As Worthington grimly remembered: "An ARVN rifle company had even less firepower than one of our infantry companies during World War II." As a result, ARVN infantry often struggled when facing off against VC or NVA forces that could marshal more firepower.
Keith Nightingale, another advisor, recalled joining the 52nd ARVN Ranger Company as an advisor in 1967 and having a similar experience Although they were ARVN's elite, the Rangers were still relying on obsolescent small arms, which put them at disadvantage against the VC.
The 52nd was organized along standard U.S. Army lines with four rifle companies and a Headquarters Company. Each rifle company had approximately 80-90 personnel. The total battalion strength on the LZ the day of this action was approximately 450. The primary armaments were the antiquated M1 carbine, BAR, .30 Cal M1919 Light MG and M79 grenade launcher...
The VC force encountered was a “Main Force” element at full strength primarily populated with new soldiers and new equipment. Post operation sweeps showed that most corpses were teenagers with new uniforms, fresh haircuts, equipment and weapons. Most VC were armed with AK 47’s with new canvas magazine carriers and stick grenade belts. Additional weapons were .51 cal Heavy Machine Guns, RPG’s, RPK squad automatic weapons and 82mm mortars. These forces thoroughly outgunned their ARVN adversaries.
The arrival of two new M60 machine guns and a handful of M16s made a major difference in the 52nd's combat performance, says Nightingale:
I shall never forget the image over my right shoulder of one of those gunners at Suoi Long calmly working off 3 round bursts with the pipe in his mouth as if he were at a Ft Benning gunnery range. The gunner keyed on the sound of the VC commanders blowing whistles and on more than one occasion I heard the whistle abruptly ingested as the M60 rounds impacted. These two guns plus the very few M16’s in the battalion were to have a decisive early effect at Suoi Long. (Hiep and Tot’s bodyguards and myself as well as some other soldiers had M16’s. Months after the battle, we were told that at the initial contact, the VC commander believed we were a new regiment as he hadn’t heard Vietnamese with M16’s before-reportedly this caused him to be more cautious with us than he otherwise might have been).
Being outgunned in firefight after firefight wore down ARVN morale for understandable reasons.
When the Americans finally began issuing M16s in larger numbers in 1968, the effect on ARVN effectiveness and self-confidence was electric. Lociano explains:
In mid-1968, MACV commissioned a study to examine the M-16’s impact on RVN armed forces. The results were telling. Though at the time of the study only 72,441 M-16 rifles had been issued, the RVNAF units who received them improved substantially on the battlefield. The MACV Doctrine and Analysis Division determined that ARVN operational capability increased by roughly 69 percent, morale and esprit increased by nearly 61 percent and “overall maintenance and reliability of the M-16 show a 51 percent improvement over the previous mix of weapons.”
US advisors and South Vietnamese officers alike confirmed that the rifle had an immediate and substantial impact. Lieutenant Colonel Phạm Văn Sơn concluded that “with this new standard weapon, South Vietnamese troops not only attained much better individual firepower but seemed also to acquire a new fighting spirit that had been lacking with the obsolete M-1.”
