Glyndwr01
Banned
They had a lower ground pressure than the human foot. One commander jumped off his Scorpion that was parked on a marsh and ended up to his knees in muck!
HMS EAGLE in the Falklands
- Thread starter flasheart
- Start date
They had a lower ground pressure than the human foot. One commander jumped off his Scorpion that was parked on a marsh and ended up to his knees in muck!
On the subject of Eagle's air group...
Does anybody know the width of a Whirlwind HAS Mk 9 with its rotors folded? Preferably in feet and inches.
Jack1971
Banned
I wonder how they would have done against Argentina’s TAM light tank.
http://armscom.net/products/tam_main_battle_tank
Ground pressure (kg/sm2) 0.788
Not sure what the equivalent kg/sm2 for the Scorpion is.
Last edited:
Battle of the Falkland Islands Part 3
The RAF Nimrod MR2 that had detected the two 3 ship strong surface groups to the north of the TEZ had reached the limit of its fuel and crew endurance and had now turned north for the long flight back to Ascension Island. However, it had done its job and provided the kind of up to date information that the two strike formations from HMS EAGLE would need to carry out their missions.
Between the Nimrod and intermittent passive sonar contact from the submarine HMS SPLENDID a total of six ships had been identified. It was felt highly likely by the British that one of these was the Argentine carrier ARA VEINTICINO DE MAYO plus her escorts likely to be Argentina’s pair of TYPE 42 DESTROYERS. The second group was felt likely to be comprised of French built DRUMMOND class corvettes equipped with Exocet SSM’s.
Both of these groups were tracked heading east towards the Task Force and were judged to present a threat and could therefore be engaged under the newly amended ROE. This was especially true in the case of the carrier but the problem was no one could tell for certain which group she was.
It had been decided that the best course of action would be to attack both groups. To this end nearly the entire air group had been launched from HMS EAGLE.
The two strike groups each consisted of eight Buccaneers carrying Martel ASM’s escorted by four Phantoms. There had been a lot of concern about leaving behind just six Phantoms to protect the Task Force but the Buccaneers would need to be protected from any CAP around the Argentine carrier and the possibility that the Argentines may have shore based fighters providing extra protection could not be completely discounted. The argument that Buccaneers were worth their weight in gold and any serious losses amongst them would seriously jeopardise the entire operation had won out.
Each Buccaneer carried two AS-37 Martel missiles. The Martel itself had two versions an anti-radiation version and TV guided version. Half of the Buccaneers were carrying the ARM’s and the other half the TV guided missiles.
Ironically the ships of the Argentine carrier group were all British built. The DE MAYO herself was the former HMS VENERABLE a colossus class light carrier built in the last days of the second world war and sold to the Royal Netherlands Navy where she had served as HNLMS KAREL DOORMAN before ultimately being passed on to Argentina. The TYPE 42 destroyers were both British designed and one was even British built and were practically identical to the ones within the British Task Force.
During the transit South from the UK multiple simulated attacks had been carried out against the British TYPE 42’s. These exercises had gradually increased in scope and challenge culminating in a success full attack on HMS INVINCIBLE which was protected by TYPE 42’s and Sea Harriers (The INVINCIBLE was felt to be the closest equivalent to the DE MAYO and the Sea Harrier to the Argentine A4 Skyhawks. The aircrews were confident that they could mount a successful strike against the older and less capable argentine carrier and aircraft.
From the results of these exercises it had been determined that the best way to attack the Argentines would be with stand-off weapons and a distance. The anti-radiation version of the Martel had to be preprogramed before flight to search for a specific radio frequency. The ASM’s being used in this operation had been programmed to seek out the 992 target indication radar and 909 fire control radars carried aboard the TYPE 42. The carrier itself was known to only be equipped with AA guns for air defence and so would be dealt with by the TV guided Martel’s and the Phantoms would deal with any Argentine aircraft.
TG 79.4, Vicinity of 4780S 5890W
Being closer to the Task Force the three DRUMMOND class corvettes were the first to be attacked by the Buccaneers callsigns Black 1-8 Covered by Phantoms Callsign Silver 1-4.
The plan was for the ASM equipped Buccaneers Blacks 1-4 to lead the way and launch first to suppress the ships air defences to allow for the TV guided Martel equipped Buccaneers Blacks 5-8 to have a clearer shot.
Upon detecting surface contacts to the west of them on their Blue Parrot radars the Buccaneers transmitted the call “Tally Ho” (Enemy sighted) and dove down to their attack height of just 200ft turning onto an attack heading. The Phantoms remained further back at a higher altitude scanning for any possible air contacts. At just over 38 miles from target Blue Parrot began the process of “slaving” the TV Martel’s onto their individual targets.
ASM equipped Black’s 1-4 were the first to “pop up” to an altitude of 2000 ft. This was considered the most dangerous part of an attack as they would be within the engagement envelope of an SAM’s. An unfortunate necessity given that Martel was not a sea skimming missile.
Having popped up the Observers in the back seats reported that their instruments weren’t detecting any of radar emissions consistent with Type 992 or 909. That meant that the ASM’s would not be able to lock onto a target but also meant that they were most likely engaging the DRUMMOND class corvettes rather than the carrier group. Without targets they could launch at Black’s 1-4 aborted their attack run and turned away from the Argentine ships.
Black’s 5-8 were next to pop up and launched the eight TV guided Martel’s in two waves of four a few seconds apart (the interval was necessary as the observer would only be able to control one missile at a time). The missiles rapidly closed their targets at an altitude of 2000ft while the Buccaneers were forced to climb even higher into a potential SAM engagement envelope to ensure that the datalink pods would be able to maintain contact with the missiles. After closing most of the distance in automatic mode the missiles switched themselves over to manual control for the terminal phase of their flight profile. During this phase the observer of each aircraft looked at a small television display on the floor between his legs and used a small joystick to guide his missile onto its target.
The DRUMMOND class corvettes ARA DRUMMOND, ARA GUERRICO and ARA GRANVILLE were intended as ASUW and ASW platforms and were not equipped with any kind of SAM system relying instead on guns for air defence. The radars on the ships had detected and been tracking the British aircraft before they even started their attack. The captain of ARA DRUMMOND and group commander Captain Juan Calmon had signalled HQ in Puerto Belgrano and the carrier group that he was under air attack. With the Buccaneers never coming anywhere near enough to engage before they launched Captain Calmon ordered his ships to turn west and present their sterns to the incoming missiles. This was in order to present as smaller target as possible and give his ships 20mm Oerlikon automatic guns and other AA guns the clearest possible field of fire.
Unfortunately for Captain Calmon the odds stacked against him were simply to great. One Martel was destroyed by AA fire from ARA GUERRICO however the next 5 missiles all scored hits with the final two overshooting their targets due to a combination smoke obscuring the TV cameras narrow field of vision and a lack of recent operator experience. ARA GRANVLLIE sustained two hits and practically was practically obliterated due to secondary explosions when one of the Martel’s struck her SSM launcher detonating the Exocets. ARA GUERRICO also sustained two hits and burned fiercely before going down by the stern after taking on water as a result of hull buckling caused by the force of the impacts.
ARA DRUMMOND was “fortunate” in sustaining only one Martel strike on her stern. While the ship did not immediately sink she drifted burning and without power. Her crew were eventually forced by fire to abandon her but were able to transmit a distress call and Captain Calmon would later be awarded one of Argentina’s highest military honours for his role in ensuring the survival of not only his own crew but many from the other two ships until they were rescued days later. A total of 146 men perished as a result of the sinkings.
TG 79.1, 4850S 6000W
The eight Buccaneers callsign White 1-8 and four Phantoms Gold 1-4 now knew that they would be attacking the Argentine carrier group and thus would be having a much harder time of things. The attack profile would be largely the same with the White’s 1-4 launching ASM’s to suppress the Type 42’s, White’s 5-8 using TV guided Martel’s to finish off the ships and Gold’s 1-4 providing top cover.
Post conflict analysis by multiple military investigations and historians showed that at this stage the carrier group commander Rear Admiral Jorge Allara was unaware of the fate of the Submarine ARA SAN LUIS or the ARA GENERAL BELGRANO and her accompanying destroyers. None of these units had been able to transmit distress calls or give any indication that they were under attack. Allara was however aware that the S-2 Tracker that had gone missing earlier in the day had likely been shot down by the British and that his screening force TG 79.4 had come under air attack.
It is interesting that Allara continued to steam east in preparation for a planned air attack by his A4Q Skyhawks. Most historians believe this to be down to two reasons. Allara not knowing of what had befallen the other naval units involved in Operation Martillo believed that the operation was proceeding as planned and to withdraw for no reason would only expose the other units to greater danger. Part of the TG79.4 screening force job (Though for obvious reasons he had not explained this to them) had been to act as a sacrificial lamb and draw the British carrier aircraft away from his own group giving him a window of opportunity. While they certainly had in part accomplished this their being sacrificed was in vain as a second group of aircraft was being tracked approaching his carrier group.
The eight A4Q Skyhawks were on deck preparing to launch when the warning came in. Having studied enough naval history (particularly the battle of midway) the carriers captain knew that having fuelled and armed aircraft on deck during an air attack was a serious risk and so ordered them to be launched. His flight deck officer informed him that not all of the Skyhawks could be launched on the single catapult in the time they had remaining. Therefore, he was ordered to begin getting as many aircraft into the air as possible while getting the rest into the relative protection of the hanger via the aft aircraft lift. Unfortunately for the 25 DE MAYO certain maintenance chickens came home to roost on the flight deck at the worst possible time.
This second Buccaneer anti shipping strike began much the same as the first. The Blue Parrot radar detected three surface contacts and the Buccaneers dived down to 200ft while the Phantoms held back out of range of the Sea Dart. From their previous exercises against their own TYPE 42 destroyers the aircrews knew that to have the best chance of surviving they had to stay as low as possible and when they popped up into the Sea Dart engagement envelope they had had to launch and get back down and preferably away as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, Sea Dart had a longer range than Martel but the two destroyers could only fire two missiles at a time meaning that they couldn’t hit all the attacking Buccaneers in one go. It was unknown how long the Argentine crews would take to reload the launchers but it was felt that they would probably be a bit slower than a well practised RN crew. The exercises had shown that even against RN ships this gap between salvos would be enough time for the surviving aircraft to bring the attack to its conclusion.
White’s 1-4 were the first to pop up and their instruments read that the ASM’s had identified their target frequencies and were ready for launch. The Blue Parrot radars were now able to see the Argentine ships again and worryingly their threat receivers were lighting up to show that they were being painted by fire control radars. Once the missiles had been launched they dove down to the surface again and turned for home but not before they heard the chilling tones from their ESM system that told them that there were missiles now in flight. The TYPE 42 destroyers had launched four Sea Darts at the attacking aircraft when they had first popped up and showed up on the argentine radar screens. However, when in the space of a few seconds four air contacts had become twelve then back down to eight fast moving contacts (The buccaneers had gone back down below radar height) the Ops room operators attempted to direct the now in flight Sea Darts onto the incoming missiles. While the earlier versions of the Sea Dart were not designed to engage relatively low flying and low radar cross section targets they did nevertheless manage to bring down two of the subsonic Martel’s. Unfortunately, this left three missiles homing towards the radar emissions from each ship. Both ships sustained hits and resulting 150kg warhead detonations to the Type 909 Radars mounted atop the forward superstructure and hanger and to the Type 992 radar atop the mainmast.
The impacts and detonations left the ships superstructures and hangers ablaze and on both ships the bridge and command teams were wiped out by the impact upon the forward Type 909.
ARA SANTISIMA TRINIDAD eventually capsized over to port after taking on water through a shattered HP saltwater ringmain system and other damaged valves taking 57 men with her.
ARA HERCULES burned and was abandoned. She remained afloat for several days afterwards and some efforts were made to recover her and take her under tow. Ultimately, she sank in rough weather after shipping water through her damaged and now open superstructure.
White’s 5-6 now popped up and launched their TV guided Martel’s. To their immense relief their ECM systems and threat warnings remained silent indicating that the TYPE 42 destroyers were no longer a threat. The eight TV guided missiles were successfully launched and once again when they began the terminal phase of their flight were manually guided towards their target by the Observers.
Like most aircraft carriers at the time ARA VEINTICINCO DE MAYO did not have her own SAM system. Being a child of the second world war though she was equipped with twelve 40mm AA guns. Sadly, these manually operated weapons were of little help against the fast-moving missiles. Despite the best efforts of the flight deck crew most of the A4Q’s were still on the deck when the missiles arrived. The single steam catapult was rather elderly and in need of an overhaul. Unfortunately, in a cruel twist of fate the catapult had been designed and built by a British company meaning that Argentina had been unable to procure the necessary expertise or replacement parts for the work. When they had tried to launch the first Skyhawk the catapult had not been able to generate enough steam pressure indicating that there was a leak somewhere. If the deck crew had had time to remove the bombs for the intended anti shipping strike then the reduced steam pressure wouldn’t have been a problem however there hadn’t been the time meaning that this particular problem had resulted in fully fuelled and armed Skyhawks still on deck with personnel desperately trying to get them below.
A total of six missiles struck the elderly light carrier. Four of these struck the flight deck along the starboard beam. The resulting secondary explosions from the ignition of fuelled aircraft on deck resulted in major fires made worse by the fact that most of the deck crews who would have fought the fires having been killed.
A fifth missile struck the carriers island superstructure resulting in the death of Rear Admiral Allara and other senior officers.
The sixth and final Martel is judged by historians and naval architects to have been the “killer blow”. The missile impacted just above the waterline on the seal between two hull plates blowing open a gap that allowed water to rush in. Damage control efforts were seriously hampered by the incapacitation of the ships command team when the island was hit and was anyway primarily focused on the fires blazing on the upper decks. The fires only got worse when the ordinance on deck began to cook off (explode due to heat) penetrating the flight deck and causing a major hanger fire.
When the USS FORRESTAL suffered a fire in 1967 she had been nearly sunk due to the sheer amount of water from the fire fighting efforts that had collected on the lower decks. Aboard the burning DE MAYO the same effect was taking place not helped by the actual flooding from the sixth missile hit. From interviews with survivors its been estimated that more water was probably being pumped onboard to fight the fires than was being pumped out from the compartments around the hull breach.
No formal order to abandon ship was given but most surviving crew saw they were rapidly losing the battle to save the ship and began to make their way to the surviving life rafts and off of the ship. Survivors would later tell harrowing story’s of struggling to find their way through smoke filled passageways, seeing paint bubble and melt off glowing red bulkheads and hearing the desperate cries for help of many men trapped below decks by fire while rising water slowly creeped towards them.
In a black day for the Argentine Navy in the first carrier on carrier action since the second world war all three ships of TG 79.1 were lost along with their commander and over 900 sailors.
Between the Nimrod and intermittent passive sonar contact from the submarine HMS SPLENDID a total of six ships had been identified. It was felt highly likely by the British that one of these was the Argentine carrier ARA VEINTICINO DE MAYO plus her escorts likely to be Argentina’s pair of TYPE 42 DESTROYERS. The second group was felt likely to be comprised of French built DRUMMOND class corvettes equipped with Exocet SSM’s.
Both of these groups were tracked heading east towards the Task Force and were judged to present a threat and could therefore be engaged under the newly amended ROE. This was especially true in the case of the carrier but the problem was no one could tell for certain which group she was.
It had been decided that the best course of action would be to attack both groups. To this end nearly the entire air group had been launched from HMS EAGLE.
The two strike groups each consisted of eight Buccaneers carrying Martel ASM’s escorted by four Phantoms. There had been a lot of concern about leaving behind just six Phantoms to protect the Task Force but the Buccaneers would need to be protected from any CAP around the Argentine carrier and the possibility that the Argentines may have shore based fighters providing extra protection could not be completely discounted. The argument that Buccaneers were worth their weight in gold and any serious losses amongst them would seriously jeopardise the entire operation had won out.
Each Buccaneer carried two AS-37 Martel missiles. The Martel itself had two versions an anti-radiation version and TV guided version. Half of the Buccaneers were carrying the ARM’s and the other half the TV guided missiles.
Ironically the ships of the Argentine carrier group were all British built. The DE MAYO herself was the former HMS VENERABLE a colossus class light carrier built in the last days of the second world war and sold to the Royal Netherlands Navy where she had served as HNLMS KAREL DOORMAN before ultimately being passed on to Argentina. The TYPE 42 destroyers were both British designed and one was even British built and were practically identical to the ones within the British Task Force.
During the transit South from the UK multiple simulated attacks had been carried out against the British TYPE 42’s. These exercises had gradually increased in scope and challenge culminating in a success full attack on HMS INVINCIBLE which was protected by TYPE 42’s and Sea Harriers (The INVINCIBLE was felt to be the closest equivalent to the DE MAYO and the Sea Harrier to the Argentine A4 Skyhawks. The aircrews were confident that they could mount a successful strike against the older and less capable argentine carrier and aircraft.
From the results of these exercises it had been determined that the best way to attack the Argentines would be with stand-off weapons and a distance. The anti-radiation version of the Martel had to be preprogramed before flight to search for a specific radio frequency. The ASM’s being used in this operation had been programmed to seek out the 992 target indication radar and 909 fire control radars carried aboard the TYPE 42. The carrier itself was known to only be equipped with AA guns for air defence and so would be dealt with by the TV guided Martel’s and the Phantoms would deal with any Argentine aircraft.
TG 79.4, Vicinity of 4780S 5890W
Being closer to the Task Force the three DRUMMOND class corvettes were the first to be attacked by the Buccaneers callsigns Black 1-8 Covered by Phantoms Callsign Silver 1-4.
The plan was for the ASM equipped Buccaneers Blacks 1-4 to lead the way and launch first to suppress the ships air defences to allow for the TV guided Martel equipped Buccaneers Blacks 5-8 to have a clearer shot.
Upon detecting surface contacts to the west of them on their Blue Parrot radars the Buccaneers transmitted the call “Tally Ho” (Enemy sighted) and dove down to their attack height of just 200ft turning onto an attack heading. The Phantoms remained further back at a higher altitude scanning for any possible air contacts. At just over 38 miles from target Blue Parrot began the process of “slaving” the TV Martel’s onto their individual targets.
ASM equipped Black’s 1-4 were the first to “pop up” to an altitude of 2000 ft. This was considered the most dangerous part of an attack as they would be within the engagement envelope of an SAM’s. An unfortunate necessity given that Martel was not a sea skimming missile.
Having popped up the Observers in the back seats reported that their instruments weren’t detecting any of radar emissions consistent with Type 992 or 909. That meant that the ASM’s would not be able to lock onto a target but also meant that they were most likely engaging the DRUMMOND class corvettes rather than the carrier group. Without targets they could launch at Black’s 1-4 aborted their attack run and turned away from the Argentine ships.
Black’s 5-8 were next to pop up and launched the eight TV guided Martel’s in two waves of four a few seconds apart (the interval was necessary as the observer would only be able to control one missile at a time). The missiles rapidly closed their targets at an altitude of 2000ft while the Buccaneers were forced to climb even higher into a potential SAM engagement envelope to ensure that the datalink pods would be able to maintain contact with the missiles. After closing most of the distance in automatic mode the missiles switched themselves over to manual control for the terminal phase of their flight profile. During this phase the observer of each aircraft looked at a small television display on the floor between his legs and used a small joystick to guide his missile onto its target.
The DRUMMOND class corvettes ARA DRUMMOND, ARA GUERRICO and ARA GRANVILLE were intended as ASUW and ASW platforms and were not equipped with any kind of SAM system relying instead on guns for air defence. The radars on the ships had detected and been tracking the British aircraft before they even started their attack. The captain of ARA DRUMMOND and group commander Captain Juan Calmon had signalled HQ in Puerto Belgrano and the carrier group that he was under air attack. With the Buccaneers never coming anywhere near enough to engage before they launched Captain Calmon ordered his ships to turn west and present their sterns to the incoming missiles. This was in order to present as smaller target as possible and give his ships 20mm Oerlikon automatic guns and other AA guns the clearest possible field of fire.
Unfortunately for Captain Calmon the odds stacked against him were simply to great. One Martel was destroyed by AA fire from ARA GUERRICO however the next 5 missiles all scored hits with the final two overshooting their targets due to a combination smoke obscuring the TV cameras narrow field of vision and a lack of recent operator experience. ARA GRANVLLIE sustained two hits and practically was practically obliterated due to secondary explosions when one of the Martel’s struck her SSM launcher detonating the Exocets. ARA GUERRICO also sustained two hits and burned fiercely before going down by the stern after taking on water as a result of hull buckling caused by the force of the impacts.
ARA DRUMMOND was “fortunate” in sustaining only one Martel strike on her stern. While the ship did not immediately sink she drifted burning and without power. Her crew were eventually forced by fire to abandon her but were able to transmit a distress call and Captain Calmon would later be awarded one of Argentina’s highest military honours for his role in ensuring the survival of not only his own crew but many from the other two ships until they were rescued days later. A total of 146 men perished as a result of the sinkings.
TG 79.1, 4850S 6000W
The eight Buccaneers callsign White 1-8 and four Phantoms Gold 1-4 now knew that they would be attacking the Argentine carrier group and thus would be having a much harder time of things. The attack profile would be largely the same with the White’s 1-4 launching ASM’s to suppress the Type 42’s, White’s 5-8 using TV guided Martel’s to finish off the ships and Gold’s 1-4 providing top cover.
Post conflict analysis by multiple military investigations and historians showed that at this stage the carrier group commander Rear Admiral Jorge Allara was unaware of the fate of the Submarine ARA SAN LUIS or the ARA GENERAL BELGRANO and her accompanying destroyers. None of these units had been able to transmit distress calls or give any indication that they were under attack. Allara was however aware that the S-2 Tracker that had gone missing earlier in the day had likely been shot down by the British and that his screening force TG 79.4 had come under air attack.
It is interesting that Allara continued to steam east in preparation for a planned air attack by his A4Q Skyhawks. Most historians believe this to be down to two reasons. Allara not knowing of what had befallen the other naval units involved in Operation Martillo believed that the operation was proceeding as planned and to withdraw for no reason would only expose the other units to greater danger. Part of the TG79.4 screening force job (Though for obvious reasons he had not explained this to them) had been to act as a sacrificial lamb and draw the British carrier aircraft away from his own group giving him a window of opportunity. While they certainly had in part accomplished this their being sacrificed was in vain as a second group of aircraft was being tracked approaching his carrier group.
The eight A4Q Skyhawks were on deck preparing to launch when the warning came in. Having studied enough naval history (particularly the battle of midway) the carriers captain knew that having fuelled and armed aircraft on deck during an air attack was a serious risk and so ordered them to be launched. His flight deck officer informed him that not all of the Skyhawks could be launched on the single catapult in the time they had remaining. Therefore, he was ordered to begin getting as many aircraft into the air as possible while getting the rest into the relative protection of the hanger via the aft aircraft lift. Unfortunately for the 25 DE MAYO certain maintenance chickens came home to roost on the flight deck at the worst possible time.
This second Buccaneer anti shipping strike began much the same as the first. The Blue Parrot radar detected three surface contacts and the Buccaneers dived down to 200ft while the Phantoms held back out of range of the Sea Dart. From their previous exercises against their own TYPE 42 destroyers the aircrews knew that to have the best chance of surviving they had to stay as low as possible and when they popped up into the Sea Dart engagement envelope they had had to launch and get back down and preferably away as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, Sea Dart had a longer range than Martel but the two destroyers could only fire two missiles at a time meaning that they couldn’t hit all the attacking Buccaneers in one go. It was unknown how long the Argentine crews would take to reload the launchers but it was felt that they would probably be a bit slower than a well practised RN crew. The exercises had shown that even against RN ships this gap between salvos would be enough time for the surviving aircraft to bring the attack to its conclusion.
White’s 1-4 were the first to pop up and their instruments read that the ASM’s had identified their target frequencies and were ready for launch. The Blue Parrot radars were now able to see the Argentine ships again and worryingly their threat receivers were lighting up to show that they were being painted by fire control radars. Once the missiles had been launched they dove down to the surface again and turned for home but not before they heard the chilling tones from their ESM system that told them that there were missiles now in flight. The TYPE 42 destroyers had launched four Sea Darts at the attacking aircraft when they had first popped up and showed up on the argentine radar screens. However, when in the space of a few seconds four air contacts had become twelve then back down to eight fast moving contacts (The buccaneers had gone back down below radar height) the Ops room operators attempted to direct the now in flight Sea Darts onto the incoming missiles. While the earlier versions of the Sea Dart were not designed to engage relatively low flying and low radar cross section targets they did nevertheless manage to bring down two of the subsonic Martel’s. Unfortunately, this left three missiles homing towards the radar emissions from each ship. Both ships sustained hits and resulting 150kg warhead detonations to the Type 909 Radars mounted atop the forward superstructure and hanger and to the Type 992 radar atop the mainmast.
The impacts and detonations left the ships superstructures and hangers ablaze and on both ships the bridge and command teams were wiped out by the impact upon the forward Type 909.
ARA SANTISIMA TRINIDAD eventually capsized over to port after taking on water through a shattered HP saltwater ringmain system and other damaged valves taking 57 men with her.
ARA HERCULES burned and was abandoned. She remained afloat for several days afterwards and some efforts were made to recover her and take her under tow. Ultimately, she sank in rough weather after shipping water through her damaged and now open superstructure.
White’s 5-6 now popped up and launched their TV guided Martel’s. To their immense relief their ECM systems and threat warnings remained silent indicating that the TYPE 42 destroyers were no longer a threat. The eight TV guided missiles were successfully launched and once again when they began the terminal phase of their flight were manually guided towards their target by the Observers.
Like most aircraft carriers at the time ARA VEINTICINCO DE MAYO did not have her own SAM system. Being a child of the second world war though she was equipped with twelve 40mm AA guns. Sadly, these manually operated weapons were of little help against the fast-moving missiles. Despite the best efforts of the flight deck crew most of the A4Q’s were still on the deck when the missiles arrived. The single steam catapult was rather elderly and in need of an overhaul. Unfortunately, in a cruel twist of fate the catapult had been designed and built by a British company meaning that Argentina had been unable to procure the necessary expertise or replacement parts for the work. When they had tried to launch the first Skyhawk the catapult had not been able to generate enough steam pressure indicating that there was a leak somewhere. If the deck crew had had time to remove the bombs for the intended anti shipping strike then the reduced steam pressure wouldn’t have been a problem however there hadn’t been the time meaning that this particular problem had resulted in fully fuelled and armed Skyhawks still on deck with personnel desperately trying to get them below.
A total of six missiles struck the elderly light carrier. Four of these struck the flight deck along the starboard beam. The resulting secondary explosions from the ignition of fuelled aircraft on deck resulted in major fires made worse by the fact that most of the deck crews who would have fought the fires having been killed.
A fifth missile struck the carriers island superstructure resulting in the death of Rear Admiral Allara and other senior officers.
The sixth and final Martel is judged by historians and naval architects to have been the “killer blow”. The missile impacted just above the waterline on the seal between two hull plates blowing open a gap that allowed water to rush in. Damage control efforts were seriously hampered by the incapacitation of the ships command team when the island was hit and was anyway primarily focused on the fires blazing on the upper decks. The fires only got worse when the ordinance on deck began to cook off (explode due to heat) penetrating the flight deck and causing a major hanger fire.
When the USS FORRESTAL suffered a fire in 1967 she had been nearly sunk due to the sheer amount of water from the fire fighting efforts that had collected on the lower decks. Aboard the burning DE MAYO the same effect was taking place not helped by the actual flooding from the sixth missile hit. From interviews with survivors its been estimated that more water was probably being pumped onboard to fight the fires than was being pumped out from the compartments around the hull breach.
No formal order to abandon ship was given but most surviving crew saw they were rapidly losing the battle to save the ship and began to make their way to the surviving life rafts and off of the ship. Survivors would later tell harrowing story’s of struggling to find their way through smoke filled passageways, seeing paint bubble and melt off glowing red bulkheads and hearing the desperate cries for help of many men trapped below decks by fire while rising water slowly creeped towards them.
In a black day for the Argentine Navy in the first carrier on carrier action since the second world war all three ships of TG 79.1 were lost along with their commander and over 900 sailors.
Are their any ships of note left in the argentine navy still alive?
Imagine the immense pressure now on the argentine airforce as they will have public and government pressure to avenge this and to attack (mostly from the public) so only option left is mass air attacks.
Are the harriers just their to protect the fleet then? As they haven't done much.
Imagine the immense pressure now on the argentine airforce as they will have public and government pressure to avenge this and to attack (mostly from the public) so only option left is mass air attacks.
Are the harriers just their to protect the fleet then? As they haven't done much.
Sorry for double post but when maradona does his hand of god the argentines will elect him now for president, and have a national holiday around it.
I also need to know the length of a Sea King with its rotors and tail folded.
That's it for the Argentinian Navy. That leaves the Air Force. But by the time the Junta has been notified of the debacle, has ordered the Air Force to strike, and the Air Force has managed to both get a strike ready and get a fix on the RN's task force's position, the strike that sunk the carrier will be recovered and the fleet guarded by more Phantoms again. Looks like a Turkey Shot is coming up.
I think you’re right - it’s been a potent reminder of Why We Have Carriers.
The TAM's chassis is that of an IFV, the german Marder. Not much armour there. Don't know if the Scimitar's 30mm could kill it to the front (probably rear, maybe sides?) but I very much doubt it would resist the Scorpion's 76mm HESH shells
Don't forget AAA and SAMs...
That's an interesting idea that might have significant butterflies given the timing. I wonder if a UK requirement for carrier capable aircraft would have been enough to keep French involvement in earlier stages of what became Eurofighter. And if by some miracle that ends up working out, an anglo-french carrier development programme might not be off the cards either.
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Good points. Maybe my memory is playing tricks, but I do seem to remember some discussions on a UK/french joint carrier project, way before the french decided on the Charles de Gaulle...
Considering the cost of developing, entirely for the UK, a CV version of the Eurofighter (since France was allready on the path for the Rafale), I doubt the UK would do it. I'd say it's more likey that a 1990s UK CV would fly F-18s. Or maybe the Rafale.