Non-purged Red Army vs Wehrmacht?

[Ryker of Terra]

So the way I understand it, Soviet armed forces were seeing some serious innovation as regards military theory during the 1920s-30s. Not only was the Red Army rapidly modernizing, Soviet commanders were also theorizing how to best make use of it, and they came up with Deep Operation/Deep Battle. Then the Great Purge started and killed off both the theory and the theorists;

By 1937, the Soviet Union had the largest mechanized army in the world and a sophisticated operational system to operate it.

However, the death of Triandafillov in an airplane crash and the Great Purge of 1937 to 1939 removed many of the leading officers of the Red Army, including Svechin, Varfolomeev and Tukhachevsky.[31] The purge of the Soviet military liquidated the generation of officers that had given the Red Army the deep battle strategy, operations and tactics and who also had rebuilt the Soviet armed forces. Along with those personalities, their ideas were also dispensed with.

But what if Stalin had been less paranoid and left the armed forces alone? I don't know how this could come about, admittedly. Stalin was paranoid and didn't trust Tukhachevsky and co., but he seemed to get on pretty well with some of the other military men like Kulik and Budyonny. Maybe if we handwave him becoming friends with the Deep Battlers instead, they would emphasize the need for a strong, modern military and it would keep the armed forces from getting purged. Or at least the more useful segments of it - if the likes of Kulik and Budyonny get purged, it will be far less damaging than OTL, methinks.

Barbarossa was a disaster. Capable commanders were dead or in Siberia, and new officers were promoted to take their place despite lacking proper experience. The psychological effect of the purges also cannot be ignored - commanders were scared shitless. I've read that even those commanders that suspected the Germans of planning something on the eve of Barbarossa refused to prepare because Stalin ordered them to ignore provocations. They were that terrified.

Zhukov was a proponent of Deep Battle, but he came into play too late to blunt the initial offensive. But what if you have capable commanders who know what they're doing and aren't afraid to do it from the start? I imagine the outcome would be far different. I don't know enough to say how successful the Wehrmacht might be in this scenario, but I can't see them getting as far as Moscow or Stalingrad.

So what do y'all think? How would a non-purged Red Army fare against the Wehrmacht? How far would they get?

 

[Thoresby]

A non-purged Red Army would have fared much, much better than OTL but the three crucial advantages that the Wehrmacht had in OTL would have all been in place;

• Combat experience, the Wehrmacht that launched Barbarossa was enormously more effective than that of the 1st of September 1939. They had a very effective method for incorporating operational experience had had learned an enormous amount in Poland, France, the Balkans and North Africa.
• Communications. Deep Battle is a great idea but you need the ability to coordinate your forces, the Wehrmacht had more and better radios and thanks to its operational experience a much better idea of how to use them. That makes the odds of getting inside the Red Army's OODA loop high.
• Air power. While the Red Air Force was also badly impacted by the purges even taking that into account the Luftwaffe is a better trained, better equipped force that is also battle hardened.

However even with those advantages a much more competent Red Army is going to bleed the Wehrmacht far more and they are far going to run out of steam a long way further West.

 

[AT0N]

Basically, the Germans are stopped at Dnieper and the Red Army takes Berlin around 1943.

 

[Thoresby]

Basically, the Germans are stopped at Dnieper and the Red Army takes Berlin around 1943.

That is highly doubtful imho. A better Red Army can slow down the Wehrmacht and force them to hit their logistics buffer much sooner actually going on the offence never mind reaching Berlin will be a lot more than that. Bluntly without a second front with WAllied ground troops fighting on mainland Europe and making the Germans fight on two fronts I can't see the Red Army being able to meaningfully advance, though Stalingrad like counterattacks against overextend German are an option from 1941 of course, see the OTL battle of Moscow.

 

[Cudymcar]

Red Army not purged while everybody else is? It doesn't work like this. You need a TL where there is no Great Purge at all.

 

[gallen95]

Would the Non-Purged army perform better in Poland and Finland? Would this cause Barbarossa to be planned differently? If so what? (such as a fall halt and dig in before winter?

 

[bpbruce]

Barbarossa might fail badly enough to scare Hitler. A scared Hitler might tell the German General Staff to do fake retreats to entrap the Red Army instead of telling them to die holding their ground. Worked for Ludendorff at Tannenberg and against the German communists. A scared Hitler might even start using captured cheka and political commissars to lead local troops against the Soviets, maybe parachuting them in well behind the front- I don't know what battlefield effectiveness this would have, but getting the cheka and Party even more paranoid might win the war right there. Ludendorff's memoirs express gratitude to the Jews who helped him to help loot Poland of food. If Hitler used the Jews of Eastern Europe and Russia similarly (yes, still planning to kill them all), he might have got more loot.

 

[AT0N]

That is highly doubtful imho. A better Red Army can slow down the Wehrmacht and force them to hit their logistics buffer much sooner actually going on the offence never mind reaching Berlin will be a lot more than that. Bluntly without a second front with WAllied ground troops fighting on mainland Europe and making the Germans fight on two fronts I can't see the Red Army being able to meaningfully advance, though Stalingrad like counterattacks against overextend German are an option from 1941 of course, see the OTL battle of Moscow.

Actually, I think that the Lend-lease was much more importnant than the Second Front against the Germany (which was opened only in summer 1944, during the Bagrathion). But without the Second Front Germans may theoretically defend their borders and turn the War into a stalemate. An officer anti-Hitler coup in such situation may make it possible for a conditional surrender for Germany, keeping her 1914 or Weiamer Eastern borders.

A scared Hitler might even start using captured cheka and political commissars to lead local troops against the Soviets, maybe parachuting them in well behind the front

Like, Hitler was lunatic in many ways but not THAT far. Really, why such crazy stereotypes about the Soviet Army and the NKVD are still alive among Western history buffs? Man, the treatment of the returned PoWs in Soviet Army was so severe and defined by paranoia that such scheme has less than zero chances to work (puting aside that it is by itself sounds ASB).

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

A non purged Russian Army will "walk over" Finland, changing Hitler's opinion on Soviet incompetency, causing a delay in Barbarossa until Great Britain is defeated.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

A non purged Russian Army will "walk over" Finland, changing Hitler's opinion on Soviet incompetency, causing a delay in Barbarossa until Great Britain is defeated.

That leaves Germany in an interesting position, where in essence the army has nothing do to but face off against two potentially dangerous opponents. They can't take part in major operations while building up amphibious capability, nor can they risk weakening the defence of the eastern border while doing so.
In such circumstances, Barbarossa still looks the better first option, since Germany understands land wars and can act now. Also, knocking out Soviet Russia isolates Britain, which might force a peace (even if more of a stalemate) and also aligns with Destiny, Inherest Superiority and all that nonsense.
Meanwhile a more powerful soviet army demands a response where the principal choices are Maginot Line Ost or Barbarossa.
In the West the options are essentially some combination of S**lion, Battle of Britain and UBoat warfare.

 

[Thoresby]

Actually, I think that the Lend-lease was much more importnant than the Second Front against the Germany (which was opened only in summer 1944, during the Bagrathion). But without the Second Front Germans may theoretically defend their borders and turn the War into a stalemate. An officer anti-Hitler coup in such situation may make it possible for a conditional surrender for Germany, keeping her 1914 or Weiamer Eastern borders.

The second front was opened with the invasion of Italy in 1943 though in logistics terms the German effort in North Africa in 1942 was equivalent to an Army Group in the East. Lend Lease was enormously important to the Red Army, they certainly aren't doing Bagration without American trucks and radios but it's important not to confuse the number of men Germany has fighting in the East with overall "effort". The Heer in the West was much more heavily equipped than in the East, look at the proportion of the German Army in Normandy that was Panzer or Panzer grenadier divisions and it's no coincidence that the Red Army was able to launch major armoured offensives after the Combined Bomber Offensive has forced the diversion of most large calibre cannon production and ammunition production to the Defence of the Reich. Basically a better Red Army accelerates Germany's defeat but the bulk of the work in OTL and any plausible ATL was done by the WAllies and that means waiting until they've sorted themselves out and America has mobilised.

 

[RedSword12]

People overrate the Red Army's innovative leaders like Tukhachevsky. As Robert Citino points out, there was nowhere near as much dialogue on practical aspects amongst the Red Army officers about how to actually turn theory into something workable, not nearly as much as there was in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht. I don't see the Red Army being much better on the tactical level; it still would suffer from inexperience and a lacking in practical knowhow in modern warfare.

 

[Thoresby]

People overrate the Red Army's innovative leaders like Tukhachevsky. As Robert Citino points out, there was nowhere near as much dialogue on practical aspects amongst the Red Army officers about how to actually turn theory into something workable, not nearly as much as there was in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht. I don't see the Red Army being much better on the tactical level; it still would suffer from inexperience and a lacking in practical knowhow in modern warfare.

I think it's hard to imagine that without the mass death and disruption to training cycles that the purges brought the average competence of field grade officers wouldn't be meaningfully higher. However I obviously agree that the lack of real world experience of putting theory in practice would seriously disadvantage the Red Army and furthermore the Red Army's mechanisms for incorporating battlefield experience into doctrine and then disseminating that across the force were much less sophisticated than the Wehrmacht's so any lessons learned from an alt Winter War probably won't be incorporated into the Western Group of Forces by summer 1941.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

A training system not plagued by the purges would have been the biggest potential change. It disrupted the progression of training from individual skills, to sub-unit drills, to unit and formation level manuevers over the intervening years. If the Soviets can enter 1941 with divisions that can actually fight as divisions, then they have a helluva lot more potential to win even compared to OTL. As it was, a lot of the Soviet formations in 1941 weren't even fit to conduct extended road marches or peacetime unit level maneuvers, let alone formation-level combined arms warfare against veteran troops.

Bluntly without a second front with WAllied ground troops fighting on mainland Europe and making the Germans fight on two fronts I can't see the Red Army being able to meaningfully advance,

So do you not count the Soviet's clearing out the Germans of Russia proper and then advancing across the length of Ukraine from mid-1943 to mid-1944 to be a "meaningful advance" or something?

The second front was opened with the invasion of Italy in 1943

So after the Soviets had already beaten the Germans at Kursk and were surging across Eastern Ukraine? Or are we talking the Sicilian landing, which by convincing Hitler to call off Citadel, helped reduce the success of the subsequent Soviet counter-stroke by putting German panzer reserves in a good place to slow it?

The Heer in the West was much more heavily equipped than in the East, look at the proportion of the German Army in Normandy that was Panzer or Panzer grenadier divisions

What rubbish. The number of panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions in mid-1944 was about 2/3rds the number of that in the East. In raw numbers of armored vehicles, the quantity was around half. And almost all armored vehicle replacements during the summer of 1944 went east, not west.

Lend Lease was enormously important to the Red Army, they certainly aren't doing Bagration without American trucks and radios but it's important not to confuse the number of men Germany has fighting in the East with overall "effort".

Germans which are stopped further west do much less damage to Soviet industry, reducing the importance of lend-lease and leaving the Soviets with massively greater deluges of material superiority that much sooner, as factories, mines, and farms which were destroyed OTL can instead contribute to the war industry and do so much more quickly than lend-lease made it's contribution to boot.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

Basically, the Germans are stopped at Dnieper and the Red Army takes Berlin around 1943.

Nah. Mid 1944 at the soonest.

 

[Undwin the Saxon]

It could be argued that without the purges, the Red army would have done worse. A lot of officers were older and stuck in the WW1 mentality and hadn't or couldn't adapt to the new war of movement. The US and UK retired a good number of older officers, with newer, younger officers that had new ideas. Of course the retirement plan was vastly different.

 

[pattersonautobody]

I actually have a contrarian view. A non-purged Red Army likely still gets beat at the frontier by the battle-tested Wermacht and this creates the real possibility of a coup against Stalin. I honestly think that the purges cowed Soviet society so that Stalin did not get offed, which prevented a general surrender. IOTL Stalin thought he was going to get couped at the beginning of Barbarossa. His instincts were right. If it were not for the purge, this is pretty much guarenteed which means Germany wins.

 

[Janprimus]

OTOH a non purged Red Army will complicate things for the German regime. As a strategic threat, that's not much different from the view in 1914. OTOH ideologically this German Regime will need to confront the Red Army. Still a stronger Soviet Union may give Molotov-Ribbentrop a bit longer. Eventually, unless they manage to end the war in the West sooner, I still see the Soviets being victorious, even when it is in 1946.

 

[Count of Crisco]

The Soviets would still be facing a battle hardened, battle experienced, and by this point army confident in itself and their superiority. However the Germans would be facing several very steep disadvantages as well.

1)The Red army is not entirely inexperienced due to fighting in Finland.
2)The professional corps and senior leadership of the Red army is intact.
3)Local commanders will likely, aside from being much more experienced and qualified, be far more willing to make guesses and take chances.
4)Command and control will be better established and the relationships of officers at all levels with eachother less formal, rigid, and terrified.
5)The massive quantative advantages of the Soviet army and air forces at all levels is still present, and the men behind the machines and uniforms are far better able to do their jobs.

 

[Crueldwarf]

People consistently over-estimate the effect that Great Purge had on the RKKA capabilities.

Firstly, pre-Purge Red Army wasn't some sort of pinnacle of military innovation and expertise in any possible metric. Yes, Purge hit some of the senior officers who were probably pretty good and their death or dismissal was definitely a great loss to the army (note that Tukhachevsky was most likely not the one of them, dude was way overrated and his reputation is more or less a martyr effect). But number of such people was limited because neither pre-Purge Red Army career advancement was based on merit much, nor the Purges were targeted on the basis of merit. Skill-wise post-Purge Red Army was about the same as it was before it because Purges were either essentially random or they were executed on the grounds entirely removed from anyone's perceived or real military competence.

To put it simply: a military genius had about the same chances to die (or to survive) the Great Purge as an incompetent moron.

Secondly, the scale of the Purge is actually dwarfed by the thing that was way more important to the Red Army performance: military expansion of the 39 to 41 where standing army size was expanded by almost a factor of four and then it was made even worse when war mobilization happened. Purge costed the Red Army about twenty thousand commanders of various ranks executed, arrested and dismissed from service. By the summer of 1941 (before mobilization kicked in) Red Army had about one hundred thousand unfilled commander billets (note that Red Army and then Soviet army had noticeably higher Officer to Enlisted ratio than the most of the Western armies due to lack of professional NCO corps, so a lot of positions that were filled by senior NCOs in other militaries were officer positions in the Red Army).

Thirdly, the most noticeable effect of the Great Purge on the Red Army was disruption of the training process in the military academies which definitely didn't help with a previous problem. But here Red Army break-neck expansion tempo rises its ugly head again. Officer training was already expanded and shortened before the Purge even started. Number of cadets going through a training pipeline increased by a factor of four during the Purge period and by the 1941 Soviets were attempting to train ten times more officers a year in comparison with 1935 starting point (~3500 thousand cadets in 1936 versus 35 thousand cadets in 1940). Yeah, Purge definitely worsened the situation further here but it didn't change the simple fact that by the sheer necessity almost half of the Red Army officers were product of the expedite 3-month lieutenant crash courses even before the war started.

So the answer to the question: Purge barely effects the Red Army performance in 1941 which was mostly dependent on the entirely different set of factors behind it.