The Polish Question and Contentious Elections
The ongoing conflict with the Polish rebels in eastern Germany was growing in its unpopularity. The armistice with the Entente had given the German people the impression that the war was over, yet the
Deutsches Heer (army) and divisions of
Freikorps were engaged with an enemy force which was clearly an extension of the Republic of Poland. Negotiations for a ceasefire had begun on 2nd February but the fighting continued unabated. The
Communists, and to a lesser extent the
USPD, seized on the undeclared war, sharply criticising the
SPD as being no different from the previous military dictatorship. It is difficult to discern whether this line of attack had much of an effect on the outcome of the three state elections of 2nd February; all three states (Saxony, Reuss-Gera, and Reuss-Greiz) were urban and industrialised. The
KPD won 14 of Saxony’s 96 seats, against 40 for the
SPD and 3 for the
Independents.[1] In the two states of Reuss,
Communist performance was much better: in Reuss-Gera, the
KPD won 7 of the 21 seats available, while the
SPD and
USPD respectively won 2 and 4;[2] in Reuss-Greiz, the
KPD won 5 out of 15 seats, and the
SPD and
USPD each received 2.[3]
The day after the Polish-German talks began, a German offensive broke through on the northern front and began to push towards Gnesen/Gniezno.[4] The radical miners’ councils of the Ruhr and central Germany, who had effectively socialised their mines throughout January against the wishes of the
SPD-led government, escalated their discussions for a coordinated general strike against the undeclared war. The
Communists and
Independents united in support of the miners and helped to facilitate the planning of the strike throughout the country. On 6th February the news of the German siege of Gniezno and the failure of armistice negotiations induced the miners to begin their strike immediately. Gustav Noske, acting as a secret liaison between Chancellor Ebert and the
Freikorps, urged Ebert to redirect some
Freikorps divisions from the Polish front to repress the miners’ strike. The Chancellor refused however, knowing that a repression of the miners would cause the collapse of his already fragile coalition between the
SPD and the
USPD. Instead Ebert pinned his hopes on quickly defeating the Polish rebellion and thus negating the primary justification for the strike. In both the Ruhr and central Germany combined a few hundred thousand workers had joined the strike; alongside their demand for an end to the war, they also demanded the imminent convention of the Second All-German Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils. Just prior to the elections in the states of Coburg and Lübeck on 9th February, Gniezno was taken by German forces and unorganised sympathy strikes were appearing across Germany, including in Coburg and Lübeck. In both states the
Communists and
Independents formed coalitions and went on the offensive against the
SPD. Out of Lübeck’s 80 seats the
KPD-
USPD coalition won 11 seats against the
SPD’s 29.[5] In Coburg’s small assembly of 11 seats the anti-war socialists won 2 seats, the
SPD 5, and the
DDP-led right-wing coalition 4 seats.[6]
The Executive Committee of the Berlin councils heeded the call of the striking miners and, without consulting the government, declared the Second All-German Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils to be opened on 11th February. In comparison to the First Congress the organisation of the Second had little involvement from the
SPD, who had since focused almost exclusively on the parliamentary elections. Additionally the workers’ councils throughout the country had become more confident in themselves and their proletarian character, and so sent considerably more delegates of working class background. Overall there were 582 delegates, 90 of whom were sent from the soldiers’ councils. The
SPD had lost the majority they had won in the First Congress, falling to 229 delegates, while the
Communists had soared to 211 delegates; with the
USPD numbered at 84, they held a majority. The first issue on the agenda was the miners’ strike in relation to the Polish rebellion. Wilhelm Koenen,
KPD delegate and one of the leaders of the strike in central Germany, delivered a strident speech castigating the government for continuing the war and arguing that the strike was a measured response to the situation. With the
Communists and
Independents in support of the strike, a vote to continue the stoppage until the government declared a ceasefire was easily passed. The question of extending the strike was disputed though; the
Communists argued in favour of the workers of Berlin joining the strike, while the
USPD countered with the claim that such an action would invite repression from the military, and the
SPD accused the
Communists of seeking to install a dictatorship. Support from the
International Communists and the anarchists wasn’t enough to give the
KPD a majority, so they relented on expanding the strike.
The next day of the Congress began with a debate on the socialisation of the economy, an issue which all of the delegates of the socialist parties ostensibly agreed upon. The leadership of the
SPD were discretely opposed to mass socialisation however and instead preferred gradual nationalisation. To this end they attempted to impress upon their delegates the need to oppose any economic initiatives proposed by the
Communists or
Independents; the party’s leadership were only partially successful. When Georg Ledebour called for the immediate nationalisation of natural resources and heavy industry, in conjunction with workplace democracy, the Congress reacted with thunderous applause, many of the
SPD delegates included; the motion was passed comfortably. The following motion, presented by Heinrich Dorrenbach, concerned the democratisation of the military through the use of the soldiers’ and sailors’ councils. The subsequent debate gave Willi Budich, former leader of the League of Red Soldiers, the opportunity to condemn the government’s collaboration with the
Freikorps, to whom Budich had lost an arm in the attempted coup of early December. The vote was passed almost unanimously.
The final debate of the Congress, which consumed the third and final day, surrounded the federal constituent assembly election and the future of the republic. Karl Liebknecht reiterated the
KPD’s support for the election and his party’s participation in it, but he plainly stated that the ultimate legislative and executive authority in Germany lay in the councils. His speech drew applause and jeers in equal measure. Max Cohen-Reuss, an
SPD delegate who had presided over the First Congress, retorted that the role of the councils had served their purpose and power should be handed over to a constituent assembly forthwith before there was a danger of the councils being subverted by a
Bolshevik-like dictatorship. To his surprise many of Cohen-Reuss’ fellow delegates from the
SPD turned their ire upon him, angry at his inconsiderate dismissal of their work. The
USPD delegate Oskar Cohn affirmed his and his party’s support for the conciliar republic, but argued that it needed to be imbued with the democratic legitimacy of the constituent assembly. However, Cohn’s left-wing colleague Emil Barth responded by pointing out that the participation of the workers in the councils provided all the democratic legitimacy that was necessary. The arguing went back and forth until the Congress’ presidium called for a vote on Liebknecht’s proposal. The vote passed with 362 delegates in favour; all of the
Communists and approximately half of the
USPD delegates were in support, but that alone fell short of a majority. Fortunately for the revolutionaries a substantial minority of
SPD delegates joined their side. With the future of a socialist republic of councils seemingly secured, the Second All-German Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils concluded and the delegates returned home, many of them going on to continue their miners’ strike.
Party | Delegates | % of delegates |
Social Democratic Party (SPD) | 229 | 39.3 |
Communist Party (KPD) | 211 | 36.3 |
Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) | 84 | 14.4 |
International Communists (IKD) | 32 | 5.5 |
Liberals | 12 | 2.1 |
Anarchists | 8 | 1.4 |
Independents | 6 | 1 |
| 582 | |
Ebert’s government was dismayed at the overtly revolutionary decisions coming out of the Congress, but they were confident in their opinion that the councils would be irrelevant following the federal election on 16th February. Meanwhile, the suppression of the Polish rebellion was foremost in the minds of the cabinet. By the end of the Congress on 13th February German forces had retaken Ostrów, which had been held by Polish rebels since before the armistice with the Entente. Subsequently the
Freikorps pursued the retreating rebels across the border into the Republic of Poland, where they engaged the Polish army. The Entente military mission that was present in Poland dispatched a strongly-worded ultimatum to the German government, demanding the immediate retreat from the Polish Republic’s territory or face the resumption of a state of war. To Ebert’s horror, the
Freikorps involved were not under his control or that of Noske. When the
USPD ministers Hugo Haase and Wilhelm Dittmann became aware of the dire situation they presented Ebert with an ultimatum of their own: outlaw the
Freikorps and inform the Entente that they were rogue elements, or the
USPD would withdraw from the coalition government. Philipp Scheidemann acted first and accepted the
Independents’ demands, instructing the foreign ministry to relay the message to Joseph Noulens, chairman of the Entente mission in Poland. The mostly French forces counterattacked the
Freikorps and by the 15th had expelled them from Poland; they remained at the border however and refused to advance towards Ostrów. Meanwhile, most of the soldiers’ councils of the
Deutsches Heer on the Polish front had voted to refuse offensive orders from the high command, in effect engaging in a mass mutiny. Thus the German government was in crisis on the eve of the federal election.
[1] OTL, USPD = 15, SPD = 42.
[2] OTL the USPD and SPD were in coalition and the former got 11 seats and the latter got 2.
[3] OTL, USPD = 7, SPD = 2.
[4] This offensive was repulsed IOTL, but with the larger
Freikorps presence ITTL it is a success.
[5] OTL it was 42 seats for the SPD. I’ve reasoned that some of the rural anti-war votes shifted from the SPD to the DDP, who got 29 seats OTL.
[6] OTL, 7 seats for the SPD.
Dramatis Personae (OTL biographies)
Wilhelm Koenen: One of the founders of the USPD, Koenen was a leader of the miners' strikes of central Germany in 1919. The next year he was one of the primary organisers of the USPD left's merger with the KPD and was elected to the party
Zentrale. From then on he was regular delegate to Comintern congresses. As a centrist in the party Koenen was sidelined during the ultra-left's ascendancy, but gradually shifted to the left in response. In 1933 Koenen fled to France, then Czechoslovakia in 1935, and Britain in 1938. From 1940 to 1942 he was interned in Canada but would later go on to work for British intelligence's anti-Nazi propaganda apparatus. After the war, Koenen joined the SED, became its chairman in Saxony, and was a regular member of the Central Committee until his death in 1963.
Willi Budich: One of the original Spartacists and an ally of Leo Jogiches, Budich organised the League of Red Soldiers. After from his injuries during the attempted coup of early December 1918, Budich moved to Munich where he was a leader of the council republic. Afterwards he fled to the USSR, returned to Germany in 1921, was arrested but escaped and returned to the USSR where worked as an agent of the Comintern and International Red Aid. Budich returned to Germany in 1929, joined the KPD Central Committee. He was arrested by the Gestapo after the Nazis came power and was interned in a concentration camp until an international campaign led to release. He returned to the USSR to continue his work in the International Red Aid until his arrest in 1936 and execution in 1938 during Stalin's purges.
Oskar Cohn: A lawyer and SPD politician, Cohn was a founding member of the USPD. During the November Revolution Cohn acted as a legal advisor to the Soviet Russian embassy and accepted funds to start a revolution. He later worked in the Ministry of Justice during the SPD-USPD coalition government. Cohn opposed the USPD's potential entry into the Comintern and stayed with the rump of the party that rejoined the SPD. During the 1920s Cohn joined Poale Zion and became a staunch Zionist. After the Reichstag fire he moved to Paris and was involved in organising aid for Jewish refugees. Cohn died in Geneva in 1934.