Having Austria not join Communist Germany would also be difficult. You'd have both the support of a lot of leftists as well as a lot of pan-German Liberals and nationalists willing to support Communism as a means for German unification. Assuming that Germany remains unified ITTL. If the Entente is able to tear out a few chunks in the South and Rhineland or if Germany gets split between Comminist and Capitalist states things might be more evenly balanced.
Nothing to Lose but Your Chains! / a German Revolution TL
- Thread starter Teutonic_Thrash
- Start date
German State Elections in February 1919
German State Elections in February 1919
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxony - 2nd February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Reuss-Gera - 2nd February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Reuss-Greiz - 2nd February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Coburg - 9th February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Lübeck - 9th February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Schaumburg-Lippe - 16th February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Oldenburg - 23rd February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxe-Gotha - 25th February
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxony - 2nd February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 40 | 41.4 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 22 | 22.9 |
Communist Party (KPD) | 14 | 14.5 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 13 | 14.3 |
People's Party (DVP) | 4 | 3.9 |
Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) | 3 | 2 |
Centre Party (Z) | 0 | 1 |
96 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Reuss-Gera - 2nd February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Communist Party (KPD) | 7 | 33.3 |
People's Party (DVP) | 5 | 21 |
Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) | 4 | 19 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 3 | 16.8 |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 2 | 9.9 |
21 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Reuss-Greiz - 2nd February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Communist Party (KPD) | 5 | 33.3 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 4 | 22.7 |
Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) | 2 | 17 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 2 | 16.8 |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 2 | 10.2 |
15 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Coburg - 9th February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 5 | 45 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 4 | 41.4 |
Communist-Independent coalition (KPD-USPD) | 2 | 13.6 |
11 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Lübeck - 9th February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 29 | 37 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 29 | 36.3 |
Communist-Independent coalition (KPD-USPD) | 11 | 15.5 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 6 | 11.2 |
80 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Schaumburg-Lippe - 16th February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 8 | 54.1 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 2 | 15.8 |
Independents | 2 | 13.2 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 2 | 11 |
People's Party (DVP) | 1 | 5.9 |
15 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Oldenburg - 23rd February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 15 | 31.1 |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 12 | 25 |
Centre Party (Z) | 11 | 22 |
People's Party (DVP) | 5 | 11.4 |
Communist-Independent coalition (KPD-USPD) | 4 | 8.4 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 1 | 2.1 |
48 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxe-Gotha - 25th February
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Communist-Independent coalition (KPD-USPD) | 11 | 60.1 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 4 | 21 |
People's Party (DVP) | 3 | 15 |
Farmers' representatives | 1 | 3.9 |
19 |
Dual Power in Germany
Dual Power in Germany
On 8th March socialist militias in Berlin executed the orders given by the socialist unity action committee. Units of the Red Guard and People’s Navy Division occupied the Chancellery and the Reichstag; with the government having relocated to Weimar and the constituent assembly for Prussia not yet having been elected, there were only a few soldiers and civil servants present at the government premises. Neither group offered any resistance to the revolutionaries, and some of the soldiers even defected to the militias. Simultaneously, telegraph and newspaper offices were seized, often with the aid of the unionised employees. The crowds of workers who had emerged the previous day to help repel the Freikorps grew in size and joined the socialist militias in erecting barricades. The only real opposition to the seizure of power came from the police and even then the response was confused and ineffective. Emil Eichhorn’s replacement, Eugen Ernst of the SPD, had attempted to root out loyalists of the former but he wasn’t entirely successful. Hearing the news that his colleagues on the Executive Committee supported the apparent coup further delayed Ernst’s response;[1] eventually the police were ordered to fortify their headquarters at Alexanderplatz. Whether due to the order being given too late or because of their political loyalties, many officers failed to return to the Red Castle (the police headquarters) before a large crowd of protesters arrived, escorted by Red Guards and Volksmarines. Leading the revolutionaries was the Red Guard commander Heinrich Dorrenbach, who appealed to the police’s reason and tried to convince them that the aim of the uprising was only to establish an all-socialist government. After hours of waiting, Ernst finally exited the headquarters in the evening and relinquished control of the building to Dorrenbach.
The following day, news finally reached Weimar of the insurrection along with the revolutionaries’ demand for a socialist unity government. The SPD leadership were staunchly opposed to a coalition with the Communists and were even wary of the Independents in light of recent developments. Yet they knew that a significant portion of the party’s membership, voters, and some deputies in the National Assembly would be in favour of such a government. On the other hand, the ominous presence of the military high command was clearly poised to end the brief experiment in German democracy if the threat of a socialist revolution grew too strong. Besides, Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann had shifted to a liberal democratic mind-set where the parliamentary arithmetic for an SPD-KPD-USPD coalition failed to hold a majority of seats in the National Assembly; gone were the heady days of workers’ councils and dreams of democratising the military, in their opinion at least. Karl Legien, Chairman of the General Commission of Trade Unions (Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands/GdGD), infamous among the left for his anti-radicalism and cooperation with the employers, proposed a potential solution: the socialist parties would form an extra-parliamentary government until the threat from the military had subsided. Otto Wels supported Legien’s initiative and offered to negotiate with the Berlin committee. It would prove to be a wasted journey; Legien had already telegraphed the proposal to Berlin. Predictably, many of the SPD members of the committee approved of the proposal, while their opponents argued that an extra-parliamentary socialist government already existed in the form of the Executive Committee of the Berlin councils. KPD Central Committee member Heinrich Brandler declared that if the SPD leadership were serious about socialist unity, they would have to institute it in the branch of government they cared most about. Most of the action committee agreed with Brandler’s assertion and voted in favour of rejecting Legien’s offer while clarifying the previous demand for an all-socialist government. The committee’s decision and explanation was telegraphed back to Weimar.
The socialist demonstration outside the National Assembly, which had begun on 5th March, was still ongoing during the brief back-and-forth negotiations between Weimar and Berlin. Paul Levi, recently elected as a deputy in the federal election, was the most senior Communist at the demonstration; since the beginning he had been labouring towards reaching a coalition agreement with the SPD deputies who were participating in the demonstration. Hermann Paul Reisshaus, the unofficial leader of the demonstrating SPD deputies, was a veteran socialist who had been present at the founding of the Second International and at the SPD’s adoption of the Erfurt Program. Even though Reisshaus had reluctantly voted in favour of war credits during the preceding years, he had been critical of the leadership’s expulsion of the anti-war members and so was open to working with the United Front to establish a socialist republic. In the negotiations Reisshaus unsurprisingly demanded that the SPD act as the senior party in the proposed all-socialist government, not only because of its larger size (in both membership and Assembly seats) but also due to its historic role in the labour movement. Levi conceded that the position of Chancellor would go to the SPD but it would have to be someone on the left of the party, a subtle hint towards Reisshaus. Furthermore Levi argued that the apportionment of ministers in the cabinet would have to be equal, as had been the case in numerous previous arrangements involving the three parties. Reisshaus bristled at the thinly-veiled criticism of the SPD’s previous conduct, but chose to let it go unanswered and acquiesced to the demand for parity. Other elements of the potential government were easier to agree: socialisation of the economy; disbandment of the Freikorps; soldiers’ councils to democratise the military; and the primacy of the workers’ councils (though Levi privately worried that Reisshaus’ view of the SPD’s relation to the councils was too paternalistic). Reisshaus presented the agreement to Scheidemann, though he shrewdly omitted the details concerning the selection of a new Chancellor. He was too late however, for Berlin’s rejection of Legien’s proposal had just arrived. Consequently, Scheidemann and Ebert had vowed to continue with their centrist parliamentary coalition.
While the negotiations between the socialists had been occurring, as a consequence of which government control had been dissipating ever further, generals Walther von Lüttwitz, Georg Maercker, and Erich Ludendorff gathered outside of Weimar. They were shortly after joined by Prussian Minister of War General Walther Reinhardt and Major Kurt von Schleicher; generals Paul von Hindenburg and Hans von Seeckt were sympathetic to their plight but remained uninvolved, while Generalleutnant Wilhelm Groener reluctantly supported the Ebert-Scheidemann government. The gathered officers were unanimous in their belief that the socialists had been allowed to run loose for too long; retaking Berlin and liquidating the socialist leadership was paramount among their aims. Their ire was also directed towards the Weimar government, not just for their apparent collaboration with the revolutionaries but also for their capitulation to the Entente. Rumours about the peace treaty that was being negotiated at the Paris Peace Conference were scandalous to the reactionary officers; limits on troop numbers, territorial concessions, monetary reparations, and more. The latest news alleged that the German government would be obliged to allow Jozef Haller von Hallenburg’s Polish Army of the Western Front to transit through Germany to Poland. To the generals the notion of enabling their enemies to steal Germany’s eastern territories was inconceivable, yet the government appeared to be seriously considering the prospect. The planned action against the government would therefore have to take place before the politicians capitulated further to the Entente’s demands. On the other hand, the gathered generals recognised that they would need some civilian support in their restoration of responsible government. The DVP and DNVP were sure to be supportive, and many in the DDP and Zentrum could be convinced if a sufficient combination of pressure and emphasis on the dangers of Bolshevism were applied. The Social Democrats were more complicated however; Ebert and Scheidemann were the faces of the failure of liberal democracy, but they could perhaps serve a public role in smoothing the transition of power. Gustav Noske, and perhaps even Wels, had shown themselves to be amenable to the interests of the military, at least while the revolutionaries remained a threat and so could have a temporary role in the new government. The generals adjourned their meeting, agreeing on the date of 15th March as the moment of action.
[1] ITTL Eugen Ernst did not win a seat in the federal election.
Dramatis Personae (OTL biographies)
Heinrich Brandler: One of the original Spartacists, Brandler was expelled from the SPD as early as 1915 and reluctantly joined the new USPD in 1917. After a brief exile from Germany, he created KPD's strongest organisation in Chemnitz and was eventually elected chairman of the party in 1921, succeeding Paul Levi. Brandler's key role in the failed March Action of that year resulted in his imprisonment, but he escaped to the USSR and worked for the Comintern. He returned to Germany in 1922 and became general secretary of the party, but the failure of further uprisings, his support for a united front with the SPD, and the rise of leftist opponents in the party resulted Brandler's recall to the USSR. He later returned to Germany and organised the Communist Party Opposition with August Thalheimer, for which he was expelled from the Comintern. In 1933 Brandler went to France and then to Cuba in 1941. He returned to (West) Germany after the war and worked as a journalist and activist until his death in 1967.
On 8th March socialist militias in Berlin executed the orders given by the socialist unity action committee. Units of the Red Guard and People’s Navy Division occupied the Chancellery and the Reichstag; with the government having relocated to Weimar and the constituent assembly for Prussia not yet having been elected, there were only a few soldiers and civil servants present at the government premises. Neither group offered any resistance to the revolutionaries, and some of the soldiers even defected to the militias. Simultaneously, telegraph and newspaper offices were seized, often with the aid of the unionised employees. The crowds of workers who had emerged the previous day to help repel the Freikorps grew in size and joined the socialist militias in erecting barricades. The only real opposition to the seizure of power came from the police and even then the response was confused and ineffective. Emil Eichhorn’s replacement, Eugen Ernst of the SPD, had attempted to root out loyalists of the former but he wasn’t entirely successful. Hearing the news that his colleagues on the Executive Committee supported the apparent coup further delayed Ernst’s response;[1] eventually the police were ordered to fortify their headquarters at Alexanderplatz. Whether due to the order being given too late or because of their political loyalties, many officers failed to return to the Red Castle (the police headquarters) before a large crowd of protesters arrived, escorted by Red Guards and Volksmarines. Leading the revolutionaries was the Red Guard commander Heinrich Dorrenbach, who appealed to the police’s reason and tried to convince them that the aim of the uprising was only to establish an all-socialist government. After hours of waiting, Ernst finally exited the headquarters in the evening and relinquished control of the building to Dorrenbach.
The following day, news finally reached Weimar of the insurrection along with the revolutionaries’ demand for a socialist unity government. The SPD leadership were staunchly opposed to a coalition with the Communists and were even wary of the Independents in light of recent developments. Yet they knew that a significant portion of the party’s membership, voters, and some deputies in the National Assembly would be in favour of such a government. On the other hand, the ominous presence of the military high command was clearly poised to end the brief experiment in German democracy if the threat of a socialist revolution grew too strong. Besides, Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann had shifted to a liberal democratic mind-set where the parliamentary arithmetic for an SPD-KPD-USPD coalition failed to hold a majority of seats in the National Assembly; gone were the heady days of workers’ councils and dreams of democratising the military, in their opinion at least. Karl Legien, Chairman of the General Commission of Trade Unions (Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands/GdGD), infamous among the left for his anti-radicalism and cooperation with the employers, proposed a potential solution: the socialist parties would form an extra-parliamentary government until the threat from the military had subsided. Otto Wels supported Legien’s initiative and offered to negotiate with the Berlin committee. It would prove to be a wasted journey; Legien had already telegraphed the proposal to Berlin. Predictably, many of the SPD members of the committee approved of the proposal, while their opponents argued that an extra-parliamentary socialist government already existed in the form of the Executive Committee of the Berlin councils. KPD Central Committee member Heinrich Brandler declared that if the SPD leadership were serious about socialist unity, they would have to institute it in the branch of government they cared most about. Most of the action committee agreed with Brandler’s assertion and voted in favour of rejecting Legien’s offer while clarifying the previous demand for an all-socialist government. The committee’s decision and explanation was telegraphed back to Weimar.
The socialist demonstration outside the National Assembly, which had begun on 5th March, was still ongoing during the brief back-and-forth negotiations between Weimar and Berlin. Paul Levi, recently elected as a deputy in the federal election, was the most senior Communist at the demonstration; since the beginning he had been labouring towards reaching a coalition agreement with the SPD deputies who were participating in the demonstration. Hermann Paul Reisshaus, the unofficial leader of the demonstrating SPD deputies, was a veteran socialist who had been present at the founding of the Second International and at the SPD’s adoption of the Erfurt Program. Even though Reisshaus had reluctantly voted in favour of war credits during the preceding years, he had been critical of the leadership’s expulsion of the anti-war members and so was open to working with the United Front to establish a socialist republic. In the negotiations Reisshaus unsurprisingly demanded that the SPD act as the senior party in the proposed all-socialist government, not only because of its larger size (in both membership and Assembly seats) but also due to its historic role in the labour movement. Levi conceded that the position of Chancellor would go to the SPD but it would have to be someone on the left of the party, a subtle hint towards Reisshaus. Furthermore Levi argued that the apportionment of ministers in the cabinet would have to be equal, as had been the case in numerous previous arrangements involving the three parties. Reisshaus bristled at the thinly-veiled criticism of the SPD’s previous conduct, but chose to let it go unanswered and acquiesced to the demand for parity. Other elements of the potential government were easier to agree: socialisation of the economy; disbandment of the Freikorps; soldiers’ councils to democratise the military; and the primacy of the workers’ councils (though Levi privately worried that Reisshaus’ view of the SPD’s relation to the councils was too paternalistic). Reisshaus presented the agreement to Scheidemann, though he shrewdly omitted the details concerning the selection of a new Chancellor. He was too late however, for Berlin’s rejection of Legien’s proposal had just arrived. Consequently, Scheidemann and Ebert had vowed to continue with their centrist parliamentary coalition.
While the negotiations between the socialists had been occurring, as a consequence of which government control had been dissipating ever further, generals Walther von Lüttwitz, Georg Maercker, and Erich Ludendorff gathered outside of Weimar. They were shortly after joined by Prussian Minister of War General Walther Reinhardt and Major Kurt von Schleicher; generals Paul von Hindenburg and Hans von Seeckt were sympathetic to their plight but remained uninvolved, while Generalleutnant Wilhelm Groener reluctantly supported the Ebert-Scheidemann government. The gathered officers were unanimous in their belief that the socialists had been allowed to run loose for too long; retaking Berlin and liquidating the socialist leadership was paramount among their aims. Their ire was also directed towards the Weimar government, not just for their apparent collaboration with the revolutionaries but also for their capitulation to the Entente. Rumours about the peace treaty that was being negotiated at the Paris Peace Conference were scandalous to the reactionary officers; limits on troop numbers, territorial concessions, monetary reparations, and more. The latest news alleged that the German government would be obliged to allow Jozef Haller von Hallenburg’s Polish Army of the Western Front to transit through Germany to Poland. To the generals the notion of enabling their enemies to steal Germany’s eastern territories was inconceivable, yet the government appeared to be seriously considering the prospect. The planned action against the government would therefore have to take place before the politicians capitulated further to the Entente’s demands. On the other hand, the gathered generals recognised that they would need some civilian support in their restoration of responsible government. The DVP and DNVP were sure to be supportive, and many in the DDP and Zentrum could be convinced if a sufficient combination of pressure and emphasis on the dangers of Bolshevism were applied. The Social Democrats were more complicated however; Ebert and Scheidemann were the faces of the failure of liberal democracy, but they could perhaps serve a public role in smoothing the transition of power. Gustav Noske, and perhaps even Wels, had shown themselves to be amenable to the interests of the military, at least while the revolutionaries remained a threat and so could have a temporary role in the new government. The generals adjourned their meeting, agreeing on the date of 15th March as the moment of action.
[1] ITTL Eugen Ernst did not win a seat in the federal election.
Dramatis Personae (OTL biographies)
Heinrich Brandler: One of the original Spartacists, Brandler was expelled from the SPD as early as 1915 and reluctantly joined the new USPD in 1917. After a brief exile from Germany, he created KPD's strongest organisation in Chemnitz and was eventually elected chairman of the party in 1921, succeeding Paul Levi. Brandler's key role in the failed March Action of that year resulted in his imprisonment, but he escaped to the USSR and worked for the Comintern. He returned to Germany in 1922 and became general secretary of the party, but the failure of further uprisings, his support for a united front with the SPD, and the rise of leftist opponents in the party resulted Brandler's recall to the USSR. He later returned to Germany and organised the Communist Party Opposition with August Thalheimer, for which he was expelled from the Comintern. In 1933 Brandler went to France and then to Cuba in 1941. He returned to (West) Germany after the war and worked as a journalist and activist until his death in 1967.
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Bear in mind the Austro-Fascist regime of OTL tried to pretend to be Pan-German - it just insisted now wasn't the right time, that it wouldn't accept such and such terms, that Austria would be given such and such status, that it objected specifically to the Nazis etc. Even when promoting Austria's independence as a state, and it's uniqueness as a Heimat, they conceded it was "Deutsche im Kultur." This position would have much more resonance against Communism than it did against the Nazis.
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On the other hand, the SDAPO was so pan-German that a worrying number of them joined the Nazi administration, so I'm thinking the spillover of the German Civil War into Austria is going to be very likely.
A Gathering Storm in Germany
A Gathering Storm in Germany
Against the backdrop of the disintegration of governmental authority and a climate of fear and uncertainty over the military’s role in politics, four more elections were scheduled for the establishment of state assemblies in Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Bremen, and Waldeck on the 9th March. The local branches of the United Front in Waldeck decided to boycott the election and instead focused on preparing the proletariat in the small, rural state for the feared upcoming civil war; the SPD won 7 of the state’s 21 seats and so were outnumbered by the right-wing parties. On the other hand, Bremen was an important centre of the revolutionary movement, though to complicate matters, the ultra-leftist International Communists were the dominant group of socialists in the city-state. Despite their traditionally anti-electoral attitude, Johann Knief and Otto Rühle recognised the significance of the current circumstances and promised the IKD’s support for the KPD-USPD anti-parliamentary electoral campaign. Of the 200 seats up for election, the United Front won 64 against the SPD’s 56.[1] Even though Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach would not ordinarily have been among the most militantly socialist states in central Germany, they had become the epicentre of the expanding strikes and demonstrations against the government. As a consequence the local working class had, by taking action into their own hands, been thoroughly radicalised by the experience and this was demonstrated in the elections in the two states. The United Front won 7 of the 24 available seats in Saxe-Meiningen, narrowly being beaten by the SPD’s 8.[2] The effect was predictably more pronounced in Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 13 seats for the United Front and 12 for the SPD, out of a total of 42 seats.[3] The Social Democrats’ claim to be the sole party of the workers was clearly faltering.
General Walther von Lüttwitz’ clique faced challenges in the preparation of their coup. The war against the Polish rebels in eastern Germany showed no signs of abating; the military high command had to resort to secret lines of communication with the outlawed Freikorps units to maintain the pretence of a ceasefire. The withdrawal of divisions from that front would only lead to a weakening of the Germans’ position there but it was necessary because most of the regular units of the Deutsches Heer were proving too unreliable for the overtly political operation that was to come. Many soldiers were deserting while others were running their orders through councils before acting upon them. Meanwhile the coup plotters had decided to not inform their potential allies among the politicians until the operation was underway for fear of their plans being revealed. The redeployment of soldiers in the days following the elections was not too hard to miss, even with the effort to keep the movements secret. The attempts at maintaining secrecy were in vain however, for members of the Communist Military Apparatus embedded in the Deutsches Heer reported their findings to their comrades. On 13th March, the Apparatus’ commander Wilhelm Zaisser submitted his report, even though he was unsure of the exact details of the coup, to the party’s Zentrale, comprising: Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Wilhelm Pieck, Leo Jogiches, Paul Levi (who was still in Weimar), Hugo Eberlein, Georg Ledebour, Ernst Däumig, Richard Müller, and Paul Neumann. At the meeting, the Zentrale members unanimously agreed on warning as many branches as possible, especially Levi and the demonstration at Weimar. There was contention though when Luxemburg suggested informing the Scheidemann government of the coup as well. Ledebour strongly disagreed with the idea, arguing that doing so would just prolong the Weimar government’s existence and thus strengthen it at the expense of the revolutionaries; Liebknecht was inclined to agree. The proposal was put to a formal vote (with Zaisser standing in for Levi): three for, five against, and two abstentions.[4] Thus, the Communist Zentrale chose not to defend the liberal democracy which had tried so hard to halt the revolution.
At midday of 15th March two Freikorps brigades and one Deutsches Heer brigade under the command of Major Kurt von Schleicher marched into Weimar. The socialist demonstration had mostly dispersed, through discrete warnings from the Communist Zentrale, and those who remained quickly fled when they saw the soldiers. The coup’s soldiers entered the National Theatre and detained the deputies, but the Communists, Independents, and some of the left Social Democrats were not present. Von Schleicher himself marched into Friedrich Ebert’s office and informed the President that he was to form a new emergency government and dissolve the National Assembly. Ebert knew that he had no choice and so meekly acquiesced to the military’s demands. Besides Gustav Noske, who was to be promoted to the position of Chancellor, there were no other SPD or centrist members in the military’s approved cabinet. Wolfgang Kapp was to be given the Vice-Chancellorship and the Ministry of Finance, while Kuno von Westarp was to be appointed Minister of Justice, and Traugott von Jagow to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The rest of the major cabinet positions were reserved for current or former military officers: Wilhelm Groener to the Ministry of Defence (as an incentive for him to support the coup); the Ministry of the Interior to the famous admiral Alfred von Tirpitz; and Werner von Fritsch to the Ministry of Labour. The retention of Ebert and Noske was designed to maintain the appearance of continuity and legitimacy for the new government, but in reality they were to be puppets of the military. The announcement of the new government, but not the dissolution of the National Assembly, was telegraphed to the rest of the country.
A few hours earlier, two understrength Deutsches Heer divisions began their advance into Berlin; General Erich Ludendorff was in command, though he remained nearby in Dallgow-Döberitz. In all, approximately 19,000 soldiers, most of whom were expecting an effortless arrest of the revolutionary leadership, were involved in the operation. Their expectations were to be dashed however. In the short time since Zaisser’s report to the Zentrale, the Red Guard and People’s Navy Division had hastily established as many proletarian militias as they could. Even though they varied in quality and experience, there were 45,000 armed workers ready to defend Berlin upon the launch of the military coup. Due to the haste in which the militias were raised, there was no time to prepare a plan more complex than merely defending the city; Red Guard commander Heinrich Dorrenbach was unofficially in command of the nascent socialist army. Though the revolutionaries were dispersed around the city, Dorrenbach had given the order to appropriate all cars and trucks that were not being used for essential services. The Deutsches Heer soldiers were fired upon almost as soon as they entered the city proper, halting their advance. For an hour or so after first contact, the two sides traded gunfire until the Deutsches Heer brought their artillery into position. Once the reactionaries’ artillery commenced its bombardment, the socialist army responded with its own. By the early evening the resolve of most of the Deutsches Heer soldiers, completely unprepared for a drawn-out battle, broke and the invaders retreated to Dallgow-Döberitz. As soon as the Deutsches Heer attacked, the revolutionary coalition had dispatched a pre-prepared announcement across Germany:
[1] OTL the result was: KPD = 15, USPD = 38, SPD = 67. Notably the KPD actually ran in this election.
[2] OTL, 2 for the USPD, 13 for the SPD.
[3] OTL, 5 for the USPD, 16 for the SPD.
[4] The vote was as follows: for – Luxemburg, Jogiches, Müller; against - Ledebour, Liebknecht, Pieck, Däumig, Zaisser; abstentions – Eberlein, Neumann.
Dramatis Personae (OTL biographies)
Otto Rühle: Originally a Spartacist, Rühle left the group when they joined the 'reformists' in creating the USPD. Rühle himself helped to establish the ISD/IKD and was partly responsible for them joining with the Spartacists to found the KPD. He was a leader of the ultra-left opposition within the party which was expelled by Paul Levi in 1920, following which Rühle co-founded the KAPD. As a delegate to the 2nd Comintern Congress Rühle rejected the Twenty One Conditions for membership and also vociferously criticised the Bolsheviks; because of this, he was expelled from the KAPD. Rühle helped establish the ultra-left General Workers' Union before coming into conflict there as well. In 1932 he moved to Prague and then to Mexico in 1936, where from he contributed to the Dewey Commission. Rühle died in 1943.
Hugo Eberlein: One of the original Spartacists, Eberlein was a central member of the KPD throughout most of the 1920s and was a leader of the clandestine apparatus. Eberlein's downfall came in 1928 when he was involved in the investigation and dismissal of Thälmann in the wake of the embezzlement scandal. Eberlein was demoted and was then moved to Comintern work. He escaped to France in 1933 and worked towards the popular front strategy until his arrest in 1935 and exile to Switzerland the next year. Eberlein escaped to the USSR where Wilhelm Pieck tried to have him rehabilitated, but he was arrested in 1937 and eventually executed in 1941.
Paul Neumann: One of the revolutionary shop stewards who split from the SPD into the USPD in 1917, Neumann was an influential leader in Berlin. He joined the majority of the USPD in merging with the KPD but left in 1922 to help form the Communist Working Group. Neumann followed the latter organisation into the rump USPD which rejoined the SPD. Neumann's later life is unknown.
Against the backdrop of the disintegration of governmental authority and a climate of fear and uncertainty over the military’s role in politics, four more elections were scheduled for the establishment of state assemblies in Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Bremen, and Waldeck on the 9th March. The local branches of the United Front in Waldeck decided to boycott the election and instead focused on preparing the proletariat in the small, rural state for the feared upcoming civil war; the SPD won 7 of the state’s 21 seats and so were outnumbered by the right-wing parties. On the other hand, Bremen was an important centre of the revolutionary movement, though to complicate matters, the ultra-leftist International Communists were the dominant group of socialists in the city-state. Despite their traditionally anti-electoral attitude, Johann Knief and Otto Rühle recognised the significance of the current circumstances and promised the IKD’s support for the KPD-USPD anti-parliamentary electoral campaign. Of the 200 seats up for election, the United Front won 64 against the SPD’s 56.[1] Even though Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach would not ordinarily have been among the most militantly socialist states in central Germany, they had become the epicentre of the expanding strikes and demonstrations against the government. As a consequence the local working class had, by taking action into their own hands, been thoroughly radicalised by the experience and this was demonstrated in the elections in the two states. The United Front won 7 of the 24 available seats in Saxe-Meiningen, narrowly being beaten by the SPD’s 8.[2] The effect was predictably more pronounced in Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 13 seats for the United Front and 12 for the SPD, out of a total of 42 seats.[3] The Social Democrats’ claim to be the sole party of the workers was clearly faltering.
General Walther von Lüttwitz’ clique faced challenges in the preparation of their coup. The war against the Polish rebels in eastern Germany showed no signs of abating; the military high command had to resort to secret lines of communication with the outlawed Freikorps units to maintain the pretence of a ceasefire. The withdrawal of divisions from that front would only lead to a weakening of the Germans’ position there but it was necessary because most of the regular units of the Deutsches Heer were proving too unreliable for the overtly political operation that was to come. Many soldiers were deserting while others were running their orders through councils before acting upon them. Meanwhile the coup plotters had decided to not inform their potential allies among the politicians until the operation was underway for fear of their plans being revealed. The redeployment of soldiers in the days following the elections was not too hard to miss, even with the effort to keep the movements secret. The attempts at maintaining secrecy were in vain however, for members of the Communist Military Apparatus embedded in the Deutsches Heer reported their findings to their comrades. On 13th March, the Apparatus’ commander Wilhelm Zaisser submitted his report, even though he was unsure of the exact details of the coup, to the party’s Zentrale, comprising: Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Wilhelm Pieck, Leo Jogiches, Paul Levi (who was still in Weimar), Hugo Eberlein, Georg Ledebour, Ernst Däumig, Richard Müller, and Paul Neumann. At the meeting, the Zentrale members unanimously agreed on warning as many branches as possible, especially Levi and the demonstration at Weimar. There was contention though when Luxemburg suggested informing the Scheidemann government of the coup as well. Ledebour strongly disagreed with the idea, arguing that doing so would just prolong the Weimar government’s existence and thus strengthen it at the expense of the revolutionaries; Liebknecht was inclined to agree. The proposal was put to a formal vote (with Zaisser standing in for Levi): three for, five against, and two abstentions.[4] Thus, the Communist Zentrale chose not to defend the liberal democracy which had tried so hard to halt the revolution.
At midday of 15th March two Freikorps brigades and one Deutsches Heer brigade under the command of Major Kurt von Schleicher marched into Weimar. The socialist demonstration had mostly dispersed, through discrete warnings from the Communist Zentrale, and those who remained quickly fled when they saw the soldiers. The coup’s soldiers entered the National Theatre and detained the deputies, but the Communists, Independents, and some of the left Social Democrats were not present. Von Schleicher himself marched into Friedrich Ebert’s office and informed the President that he was to form a new emergency government and dissolve the National Assembly. Ebert knew that he had no choice and so meekly acquiesced to the military’s demands. Besides Gustav Noske, who was to be promoted to the position of Chancellor, there were no other SPD or centrist members in the military’s approved cabinet. Wolfgang Kapp was to be given the Vice-Chancellorship and the Ministry of Finance, while Kuno von Westarp was to be appointed Minister of Justice, and Traugott von Jagow to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The rest of the major cabinet positions were reserved for current or former military officers: Wilhelm Groener to the Ministry of Defence (as an incentive for him to support the coup); the Ministry of the Interior to the famous admiral Alfred von Tirpitz; and Werner von Fritsch to the Ministry of Labour. The retention of Ebert and Noske was designed to maintain the appearance of continuity and legitimacy for the new government, but in reality they were to be puppets of the military. The announcement of the new government, but not the dissolution of the National Assembly, was telegraphed to the rest of the country.
A few hours earlier, two understrength Deutsches Heer divisions began their advance into Berlin; General Erich Ludendorff was in command, though he remained nearby in Dallgow-Döberitz. In all, approximately 19,000 soldiers, most of whom were expecting an effortless arrest of the revolutionary leadership, were involved in the operation. Their expectations were to be dashed however. In the short time since Zaisser’s report to the Zentrale, the Red Guard and People’s Navy Division had hastily established as many proletarian militias as they could. Even though they varied in quality and experience, there were 45,000 armed workers ready to defend Berlin upon the launch of the military coup. Due to the haste in which the militias were raised, there was no time to prepare a plan more complex than merely defending the city; Red Guard commander Heinrich Dorrenbach was unofficially in command of the nascent socialist army. Though the revolutionaries were dispersed around the city, Dorrenbach had given the order to appropriate all cars and trucks that were not being used for essential services. The Deutsches Heer soldiers were fired upon almost as soon as they entered the city proper, halting their advance. For an hour or so after first contact, the two sides traded gunfire until the Deutsches Heer brought their artillery into position. Once the reactionaries’ artillery commenced its bombardment, the socialist army responded with its own. By the early evening the resolve of most of the Deutsches Heer soldiers, completely unprepared for a drawn-out battle, broke and the invaders retreated to Dallgow-Döberitz. As soon as the Deutsches Heer attacked, the revolutionary coalition had dispatched a pre-prepared announcement across Germany:
- The Free Socialist Republic was declared (for a second time) and the government in Weimar was to be considered obsolete.
- A new Council of People’s Deputies, led by Hermann Paul Reisshaus, Karl Liebknecht, and Emil Barth, was to assume the mantle of government until a new All-German Congress of Worker’s and Soldiers’ Councils could be convened.
- All members of the labouring classes, that is workers, poor farmers, and soldiers, were to arm themselves and prepare to defend the revolution from reactionary forces in conjunction with a general work stoppage.
- The means of production were to be immediately brought into public ownership and to be administered by the labouring classes for equitable and productive use.
[1] OTL the result was: KPD = 15, USPD = 38, SPD = 67. Notably the KPD actually ran in this election.
[2] OTL, 2 for the USPD, 13 for the SPD.
[3] OTL, 5 for the USPD, 16 for the SPD.
[4] The vote was as follows: for – Luxemburg, Jogiches, Müller; against - Ledebour, Liebknecht, Pieck, Däumig, Zaisser; abstentions – Eberlein, Neumann.
Dramatis Personae (OTL biographies)
Otto Rühle: Originally a Spartacist, Rühle left the group when they joined the 'reformists' in creating the USPD. Rühle himself helped to establish the ISD/IKD and was partly responsible for them joining with the Spartacists to found the KPD. He was a leader of the ultra-left opposition within the party which was expelled by Paul Levi in 1920, following which Rühle co-founded the KAPD. As a delegate to the 2nd Comintern Congress Rühle rejected the Twenty One Conditions for membership and also vociferously criticised the Bolsheviks; because of this, he was expelled from the KAPD. Rühle helped establish the ultra-left General Workers' Union before coming into conflict there as well. In 1932 he moved to Prague and then to Mexico in 1936, where from he contributed to the Dewey Commission. Rühle died in 1943.
Hugo Eberlein: One of the original Spartacists, Eberlein was a central member of the KPD throughout most of the 1920s and was a leader of the clandestine apparatus. Eberlein's downfall came in 1928 when he was involved in the investigation and dismissal of Thälmann in the wake of the embezzlement scandal. Eberlein was demoted and was then moved to Comintern work. He escaped to France in 1933 and worked towards the popular front strategy until his arrest in 1935 and exile to Switzerland the next year. Eberlein escaped to the USSR where Wilhelm Pieck tried to have him rehabilitated, but he was arrested in 1937 and eventually executed in 1941.
Paul Neumann: One of the revolutionary shop stewards who split from the SPD into the USPD in 1917, Neumann was an influential leader in Berlin. He joined the majority of the USPD in merging with the KPD but left in 1922 to help form the Communist Working Group. Neumann followed the latter organisation into the rump USPD which rejoined the SPD. Neumann's later life is unknown.
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Alright, it's showtime. The SPD played themselves so the time has come for the actual radicals to show them what a true proletarian government looks like.
The SPD leadership leadership would have been forced to work with the United Front in fighting the reactionaries, which would probably lead to them being sidelined by the left wing members in the party.
So an even greater revolutionary advantage for the Radical Left?
Maybe in the early period, but my idea is that the current split in the SPD between revolution and reaction will lead a lot of the party's members and voters to move leftward and support either the Communists or Independents.
German State Elections in March 1919
German State Elections in March 1919
Constituent Assembly of the State of Waldeck - 9th March
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxe-Meiningen - 9th March
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach - 9th March
Constituent Assembly of the State of Bremen - 9th March
Constituent Assembly of the State of Waldeck - 9th March
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 7 | 30.4 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 6 | 23.2 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 4 | 21.2 |
Waldeckian People's League (WldVB) | 3 | 13.6 |
People's Party (DVP) | 1 | 8.7 |
Centre Party (Z) | 0 | 2.9 |
21 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxe-Meiningen - 9th March
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 8 | 33.3 |
Communist-Independent coalition (KPD-USPD) | 7 | 26.6 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 5 | 18.3 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 3 | 15.4 |
People's Party (DVP) | 1 | 6.4 |
24 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach - 9th March
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Communist-Independent coalition (KPD-USPD) | 13 | 30.5 |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 12 | 28.7 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 9 | 21.2 |
National People's Party (DNVP) | 7 | 11.3 |
People's Party (DVP) | 1 | 5.4 |
Centre Party (Z) | 0 | 2.9 |
42 |
Constituent Assembly of the State of Bremen - 9th March
Party | Seats | % of vote |
Communist-Independent coalition (KPD-USPD) | 64 | 32.8 |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 56 | 26.9 |
Democratic Party (DDP) | 39 | 19.9 |
People's Party (DVP) | 27 | 12.9 |
Independent parties | 11 | 5.8 |
Centre Party (Z) | 3 | 1.7 |
200 |
Taimur500
Banned
Nice data update, waiting to see how these political groups use their influence after the breakdown of the parliamentary system.
My ideas have changed a bit since that teaser I previously posted.
The USPD and SPD are going to merge and form the United Social Democratic Party of Germany (VSPD). The ultra-left IKD are instead going to change their name to International Communist League rather than KAPD. Austria is very likely to join Germany but the Austrian Social Democrats will retain their independence as the SDAPDO.
Given that the revolutionaries are fighting what is blatantly a military coup, some centrist liberals may at least stay independent rather than join the forces of reaction and so there technically wouldn't be a justification for their organisations to be banned after socialist victory.