In December of 1945 George Marshall was sent by Truman to broker a compromise between the KMT under Chiang Kai-Shek and the CPC under Mao Zedong. Historically, he was able to reach an agreement with the two that lasted a mere six months or so before Chiang launched an attack on Mao that would horribly backfire and send the KMT packing to Taiwan after a three year curb-stomp. The KMT lost for many reasons including a lack of morale base from his army, treating the liberated provinces worse than shit, and hyperinflation. Mao in fact had the moral high ground in this war considering he continuously promised land reforms for the disaffected and turned the civil war into a popular revolution. (He only lost it when he enacted his failed Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution policies in the 50s-60s.)
So let's say that Truman (for CYOA purposes), instead of broadly applying George Kennan's rhetoric against Stalin towards every communist regime, more properly interprets Kennan's warnings and decides to send feelers to both capitalist and communist regimes alike opposite of Stalin.
Let's say that he tells Marshall that he should really look into Mao's character, his ambitions, policies and goals, take notes and report back to central of his true goals (namely, not communist world domination but protection for China from imperialist interests, the revival of the ruined national and domestic sector, and that he dislikes Stalin as much as Truman). Let's say this works and the White House decides that they could possibly strike a deal with Mao and support them over the failed semi-fascist KMT state. They also make such distinctions between Stalin's goals and other communist leader's goals known to the public at large, re-directing the future red scare towards the soviets and the soviets alone.
The result of this is that China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and other communist groups not firmly in cahoots with Stalin are not seen as enemies of American interests, and are instead made allies as possible buffers against Soviet aggression (at least as long as Stalin lives). In addition, populist regimes seeking domestic reforms in Latin America are given preference over reactionary dictatorships, preventing the likes of Operation Condor, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, and other mishaps.
Could this work?
So let's say that Truman (for CYOA purposes), instead of broadly applying George Kennan's rhetoric against Stalin towards every communist regime, more properly interprets Kennan's warnings and decides to send feelers to both capitalist and communist regimes alike opposite of Stalin.
Let's say that he tells Marshall that he should really look into Mao's character, his ambitions, policies and goals, take notes and report back to central of his true goals (namely, not communist world domination but protection for China from imperialist interests, the revival of the ruined national and domestic sector, and that he dislikes Stalin as much as Truman). Let's say this works and the White House decides that they could possibly strike a deal with Mao and support them over the failed semi-fascist KMT state. They also make such distinctions between Stalin's goals and other communist leader's goals known to the public at large, re-directing the future red scare towards the soviets and the soviets alone.
The result of this is that China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and other communist groups not firmly in cahoots with Stalin are not seen as enemies of American interests, and are instead made allies as possible buffers against Soviet aggression (at least as long as Stalin lives). In addition, populist regimes seeking domestic reforms in Latin America are given preference over reactionary dictatorships, preventing the likes of Operation Condor, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, and other mishaps.
Could this work?