Look to the West Volume IX: The Electric Circus

OTL Indian logos and heraldry which use elephant heads which are supposed to be Indian elephants, but the ears always look too big and African to me, and this was the least African-looking one I could find :p
Hmm. Might be a Liberian state flag case, where the digitizer takes some liberties.

I personally would have hoped for something like the Turkmenistan or Belarus flags, a stripe of traditional fabric/carpet patterns down the side. In a world where no one found Ashoka's columns India probably would have put the spinning wheel on its flag as Gandhi wanted.
 
Over the last two years I've speculated a lot on Societism, and part of the reason I came back every week to do it was because the various topics LTTW juggles were often a guide for what I wanted to read about next, and I would often learn something new (starting from a base of not knowing very much) that greatly affected my previous ideas and assumptions.

The concept of an ideology's specific neuroses defining the character of its opposition is the most interesting part of the whole thing, but rather than the intended positive feedback of Societism and nationalism pushing each to greater extremes, in the current situation the sources of Societist or nationalist strength are unclear, and the conflict between them is either one-sided or even... no-sided, or nonpolitical.
1) The in-universe justifications of secrecy, destruction of records, barriers to international historical research, and the fact that the Combine gets better results against its most powerful enemies through conquest than proselytism have led to Societism looking more like a military than a political phenomenon. I will admit that there's a big exception, the portrayal of Societism's success in the UPSA itself-- that process already says a lot of what I'm about to say. My issue is that this precedent is not referred to in the portrayal of Societist success elsewhere. It sometimes still involves political mobilization, especially in those territories where nationalism has already manifested and discredited itself. The Spanish, Carolinian, and Yapontsi cases all share the trait that nationalism, specifically intended for mass mobilization, has not produced anything strong enough to end the threat of annexation or further degradation hanging over them. This unfulfilled feeling, rather than rescuing them, only makes them more fruitlessly unhappy with what their failure has made inevitable, and encourages their masters to give up on integrating them (look, even they think they're "different") and keep them in second class status. The elements of society that succeed despite all this may be tarred as collaborators, and if this claim is actually correct (it probably is in Yapon) they may fear being sacrificed on the altar of change. There is no better OTL example than the Palestinians, bestowed with the most agonizing nationalism in the world by their unstoppable opposition and unreliable leadership. Where OTL disappointed nationalists have turned to Islamism in Timeline L they turn to a different Black Flag, but with the same nihilistic mood in which there are no end of strategies for destroying the current order but only a few hackneyed slogans to describe what will replace it (likely it will only be a more brutal and idiosyncratic riff on the status quo). So I like these cases, but in many others the expansion of Societism is only the filling of a vacuum (Indonesia, Central Africa, and possibly Guntoor)-- a military as well as a political vacuum, most of these small and premodern states probably didn't have a "politics" beyond the affairs of court, tribe, and foreign hegemony's local representation. And at worst we have the Cuban case, a purely military endeavor left to special forces and assassinations, an anti-politics focused on blasting the existing polity to bits, creating a vacuum where one was not provided and then doing the usual thing.
2) A constitution introduced in a land governed by a mess of compacts instead of a uniform law can seem at first more like a threat to liberty than a guarantee of it. The constitution threatens to privatize lands held in common, to give the state's appointees a monopoly on justice, to hand over local governance to unfamiliar procedures that insiders can manipulate at the expense of the uninformed, to create inescapable and unaccountable systems of policing and taxation and recruitment, to destroy the foundation of local societies like the burgh or the Cossack host or the Aragonese fuero. Of course, the response to all of these is that industrialization, or the underdevelopment resulting from lack of industrialization relative to neighbors, will soon corrode all of these things anyways-- a new form of allegiance must be invented, supersede older forms, and serve as a basis for necessary changes to make the overall ride smoother. That new form could be nationalism, which might as OTL draw strength from industrialization as well as the lack of it. Nationalism might emphasize a region's underdevelopment and need to catch up, or seek to protect an overdeveloped region (Catalonia, Bohemia, Croatia) from grasping hands; in all cases it will benefit from growing literacy, the development of mass media, etc. But while nationalism in Timeline L still makes sense as a response to economic circumstances, it is less able to portray itself as a solution to economic or social problems, as the basis of a universal coalition, as an all-encompassing force of liberty and progress. Jacobin France compares very poorly on any metric to the restored Kingdom, and the Popular Wars' Jacobin Germany and Marleburgensian Britain are further warnings against seeing the nationalist road as the only one. The German Kulturkampf, an aggressive imposition of nationalism from above, has been brought down by a regionalist revolt. Populist Britain's efforts to remain Imperial subordinated it to the only true Empire in the room, and that Empire's rising nationalism ruined the social compact that held its component parts together. The more romantic nationalisms of OTL-- Poland, Italy, Norway, Greece, the rest of the Balkans, the Habsburg nationalities-- have all been forestalled by a more harmonious accommodation with the empires and dynasties that be, right down to Italian unification being accomplished by a pure elite pact sealed by marriage. Siam is not "Thai"land and the Great Feng have no need for "Zhongguo" as a name for the nation independent of the dynasty, since the dynasty is doing so well-- both Asian powers affirm the dynastic/civilizational over the national principle. Bengal's purchasing of its own freedom is legendary. British Regressivists seem to have been vindicated by events-- the well-off are those who found their way to a more perfect version of what they had before, while the innovators suffer their Great Jihads. But in such a situation it's unclear what the Societists are even harping on about. Of course the Pandoric War is what they're harping about, that and Tsar Pasha's Wars and all the other things that are building a more nationalist world out of the previous one. But this is an uneven development, so in some places a Societist politics may still have no strong local nationalism to dance with.

This weakness of nationalism (at least, in the places that haven't become warzones, like Poland with its "House of Ojczyzna"), however, implies the continued strength of those political actors who never had any interest in nationalism to begin with, elements that in Timeline L might have a vigorous ongoing conflict with the new nationalist species instead of having it drive their worldview to extinction. Archbishop Ramirez's numbered list of tribe-city-nation-Combine of course leaves out the majority rural population of any preindustrial society, but maybe "tribe" and "city" are enough to metonymically describe two versions of non-nationalist governance and allegiance-- the former consisting of compacts among agricultural communities with "state" authority only involving a warchief's powers of command over certain hybrid working/learning/fighting units (the Zulu age-grades for example), and the latter involving a "state," a great tent anchored into the ground by cities and smaller towns of absentee landlords, financiers, premodern manufacturers, and military garrisons focused on a more thorough exploitation of the rural economy (and higher standard of living for themselves) than the "tribe" aspires to. The specific forms of allegiance of a "tribe" or "city" represent real and existing (not just hypothetical pie-in-sky Final Society) sources of opposition to political actors promoting the ideal of a "nation". In many places (Northern Nigeria, Malaya, the Indian princely states, Egypt, Iraq) the aspiration of colonial governance was to keep "tribe" and "city" intact, to preserve the premodern character of a society and its leadership, and place the foreign element as a layer over that. The ingrown and exclusionary parliamentarism of Egypt and Iraq was a very successful assertion of "city" interests. The king of Egypt was an Albanian and the king of Iraq a Hejazi, and among the nobility of both there were Mamluks and Circassians and so on-- but what did it matter, they were all on the same team, part of the same club, and the job of "national" leadership was only the management of intra-club jealousies and commanding the troops that kept the outsiders out, which is why trusted shipwrights could effortlessly become prime minister over and over, defining whole eras by their single-minded pursuit of nothing in particular. Above all government must be non-ideological-- it must stand for the general welfare and moral development of course, but those educated, mercantile, or well-armed enough to be susceptible to more dangerous fancies must be screened carefully, admitted into the club only if they will come to identify with it and perpetuate it. Nationalism, whether doradist or cobrist, is a new idea and can only be accepted if it can be made safe. It took the ultimate show of incompetence, the 1948 war against Israel, for the perennial charge of "incompetence" to finally make the club no longer worth joining. And now looking at the character of the UPSA reveals something very important-- because this polity, the guiding light of republicanism, assembled the Hermandad in the interests of its own "city", Buenos Aires and Cordoba, and those of its subject oligarchies-- the fact that those governments could be kingdoms inherited from New Spain only reinforced oligarchy, relying minimally on the new concept of mass mobilization and maximally on (modern forms of) the timeless principle of "[selective access to] might [and wealth] makes right", as the central principle. It could be argued that within the Hermandad there was never any "nation" at all, as there was not even any counterpart to the Supremacist phenomenon of mass mobilization that transformed what was once a very similar oligarchy in in Septentria. In fact, the UPSA version of that probably would have been Monterroso's cobrist nationalism, if he was blessed enough to wage a civil war instead of a world war.

Whether this leads to a sheepish "Leninist" acknowledgement that the backwardness of the UPSA might have let it leapfrog over a developmental stage that soon would have gone sour (or if one prefers, a simultaneous Third and Final Revolution), or a more "Maoist" enthusiasm for backwardness as containing greater potential for precocious development than previously assumed, I think we have a coherent picture of the likely social basis of any Societist Party. They have been portrayed so far as more prosperous and eccentric than the average, but these mavericks should only be the public face of a larger constituency, one aware of its oligarchic nature but professing greater potential in its own capacity for evolution than in that of the looming nationalist replacement. (Which does beg the question of what makes the users of a nationalist strategy so potentially disastrous as rulers. Aside from nationalism itself being a bad strategy, its users might be thought to have a defective temperament, which the Combine prevents by inculcating virtue, temperance, confloct resolution skills, etc. through the UniChurch and other institutions.) The places where the heralds of the Third Society attack in hopes of introducing their own methods-- up high the monarchy and aristocracy; down low the traditional guilds, religious orders, secret or public fraternities, hereditary castes, and other institutions that define the common person as the inhabitant of a particular niche and not as a citizen owing primary loyalty to the nation, legally identical to and interchangeable with all other citizens-- are what the "Final Society, by way of the First and Second" must defend conditionally and then redefine into a more perfect form. (All those premodern forms of association might get in the way of Combine totalitarianism, but most Rejes will probably recognize the usefulness of non-national forms of diversity in managing their populations.) The antiquarian inclinations of Societism shouldn't just be a quirky result of Sanchez's academic interests, but an integral link in the causal chain that leads to the promised result.

Taking the OTL 1800s Spanish example, between the modernizing Spanish liberal nationalism that cannot stand regional autonomy and the modernizing Catalan nationalism radicalized into the exact opposite attitude, the proto-Societist sympathy must lie with the Carlist revolt of the Basques, who stood for premodern autonomy within "Spain as usual" and for an end to Madrid's attempts to profit on their robust local manufacturing and trade with the outside world. And while the Zones will of course suffer totalitarian caprice that makes taxes seem mild, the basic idea that patrician elites secure in their stations can build and honor a tradition of mutual respect, where more uncompromising nationalisms promoted by insecure, grasping, tradition-less parvenus would lead to war might lend some substance to their moralism (instead of "killing bad [but we do it until there's no one left, just like our enemies]" its "here's why we stand a chance of stopping killing forever, without having to kill everyone [although we will crack millions of eggs]") and will have pretty wide currency in Timeline L Spain and beyond. England and Scotland put an end to war through a patrician social pact-- no need for referendums or popular nationalism, that can be accomplished after the fact of Union-- and the self-serving nationalists, who in another world would be "bourgeois" as well, have ended that tradition. Danubia, while more democratic in method, upholds the primacy of a cosmopolitan and refined multinational elite over those who are closer to, and more partial to, their native soil; the more cosmopolitan are safer from dangerous thoughts, while the less cosmopolitan are the fifth column, the inherent potential for ruin, against which true Danubians must be vigilant. Asked why his government is so perfect, a Combine Human(tm) might describe his land as a more perfect Britain-- out of its innumerable Englands and Scotlands it has developed a single elite capable of performing countless Highland Clearances without a flinch.

And then I might as well mention the case that specifically got me thinking about this-- the various historical losers of decolonization who found themselves on the side of the colonialists, or at least against the victorious faction of anti-colonialists. The king of Buganda, faced with the transformation of the hands-off British protectorate over his and other kingdoms into a very hands-on republic, had no choice but to become the face of regionalist, traditionalist hostility to the republic and to the other kingdoms; South Asian Anglophiles feared that no independent state could possibly be multiethnic, multiconfessional, democratic, and economically vigorous all at once-- and recommended waiting "until we are ready". These tendencies and many others choked and died in isolation, but what if they had another option-- to become Societist, and draw on the resources and insights of an international movement? What if, during Bisnagan decolonization, a time in which Diversitarianism hasn't yet assumed its stable 1980s form and might still be wild and unreasonable, a Viennese style Grey Societist movement emerges to promote the Danubian model as a surer basis for multiethnic federation than what the Diversitarians are pushing? And within that, what if an extremist faction believes the solution for Bisnaga is not decolonization, but recolonization-- to join the waiting arms of the Combine? The obvious response is "you're insane, look at all these Alkahest shells and nukes they lob carelessly and tell me which one is the 'last throw'"-- but a compelling response might well be "If we join them, they won't nuke us, now will they?" Or take Siam-- already threatened by the Combine, but have much more to lose from a botched attempt at Diversitarianism than, say, China does. Can't be falling too far behind China now, and doing so in an attempt to imitate them would be insult on injury-- is non-nationalism the nationalist's choice? If a multiethnic state (so much of this world, definitely over half of the eastern hemisphere, consists of multiethnic states vulnerable to runaway nationalism-- Guinea, Matetwa, Persia, Belgium...) were to really begin falling apart, would some decisive segment of state or society prefer rebuilding the edifice under Combine supervision to letting it fall apart completely (and perhaps permanently)? How would a protracted, personal, divisive presidential campaign between a Societist and a nationalist go-- and what if it was the first election in a newly independent state? I suppose they'll do it like the Reds and Whites did the Socialist Revolutionaries-- whichever side steals more of the Mentian program and still manages to come off as sincere probably beats the side that steals less or rejects the whole bill, and goes on to implement what it really believes in. If Georges Boulanger could cavort with monarchists of every stripe, and get the socialist vote anyways because given the chance to use military force against striking workers he didn't do it on one occasion...

Fears of non-conventional and nuclear war, plans for harmony that sound like pure insanity-- Societism and nationalism may draw on similar trends everywhere but in each contest they should address these issues in a way that makes sense to the local battlefield of opinion, drawing on the unique genealogies that produced a "Societist party" and a "nationalist party" out of whatever tendencies existed before (French ultramontanism, Indian pantheism, "Tonkinese" Confucianism, etc). I think that's the only way we get Societists and nationalists to goad each other onwards, rather than two philosophies hiding behind their respective nuclear umbrellas and making fun of each other's books.
 
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301

Thande

Donor
Part #301: Can I Be Electric Too?

“NEW SCIENCE CARTS! AUTHORISED IMPORTS!

PROF CHEN MEILING (CHINA) – ‘THE SILICIUM LIMIT – WHITHER YPOLOGETICS?’ (2007)
DX BEATRICE BRISTOW (ENGLAND) – ‘MANY FUTURES, MANY PASTS – THE POLY-STREAM HYPOTHESIS’ (2018 NEW!)
DR VLADIMIR NIKOLAYEV (RUSSIA) – ‘LIFE ON MARS, THE ULTIMATE QUESTION’ (2010)

Fully authorised with Ministry seal of quality! All-American voice dubbing!

Compatible with Stimmetz AND Imperial Standard cart players!

Prices start at just Ī14.9.9! Contact Pottermack Imports on Motext page 22A-551!”

– Advertising poster outside Chamberlain Hall lecture theatre, Fredericksburg, ENA.
Photographed and transcribed by Dr David Wostyn, October 2020​

*

(Dr Wostyn’s note)

This was one of the first lectures we observed and recorded – discreetly, as it’s not technically allowed, but fortunately their detectors aren’t looking for small solid-state electronics like our recorder. They probably wouldn’t have noticed anyway, what with Captain Nuttall providing a nice distraction by CONSTANTLY FIDGETING THROUGHOUT

(coughs)

Anyway, although this was a public lecture, we understand that Prof George Greening, the lecturer, essentially just put on the first of an existing academic lecture series he gives at Imperial College, with a few tweaks. Not the best pedagogic practice for a general audience, but for our purposes, it does pitch it at a more usefully higher level than some of the other lectures we’ve recorded...

*

Recorded lecture on “The Second Interbellum: The Electric Circus” by Professor George Greening, recorded October 10th, 2020—

The period of almost 30 years, separating the Black Twenties from the Sunrise War, goes by many names. In France it is Les Trente Glorieuses, while in Russia it is Epokha Leta, the Age of Summer. To us in the English-speaking world, it bears the appellation awarded to it by the Californian author Elspeth Kennedy, at the time, rather than in hindsight: The Electric Circus.

All of these names have something in common. Like ‘The Black Twenties’ before them, they betray the fact that they were coined in the spirit of a more popular age. Some have dubbed the 20th century ‘The People’s Century’, and these choices of names reflect this. Not so the anodyne, stuffy names of past conflicts and periods of peace, chosen by kings, bishops, historians. Reflective of this same popular spirit, it was at this time that historiographers frequently reinterpreted their labelling of past eras from a less elitist perspective.e

Though the Diversitarian idea would continue to develop through this age, it was early on that the eighteenth century in particular would see considerable such re-examination. The American politician and historian, George Spencer-Churchill the Younger, would re-examine the past conflicts of that century – along with others of similar mind – though the ‘Central Character’ interpretation of history itself would see similar criticism, it has proved far more resilient!

Rather than elitist labels such as ‘the War of the Spanish Succession’, ‘the War of the Austrian Succession’ or ‘the War of the Diplomatic Revolution’,[1] Churchill and his fellow neo-whigs would rename these conflicts by the more global, ideological names they are more frequently known by today – the First, Second and Third Wars of Supremacy. Churchill argued that the real import of these wars had not been the issues which had dominated their casus belli or eventual peace treaty at the time – the occupancy of a throne or ownership of a few scraps of land in Europe – but rather the seeming sideshow of those wars’ global, colonial theatres. It mattered very little for the long-term future of the nations of the human race who owned Silesia in 1759, say, a small bit of land that would change hands several more times over the ensuing centuries. Rather, the true significance was over vast swathes of land, resources and people signed over in India, Africa, or – especially – the Novamund, often almost as an afterthought at those treaties.

No matter how powerful a united Germany (for instance) might become, in terms of global cultural dominance she would forever be playing catch-up to the civilisations that spoke English or Spanish, which had expanded to fill entire continents. It mattered not that Britain/England suffered decline through the 19th century while France became arguably the world’s premier power for a time. The continuing relevance of the French language and culture in our own time, almost a century on from the end of the Black Twenties, owes far more to the founding of the enduring Pérousie colony long before that than to any transient temporal power that France wielded at that time. It is almost irrelevant that Pérousie would come into conflict with her mother country; France still benefited from her language and culture planted on the far side of the world. Such is the thesis of the Churchillians.

Of course, by mentioning the Pérousien Troubles, we implicitly highlight an issue with the labels we know the ‘Electric Circus’ period by. Most popular culture remembers the 1930s and 1940s as a time of unsurpassed peace, prosperity and development, with the 1950s dampened only by the distant drums of the coming war. But as far as the governments and ruling elites of the European (and American) nations were concerned, the 1930s-50s were a far more mixed bag than the positive names appended to them imply. Yet it is that self-same popular spirit of the age which lies at the heart of this apparent paradox. In nations as varied as Scandinavia and China, from Guinea to Bisnaga, ordinary people were standing up to demand a greater say in the governance of their lands. The Black Twenties had seen a mobilisation of society on all levels. While the Pandoric War had affected civilians far from the front lines like no war before it, the Black Twenties had been fought as much against the plague as against any human enemy. Indeed, it is significant that there is no widely accepted overarching ‘war’ label for the Black Twenties (as opposed to particular theatres or component conflicts). Again, this is a sign of the impact of the popular spirit on historiography.

Regardless, the peoples of many nations had been tested to the limit by the harrowing challenges of the 1920s. In military victory and defeat alike – the two frequently barely distinguishable – they had been weighed in the balance, and not found wanting. Now, they were unwilling to be neatly folded back into their antebellum box. Not only the male front-line veterans, but the young women who had volunteered as nurses in plague hospitals or as agricultural labourers and factory workers. Many of this group lacked voting rights, depending on the country. Frequently contrasted with their parents of the ‘Flippant’ generation, these young people would demand the right to have their fair share of influence over the leadership of those same nations that had called on them to fight, to care, to make, to harvest.

What these people (and indeed their older relatives) were frequently concerned with was their own standard of living and their economic opportunities. By any measure, the 1930s-50s were a golden age of improvement in these factors. They compared favourably even to the Long Peace, whose prosperity had frequently only trickled down so far in society. Such things had seemed unimportant in the eyes of many bourgeois commentators at the time, who might scarcely view their servants or employees as people. But the world was changing.

The point is that the 1930s-50s were frequently becoming defined by the wider populations living through them, and not merely by the formerly dominant elite commentators. As such, the fact that this age saw violent colonial wars and the ever-growing threat of Societism was ignored. The people, it transpired, rarely cared if their nation’s flag was being burnt by rebels in a far-off colony of which they knew little; rather, they cared more if their taxes were hiked to pay for a punitive expedition to put the revolt down. A minority even sympathised with rebel colonists or subject peoples fighting for their freedom. After all, the propaganda of the Black Twenties, that the nations were fighting for freedom, could not be quietly ignored and forgotten after the conflict was over. So what if wealthy businessmen lost money on their colonial investments? To the average subject – the average voter - colonies were increasingly seen as a sink, not a source, of money.

And as the period went on, they voted with their feet.

This is not to say that the ‘Electric Circus’ age was dominated by serious, humourless politics – far from it! However, even the higher standard of living that came to much of the world was manifested in more ideological youth movements than the Flippants of the last generation. Perhaps inevitably, the global trauma of the Black Twenties defined a cutoff point of history, and two opposing youth subculture factions formed in response. The exact names and attributes of these two naturally varied greatly from nation to nation, but they were present almost everywhere in some form.

Such universality might have pleased the ghost of Pablo Sanchez, at least until someone told him that the one place which saw no such groups was, inevitably, the lands under Combine rule. Even in the latter days of Alfarus, before the Silent Revolution, such a public disagreement over a fundamental issue would be unacceptable under the black flag – even if it paradoxically meant trying to strike down an apparent ‘human universal’ that could have slotted neatly into the thesis of Unity Through Society!

As I said, the two groups were known by many names. In the Empire and much of the English-speaking world, they came to be known as the Archies and Wreckies – short for Archaeophiles and Wreckers. Elsewhere, the local versions of the Archies might be known by names such as the Trads or the Nostalgics, and the Wreckies might be known as the Futurites or the Neophiles, but the principle was the same regardless.

The Black Twenties had shattered many comfortable assumptions about the world. The Archies sought to respond to this by looking into the past and embracing fashions, ideas, languages of past eras. The Wreckies, by contrast, thought that the Black Twenties were a signal to turn their back on all that had gone before. In its most harmless form, this might consist of wearing futuristic, utilitarian ‘rational dress’, fighting for greater Cytherean rights, and enthusiasm for the new rocket technology in peaceful forms. At its worst, some extremist Wreckies would attempt to burn down art galleries or libraries so that ‘the new is not strangled by the old’.

In many countries, commentators attempted to connect the Wreckies with Societism, but this was usually a coincidence. Ironically, one could argue that the K.a.K. in the wake of Alfarus’ death was itself an expression of the (suppressed) Wrecky ideology manifesting itself in Combine lands. Generally, however, the two rival groups were more purely aesthetic and less political than they are often portrayed. Even the Archies, no matter their backward-looking rhetoric, usually supported greater voting rights and new technology, at least in a qualified manner.

So much for the generational discourse and geopolitical contest of this era.[2] But we have yet to discuss that phenomenon which gave the age its Anglophone name – the ‘Electric Circus’. It would be a poor summary which did not discuss the nominative factor!

Electricity had been known of since antiquity, of course, to some extent. Our name for the phenomenon stems from the ancient Greek word elektron, meaning amber – for the Greeks’ first observation of electric charge took the form of noting that an amber rod, rubbed on a wool cloth, would ‘magically’ attract small, light objects such as fragments of paper.[3] At the same time, the Chinese were inventing the compass, observing that a special ‘lodestone’ always pointed north – another piece of the puzzle. Named ‘magnetism’ after the region of Magnesia in Greece where lodestone could be found, this effect proved useful to generations of explorers, yet philosophers and proto-scientists struggled to explain it. Knowing that compasses could be thrown off by the presence of large amount of nearby iron (or iron ore), some mediaeval Europeans speculated that they their needles were pointing towards a giant iron magnetic mountain on an Arctic island![4] Few would have dreamed that this useful, but mysterious, bit of practical magic could have any connection with the amber rod party trick.

The eighteenth century saw a new interest in electricity, both classical and, eventually, channel. The famous kite experiments performed by both Ben Franklin and Abbé Nollet – we will skip over the obligatory debate over who came first! – showed that lightning is a natural form of channel electricity.[5] Henry Cavendish similarly proved that animals such as the torpedo fish and electric eel can naturally generate channel electricity, paving the way for the understanding that electric charge plays a key role in our own nervous systems. Basic charge-store devices like the Leyden Jar puzzled great minds throughout the century, and Franklin’s study of them was responsible for the victory of the monist over the dualist model of charge.[6]

It would not be until later in the 19th century that electricity and magnetism would finally be recognised as two manifestations of the same phenomenon. Always together, never apart. A moving electrical charge must come with a magnetic field, like a shadow cast at ninety degrees into a different world; a world we cannot see, yet dimly perceive by how it impacts ours. This pairing became clear only when channel electricity became readily usable for experimentation for the first time. In the 1820s, Buysse and Luns developed the first electrochemical array, later known as a battery, and this source of power would ultimately make Lectel possible.[7] It would not be for another full century that the true potential of this invention, of electricity itself, was truly realised.

It had already become apparent that this seemingly esoteric scientific puzzle, the relationship of electricity and magnetism, actually had world-changing implications. Electricity transfrormed the world as early as the rise of Lectel in the 1850s, just as the magnetic compass had centuries earlier. Yet it was the understanding of the connection between electricity and magnetism, beginning in the closing years of the nineteenth century, that would be truly transformative. Almost twenty years after Buysse and Luns, the Italian signalman Giacinto Masselino noticed the impact of flowing electricity on his compass, and the scientist and engineer Gianluigi Argante published his observations.[8] Theories were gradually built up to try to understand the connection between electricity and magnetism.

Not only were electricity and magnetism linked, but light itself was now understood as an ‘electro-magnetic’ phenomenon. And there were other forms of light predicted beyond the visible, which were dramatically supported when Bietmann accurately predicted the phenomenon of Far Infralight in 1881 before it was discovered in 1894. Far Infralight was harnessed by Ilsted and Photel was born.[9]

In the Flippant era of the First Interbellum, the new invention was experimented with, used for military communication and government propaganda. It would make a radical difference to warfare, even in its clumsy, primitive, early form, in the Black Twenties conflicts. Yet its impact on civilians at this time has been greatly exaggerated. Even the most ambitious VoxHumana ideas of the Combine were themselves more propaganda than reality at this time – not helped by the Biblioteka Mundial later rewriting the history of technological development to confuse matters. The Russian Dalekodeon, more widespread, is frequently misunderstood as a Photel set, when in reality it functioned as a variant of wired quister technology.[10]

No, Photel and electricity alike would not truly transform the lives of the wider population until the Second Interbellum of the 1930s-50s – in that same popular spirit of the age. The two are inextricably linked. When electrical augmentophones [amplifiers] superseded compressed-air ones in the 1930s, they might as well have been directly augmenting that same voice of the people that equally defined the age.[11]

While Flippants had danced to clockwork grooveplayers with simple manual output horns, their children congregated in deafening grooveclubs. Musicians bemoaned the decline in the playing of instruments (and their own gigs) as music from electrically augmented grooveplayers or Photel sets could fill theatres and clubs in their absence. The invention of the electrically-powered phakophone [microphone] in 1934 led to a decline in purely instrumental songs, as it was now much more feasible for a singer to project their voice over their backing group; formerly, they had had trouble gaining sufficient volume when simply singing into a grooveplayer horn used in reverse, which had favoured singers who used a very loud, shouty style. The phakophones allowed singers to access a much greater dynamic range and still be heard. Novelty, and continuing technical limitations in other aspects, meant that this favoured a new singing style synonymous with the late 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s – the so-called Smoothies.[12]

It is telling that, while many classical composers from previous centuries remain household names – Handel, Beethoven, Druschetzky – few singers from before this time are remembered by all but historians of music. But from the late 1930s, we finally have decent-quality recordings of singers, and Smoothies like Jack Phantom, Leo Desaix and Gordo Valentino are still popular today, often long after they have passed away. It took a little longer for female singers, reflecting the fact that the phakophones had first been designed for a male dynamic range, but then we had other icons like the Campari Sisters and Greta Dahlqvist. Not forgetting Lady Xinyi; this was also an age when music from around the world started to be heard in far lands, without musicians and instruments needing to travel. In 1942, disappointed he would never get to see his favourite groovetape singers perform in person, engineer Tajmul Mostafa hit upon the idea of overlaying instrumental versions of songs with live phakophone performances – the global phenomenon of khalisangita was born.[13]

Music was the most iconic way that the wider availability of electricity an Photel changed the world. But there were many others. Home appliances had formerly been only for the wealthy, powered by electric motors on-site driven by the Civic Steam supply. Technological wonders of the pre-Pandoric age as they were, they were still bulky and inefficient, often implicitly designed with the assumption that their owners would always have servants on hand to operate them. Home electricity distribution systems were developed in the First Interbellum, but these consisted of a single large electric motor for the house driven, again, by Civic Steam, town-luft or other forms of power. It would not be until the Second Interbellum that switching-channel electricity distribution became advanced and cheap enough that it could be instead be generated centrally from a power station and channelled to homes to drive appliances directly.[14]

Central rather than local power generation dramatically changed the paradigm of electricity, and would ultimately make appliances – lec-apps, to use the term your parents’ generation and mine love – something within the price range of the average person. Even something we take for granted, like the vac-bulb [incandescent lightbulb], would have been considered the preserve of the wealthy during the Black Twenties. But by the end of the Second Interbellum, in the wealthier countries every home had its electrolier. The story of electricity is not that of Prometheus stealing fire from the gods, but of all mankind demanding their right to share in that power, not merely the ruling classes.

I have given you a very Western perspective. Even in China, the Black Twenties lasted well into this period – Black Thirties, if you will, while in Europe and America they had long since become the Dirty Thirties or Flirty Thirties as the older generation railed at the allegedly decadent youth. And that’s to say nothing of Bisnaga, Panchala, and other colonies fighting for their freedom, where such ecumenical electricity would have to wait many years more. Or the Combine. Even if I was to restrict myself to Europe and America, I could define this era in many other ways. What of the important shifts in attitude towards healthcare after the plague pandemic, the creation of universal national insurance programmes, a sense that poverty and deprivation was now everyone’s problem?

But I shall leave that for another day. Instead, I shall leave you with your eyes still blinking from the glow of those electroliers in every home. For the first time, the Earth from space – as rockets would see it, before too long – declared the presence of humanity with an artificial light sharper than candles, brighter than luftlights. The whole world lit as a beacon that proclaims, we are here, and we cannot be ignored, for all our foibles and misadventures. A time that would be fondly remembered when times of strife returned, and never forgotten.

An Electric Circus, indeed…





[1] See Interlude #1 in Volume 1. The War of the Diplomatic Revolution roughly corresponds to the OTL Seven Years’ War, but did not last so long and the Hispano-Portuguese aspect became a separate conflict in TTL, the First Platinean War.

[2] The latter has only been hinted at very briefly, of course.

[3] Not that the ancient Greeks had paper.

[4] This theory originates from a lost 14th century work Inventio Fortunata, which names the magnetic island Rupes Nigra or ‘Black Rock’. It routinely appeared on European maps for the next two centuries, including those of Mercator.

[5] Classical and channel electricity = static and current electricity in OTL terminology. See Interlude #11 in Volume III for more details on this period.

[6] The term condensor or capacitor is used in OTL instead of ‘charge-store’. Charge is usually presented in a dualist manner in OTL (positive and negative charges), whereas in TTL it is presented as a surfeit or deficit in a single kind of charge (negative in OTL terminology, i.e. the charge of electrons).

[7] See Interlude #11 in Volume III.

[8] See Parts #254 and #261 in Volume VII. The Dalekodeon technology appeared in OTL France under the name Theatrophone.

[9] Far Infralight is the scientific name in TTL for radio waves, but most people just use ‘Photel’ indiscriminately.

[10] See Part #254 in Volume VII.

[11] See Part #256 in Volume VII.

[12] This is the same pattern that happened in OTL, except OTL’s faster pace of electrical technological development meant that it started sooner (the relevant microphone was developed in 1923). TTL’s Smoothies are similar to OTL’s Crooners.

[13] Very similar to karaoke in OTL, which was formally invented in Japan in the 1960s but based on the existing idea of ‘sing-a-long songs’.

[14] See Part #271 in Volume VII. ‘Switching-channel electricity’ (SC) is the TTL term for alternating current (AC) electricity.
 
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Thanks for that detailed essay, @LostInNewDelhi , I shall read through that when time permits (currently trying to finish several writing commitments before I go on holiday!)
Uh, I read LTTW last back when , so I dont Remember, but can you update me on what happened to Qing, Maratha, Ottoman and Zand / Qajar Empires?
 
Uh, I read LTTW last back when , so I dont Remember, but can you update me on what happened to Qing, Maratha, Ottoman and Zand / Qajar Empires?
Same here, but this is all the info I can recall:
  • Ming loyalists in the southern half of the Qing rebelled and formed the Feng dynasty, which would grow stronger while the Qing became more backwards and dependent on Russia. (Korea also took over much of southern Manchuria around the same time, weakening them further.) At the turn of the century, the Feng fully conquered their rival in the Pandoric War and became the undisputed rulers of China.
  • The Maratha Empire became a puppet of Portugal before collapsing during the Great Jihad. The power vacuum was later filled by "Senhor Oliveira's Company," a subsidiary of Priestly Aerated Water. Although it was originally a de facto colony of the UPSA, the French forced it to cut those ties and become an independent corporatocracy similar to Bengal. It may be known by a different name now, but I can't say for sure.
  • The Ottomans had a messy civil war in the early-to-mid-1800s which was eventually won by an Arab reformist who equalized the millets (?) and reincorporated Rumelia from its stint as a breakaway government run by rebellious Janissary forces. The empire had a much stronger 19th century, largely avoiding the upsurge of nationalism in the Balkans and only losing Serbia and Greece, and even reasserting control over Algeria from under France's nose. However, the events of the Black Twenties saw the Russians cut through the empire to the Mediterranean with the "Tarsus Salient," which remained after the ceasefire and presumably still exists, and I think the Algerians also rebelled at some point.
  • Early in the timeline, the Zand dynasty remained stable and defeated the Qajar invasion, and it has been able to stay competitive through its vassals of Oman, Kalat, and Bukhara, and sub-vassals of Zanzibar, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. Although it was defeated by Russia in the Black Twenties and forced into their sphere of influence, their ex-vassals have still remained independent.
 
I think what makes this timeline so special compared to others is that it examines the implications of a world that's completely different from ours. People call things differently, they interpret things differently, and they even use technology that while similar to OTL, doesn't work the way you are familiarized with it.
 
Although I am a relatively new addition to the forum, and as such was not here for much of the earlier parts of this magnificent timeline of yours, I can say with confidence that I am excited to see the return of one of the greatest TLs on this website. I will be looking forward to seeing what you have next!
 
Early in the timeline, the Zand dynasty remained stable and defeated the Qajar invasion, and it has been able to stay competitive through its vassals of Oman, Kalat, and Bukhara, and sub-vassals of Zanzibar, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. Although it was defeated by Russia in the Black Twenties and forced into their sphere of influence, their ex-vassals have still remained independent.
Also Oman invaded OTL Italian Somalia except of the tip. The sheet back and forth shifting of colonial borders instead of OTL new imperialism seems kinda chaotic.

i also wonder if nationalist movements in sub-saharan Africa are possible at this point in time esp along the Indian Ocean coast
 
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Also Oman invaded OTL Italian Somalia except of the tip. The sheet back and forth shifting of colonial borders instead of OTL new imperialism seems kinda chaotic.

i also wonder if nationalist movements in sub-saharan Africa are possible at this point in time esp along the Indian Ocean coast
I thought Somalia was controlled by Germany and then Ethiopia? Actually, I was rereading some past updates and saw mention of a “Swahililand” existing in the modern day, so I think African nationalist movements are very likely.
 
I thought Somalia was controlled by Germany and then Ethiopia? Actually, I was rereading some past updates and saw mention of a “Swahililand” existing in the modern day, so I think African nationalist movements are very likely.
I meant in the 30s and 40s
 
The Ottomans had a messy civil war in the early-to-mid-1800s which was eventually won by an Arab reformist who equalized the millets (?) and reincorporated Rumelia from its stint as a breakaway government run by rebellious Janissary forces. The empire had a much stronger 19th century, largely avoiding the upsurge of nationalism in the Balkans and only losing Serbia and Greece, and even reasserting control over Algeria from under France's nose. However, the events of the Black Twenties saw the Russians cut through the empire to the Mediterranean with the "Tarsus Salient," which remained after the ceasefire and presumably still exists, and I think the Algerians also rebelled at some point.
Pretty sure the Ottomans went Societist too irrc
 
DX BEATRICE BRISTOW (ENGLAND) – ‘MANY FUTURES, MANY PASTS – THE POLY-STREAM HYPOTHESIS’ (2018 NEW!)
Oh, this is interesting, since the point's previously been made by the field team that TTL doesn't have the concept of parallel universes. Especially in conjunction with the end of the last thread, which also mentioned Dx Bristow...
 
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Oh, this is interesting, since the point's previously been made by the field team that TTL doesn't have the concept of parallel universes. Especially in conjunction with the end of the last thread, which also mentioned Dx Bristow...
What does Dx signify?
 
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