Though the Soviet Union didn’t finally meet its end until Christmas 1991 it had been obvious even years earlier that the end was nigh and there was no road to recovery. With the overthrow of communist regimes in Europe and the retreat and accelerating decline of the Soviet Union, from about 1989 many Western leaders had started talking about a so called “Peace Dividend”. With the Cold War for all intents and purposes over and the end of show credits playing in the USSR western nations began to look towards implementing significant cuts in their defence expenditure.
The United States was looking at withdrawing down its significant presence in Europe. On the continent the iron curtain had been well and truly pulled down and European nations were no longer living in fear of Soviet tank armies storming across the Inner German Border. The various Groups of Soviet Forces (Germany, Northern, Central, Southern) that had intimidated Western Europe for decades now found themselves isolated in unwelcoming foreign lands and were desperate to get back to Russia as soon as possible leaving a wake of empty military bases and abandoned equipment in their wake. European nations began to withdraw their forces from the former frontlines in Germany. Throughout Europe many nations no longer needing to maintain large military establishments began to abolish compulsory military service and chose instead to become professional volunteer forces. In the newly reunified Germany, the Bundeswehr which had absorbed the Nationale Volksarmee (the armed forces of the now non-existent East Germany) found itself one of the most heavily armed nations on earth with close to 600,000 men and masses of vehicles, aircraft and hardware. However, with East Germany and the Warsaw Pact now but a footnote in history the Bundeswehr which had throughout its entire existence geared and trained itself solely to take on the East found itself without an enemy or a purpose. It didn’t take long for the cuts to set in as manpower shrunk by hundreds of thousands and masses of Soviet origin hardware deemed surplus to requirements and disposed of. With some notable exceptions such as the MIG-29’s and a select few personnel there was no place for the former NVA in the reunified Germany and the once mighty force met its end not on the battlefield but through budget cuts and absorption.
Britain’s response to the money saving opportunity offered by the so called Peace Dividend was to conduct a new defence review starting in 1990.
A defence review usually occurs usually every decade or so (there being no fixed frequency) with the last one having occurred in 1983 in the aftermath of the Falklands Conflict. In theory what happens is the review works out what threats the UK is likely to face and what commitments the armed forces will likely need to meet over the next decade or so and how best to counter those threats and meet those needs. This then leads on to how the Armed Forces should be structured and equipped in order to meet the requirements identified which in turn leads on into the details of what equipment needs to be procured, what restructuring and reorientations need to take place and what is no longer required. Finally this leads into how much money will be needed to pay for everything and how budgets will be redistributed.
The 1983 Defence Review had been unique in that it had been one of the few reviews where this process had been followed and where requirement had dictated budget and procurement.
Most of the time what actually happened was that a review would be conducted in response to a reduction in defence spending and the process would be followed in reverse with newly reduced budgets dictating what threats the armed forces could actually afford to meet and equipment and manpower disposed of on the basis of what was affordable rather than what was needed. The Defence Reviews carried out in 1981 and earlier in 1966 were prime examples of this with the 1966 review especially having far reaching consequences for the armed forces and Royal Navy in particular. The worst effects of the 1981 review had fortunately been cancelled out by the Falklands Conflict and the 1983 review which had been carried out as a result of the lessons learnt in the Falklands.
From the outset everyone knew that the 1990 review would be no different. Like most western nations the UK had for years focused on defending Western Europe from the threat posed by the Eastern Bloc. Granted the UK had been involved in plenty of conflicts such as Operation Banner in Northern Ireland, the Falklands Conflict and various bushfire wars around the former British Empire in recent decades but in the grand scheme of things these had been sideshows and distractions from the main focus in Europe and the North Atlantic.
Thus, when the military threat from the East had evaporated the British Armed Forces had found themselves without their previous primary purpose. All of a sudden it was extremely difficult for the armed forces to justify the numerous expensive high technology equipment programmes which were intended to fight an enemy that no longer existed and impossible to justify keeping the British Army of the Rhine at anything near its present size when it was now protecting Germany from nothing. The government and treasury had been quick to exploit this. The 1990 review had been due to report in November of 1990 and had it gone ahead by all accounts would have imposed utterly brutal cuts upon the Armed Forces. One Civil Servant who had been involved in the review that would come to be known as one of the great what ifs of British military history years later described it as mere salami slicing on a massive scale. He explained that by this he meant that the review paid next to no attention to the likely threats and taskings that the Armed Forces would face in the future and was simply an exercise in working out how and where money could be saved.
Fortunately for the Armed Forces much like the still imprisoned General Galtieri had saved them from John Nott’s 1981 Defence Review by invading the Falklands and allowing them to demonstrate their worth in another far flung part of the world another despot was about to unwittingly save them from the effects of another brutal review.
In August of 1990 motivated by a longstanding territorial dispute and disputes over debts accumulated during the bloody 8 year war with neighbouring Iran Iraq invaded and occupied the tiny nation of Kuwait.
Iraq had always claimed that Kuwait was rightfully part of Iraq and that its independence was as a result of unjust intervention by British imperialists. Following the Iraq Iran war Iraq’s economy was in a shambles and struggling with a heavy debt burden accumulated during the conflict and in desperate need of oil revenues to rebuild and pay off debts. This led to diplomatic conflict with Kuwait whom Iraq accused of oil overproduction thus driving down the price and hurting Iraq’s ability to rebuild. This had led to Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to decide to invade and annex Kuwait.
When they had taken the decision to invade and occupy the Falkland Islands the Argentine Military Junta had sought to unite an increasingly fractured population around a popular patriotic cause and thus preserve their grip on power. It is possible the Saddam Hussein had been at least partially attempting to do the same by annexing Kuwait. The Iraq Iran war had started in 1980 when Saddam Hussein had attempted to invade and annex the western Iranian province of Khuzestan taking advantage of the political chaos in Iran in the wake of the 1979 revolution and of the fact that the Iranian armed forces had been severely weakened by purges of its personnel in inability to source spare parts or sophisticated munitions for its western made equipment due to sanctions.
Unfortunately for Saddam the war hadn’t gone well and had devolved into an 8 year long struggle that had left both sides back where they started and resulted more than 1 million casualties.
Following the failure to achieve decisive victory or anything even remotely resembling it during the war with Iran and the hardships and losses suffered in the process tensions existed within Iraq. Therefore, knowing that Kuwait would likely be a quick and easy win Saddam may have seen invasion as a way to restore confidence in within the armed forces and his regime and unite the Iraqi people around him to see off any internal threats.
The rest of the world and the United States in particular were outraged by this blatant act of aggression and disregard for international law. Even worse was the perceived threat to the worlds oil supplies ad the economic effects of the sharp rise in oil prices.
The worry was that Saddam having taken Kuwait may decide to push on into Saudi Arabia in order to establish Iraq as the regional superpower. The present situation was unacceptable to the rest of the world and clearly could not be allowed to get worse.
This resulted in a response on two fronts. The first was through diplomatic means in the form of sanctions against Iraq. The second was the military option.
Over the course of the following 6 months in what would become known as Operation Desert Shield a massive military build up took place in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf as the United States along with the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Egypt France and other nations assembled a force close to one million men strong. Diplomatic efforts had continued during this build up there comes a point where a build up for an operation develops a nearly unstoppable momentum of its own. This momentum makes military conflict more likely the longer its allowed to go on for. Saddam’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait merely sealed the deal.
Therefore, in the early hours of the 17th of January 1991 the coalition began what would become a 42 day long air campaign against the Iraqi’s. Within a week total air dominance had been achieved and the campaign began to switch to attacking Iraqi forces on the ground in preparation for the coalition ground offensive that would soon come. The Iraqi air force was shattered as a fighting force with 36 aircraft downed in air to air combat, more than 100 destroyed on the ground. Seeing it as their only hope for survival more than 100 Iraqi aircraft fled to the territory of their recent enemy Iran. The Iranians were quite pleased with this turn of events as chose to regard the aircraft as a form of compensation for the aircraft the had lost at the hands of the Iraqi air force. Saddam’s hope that they would merely impound the aircraft and airmen and soon return them was found to be one of many terrible miscalculations.
The air campaign was merely the prelude to the ground phase of the war. The operation code named Desert Storm (also commonly known as the 100 hour campaign) aimed to isolate and then destroy Iraqi forces in Kuwait by advancing into southern Iraq and encircling them before finally clearing them out.
At the start of the campaign Saddam Hussein had bombastically proclaimed that the mother of all battles had begun. 100 hours later western commentators were proclaiming Desert Storm to be one a one sided massacre.
The Iraqi army had been utterly crushed and swept aside. Both Iraqi and coalition commanders had severely over estimated the Iraq forces ability and willingness to resist. It was notable that the only reason why Saddam Hussein had not been forced out of power by the coalition advance was not because of any ability of his forces to fight off the invaders but because having achieved what they had set out to do in liberating Kuwait and removing the threat to Saudi Arabia the coalition had decided against pushing on towards Bagdad for their own political reasons.
The conflict was also notable for having taken place right at the end of the Cold War meaning that coalition forces were made up of men who had been trained and equipped to fight the Soviets and the Iraqi forces were equipped with the same kind of Soviet made hardware that they would have faced in the war in Europe that had never happened.
The commander of the British Forces in what became known as the Gulf War Lt General Peter de la Billiere (who had been the Director SAS during the Falklands Campaign) later remarked that the Gulf War had presented the British and American militaries with the opportunity to finally fight the kind of war that they had spent so many decades and so much money preparing for without having the inconvenience of a descent enemy.
The poor performance of the Iraqi forces and in particular their equipment had shocked many. In particular Iraq’s Soviet made tanks such as the T72 had been found to be almost completely useless when faced with the superior American Abrams and British Challenger’s.
One significant consequence of this was a dramatic change in direction for China’s Peoples Liberation Army. Up until this point the PLA had followed the doctrine of quantity over quality and based most of their doctrine on the belief that enough numbers could overwhelm any opponent no matter how much more advanced, they were. The PLA had actually considered the Iraqi forces to be significantly more technologically advanced and better trained than they were. The almost overnight destruction of the Iraqi armed forces had come as a terrible shock to the PLA and been cause for reflection and soul searching as they realised their beliefs and assumptions had been literally blown apart. If the Iraqi’s had been little more than a speed bump for the Americans then they would probably cut through the PLA as if it wasn’t even there. The result was a complete change in direction as the PLA decided that they would need to become a high technology force while retaining their numerical superiority.
Britain had played a major part in the Gulf War with its contribution being named Operation Granby. With no need to counter the Soviets any more the UK had been able to deploy almost 55,000 men to the Gulf.
The British Army’s contribution had come in the form of the reinforced 1st Armoured division. The Division had added yet another battle honour to its proud history taking part in the gigantic armoured “left hook” which had outflanked the Iraqis and pushed into Kuwait. The still new and state of the art Challenger MBT’s supported by Warrior IFV’s had easily cut through the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions opposing them destroying well over 300 enemy vehicles for hardly any losses of their own. One Challenger had written itself into the record books when it had destroyed an Iraqi tank by landing a hit on it at a distance of 3 miles.
During the Falklands Campaign the RAF had been somewhat perceived as playing second fiddle to the RN and Army. In the aftermath of that conflict the RAF had often found itself the butt of jokes from members of the RN, Army and RM about having to remind everyone that they were also there. The RAF’s most visible contribution had been the Black Buck Vulcan bombing missions which had set records for the longest bombing mission in history (subsequently broken by the USAF in the Gulf War). Since then commentators had debated whether Black Buck was carried out for reasons of military necessity or as a way for the RAF to prove its worth.
In the Gulf War however the RAF arguably made up Britain’s most significant contribution to the coalition deploying hundreds of aircraft of multiple types fulfilling every role imaginable. Tornado GR1’s proved very effective in putting Iraqi air bases out of action by destroying runways while the Jaguar had also been a success in its ground attack and close support role. C130 Hercules transport aircraft once again provided a vital air bridge with the UK, Nimrod MPA’s patrolled the seas and even provided SIGINT and ELINT capability and Chinook and Puma transport helicopter played a vital role in supporting British and coalition ground forces.
Even the Buccaneers had one last hurrah supporting other RAF aircraft by carrying laser targeting pods for precision guided munitions and carrying out their own strikes. After a career spanning nearly 30 years that was now coming to its end many serving and former RAF and FAA men were delighted that the type got to go out with a bang.
Tornado F3 interceptors were also deployed to the Gulf by the RAF but despite flying hundreds of sorties never encountered the opportunity to engage any enemy aircraft. One glaring omission from Operation Granby’s air order of battle was the Phantom. The type was showing its age by this point and it was felt that with all of the other aircraft being deployed to theatre the capability that Phantom’s would bring wouldn’t really justify the effort required to deploy and support them.
Britain’s brand new Hornet’s on the other hand would have been an excellent addition to the order of battle. However, the type was still in the extremely early stages of entering service and both the RAF and FAA were yet to stand up their first squadrons and were still at least a year and a half away from being ready to deploy. Both the RAF and FAA did however pay very close attention to the performance of the USN’s and USMC’s F/A-18 Hornets during the Gulf War.
The air force that Britain had deployed to the Gulf was a very different beast to the one that had taken part in the Falklands. Older aircraft types had been retired and replaced with new cutting edge types such as the Tornado and even more significant the RAF had this time been able to arrive in force.
The Royal Navy on the other hand found its role in the Gulf War very different from the central role it had played in the Falklands. The state of the RN at the time and the nature of the conflict meant that it played a much more limited role in the Gulf War supporting the primarily US Navy coalition naval forces.
The Royal Navy during the Gulf War had two areas of operation the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. Within the Persian Gulf itself the RN’s most valuable contribution in terms of capability were the 6 HUNT class mine counter measure vessels that cleared the costal waters around Kuwait to allow larger vessels to close with the coast to provide naval gunfire support. The RN also contributed frigates and destroyers as escorts for the vast armada that the US Navy deployed which grew to include no less than 6 carrier battle groups. In one notable incident HMS GLOUCESTER used her Sea Dart SAM’s to destroy a pair of Iraqi Silkworm SSM’s that had been launched against the battleship USS MISSOURI which thanks to RN mine clearing efforts had closed with the coast and had been using her 16 inch guns to conduct devastatingly effective shore bombardments.
In another notable action the Iraqi Navy was virtually wiped out when it was attacked by Sea Skua armed Lynx helicopters that had been launched by RN frigates and destroyers that had been covering the RN MCMV force as it went about its vital work.
The timing of the Gulf War caught the RN in a slightly awkward position in terms of the make up of the fleet. HMS EAGLE had been decommissioned in 1986 and gone to the scrappers 2 years later and the future HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH was still years away from delivery meaning that in terms of carriers the RN only had its pair of INVINCIBLE class light VSTOL carriers and one of those was undergoing a refit at the time.
The RN had deployed a battlegroup based on HMS INDOMITABLE to the eastern Mediterranean. The Sea Harrier’s that made up her air group were fine aircraft and a massive improvement upon the earlier models that her sister HMS INVINCIBLE had carried during the Falklands campaign. However given that the Iraqi air force at the start of the conflict at least operated advanced and fast aircraft such as the MIG-29 and MIG-25 it was felt that there would be little sense in putting Sea Harriers into harms away against these aircraft when the USN’s F-14D’s and F/A-18’s would be a much better match. Therefore, the INDOMITABLE battlegroup had remained in the Eastern Med for two reasons. One was to protect the coalition sea lines of communication which went through the Suez canal and across the Mediterranean into the Atlantic.
The other was in case of a widening of the conflict. Saddam Hussein had launched a large number of Scud ballistic missiles at Israel in an attempt to provoke them into becoming involved in the conflict. If this had come to pass it was unknown how the Arab nations that made up a significant proportion of the coalition and in particular Syria would react. Therefore, it was considered sensible to keep a carrier in the Mediterranean to guard against all possibilities. In the end Israeli intervention/retaliation was only averted through a massive diplomatic effort and the diversion of coalition air and special forces assets to locating and destroying Iraqi Scud missile units.
HMS INDOMITABLE wasn’t the only INVINCIBLE class aircraft carrier to take part in the conflict. The Royal Australian Navy had deployed a number of ships to the Persian Gulf including the aircraft carrier HMAS AUSTRALIA which had begun its life as HMS ILLUSTRIOUS. The AUSTRALIA had carried an air group consisting of American manufactured AV-8B Harrier II’s and Sea King helicopters including a number of Sea King ASaC MK 7 AEW helicopters. The RAN AV-8B’s had operated alongside their USMC counterparts operating from the LPH’s USS TARAWA and USS NASSAU and had proven themselves to be a extremely welcome addition by the USMC effortlessly slotting in with the so called “Gator Navy”. The strike carrier role played by HMAS AUSTRALIA stood in stark contrast to the less visible role played by HMS INDOMITABLE far away from the action.
When it had become clear in August of 1990 that Britain was likely to become involved in a major conflict in the Gulf the decision had been quietly made to pause the then ongoing Defence Review. Politically it would have looked pretty bad for the government if it found itself releasing a review imposing brutal cuts upon the armed forces while they might potentially be involved in a high intensity (and potentially high casualty) shooting war. At the time of this decision there hadn’t really been any clear idea of when to carry on again beyond “when this thing in the Gulf was over”. Ongoing operations in the Gulf meant that unfinished review was pushed to the back of everyone’s minds as the senior officers and civil servants writing it found themselves busy dealing with more pressing concerns. It wasn’t until March 1991 that consideration was given to continuing with the review. However much like what had occurred in the aftermath of the Falklands the Armed Forces and MOD insisted that to pick up the review so soon after the end of hostilities would be unsound as they would be conducting their own studies into the conduct and performance of the armed forces during the Gulf Campaign.
Given the length of time that it would take to undertake these studies and mindful of the potential game changing effects of their findings as had happened as a result of the Falklands Conflict the Secretary of State for Defence Tom King was persuaded by the argument that it would be better to abandon the paused 1990 review and start afresh.
A new review was therefore initiated in August of 1991 and delivered its findings in February of 1992.
The 1992 review which became known simply as the Strategic Defence Review or SDR took place against a very different backdrop compared to the 1990 review. It was felt that the Gulf War had demonstrated the kind of operations that the Armed Forces would be likely to conduct going forward. For decades the armed forces had been pivoted towards fighting set piece battles in continental Europe. Their main objective in effect had been one of providing deterrence both conventional and nuclear while still maintaining some capacity for what had been described as out of area operations arising from emerging situations such as the Falklands and Northern Ireland.
The review stated that the armed forces focus should now be on rapid reaction due to the more unpredictable and uncertain nature of the post Cold War world and power projection and overseas intervention.
The Gulf War was used as an example of the kind of overseas intervention in response to a suddenly appearing situation that the armed forces should be reconfigured to respond to. The review did however note that it had taken a months long build up to deliver sufficient forces into the Gulf theatre before combat operations could begin and this had only been possible largely due to the cooperation of the enemy (who had very thoughtfully not lifted a finger to do anything that might hinder or prevent this build up and merely waited until the coalition was ready to begin hostilities on its terms). Therefore, a need had been identified for the ability to mobilise, deploy and sustain significant forces much more quickly.
Despite all of these positive sounds statements the treasury hadn’t just gone away and were still going to get their pounds of flesh from the defence budget.
The phrase “leaner but meaner” was often used in conjunction with the report which read as follows:
ROYAL NAVY
Manpower
- The Royal Navy would incur a manpower loss of 10,000 which would reduce the service to a strength of 60,000.
- The Women’s Royal Naval Service would be disbanded and its members integrated into the regular RN which with the exception of some branches including the Royal Marines and Submarine service open recruitment to females. This would be carried out in conjunction with the disbandment and integration of the Women’s Royal Army Corps and the Women’s Royal Air Force. Officially this move was in response to changes in society and the necessity of moving with the times. While this wasn’t untrue there were other motivating factors.
In the aftermath of the Falklands War the armed forces had enjoyed a boom in recruitment. However, 8 years later the majority of those recruits had done their time and left the forces meaning that forces once again were fighting the never ending battle against manpower shortages. By opening recruitment to women, the pool of potential recruits would be doubled overnight going a long way towards alleviating manpower issues. It would take some years to build up a significant female cadre within the forces and it be a bumpy road in some areas but it was a journey that in the 1990’s was now unavoidable.
Submarine’s
- The TRIDENT and VANGUARD class SSBN programme would continue as planned.
- The UK’s Trident SLBM and VANGUARD class SSBN programme was one of two vastly expensive megaprojects that the MOD was undertaking at the time the review was published (the other being the QE class aircraft carrier’s).
Questions had been asked about the continuing need for an expensive submarine based nuclear deterrent in the post cold war world. However there had never been any serious consideration given to anything like nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union may have gone but their nuclear stockpiles still existed. In fact with the break up of the USSR there were now more nuclear armed states in the world than ever before and nuclear proliferation was a serious concern. By this point the Trident programme was far too advanced and far too much money had been spent to even consider cancellation.
Some thought had been given to perhaps scaling the programme. The final VANGUARD class SSBN HMS VENGEANCE wasn’t due to be laid down until 1993. Considerable savings could be achieved by not pressing ahead with this boat and some in the treasury were pressing hard for this option. In the end the Prime Minister had personally intervened to stop talk of any such nonsense. With only 3 boats it would have been impossible to maintain continuous at sea deterrence and this was not something that the PM was willing to even consider giving up. In fact much to the ire of the treasury further funds would likely have to be allocated to the programme to speed up the introduction of the VANGUARD’s owing to worsening issues with the rapidly aging RESOLUTION class SSBN’s.
- The VALIANT & CHURCHILL class SSN’s would be retired without replacement
- These 5 boats would be taken out of service as part of a general downsizing of the fleet. The boats were starting to become fairly elderly (the youngest HMS COURAGEOUS being 22 years old) and increasingly obsolete and expensive to maintain. In the post Cold War World without having to counter the once formidable Soviet submarine force there was going to be less demand for expensive SSN’s.
This did however raise the issue of how to dispose of nuclear powered vessels. In true government style the review made no mention of this and the can would be repeatedly licked down the road while the boats slowly rusted in a basin in Devonport Dockyard.
- A new class of SSN would be ordered to replace the SWIFTSURE class
- Previously a new class of SSN’s had been planned as a follow on to the TRAFALGAR class boats under the auspices of the SSN20 project to replace the VALIANT and CHURCHILL class. This project had been cancelled when VSEL had been awarded the contract to build the future HMS EAGLE which alongside the ongoing VANGUARD class building programme meant that Barrow which was the only yard capable of building nuclear powered vessels simply had no room for another project. With HMS EAGLE along with the second boat of the Vanguard class HMS VICTORIOUS due to launch in 1993 space would become available to start working on new boats. A new set of design studies would be undertaken with cost control being a key priority. The intention would be to build upon the still very recent TRAFALGAR class to produce an evolved design or “Batch 2” for reasons controlling costs and technical risk. This project would for now be known as the Batch 2 Trafalgar Class or B2TC.
- The remaining OBERON class SSK’s would be withdrawn from service as soon as possible.
- These boats were getting very old and were now obsolete. Decommissioning the entire class would free up the significant sums it was costing to run them and would free up a significant amount of manpower for reassignment to other boats or in many cases redundancy.
- The UPHOLDER class SSK Programme would be capped at 4 boats
- This one had caused many headaches and less than pleasant exchanges between the MOD and Cammel Laird. The original plan had been to build 12 boats in 3 batches of 4. Batch 3 hadn’t been ordered yet so cancelling that was simple enough. Of the first batch of four two were already in service with the other two due to join the fleet within the next year. Batch 2 had been the problem seeing as the first 2 of these boats were already under construction. The contract for these boats included a cancellation cause meaning that the MOD would have to compensate Cammel Laird for the money they had already spent so far on building HMS UNDAUNTED and HMS UNBEATEN. Worse still though the order for the second pair of batch 2 boats (which would have been named HMS UPROAR and HMS UNRIVALLED) had not yet been placed the letters of intent had been signed meaning that Cammel Laird had already been preparing to begin construction. Cammel Laird were now threatening to take the MOD to court over what they felt to be a violation of an agreement which had left them out of pocket.
Fortunately, it was at this point that the MOD’s attempts to market the UPHOLDER class had paid off and help had come from the Royal Canadian Navy. Following the abandonment of the unrealistic CANADA class SSN project the Canadians had been looking for a new class of SSK to replace their OBERON class boats. A deal had been struck with the Canadian’s whereby the contract for the Batch 2 UPHOLDERR class would be amended to have the boats completed to Canadian specifications. As soon as the each boat was handed over to the Royal Navy as per contract it would be immediately (on the same day) sold to the Canadian’s who would make down payments well in advance (non refundable in case anyone on the other side of the pond was tempted to change their minds).
- The RN’s four UPHOLDER class SSK’s would be based at HMS Dolphin in Gosport where they would be used for specialised work that the larger SSN’s were less suited for such as shallow water operations, SF insertion, surveillance and so on. RCN submarines would also temporarily be based at Gosport while the Canadian crews were trained by the RN on their new boats.
- The Tomahawk TLAM would be procured for the RN’s SSN and SSK fleet.
- The British had been extremely impressed with the performance and capability provided by the submarine launched TLAM during the Gulf War. It had been decided to procure this missile as it was judged to be a relatively cheap way of significantly boosting the potency of the Submarine Service.
Aircraft Carriers
- The CV-90 Programme would continue as planned
- Along with the Trident programme this was one of the most expensive defence projects currently underway and one that the Treasury had been desperate to scale back. The first ship HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH was already in the water and simply to far along to cancel.
The second ship of the class HMS EAGLE was about 18 months behind her sister in terms of build progression and was the obvious candidate for being axed. The ship had been laid down in 1988 and was now only a year away from being launched. Had the defence review gone ahead in 1990 as originally planned it is likely that EAGLE would have been cancelled. However, by 1992 the ship was far along enough that cancelling her would politically be a PR catastrophe to say nothing of the money wasted. Other possibilities had been explored such as selling or laying up one of the ships but these options had been considered unviable for practical and political reasons. Therefore, both ships would enter service and actually fitted quite well into the MOD’s vision of power projection and overseas intervention.
- HMS INDOMITABLE would be decommissioned
- HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH was now reaching the point where her ships company would soon start to be assembled. In order to free up the necessary manpower it had been decided to withdraw one of the INVINCIBLE class slightly earlier than planned. HMS INVINCIBLE had recently completed a refit and was in a better condition than her sister and so she would be retained in service until the QE reached her initial operating capability at which point, she would be withdrawn with her crew going to HMS EAGLE.
The early withdrawal of INDOMITABLE would have the knock on effects of saving the money it would have cost to operate her for her planned final years and allow some of the Sea Harrier squadrons to begin converting onto the Hornet FGR2.
The INDOMITABLE and ultimately INVINCIBLE would be disposed of by sale with India, Brazil and Australia being identified as the most promising candidates. Since the deal to sell them the former HMS HERMES had fallen through the British Government gently trying to woo the Indian Navy into taking on one of the Invincible’s when they became available. Australia already operated and INVINCIBLE class carrier and especially in the wake of the performance of HMAS AUSTRALIA in the Gulf War it was hoped that they might be interested in taking on a second of the class. If not to operate then perhaps as a source of spare parts to support the AUSTRALIA.
Amphibious Warfare
- A new class of Amphibious Assault ship would be built to replace the FEARLESS class LPD’s
- HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID were now approaching 30 years old. Being one of the few remaining steam powered vessels in the RN they were increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and in dire need of replacement. To this end a new pair of Amphibious Warfare vessels would be built. Various design concepts had already been studied. The RN had been without a dedicated LPH since the retirement of HMS HERMES and some had been pushing for a new ship to fill this role. The options put forward were to either convert one of the INVINCIBLE class to an LPH configuration when it was no longer required as a carrier or to build a completely new ship based on the INVINCIBLE class design. The first option had been discarded as it was felt that a converted INVINCIBLE wouldn’t really be able to provide a capacity for a meaningful embarked military force. The second option had been rejected out of hand seeing as the money and manpower to build and operate a completely new class of large ship wouldn’t be forthcoming.
The new ships would be a combined LPH/LPD type of vessel. Initial artists impressions showed a ship that outwardly looked like a large LPH with plenty of helicopter carrying capacity but also equipped with a large well deck and vehicle deck. These ships would be at least as big as an INVINCIBLE class ship and most likely reach anywhere between 25 and 30 thousand tons. However, with the capability they would offer and the fact that thanks to advances in automation and the less complicated nature of the ship the crew size could be kept reasonably modest they were felt to be good value for money.
FRIGATES & DESTROYER’s
- HMS BRISTOL would be withdrawn from service
- Ships that are the only example of their class are always disproportionally expensive to operate and maintain. HMS BRISTOL was a large ship with a large crew and lots of unique systems. Therefore, the decision made been made to retire her as a cost and manpower saving measure.
- HMS ANTRIM would be withdrawn from service
- The COUNTY class destroyer HMS ANTRIM had suffered heavy damage during the Falklands conflict and had been rebuilt as a training ship and since spent most of her time conducting training cruises for the officer cadets at Britannia Royal Naval College. Given the ships age and tightening budgets decommissioning her had been an easy decision.
- The UK would partake in the HORIZON class programme
- The UK had originally been a member of the multinational NATO Frigate Replacement for the 90’s (NFR90) project which had fallen apart owing to each nations incompatible differing requirements. The UK would therefore team up with France and Italy to design a new type of air warfare destroyer with which the UK intended to replace the TYPE 42 destroyer.
- The TYPE 21 Frigates would be withdrawn from service without replacement
- This one was purely down to cost cutting and manpower reductions resulting from planned redundancies. Equipped with Exocet SSM’s, a 4.5 inch gun and Phalanx CWIS these ships were ok for general patrol work but not much more that could justify their retention. Of the eight ships originally built two HMS ANTELOPE and HMS ARDENT had been sunk by air attack at the battle of San Carlos during the Falklands. Already Pakistan had all but agreed to purchase the remaining six vessels.
- Some consideration had been given to retiring the first four TYPE 22 frigates as they were felt likely to have some resale value. However, given the demand for escorts for the QUEEN ELIZABETH class carrier battle groups it was felt unwise to let go of these still very capable ASW frigates and so this idea had been abandoned.
- The TYPE 23 Frigate programme would be cut back to 18 ships
- Originally this programme had been expected to somewhere between 18 to 25 ships to replace the LEANDER class. Budget cuts had dictated that once the minimum planned level of 18 had been reached that would be it. Already the TYPE 23 was attracting considerable interest from abroad with Chile having announced their desire to purchase two vessels and Singapore expressing a strong interest.
So far 3 vessels were in service with the Royal Navy with seven more in various stages of construction and others expected to follow at a rate of about two vessels per year.
- Decommissioning of the remaining LEANDER Class FRIGATES was to be accelerated
- This was in order to achieve some sort term cost savings to appease the treasury as the decommissioned vessels would be a source of spare parts for those remaining in service while relieving pressure on manpower.
Other
- A second batch of seven SANDOWN Class MCM vessels would be ordered.
- The final 2 of the planned 6 FORT II class Replenishment Oilers would not be built
ROYAL AIR FORCE
- RAF GUTERSLOH & RAF WILDENRATH would be closed down
- As part of a general scaling down of British forces in Germany the RAF would be closing two of its four air bases in the country. RAF Wildenrath had been intended to become the base for the RAF’s Hornet force in Germany. These plans would now be abandoned and all RAF Hornet FGR1’s would be based within the UK.
- RAF FINNIGLEY in the UK would be closed down
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- The RAF would incur a manpower reduction of 15,000 reducing its strength to 72,000.
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- The remaining Buccaneer’s would be withdrawn from service
- The 60+ Buccaneer strike aircraft still in service were reaching the end of their lives and with a general downsizing of the RAF would be withdrawn immediately without a direct aircraft for aircraft replacement.
- The remaining HARRIER GR3’s would be withdrawn and production of the HARRIER GR5/7 curtailed
- At the time of the review just over 60 older Harrier GR3’s remained in service while More than 100 newer Harrier’s were in service or build split between the GR5 which was itself being upgraded to GR7 standard. The decision to remove the GR3 and stop production of the newer Harrier variants would effectively halve the force.
- The Number of Nimrod MPA’s in service would be reduced
- Activity from the formerly Soviet Submarine fleet had declined massively with hundreds of boats laid up and the Russian Navy barely able to keep SSBN’s at sea on deterrent patrol (In 1992 to 1993 not one Russian SSBN patrol would be carried out). Therefore, the opportunity had been seized to make a small reduction in the MPA fleet. Of the 36 Nimrod’s currently in service the 6 with the most hours on their logs would be withdrawn from their squadrons and gradually ripped apart in their new role as sources of spare parts for the aircraft that remained flying.
- 60 Hornet FGR2’s would be procured as a replacement for the Jaguar
- This was the one bit of good news for the RAF. They had been very pleased with the Hornet FGR1’s they had already received and had decided to procure the two seat FGR2 which was geared more towards ground attack to replace the Buccaneer and then ultimately the Jaguar. The review had stated that there would be no replacement for the Buccaneer’s. The RAF already had 120 FGR1’s on order and had wanted another 100 FGR2’s the realities of the new financial climate however had seen this slashed to only 60 which would replace the Jaguar on a less than one for one basis.
- The Tornado GR1 would be upgraded
- The Tornado GR1 had given a good account of itself in the Gulf and had been approaching the point where it was due for a midlife upgrade anyway. The new GR4 variant would enhance the Tornado’s capabilities and incorporate lessons leant in the Gulf. The flipside of this was that out of 200 Tornado GR1’s originally produced only 170 would receive the upgrade with the remainder eventually withdrawn from service.
- £350 million would be spent on laser guided munitions and target designators
- With a sever reduction in combat air power strength it was important to make the best use possible of the remaining aircraft. The Gulf War had demonstrated the value and usefulness of precision guided munitions and convinced the RAF to replace its entire bomb stock with PCM’s Overall stocks of munitions however would be reduced with a number of munitions storage facilities emptied and closed down. The large quantity of munitions expended in the Gulf had helped considerably with the issue of safe disposal.
BRITISH ARMY
Out of all the services the British Army could quite legitimately claim to have suffered the worst at the hands of the review. More than 30,000 men would be made redundant leaving its strength at 118,000. Deports and other facilities would be closed with the land sold off to raise cash. The British Army of the Rhine in Germany would see its strength cut by nearly 60% and would itself be renamed British Forces Germany.
The aim was to create a smaller but better equipped and more versatile army. One senior officer involved in the review explained that the aim was to transform the army from one that killed a man by repeatedly hitting him with a sledge hammer to one that killed him by cutting his throat with a scalpel in just one movement. In terms of equipment programmes there would be some good news.
- While it had achieved phenomenal kill ratios in the Gulf the Challenger MBT had shown that it had plenty of limitations and issues. Therefore it would be replaced by a completely new and superior MBT (albeit at a reduced number)
- The British Army would procure the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter having seen US Army Apache’s in action in Iraq noting how vastly superior they were to their own TOW equipped Lynx MK7’s.
- New and modern small arms and other individual bits of kit such as body armour, boots and bergens would be procured.
Where thing got unpleasant was when it came to the restructuring that was going to be forced upon them as a result of the army’s dramatic downsizing. Officially no regiment would be outright disbanded. They would simply be amalgamated into new or existing units so as to maintain the lineage and traditions. In most of the affected unit’s amalgamation meant a change of name and cap badge to something new and completely unfamiliar and many men being lost during the transition. Some regiments would continue to exist but find themselves losing while battalions.
There was even an attempt to force the two most senior and prestigious regiments in the British Army the Lifeguards and the Blues and Royals into a sort of shotgun wedding to form a single composite regiment. However, many powerful, influential and well connected men have passed through their ranks and officers messes meaning that eventually this particular proposal was dropped. Some serving and former members of the Blues and Royals had even pushed for the regiment to be deamalgamated and returned to its pre 1969 state of being two separate regiments. The Royal Horse Guards who had originally been formed in 1650 and the Royal Dragoons who had existed since 1661.