From the Greek point of view a Greek campaign would be most convenient of course. In the grander scheme of things I suspect it would be secondary to the campaign in Italy. Depending on how fast the allies move the Germans could try holding either on the Olympus or roughly along the lines of the Macedonian front of WW1. Of course they would need to keep Bulgaria in line but this between incentives (like leting Bulgaria annex Thessaloniki) and pressure is probably doable for a time. Still liberating most of Greece from 1943 hardly hurts and opens possibilities for post war Yugoslavia...
Given the better jumping off point with Crete and a number of other islands in Allied hands, and Greece being able to supply what, 3 or 4 divisions worth of troops by themselves, Roosevelt probably still wouldn't care, but I could see Churchill keeping an "Army" in the region as a reserve/contingency to take advantage of anything that might come up. By "Army", I'm thinking say a couple odd British infantry divisions, an Indian infantry division, and some other Commonwealth/Empire division. Maybe 2nd South African Division perhaps?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Infantry_Division_(South_Africa)
ITTL, that division wasn't captured and destroyed at Tobruk.
Throw in support units, and maybe not an armored division but maybe an independent armored brigade to round things out.
Given the US might be able to commit several extra divisions, what without having a campaign in Alaska and the Solomons campaign being a pail sideshow compared to OTL, if Churchill does persuade Roosevelt to a Greek operation, maybe the US could free up three or four divisions as an "Army" down the road. Keeps the British and Greeks happy, and if it's a low intensity theater, it might make an effective dumping ground or holding pen for officers that aren't fit for higher profile jobs but that are too politically connected to discard, or for those that could be of use but have no other place to put them and don't want to stick them behind a desk where they might decide retirement is a good idea.
I think the sidebar discussions by readers connecting/contrasting OTL events to the author's central theses add interesting lines of thought. To go all "Pollyanna" here, we're lucky to have so many knowledgeable participants.
I think the sidebar discussions by readers connecting/contrasting OTL events to the author's central theses add interesting lines of thought. To go all "Pollyanna" here, we're lucky to have so many knowledgeable participants.
When I was talking about racism vis a vis "American boys dying "needlessly" to free colored folks (pick color)" it was not about the person to person contacts of soldiers. This is more about what would be happening back in the states, especially among certain politicians especially from some areas...
Just a quick look at https://www.distancefromto.net/Wake is 1,900 from Tokyo & Guam is 1,500 (round numbers)
OTL the Japanese really misused their submarine force, which could have been a real nuisance had they put an effort in to anti-shipping operations. I wonder if here, given the devastation of the surface fleet so early, if the force might be directed away from the anti-warship focus and more towards commerce destruction. Much easier for subs to hit relatively slow moving convoys than warships moving much faster, and probably screened much better. Single ships or cripples are another factor, but that is a matter of sheer luck. Given that this shift would be a rational approach to Japanese problems and how the USN will have long sea lanes to protect in the Pacific, the IJN probably won't do it.
I could be totally wrong but I thought that a big part of the Japanese subs were used to run supplies to otherwise-blockaded island garrisons that the US left to rot on the vine.
OTL the Japanese really misused their submarine force, which could have been a real nuisance had they put an effort in to anti-shipping operations. I wonder if here, given the devastation of the surface fleet so early, if the force might be directed away from the anti-warship focus and more towards commerce destruction. Much easier for subs to hit relatively slow moving convoys than warships moving much faster, and probably screened much better. Single ships or cripples are another factor, but that is a matter of sheer luck. Given that this shift would be a rational approach to Japanese problems and how the USN will have long sea lanes to protect in the Pacific, the IJN probably won't do it.
These are the same people who still thought as of the battle of Leyte Gulf, that they could win the Kantai Kessen. So no, that would require someone rational in charge of the Navy.
Based on a quick perusing of wiki.
Wake is 1,900 from Tokyo & Guam is 1,500 (round numbers). Both are within the range of the B-29’s. The current airfield there is 9,850 ft. long.
Given that, I can see
-the US setting up an airbase on Wake for the 1st B-29’s (this’l be less costly & more effective than Operation Matterhorn),
-skip the Gilberts as there is no need ITTL
-the USN seizing the Marshall Islands or some other islands for airbases as needed
-once the Mariana Islands are available, the B-29’s move there and increase the pressure on the Japanese.
As far as the question of invading or blockading Japan goes, no one is invading Japan until after Germany is finished. It will, obviously be blockaded & bombarded (& mined & shelled) all of which would be a preliminary steps to an invasion anyhow.
I don’t know much about Formosa/Taiwan, but I can see the Allies landing on mainland China if it means opening a direct line of supply to Chiang (more effective than either the “Hump” or the Burma Road). But this won’t happen, if it does, until after the PI cleared.