No De-Stalinization: Effects in the Warsaw Pact?

[Vinization]

Suppose that the USSR, rather than exposing and condemning Stalin's monstrous deeds wholesale, instead only undoes the worst parts of the terror (shutting down the gulags, for example) and shifts most of the blame to someone else (such as Beria) while the late dictator gets the Mao treatment (the "60% good and 40% bad" thing).

Does this affect the politics of the Warsaw Pact regimes in any way, and if so, how? For example, can Mátyás Rákosi (Hungary's mini-Stalin) hold on to power? What about Poland and Czechoslovakia, two Soviet satellites that also experienced significant upheaval (Polish October and the Prague Spring, respectively)?

 

[RousseauX]

Suppose that the USSR, rather than exposing and condemning Stalin's monstrous deeds wholesale, instead only undoes the worst parts of the terror (shutting down the gulags, for example) and shifts most of the blame to someone else (such as Beria) while the late dictator gets the Mao treatment (the "60% good and 40% bad" thing).

Does this affect the politics of the Warsaw Pact regimes in any way, and if so, how? For example, can Mátyás Rákosi (Hungary's mini-Stalin) hold on to power? What about Poland and Czechoslovakia, two Soviet satellites that also experienced significant upheaval (Polish October and the Prague Spring, respectively)?

It's actually 70%-30% good/bad comrade!

 

[Cregan]

No De-Stalinisation could delay, or even prevent, the Sino-Soviet Split. If it does happen it will certainly be less acrimonious. This has significant effects on the worldwide Communist movement and Third World politics.

 

[trainvoi]

Without a Sino-Soviet split, you could see China being somewhat industrialized by 1980s, although development might stagnate after the point. No Sino-Soviet split meant that 1972 Sino-American detente might never come into existence, so the Republic of China might still hold the permanent member seat. Also, Pol Pot would be dead in 1978-1979 instead of living until the 1980s.