensions. It was only when the African Union decided to intervene that the negotiations actually started with the threat of the EAC intervening, mostly with Ugandan and Tanzanian forces amassing on their respective borders with the Congolese, with Ethiopian assistance. There was the basic agreement to restore the borders in 1962 - much to Kigali's frustration - and to repatriate all Banyamulenge to Rwanda-Burundi with Kinshasa providing the bare minimum in financial assistance. Next, the border was made a demilitarized zone patrolled by EAC soldiers of Tanzanian and Ethiopian composition for a temporary period as the lengthy talks resulted in the Dodoma Treaty of 1976 in early February.

Finally, Kabila had avenged Lumumba's losses and the men who'd sacrificed their lives for Congolese sovereignty in 1962 by reclaiming South Kivu. However, Kabila was not simply satisfied with this treaty and was not exactly trusting of the Mwami's government in Kigali, leading to Kinshasa to renew support for the veteran Parmehutu. Even as he spent decades abroad, Grégoire Kayibanda retained his fierce desire to return home and liberate this poor, downtrodden people of his who'd suffered so long under Tutsi hegemony, continuing to proclaim his staunch belief in extreme Hutu nationalism and denounced the "Semitic" Tutsis. Kayibanda led tens of thousands of an isolated community of loyal Banyarwanda, whether they'd fled to the Congo in the 1960s or had been here for centuries, and mobilized them all in what he proclaimed was a righteous struggle against Kigeli's Tutsi empire. His radical leanings attracted the young Hassan Ngeze - a 20 year old veteran who'd fled to the Congo as a child with the rest of his family and went on to join the ANC-trained Interhamwe militia. From there, he was deployed to a fiercer part of the war around Goma for the next two months before peace talks begun and he joined Parmehutu as an avowed Hutu supremacist that challenged even Kayibanda himself.

Parmehutu militiamen in South Kivu, March 1976.

Excerpt from Our Spear and Shield: The Kenya-Somalia War, 1978-79/80 by Alex de Waal​

By October 1978, Kenyan forces were finally done being reorganized under General Mahamoud Mohamed and primed for action. Needing to consolidate its gains, the Somali National Army focused on entrenching itself even as it found itself under sudden and unexpected attack across the frontlines by surprisingly successful Kenyan forays. They managed to dislodge Somali contingents from Garissa and Tana, rushing plentiful reinforcements they desperately needed by way of the Isiolo–Moyale Road before their Somali foes could amass enough force for an immediate counterattack. The Kenya Air Force was startlingly effective in its response, responding quickly so as to deny the Somalis aerial superiority and cooperating closely with their comrades on the ground to ensure the most effectiveness. What some have dubbed "The Christmas Offensive" was reasonably successful, though it did come at the price of heavy Kenyan casualties when the SNA brought in heavy artillery and armor, albeit with their own losses. Total Kenyan losses numbered around 9,000 whereas the Somalis had suffered 7,000 and it would allow the frontlines to finally stabilize in mid-January 1979 to concentrate on supplementing their existing forces. However, Kenya was by no means out of the fight and had proved it by then.

KDF troops march past the wreckage of a former SNA camp, October 1978.​

Somalia's invasion meant an outpouring of support for Kenya as Somalia was vilified for its Arab alignment and for invading a fellow African country. Said support also came from the West, mostly London and Washington who had been looking for allies in East Africa aside from a controversial Rwanda-Burundi and found it in Moi's Kenya. They not only gave financial aid and material support to equip frontline units but invested in Kenyan industries, providing an economic boost that led directly to the liberalization of Kenyan authoritarianism [2] as the Kenyan Defense Forces developed plans for another offensive. At the same time, Somalia was playing on its Arab ties for supplies needed to continue its campaigns in Kenya with the focus of the war now shifting to Kenya's coastline and Barre himself tried to appeal to Brezhnev. Moscow was uneasy at unnecessarily angering the British with the presence of British forces training in the country, sending token support and pressuring North China into sending more substantial aid. It helped to make up for the lack of spare parts for the SNA's heavier equipment and they managed to create an elaborate defense network across the NEP, attempting to focus on defense while the fighting along the coastline and in southern Kenya continued to worsen.

The SNA's occupation of much of the NEP meant that a good portion of the Kenyan coastline was now in Somalia's hands. This forced Nairobi to commit even more reinforcements and equipment to the troops in the southern front, barely warding off the Somali advance with heavier casualties on their part. To Moi, keeping access to the coast was vital to both internal and economic stability if Kenya wanted to win this war, especially with the rather undeveloped state of roads with neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Juwama instead of potentially becoming reliant on her ideological opponents in Dodoma for imports and exports. Thus, investment in border regions of Kenya's neighbors was increased to build road and railway networks capable of ferrying imports and exports from and into Kenya through allies in the Nairobi Pact. It also provided employment and minor economic growth to the people there as the KDF High Command continued mobilizing able-bodied manpower and brought the KDF's numbers up to 100,000 men. Most men went to the southern front where a salient formed around Malindi and Mombasa after the fall of Lamu a month prior, becoming the focal point of the war as the Somalis continuously tried to dislodge them from the coast and reduce Kenya to a landlocked status.

Renewed Somali efforts to pierce through the bulge at Malindi by December ran into steadfast opposition from dug-in Kenyan troops. The KDF had taken the opportunity to construct its own elaborate defenses so as to wear down the attacking Somalis who were bled dry with each trench and each fortification they had to seize. It helped these Kenyan soldiers were drilled extensively and armed with the finest equipment that Moi could afford and it showed in the grinding attrition of the battle as the SNA tried to carve into the flanks of the Malindi salient following their characteristically fierce bombardments. The proclamation by General Mahamoud Mohamed on this decisive battle was that any Kenyan soldier who retreated without orders was to be executed alongside those who caused panic in the ranks, contributing to the rather fierce Kenyan defense. After a month of pitched fighting, the SNA was beaten back and the KDF advanced forward to push the Somalis back from the Malindi Front after losing 5,000 men. What was more important was that the Somalis were getting it worse and without much of its own capability to replace its losses as time went on, the SNA having sustained a total of 10,000 casualties. Thus, Barre made the fateful decision to head directly for Nairobi in February.

----​

[1] Instead of going on to rebel in Manono in '60, join the Simba rebellions, and generally be a nuisance to the Zairean government, Kabila ends up enlisting in Lumumba's Congolese Army in '62 and entering politics.

[2] ITTL, Moi's Kenya ends up being substantially less corrupt than OTL's Kenya and undergoes earlier liberalization instead of the rather recent liberalizing trend in the late 1990s.

 

[Hagre]

Oh okay. Must’ve forgot.

Bokassa will certainly play a role in Equatorian politics so watch out for that. Unfortunately, we're not going to get to see him crown himself Emperor of Equatoria.

 

[Hagre]

Lion of the Crown

Excerpt from A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991 by Bahru Zewde​

Mikael Imru continued to usher in liberal reforms to accommodate the Ethiopian transition to a constitutional government. Although Imru and Araya saw to the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1949, this one wasn't the one that his British advisors told him to adopt and was little more than an attempt to consolidate the new government's position in the aftermath of the Italian occupation. It did incorporate democratic elements into the Imru government by extending the franchise for the lower Chamber of Delegates to the Ethiopian peasantry. However, the upper Senate remained partly appointed by the Emperor and partly elected by the Ethiopian nobility as an instrument to further reduce the influence of the nobles who'd resisted the Italians, were returning from Italy proper, and/or joined Imru in the late stages of the war. Even as the conservative Crown Council and Senate would staunchly oppose any democratization, there was still a surprisingly high level of autonomy amongst the provinces and various cultures. This was particularly evident with the survival of Ethiopia's regional monarchies like the Aussa Sultanate which retained varying levels of autonomous movement, though that would depend on how they'd helped and screwed Imru during the Italian occupation.

Nonetheless, Mikael introduced democratic reforms and qualifying literate and educated Ethiopians for the vote. The combined efforts of the Imperial government and cooperative religious authorities in their literacy reform yielded results - by 1971, the Ethiopian literacy rate was placed at 90%. Additional education reforms were facilitated through the finance and construction of primary and secondary schools all over the country that provided the new elites, or "New Nobility", of the mid- to late 1960s/1970s who started superseding the veteran bureaucrats from the 1940s, though they were mostly veterans too. This New Nobility came into dispute with older men who'd made their careers during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War and World War II, wary of these new generation aristocrats who promised newer ideas. It didn't help that a good chunk of them were educated in the West and brought back elements of Western culture and freedoms which they desired to spread, much to the chagrin of the more conservative elites. Even though Mikael himself was wary about Ethiopia becoming Western, he made it a policy to support their rise through the Imperial bureaucracy and Parliament to cultivate his own cadre of support to push through his reformist agenda and gain Western support.

Ethiopian democratization was continued by restructuring the Imperial government for election and planning the necessary amendments to the 1949 Constitution. With the help of the Private Cabinet and American advisors over the course of the mid- to late 1970s, Mikael presided over the drafting of a new constitution to introduce popular rule. His administration helped to dismantle the Gihon Union's role as the Imperial party, hoping that that would prevent it from interfering as an instrument of the more absolutist leanings of the Imperial government and ultimately end up becoming an arm of the conservative Ras Asrat Kassa. Mikael appointed Amha Selassie and Leult Ijigayehu Amha Selassie to positions of importance, the former to the post of Prime Minister and the latter to the Crown Council to help enforce his reforms. At the same time, Lij Ermias Sahle Selassie was made Premier in another bid to ensure that Mikael's reforms would go through and assisted in drafting a new constitution. He'd also been recruited to handle the process of domestic affairs and cooperate with the Ministry of the Interior as ethnic and religious tensions begun to rear their ugly heads by the late 1970s and early 1980s, threatening to become instruments of foreign powers and to destabilize Ethiopia's internal stability.

The rise of ethnic nationalism on the Imperial periphery had its origins in Italian colonial policy during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Seeking to partition Ethiopia on ethnic and religious lines in hopes of easy governance, a hopeful Italian colonial administration sought to embolden ethnic and religious minorities on the periphery to integrate them. At the same time, Orthodox Christian ethnic groups who'd historically constituted the basis of the Ethiopian Empire found themselves increasingly persecuted by the Italian administration and its indigenous proxies. Despite initial successes, minority support evaporated when the death of the Viceroy in '37 led to Italy now encouraging the Italian forces in East Africa to rampage across the Ethiopian country, horrifying and isolating minority supporters as Imru made his own bid in a sudden counterattack. It would set a precedent when Ethiopia's sovereignty was restored but Imru and his Patriots had to deal with the many issues that the Italians left behind, particularly that of ethnicity. This was present in the Tigrayan, Afar, Oromo and Somali provinces where they've been the source of much discontent during the 1970s and 1980s, even as Imru and Araya worked to dismantle the importance of ethnicity and religion in favor of a supreme Imperial identity.

Araya and Imru handled ethnicity very carefully despite the Imperial government's tendency to favor those of a "Habesha" background. Tigrayan nationalism was strangled in the cradle in 1943 as the repression of the revolts and imposition of direct Imperial rule led to Tigrayan regionalism being supplanted by Ethiopian nationalism. In 1961, Greater Tigray idea was made a reality when the Imperial government made the decision to partition their Eritrean neighbors to the north, conceding the predominantly ethnic Tigrayan regions of the Eritrean Highlands to the namesake province. The Afar Aussa Sultanate was enlarged by the southeastern lands of Eritrea and they were made an autonomous entity within Wollo province, loyal to the Solomonids as champions of Ethiopian nationalism. The Ogaden, historically in conflict with Ethiopia and focal to Somali irredentism, was placed under this Imperial administration with the backing of the Eastern Command and integrated into Ethiopia proper as it became the scene of brutal clashes with Somalia. Direct Imperial rule was resumed with the Ethiopian counterattack of 1965/66 that drove Somalia out of Ethiopia entirely, followed up by an Ethiopian incursion into northern Somalia. Oromia became the scene of ethnic and religious tensions in the 1980s.

Given the prominence of ethnic Oromos in Imperial Ethiopia and pan-Ethiopian nationalism, it wasn't until the 1980s that Addis Ababa had to deal with it. It all started with Taddesse Birru, a veteran who'd served between the wars of 1935-1966, who was the prime example of an assimilated Oromo rediscovering his native culture and an advocate for self-determination. Becoming a prominent leader of the Mecha-Tulama Self-Help Association, the veteran advocated peacefully for the promotion of the Oromo language, culture, etc. and Taddesse possessed much influence with many Oromos. The Imperial government observed this movement with suspicion and saw the group as a potential venue through which foreign powers would subvert Ethiopia to destabilize as Cairo had tried to do with the Eritrean Liberation Front and Mogadishu with the Somali Youth League. At the same time, Imru, alongside Araya, was attempting to handle the issue delicately in spite of the demands of his advisors in the Crown Council to crack down on what they saw as rebellion. However, neither Imru or Araya were willing to give the emerging social movement any sort of cause for rebellion amongst one of the country's largest ethnic groups and wanted to keep Ethiopia whole, continuing to cautiously approach the issue.

This would also become central to how the Imperial government dealt with ethnicity, especially when there was much more cultural prosperity. There was certainly much more cultural autonomy in which Mikael saw fit for its expansion and included Ethiopian multiculturalism into the framework of his drafted constitution, taking examples from other nations. Instead of providing the various ethnic and religious groups with representation via their delegates in the Senate, there would be yet another legislative body composed of these representatives to help make major decisions and advise the Emperor on these affairs. This would be the House of Empire, a body which bore resemblance to Juwama's House of Nationalities and transform the planned Ethiopian Parliament into a tricameral body like that of Biafra and South Africa. It was included in the Constitution of Ethiopia which was to be promulgated in July 1983, ushering in a period of rapid liberalization and democratization of the Ethiopian Empire. However, out of fear that the Crown Council and other threats internal and external would intervene, Mikael ensured that the Emperor's position retained much of his extensive power even as more genuine concessions of power were made to bodies like Parliament and the Council of Ministers.