Malaysia:
The most positive reaction Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi got from the Sipadan Hostage rescue in September 2000 was relief. Once that washed over, the nation had to face the fact that it owed Indonesia a favor and that Badawi had put Malaysia in such a situation. Inside the cabinet, Badawi all but faced a mutiny when he told them that in exchange for saving the Sipadan hostages he had promised to join Indonesia’s Try Sutrisno in a political bloc. At last Badawi backed down on the condition that what he had promised Try would never be made public.
Badawi exited this predicament with his position weakened and his reputation for being indecisive and weak enforced. His opponents inside the government rallied around Minister of Industry and Trade Najib . As the year drew towards its final 3 months, there was talk of unseating Badawi as the Prime Minister and President of UMNO with the aim of replacing him with Najib. The removal would be on the grounds of weak leadership which in turn has led to an economy that had not fully recovered yet. It was agreed though that Badawi should be allowed to “run out of steam” on his own.
These developments were being followed from Beijing very carefully. For Najib is the son of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Razak who had opened diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China as well as sharing a positive sentiment towards China. Najib, growing increasingly aware of Indonesia’s maneuverings in 2000, began to adopt the stance that that ASEAN member countries should implement existing commitments within ASEAN rather commit themselves to “new but uncertain ventures”. The 2000 ASEAN Unofficial Summit was considered to be a victory for Najib with news breaking out in diplomatic circles that Indonesia was not going to push the issue of Malaysia being part of its bloc.
Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim watched these developments. Prior to the Sipadan Hostage rescue, he had met with Indonesia’s BJ Habibie. The two are friends and BJ Habibie made mention that it would be great that support for Indonesia’s action be given by both the Malaysian Government and Opposition alike. Anwar however was not in a position to give strong support for Indonesian action when Badawi was ambivalent towards it. Privately, he told Habibie that he was behind Try’s effort to establish a Southeast Asian Bloc.
Stagnant economic figures for 2000, brought about by the fact that Malaysia’s economy had not fully recovered yet along with the perception that Malaysia lacked stability, finally made Badawi’s position untenable. In February 2001, Badawi resigned as both Prime Minister of Malaysia and President of UMNO paving the way for Najib Razak to assume both positions.
Perhaps symbolic that he was going to take a different line to Indonesia, as Try Sutrisno and Thailand’s Thaksin signed their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Najib was on a visit to China where he was given a very lavish welcome by the Chinese Government. When asked what he thought on the treaty, Najib quipped that “Indonesia and Thailand has Malaysia in a pincer” but added quickly that he was joking and made some comment about how he had no problem with what was going on though all those present could not help but think that there was more than a tiny bit of seriousness in what he was saying.
Singapore:
Singapore, seeing the Sipadan Hostage rescue, was also having its own internal debate about how to react. In a cabinet meeting at September 2000, Minister for Foreign Affairs Lee Hsien Loong said that the international environment being what it is, it is better for Singapore to align with and influence a regional power that wants to adopt an independent foreign policy and that right now that regional power is Indonesia. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong demurred that Singapore has to take into consideration how Malaysia might react.
Pushing his argument at another cabinet meeting, Goh said that Malaysia controls Singapore’s water supply, it would not do if Singapore supports Indonesia and then Malaysia is happy about it. Over on the other end of the table, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew sat back and thought that water would be an issue with Malaysia if Badawi fell from power. If that were to happen, Najib, backed by Beijing, would be as large an obstacle as possible to Indonesia forming a bloc. When Badawi’s time as Prime Minister of Malaysia came to an end, Goh and the Singaporean cabinet agreed to fast track construction of its water purification plants so that Singapore could take a more “independent stance”.
Relations between Indonesia and Singapore, however, were as good as ever. Indonesia remained a large market for Singaporean snacks, drinks, and restaurants as well as a good place to invest in while the BKPM and Perumnas were respectively conducting exchanges with the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Housing and Development Board (HDB). The only “cause for complaint” was the fact that there is a decline in enrollment a Singaporean universities by Indonesian students a sign that that Indonesian parents were more financially confident to send their children elsewhere under than Singapore to study.
Philippines:
“We’re ready to do whatever he tells us to do”, said President Joseph Estrada of his stance towards Try Sutrisno. Estrada appreciated Try’s support in the campaign against Abu Sayyaf and gladly facilitated the Sipadan Hostage Rescue before turning on the might of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Estrada was not necessarily in the know of what Indonesia was intending to do though Try could be almost certain of support on the part of Estrada.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon Jr. became the first official of any ASEAN country to have direct contact with the incoming US Administration, meeting with Vice President-elect George W. Bush in Washington DC in December 2000. Bush was rather brusque, telling Siazon among many other things that the incoming administration agreed with President Bill Clinton’s policy of not allowing the 10 ASEAN nations to “band together” and influence the outcome of the IMF Managing Directors’ selection process. The result of this meeting was common knowledge among Southeast Asia’s diplomatic circles by the end of 2000.
Estrada shared this concern with Prime Minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra when he visited Thailand after his visit to Indonesia. Though both led countries who traditionally had close relations with the United States, both agreed that it seemed that the new Administration will be less concerned about Southeast Asia. Both agreed that they had to drift close to the largest nation in the region.
When Indonesia and Thailand treaty signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in February 2001, Estrada publicly welcomed it. Privately though, he was quite disappointed and wished for something similar between Indonesia and the Philippines. Having not gotten on with the Malaysian Government by wishing for their defeat the last time there was an election there, China’s building of artificial islands close to Filipino waters, and the fact that Try Sutrisno had provided strong support in suppressing the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Estrada believed that the best course of action for the Philippines was to remain close with Indonesia.
Domestically, while he was known to carry on affairs with mistresses and gamble well into the night with shady characters, Estrada continued to cultivate a populist image and was able to guide the Philippines to economic recovery. As May 2001 approached, Estrada looked to utilize the successes he had gained during the presidency to increase his majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives at the mid-term elections.
Brunei Darussalam:
In the face of the Sipadan Hostage Rescue, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah began to consider his position regarding Indonesia. Whilst wanting to build good personal relations with Try Sutrisno, Bolkiah wondered how to position himself and his kingdom. Consulting with Goh Chok Tong of Singapore after the APEC Summit in November 2000, Bolkiah argued that Indonesia’s always had a leadership position in the region on account of its size. Goh explained that this unofficial arrangement has been on a “First among equals basis” but that from he gathered, and especially with the international environment being what it is, Indonesia would like to assume the leadership of a bloc that was to function as an independent force in world affairs.
In April 2001, after Indonesia had temporarily ceased to import beef from Argentina, Bolkiah allowed for Indonesia to import cattle and beef from Brunei. Try Sutrisno sent Indonesian Ambassador of ASEAN I Gede Awet Sara to convey his thanks.
Thailand:
For Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the bad news as Indonesia’s Ambassador to ASEAN I Gede Awet Sara introduced himself in August 2000 was that Indonesia seemed to prioritize Malaysia over Thailand in its regional activities. I Gede Awet Sara diplomatically said that President Try wanted closer relations with Malaysia who was Indonesia’s more immediate neighbor. Thaksin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Surakiart Sathirathai knew what was going on better than most and saw the Sipadan Hostage rescue as a sign that Indonesia was making its decisive bid for leadership in the region.
It was to Thaksin’s delight when Try Sutrisno sat down with him at the ASEM Summit and explained his vision. Thaksin and Surakiart put on poker faces and said they would consult with the cabinet. Even before the meeting was over however, they realized that Try was starting to give up on Malaysia and immediately began thinking how Thailand could show its usefulness to Indonesia. Back in Bangkok, Thaksin easily got the support of the cabinet.
Thaksin further built up his position at the ASEAN Unofficial Summit, agreeing with Try Sutrisno to start negotiations for a treaty of cooperation between the two countries with said negotiations to be headed by Indonesia’s Vice President JB Sumarlin and Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister Barnhan Silpa-Archa. It took only 3 months for negotiations for a treaty to be drawn up. Try’s desire to begin constructing a bloc in Southeast Asia was matched only by Thaksin’s to establish Thailand as Indonesia’s “right hand” and this moved things along.
The other thing that moved things along was that there was a consensus within the political elite by January 2001 that what he was embarking on with Indonesia was the right thing. Opposition Leader Chuan Leekpai, the Thai Military, and the Palace either gave support to Thaksin or did not get in his way so far as his stance towards Indonesia was concerned. Thaksin’s position was bolstered by his domestic position; his expansionary economic policy was fuelling economic growth.
In February 2001, Thaksin and Try Sutrisno signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation across various areas to solidify both nations’ relationship with each other.
Cambodia:
Much as Malaysia, Cambodia also showed skepticism at Indonesia’s increasing assertiveness in the region. Though thankful for Indonesia’s assistance in the peace process in Cambodia early in the 1990s, Prime Minister Hun Sen could not just ignore the fact that China was the first to acknowledge Hun Sen’s removal of Co-Prime Minister Norodom Ranaridh and that China had given more financial assistance than even the United States. When the Chinese Government showed that it was not so happy with Indonesia beginning to become more assertive, Hun Sen felt that he was not in a position to reject China’s sentiments.
Myanmar:
Isolated though he and his nation was, Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Than Shwe kept abreast of the developments, adopting a “wait and see” attitude. In late September 2000, Than Shwe placed General Secretary of the National League for Democracy Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for violating travel restrictions. Amidst the international condemnation, Than Shwe noted the Indonesian Government’s official statement to this was that this was an internal matter for the Myanmar Government to settle.
In December 2000, the SPDC discussed Bush’s “rude exchange” with the Philippines’ Siazon. SPDC Secretary Khin Nyunt wondered whether or not this justified “decisively” drifting in China’s direction. Vice Chairman of the SPDC Maung Aye wondered if it was wise to become politically close given that Myanmar’s economy was already largely reliant on China’s. Khin Nyunt countered by saying that India was closer to the United States. Than Shwe kept quiet, there was one nation that should be part of Myanmar’s foreign policy calculation but wasn’t.
Laos:
By the end of 2000, Laos’ economy was still stagnant though cushioned somewhat by investments coming in from Indonesia and Thailand. Laos’ concerns by the end of 2000 however were more political rather than economic. March 2001 was originally scheduled to be the month where the country would hold the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) National Congress and the National Assembly’s Congress. The former would determine who would be the party leaders and the latter to determine the state leaders.
Traditionally divided between a pro-Vietnam and a pro-China faction, the LPRP as it approached its National Congress found itself divided instead between a pro-Southeast Asia and pro-China faction, considering that Vietnam is now being drawn into China’s orbit. Pro-Southeast Asia in this case meaning those wanting Laos to have closer relations with Indonesia and Thailand. Championing the pro-Southeast Asia cause was Minister of Finance Bounnhang Vourachith while Minister of Foreign Affairs Somsavat Lengsavad, who spoke Mandarin, represented the pro-China cause.
The LPRP National Congress produced a result which pleased its factions. General Secretary Khamtai Siphandone was re-elected as General Secretary of the LPRP and ranked first in the Politburo, Choummaly Sayasone ranked third, and Bounnhang Vourachith ranked fourth. At the National Assembly conducted 2 weeks after the LPRP National Congress, Khamtai Siphandone relinquished the presidency allowing Choumally Sayasone to take over as president. Bounnhang and Somsavat contested the Prime Minister’s position but Bounnhang enjoyed more support and it was he who became the Prime Minister and Somsavat had to settle with the Deputy Prime Ministership.
At the first post-LPRP National Congress meeting and among the many other things discussed, the Politburo reaffirmed Laos’ traditional foreign policy stance of seeking balance and that with China’s strong position, balance in this regard means becoming closer with the “largest power in the Southeast Asia region”.
Vietnam:
I Gede Awet Sara, when making his first courtesy call as Indonesia’s Ambassador to ASEAN to Hanoi, met with Premier Phan Van Kai in August 2000. When questioned about Vietnam’s foreign policy stance especially as regards China, Phan only said that the only way this can change is if the party line changed at the next Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) National Congress. Until there was a change in the party line, Vietnam would continue its drift into China’s orbit.
While it detested China, Vienam was vitriolic towards the US. General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) lectured President of the United States Bill Clinton when the latter visited Vietnam in November 2000 as part of his final overseas visits in the presidency. Back in Washington, President-elect John McCain vowed that though he bore Vietnam no ill personal will, he would not allow Le and Vietnam to get away with what was perceived as a humiliation of Clinton.
Vietnam’s relation with Russia was great. Though a downgraded version of Vietnam’s relation with the Soviet Union, Russia’s relationship with Vietnam was still close enough that Russia continued to operate in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay. At the 2000 APEC Summit, President of Russia Yevgeny Primakov communicated to President of Vietnam Tran Duc Luong that he would like to extent Russia’s rent. But things took a turn for the worst when Primakov signed the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship with China in January 2001. Le Kha Phieu welcomed the treaty but not his opponents inside the party. The latter group were now of the opinion that Russia could no longer be relied upon.
Once the LPRP had completed its national congress all eyes turned to the other communist party the region. The VCP was filled with internal jockeying as it approached its 9th National Congress scheduled for April 2001. Le Kha Phieu looked for a re-election to a second term as the leader of his party however things did not look easy for him. Along with many other issues, the way Le had guided Vietnam into China’s orbit had not won him acclaim from the party. The man which Le’s opponents inside the party prepared to challenge him was Chairman of the National Assembly Nong Duc Manh. A moderate reformer, acceptable to all in the party, and speculated to be the illegitimate son of Ho Chi Minh, Nong was the ideal candidate.
While economic underperformance, corruption, and Le’s own desire to consolidate played their roles, the sight of Indonesia signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Thailand helped cause the desire to unseat Le Kha Phieu to go into overdrive. The General Secretary had dismissed notions that Vietnam should balance its relationship with China by also having close ties with Indonesia asking “Why should we rely on a nation that still imports its rice from us?” Nong, who organized a visit to Bangkok to coincide with Indonesia and Thailand’s treaty signing specifically so that he could meet Try Sutrisno, came to back to Hanoi even more convinced that Vietnam’s foreign policy had to change and that to that end Le Kha Phieu had to be removed.
With days until the VCP was due to start, Vice President of China Hu Jintao came for a short 1-day informal visit. Two days afterwards, Le Kha Phieu announced that the VCP 9th National Congress has been postponed indefinitely due “to unfavorable circumstances”. Nong and his supporters began to think about how best to remove Le Kha Phieu as General Secretary.
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Welcome to the region that most feels the flaps of the butterfly wings.
The most positive reaction Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi got from the Sipadan Hostage rescue in September 2000 was relief. Once that washed over, the nation had to face the fact that it owed Indonesia a favor and that Badawi had put Malaysia in such a situation. Inside the cabinet, Badawi all but faced a mutiny when he told them that in exchange for saving the Sipadan hostages he had promised to join Indonesia’s Try Sutrisno in a political bloc. At last Badawi backed down on the condition that what he had promised Try would never be made public.
Badawi exited this predicament with his position weakened and his reputation for being indecisive and weak enforced. His opponents inside the government rallied around Minister of Industry and Trade Najib . As the year drew towards its final 3 months, there was talk of unseating Badawi as the Prime Minister and President of UMNO with the aim of replacing him with Najib. The removal would be on the grounds of weak leadership which in turn has led to an economy that had not fully recovered yet. It was agreed though that Badawi should be allowed to “run out of steam” on his own.
These developments were being followed from Beijing very carefully. For Najib is the son of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Razak who had opened diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China as well as sharing a positive sentiment towards China. Najib, growing increasingly aware of Indonesia’s maneuverings in 2000, began to adopt the stance that that ASEAN member countries should implement existing commitments within ASEAN rather commit themselves to “new but uncertain ventures”. The 2000 ASEAN Unofficial Summit was considered to be a victory for Najib with news breaking out in diplomatic circles that Indonesia was not going to push the issue of Malaysia being part of its bloc.
Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim watched these developments. Prior to the Sipadan Hostage rescue, he had met with Indonesia’s BJ Habibie. The two are friends and BJ Habibie made mention that it would be great that support for Indonesia’s action be given by both the Malaysian Government and Opposition alike. Anwar however was not in a position to give strong support for Indonesian action when Badawi was ambivalent towards it. Privately, he told Habibie that he was behind Try’s effort to establish a Southeast Asian Bloc.
Stagnant economic figures for 2000, brought about by the fact that Malaysia’s economy had not fully recovered yet along with the perception that Malaysia lacked stability, finally made Badawi’s position untenable. In February 2001, Badawi resigned as both Prime Minister of Malaysia and President of UMNO paving the way for Najib Razak to assume both positions.
Perhaps symbolic that he was going to take a different line to Indonesia, as Try Sutrisno and Thailand’s Thaksin signed their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Najib was on a visit to China where he was given a very lavish welcome by the Chinese Government. When asked what he thought on the treaty, Najib quipped that “Indonesia and Thailand has Malaysia in a pincer” but added quickly that he was joking and made some comment about how he had no problem with what was going on though all those present could not help but think that there was more than a tiny bit of seriousness in what he was saying.
Singapore:
Singapore, seeing the Sipadan Hostage rescue, was also having its own internal debate about how to react. In a cabinet meeting at September 2000, Minister for Foreign Affairs Lee Hsien Loong said that the international environment being what it is, it is better for Singapore to align with and influence a regional power that wants to adopt an independent foreign policy and that right now that regional power is Indonesia. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong demurred that Singapore has to take into consideration how Malaysia might react.
Pushing his argument at another cabinet meeting, Goh said that Malaysia controls Singapore’s water supply, it would not do if Singapore supports Indonesia and then Malaysia is happy about it. Over on the other end of the table, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew sat back and thought that water would be an issue with Malaysia if Badawi fell from power. If that were to happen, Najib, backed by Beijing, would be as large an obstacle as possible to Indonesia forming a bloc. When Badawi’s time as Prime Minister of Malaysia came to an end, Goh and the Singaporean cabinet agreed to fast track construction of its water purification plants so that Singapore could take a more “independent stance”.
Relations between Indonesia and Singapore, however, were as good as ever. Indonesia remained a large market for Singaporean snacks, drinks, and restaurants as well as a good place to invest in while the BKPM and Perumnas were respectively conducting exchanges with the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Housing and Development Board (HDB). The only “cause for complaint” was the fact that there is a decline in enrollment a Singaporean universities by Indonesian students a sign that that Indonesian parents were more financially confident to send their children elsewhere under than Singapore to study.
Philippines:
“We’re ready to do whatever he tells us to do”, said President Joseph Estrada of his stance towards Try Sutrisno. Estrada appreciated Try’s support in the campaign against Abu Sayyaf and gladly facilitated the Sipadan Hostage Rescue before turning on the might of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Estrada was not necessarily in the know of what Indonesia was intending to do though Try could be almost certain of support on the part of Estrada.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon Jr. became the first official of any ASEAN country to have direct contact with the incoming US Administration, meeting with Vice President-elect George W. Bush in Washington DC in December 2000. Bush was rather brusque, telling Siazon among many other things that the incoming administration agreed with President Bill Clinton’s policy of not allowing the 10 ASEAN nations to “band together” and influence the outcome of the IMF Managing Directors’ selection process. The result of this meeting was common knowledge among Southeast Asia’s diplomatic circles by the end of 2000.
Estrada shared this concern with Prime Minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra when he visited Thailand after his visit to Indonesia. Though both led countries who traditionally had close relations with the United States, both agreed that it seemed that the new Administration will be less concerned about Southeast Asia. Both agreed that they had to drift close to the largest nation in the region.
When Indonesia and Thailand treaty signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in February 2001, Estrada publicly welcomed it. Privately though, he was quite disappointed and wished for something similar between Indonesia and the Philippines. Having not gotten on with the Malaysian Government by wishing for their defeat the last time there was an election there, China’s building of artificial islands close to Filipino waters, and the fact that Try Sutrisno had provided strong support in suppressing the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Estrada believed that the best course of action for the Philippines was to remain close with Indonesia.
Domestically, while he was known to carry on affairs with mistresses and gamble well into the night with shady characters, Estrada continued to cultivate a populist image and was able to guide the Philippines to economic recovery. As May 2001 approached, Estrada looked to utilize the successes he had gained during the presidency to increase his majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives at the mid-term elections.
Brunei Darussalam:
In the face of the Sipadan Hostage Rescue, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah began to consider his position regarding Indonesia. Whilst wanting to build good personal relations with Try Sutrisno, Bolkiah wondered how to position himself and his kingdom. Consulting with Goh Chok Tong of Singapore after the APEC Summit in November 2000, Bolkiah argued that Indonesia’s always had a leadership position in the region on account of its size. Goh explained that this unofficial arrangement has been on a “First among equals basis” but that from he gathered, and especially with the international environment being what it is, Indonesia would like to assume the leadership of a bloc that was to function as an independent force in world affairs.
In April 2001, after Indonesia had temporarily ceased to import beef from Argentina, Bolkiah allowed for Indonesia to import cattle and beef from Brunei. Try Sutrisno sent Indonesian Ambassador of ASEAN I Gede Awet Sara to convey his thanks.
Thailand:
For Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the bad news as Indonesia’s Ambassador to ASEAN I Gede Awet Sara introduced himself in August 2000 was that Indonesia seemed to prioritize Malaysia over Thailand in its regional activities. I Gede Awet Sara diplomatically said that President Try wanted closer relations with Malaysia who was Indonesia’s more immediate neighbor. Thaksin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Surakiart Sathirathai knew what was going on better than most and saw the Sipadan Hostage rescue as a sign that Indonesia was making its decisive bid for leadership in the region.
It was to Thaksin’s delight when Try Sutrisno sat down with him at the ASEM Summit and explained his vision. Thaksin and Surakiart put on poker faces and said they would consult with the cabinet. Even before the meeting was over however, they realized that Try was starting to give up on Malaysia and immediately began thinking how Thailand could show its usefulness to Indonesia. Back in Bangkok, Thaksin easily got the support of the cabinet.
Thaksin further built up his position at the ASEAN Unofficial Summit, agreeing with Try Sutrisno to start negotiations for a treaty of cooperation between the two countries with said negotiations to be headed by Indonesia’s Vice President JB Sumarlin and Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister Barnhan Silpa-Archa. It took only 3 months for negotiations for a treaty to be drawn up. Try’s desire to begin constructing a bloc in Southeast Asia was matched only by Thaksin’s to establish Thailand as Indonesia’s “right hand” and this moved things along.
The other thing that moved things along was that there was a consensus within the political elite by January 2001 that what he was embarking on with Indonesia was the right thing. Opposition Leader Chuan Leekpai, the Thai Military, and the Palace either gave support to Thaksin or did not get in his way so far as his stance towards Indonesia was concerned. Thaksin’s position was bolstered by his domestic position; his expansionary economic policy was fuelling economic growth.
In February 2001, Thaksin and Try Sutrisno signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation across various areas to solidify both nations’ relationship with each other.
Cambodia:
Much as Malaysia, Cambodia also showed skepticism at Indonesia’s increasing assertiveness in the region. Though thankful for Indonesia’s assistance in the peace process in Cambodia early in the 1990s, Prime Minister Hun Sen could not just ignore the fact that China was the first to acknowledge Hun Sen’s removal of Co-Prime Minister Norodom Ranaridh and that China had given more financial assistance than even the United States. When the Chinese Government showed that it was not so happy with Indonesia beginning to become more assertive, Hun Sen felt that he was not in a position to reject China’s sentiments.
Myanmar:
Isolated though he and his nation was, Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Than Shwe kept abreast of the developments, adopting a “wait and see” attitude. In late September 2000, Than Shwe placed General Secretary of the National League for Democracy Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for violating travel restrictions. Amidst the international condemnation, Than Shwe noted the Indonesian Government’s official statement to this was that this was an internal matter for the Myanmar Government to settle.
In December 2000, the SPDC discussed Bush’s “rude exchange” with the Philippines’ Siazon. SPDC Secretary Khin Nyunt wondered whether or not this justified “decisively” drifting in China’s direction. Vice Chairman of the SPDC Maung Aye wondered if it was wise to become politically close given that Myanmar’s economy was already largely reliant on China’s. Khin Nyunt countered by saying that India was closer to the United States. Than Shwe kept quiet, there was one nation that should be part of Myanmar’s foreign policy calculation but wasn’t.
Laos:
By the end of 2000, Laos’ economy was still stagnant though cushioned somewhat by investments coming in from Indonesia and Thailand. Laos’ concerns by the end of 2000 however were more political rather than economic. March 2001 was originally scheduled to be the month where the country would hold the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) National Congress and the National Assembly’s Congress. The former would determine who would be the party leaders and the latter to determine the state leaders.
Traditionally divided between a pro-Vietnam and a pro-China faction, the LPRP as it approached its National Congress found itself divided instead between a pro-Southeast Asia and pro-China faction, considering that Vietnam is now being drawn into China’s orbit. Pro-Southeast Asia in this case meaning those wanting Laos to have closer relations with Indonesia and Thailand. Championing the pro-Southeast Asia cause was Minister of Finance Bounnhang Vourachith while Minister of Foreign Affairs Somsavat Lengsavad, who spoke Mandarin, represented the pro-China cause.
The LPRP National Congress produced a result which pleased its factions. General Secretary Khamtai Siphandone was re-elected as General Secretary of the LPRP and ranked first in the Politburo, Choummaly Sayasone ranked third, and Bounnhang Vourachith ranked fourth. At the National Assembly conducted 2 weeks after the LPRP National Congress, Khamtai Siphandone relinquished the presidency allowing Choumally Sayasone to take over as president. Bounnhang and Somsavat contested the Prime Minister’s position but Bounnhang enjoyed more support and it was he who became the Prime Minister and Somsavat had to settle with the Deputy Prime Ministership.
At the first post-LPRP National Congress meeting and among the many other things discussed, the Politburo reaffirmed Laos’ traditional foreign policy stance of seeking balance and that with China’s strong position, balance in this regard means becoming closer with the “largest power in the Southeast Asia region”.
Vietnam:
I Gede Awet Sara, when making his first courtesy call as Indonesia’s Ambassador to ASEAN to Hanoi, met with Premier Phan Van Kai in August 2000. When questioned about Vietnam’s foreign policy stance especially as regards China, Phan only said that the only way this can change is if the party line changed at the next Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) National Congress. Until there was a change in the party line, Vietnam would continue its drift into China’s orbit.
While it detested China, Vienam was vitriolic towards the US. General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) lectured President of the United States Bill Clinton when the latter visited Vietnam in November 2000 as part of his final overseas visits in the presidency. Back in Washington, President-elect John McCain vowed that though he bore Vietnam no ill personal will, he would not allow Le and Vietnam to get away with what was perceived as a humiliation of Clinton.
Vietnam’s relation with Russia was great. Though a downgraded version of Vietnam’s relation with the Soviet Union, Russia’s relationship with Vietnam was still close enough that Russia continued to operate in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay. At the 2000 APEC Summit, President of Russia Yevgeny Primakov communicated to President of Vietnam Tran Duc Luong that he would like to extent Russia’s rent. But things took a turn for the worst when Primakov signed the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship with China in January 2001. Le Kha Phieu welcomed the treaty but not his opponents inside the party. The latter group were now of the opinion that Russia could no longer be relied upon.
Once the LPRP had completed its national congress all eyes turned to the other communist party the region. The VCP was filled with internal jockeying as it approached its 9th National Congress scheduled for April 2001. Le Kha Phieu looked for a re-election to a second term as the leader of his party however things did not look easy for him. Along with many other issues, the way Le had guided Vietnam into China’s orbit had not won him acclaim from the party. The man which Le’s opponents inside the party prepared to challenge him was Chairman of the National Assembly Nong Duc Manh. A moderate reformer, acceptable to all in the party, and speculated to be the illegitimate son of Ho Chi Minh, Nong was the ideal candidate.
While economic underperformance, corruption, and Le’s own desire to consolidate played their roles, the sight of Indonesia signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Thailand helped cause the desire to unseat Le Kha Phieu to go into overdrive. The General Secretary had dismissed notions that Vietnam should balance its relationship with China by also having close ties with Indonesia asking “Why should we rely on a nation that still imports its rice from us?” Nong, who organized a visit to Bangkok to coincide with Indonesia and Thailand’s treaty signing specifically so that he could meet Try Sutrisno, came to back to Hanoi even more convinced that Vietnam’s foreign policy had to change and that to that end Le Kha Phieu had to be removed.
With days until the VCP was due to start, Vice President of China Hu Jintao came for a short 1-day informal visit. Two days afterwards, Le Kha Phieu announced that the VCP 9th National Congress has been postponed indefinitely due “to unfavorable circumstances”. Nong and his supporters began to think about how best to remove Le Kha Phieu as General Secretary.
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Welcome to the region that most feels the flaps of the butterfly wings.