Ghastly Victories: The United States in the World Wars
- Thread starter RamscoopRaider
- Start date
Truth.
More importantly though is that Richthofen won't let Hitler browbeat him into changing his strategy mid-way through the battle, he would most likely resign if given orders that would bring only harm to the Luftwaffe.
Honestly I wondering how spent of a force the ITL British are going to be once this war is over.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Inline engine, rough performance of a BF-109F in initial variants, development potential roughly equal to the BF-109 series, current armament 1 20mm cannon in nose, 1 13mm machine gun in each wing, with room for wing guns to be upgunned to 20mm and 2 cowl mounted machine guns
No further description, I keep things vague to avoid any obviousfails
And for other aircraft
The British Headsman is very similar to a Gloster Gladiator
The Bandit is a Boulton Paul Defiant but slightly higher performance
The Glaive has performance similar to a Hawker Hurricane but has different enough wings you won't mistake it for one
The Warhawk will be a Typhoon/Tempest equivalent
So no Alt-Spitfire? Fucking hell what the hell was British aviation up to during the interwar period with an extra year to prep TTL even?
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Everybody is behind by 1-2 years in aviation. Longer WWI screwed everyone in this way
Buying more bombers than OTL that got scrapped without seeing combat and getting into even more viscous political fights with the RN over funding and control of the FAA. In this specific case I mentioned way back in part 5-38 that the British wanted to "skip a generation", build an adequate monoplane (*Hurricane) and then build a world beater (*Typhoon) without building a very good monoplane (*Spitfire) in between to get the world beater faster
How much more irrational/stupider percentage-wise would you describe the occupants of TTL compared to ours?
RamscoopRaider
Donor
They aren't any stupider/more irrational
The British made a decision in the context where any war with the Germans would have the French as an ally and that German bases are too far away for escorted bomber attacks on the UK and liable to stay that way, so a temporary degreee of aerial inferiority was not a major problem. That decision proved to be wrong, but the idea that France could fall in seven weeks and Germany could have bases on the Channel shortly afterward would have been seen as lunacy. Without that they wouldn't be in a situation where they are having to press *Gauntlets against *BF 109s
The lack of a Spitfire equivalent is in the short term not too much of a problem. The early model aircraft were not that far apart in performance, to the point where pilot quality being the defining factor, with the Hurricane equipped 303 sqdrn having a better K:L ratio than any spitfire unit in OTL. Long term the Spitfire had a lot more growth potential with later units blowing away BoB models
The real short term problem is that ITTL the UK never really developed an equivalent of the Dowding system and that is what is screwing them up. And that is mostly due to chance and different personnel in different places, not irrationality/stupidity
Part 6-52 Iron Eagle, Setting Sun, Before the Storm
RamscoopRaider
Donor
…The rapid nature of the victory over France stunned the Wehrmacht. What they thought was going to be a long slog with an inevitable defeat at the end turned into a brilliant victory within two months. That the victory came from a return to the German Army’s pre WWI roots in Bewegungskrieg was even better and served to bolster their level of confidence even more. Everyone claimed responsibility for a key part of the victory and everyone believed that the sky was the limit. The French had the second best army in the world and they beat them in six weeks, if they could do that they could do anything…
…The Battle of France finally revealed to the Wehrmacht that the Panzer force was an arm of decision of its own and not merely an adjunct to the infantry. The Panzers could be used for decisive effect on their own and had been so used to great success. The Panzerwaffe received enormous prestige and became the symbol of German military might and martial success. In consequence t moved from being a middling priority as far as resource allocation went to a much higher one…
…After the fall of France the decision was made to increase the Panzerwaffe to 25 Panzer divisions. This was partly due to the increased prestige of the Panzerwaffe, partly due to the increased role foreseen for the Panzer Divisions, partly due to Hitler’s desire for large numbers and partly due to simple practicality. The Battle of France had shown that the Panzer divisions had too few supporting troops for the number of Panzers that they had and the Panzers sometimes suffered unnecessarily heavy losses because of this.
Rather than add support troops to each division it was decided to reduce the strength of each Panzer division to a single regiment of Panzers and to increase the number from 14 to 25, in addition to forming a number of independent units and attaching a battalion to of tanks to 7 motorized infantry divisions to upgrade them to Panzergrenadier divisions. A similar expansion of the motorized infantry was also planned however there was a lack of motor transportation even with the looting of French vehicle parks and with the Panzers having high priority ordinary infantry units were left behind…
…The Battle of France had shown that the German panzer force was significantly deficient in quality. The Panzer VG “bunker buster” was their best machine, but even it found itself lacking the armor to deal with the newest British and French anti-tank guns and the firepower to deal with the newest British and French infantry tanks. Other models of Mark V performed even more poorly and the IV, III, 38(t) and 35(t) ranged from inadequate, in the case of the 38(t), to death traps in the case of the Mark III.
Experience showed that Germany would need 4 types of Panzer to replace their current fleet. A fast scout Panzer, a general purpose medium, a spearhead heavy and a fortress destroying super heavy. The first would need to have roughly the firepower and protection of the current Mark VG with far greater mobility, the second greater mobility than the Mark V with an 88mm class gun and ability to resist fire from an 88mm at long range, the third mobility similar to a Mark V but with a gun a class up from an 88mm and the ability to resist an 88mm at point blank range and the final a massive 120mm+ weapon and the ability to resist heavy field artillery.
This however was far too ambitious for the near future. As a stopgap the next generation would consist of an uparmored Mark V with a longer barreled 7.5cm gun as a medium, a light Mark VII with a high velocity 5cm gun and resistance to 4.7cm class weapons, a heavy Mark VIII with a standard 88mm and resistance to the same at range, and a super heavy Mark IX with a 105mm gun and functional immunity to 88mm class weapons…
…The Battle of France had reinforced the need for more self-propelled guns in the German Army, not just infantry support weapons but anti-tank weapons and proper artillery so that the Panzer divisions and motorized infantry would have proper fire support without losing the benefit of mobility.
With the Panzer III to be moved out of combat units they were available for conversion to Tank Destroyers. In that role they would be supplemented by more powerful anti-tank guns on captured French tractors and on surplus Panzer IV or 38(t) chassis as production of the designs converted to recon variants in preparation for replacement by the Panzer VII in 1943.
For assault guns the existing turretless variant of the Panzer V would be procured in greater number, supplemented by a variant of the 38(t) with a 15cm infantry support howitzer. Proper artillery support would be provided by 10.5cm howitzers on Panzer IV chassis and 15cm howitzers on Panzer V. Supplemental self-propelled artillery would take the form of rocket launchers on halftrack chassis
With the exception of the tank destroyers, the Sturmgeschutz V and the halftracks production of these weapons did not start in large scale until 1943…
…With the defeat of the French the Germans captured two very important pieces of military research. The first was the French research into Sabot rounds to improve their older anti-tank guns, the second was their copy of the American 3” infantry rocket, one the French had hastily grafted a shaped charge warhead on to create a last ditch AT weapon…
-Excerpt from The Iron Blooded Eagle, Germany in WWII, Bishop Press, New York, 2000
…The Invasion Panic, while less crippling than the Fall of France itself or the Battle of Britain, was still a crippling blow the Empire could ill afford and one that was completely unneeded. The Royal Navy had a far greater margin of superiority over the Kriegsmarine than it ever had over the Kaiserliche Marine and there was no concern about an invasion then. If even a handful of British Captains showed a sliver of Nelson’s spirit then any German invasion would be defeated in a sea of blood and the Germans were aware of this. The Royal Navy reported that there was no potential of a German invasion before 1943 given the odds at sea and lack of preparation, and the secret service concurred. That the government chose to ignore this was a mistake with great consequences…
…In the rush to prepare against an invasion that would not come the changeover to a new generation of weaponry was paused mid stride, not only continuing to produce obsolete equipment but complicating logistics and preventing economics of scale in the name of short term production. The 2 pounder AT gun was built alongside the 6 pounder and the 6” 26cwt howitzer alongside the 5.5” gun howitzer that was supposed to replace it. This was most prevalent in armored vehicle production where no fewer than 6 models of tank were being built.
The first two were the Mark VII and VIII light tanks, continuing to be built after the Armoured Corps considered the type useless after the Battle of France revealed that there was nothing they could do a cheaper armored car could not. The Mark III Infantry Tank and Mark IV Cruiser were produced alongside the Mark IV Infantry Tank and Mark V Cruiser, despite the latter being better armored and having the option of a 6 pounder rather than a 2 pounder gun. Admittedly there was some cause to keep the older Cruiser and Infantry tanks in production given that the newer models had major suspension issues, but the nature of the panic prevented those issues from being looked at until after hundreds of each had been produced…
…The Invasion Panic led to a severe lack of resources for North Africa, with the early deliveries of heavy equipment from Commonwealth donations and the stripping of India proving entirely inadequate…
…The Home Guard, for all the fond memories, was given far too many resources. While vital for purposes of morale a significant quantity of scarce resources were used to bolster an ultimately unnecessary organization. The story of the Pikes and Maces is well known, 500,000 of each produced to a standard pattern on the insistence of Churchill after hearing that almost 60% of the Home Guard lacked firearms. These were then delivered in October and November, after every member who felt a need had improvised their own and the unarmed members had found roles as grenadiers, drivers or heavy weapons operated. These however were but the most infamous of the boondoggles in arming the Home Guard.
The Home Guard Shotgun while a cheap and easy to produce weapons and useful for morale purposes should not have been kept in production into 1943, and the Home Guard Rifle, inferior in most respects to the old Martini-Henry, should have never been made let alone seen 400,000 produced at a time the Regular Army lacked a working semi-automatic rifle, having had to switch to a bolt action after the failure of the Model 39. The situation for pistols was no better and for all the weapons that were actually issued thousands of skilled manhours were wasted on various prototypes, including muskets, air guns and even crossbows that could have been used developing real weapons.
The situation in heavier weapons was even more of a travesty with only the dubiously effective 3” AA rockets, “John Boy” Grenade launcher and the “Hoover” Pneumatic AA mortar actually in service by fall of 1941, with the other designs not even starting to be built until late 1942, well after there was any need for them…
…Rationing in Britain began in 1940 with the start of the war but only started to effect food by 1941 and only limited varieties until the Fall of France. After the Fall of France rationing tightened and only fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, bread and a few odds and ends were left unrationed, a situation that would only get worse by wars end…
…Rationing would only end in 1980 after a 40 year period that saw a generation reach middle age with it as a constant factor…
…By Fall of 1941 the resources of the British Empire were strained to their utmost and the decision was made to go hat in hand to the United States. It was a decision that would ruin the Empire, yet thanks to Hitler it was the only possible one…
-A Setting Sun, the Decline and Fall of the British Empire, Bodley Head, Nottingham, 2015
…The Battle of France was a terrifying revelation to the United States Army. Ever since the Revolution the US had seen the French Army as the acme of skill in land based warfare. That it was destroyed, and in six weeks no less, was purely terrifying. That the US Army was in many ways a copy of the French Army made that all the worse, for whatever weaknesses the French had the US probably shared. The US Army would need to completely reevaluate its tactical, operational and organizational practices in light of these new revelations.
An enormous series of wargames and field exercise were scheduled to start developing and testing the new changes…
…There were three major deficiencies identified with the equipment of the US Army, in addition to a host of minor ones, anti-armor, mobile anti-aircraft, and mobile artillery.
In the case of the first the US Army had standardized on a French 25mm towed AT gun, without any ancillary weapons. The 25mm had proved inadequate in France and that the US only issued 3 guns per battalion with no higher reserve meant that even if the guns were useful they would not be concentrated enough to stop an armored fist. The US needed a better anti-tank gun, it needed that anti-tank gun to be mobile and it needed reserves of them. As a stop gap 75mm field guns in storage were converted to AT guns and mounted on halftracks to form independent battalions to be held in reserve and the infantry were issued with AT rifles to supplement their AT guns. As a medium term solution a license for the British 6 pounder was purchased, at an inflated price to subsidize the British, to provide an adequate towed anti-tank gun and in addition to a 3 per battalion issue each regiment would have a 9 gun company and each division headquarters an additional 3 gun platoon. For the longer term design work began on a series of fast full tracked tank destroyers, open topped and lightly armored but with a rotating turret and a powerful new 76mm gun. These would be formed into battalions and brigades as a mobile first available to army group commanders to counter any massed armored attacks.
In the case of anti-aircraft weaponry, while the new 90mm was judged as sufficient for heavy AA in concert with the prototype 120mm, the 25mm Bofors autocannon, .60 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns used for light AA were judged as both lacking in mobility to cover mobile troops against dive bombers and lacking the range and firepower to stop them. A longer range piece with greater firepower was needed and one was available, the 40mm counterpart to the 25mm Bofors the Army was already using. With the Navy already having a license expanding production to a land based variant was simple. New half-track mounts were to be designed for both the 40mm and the existing 25mm cannon and .60 caliber machine guns.
Finally there was the case of artillery. France had shown that mobile forces were needed for counterattacks, and those forces needed considerable firepower. While the United States possessed a superb train of towed artillery, this was all towed. A fully tracked 105mm gun was to be developed based on the standard medium tank chassis, as a first step, with larger guns to follow…
…As summer of 1941 turned to fall the British financial situation grew more desperate. This was problematic for the United States as it was felt by the establishment in both parties that it was in the interests of the United States for Britain to keep fighting Germany, and thus to aid Britain. At the same point the Neutrality Acts tied American hands, money could not be loaned to belligerents who had previously defaulted on American war loans. Even if they had Britain had precious little unencumbered collateral and no private business would risk an unsecured loan to a belligerent who had already defaulted from a much better position. A government to government loan would be needed, yet public opinion was firmly against that at this point.
As a stopgap President McNutt arranged for the sale of a large amount of war equipment to Britain at less than scrap value to allow Britain to stretch out its reserves of hard currency. This however could only do so much and did nothing to stem the amounts Britain was forced to spend on new arms and raw materials. A workaround was needed.
Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace proposed one such. He pointed out that Britain was importing food from the United States, and paying for that with hard currency. If the United States organized a food aid program, that could save the British currency, support American farmers and be easier to get through Congress. This was taken as the basis for the Wartime Food Relief Program.
Nominally open to all European countries as a sop to Congress, the verification requirements ensured that only Britain and the governments in exile in London would be eligible for it. The program provided food and auxiliary items to the UK free of charge to ensure that there was adequate nutrition for the whole population under wartime conditions. While not fully covering the food imports of the UK, or even coming close, it did free up a substantial amount of cash and included quite a few ancillary items, some of which had military value.
The program passed in October after heavy debate and was a model for a Wartime Medical Relief Program in November and a Wartime Shelter Relief Program in December. These however while useful merely kicked the can down the road. Sooner or later Britain would run out of assets to liquidate and have to cut back on her purchases, crippling her war effort. A comprehensive program was needed…
-Excerpt From Before the Storm: American Neutrality in WWII, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2000
…The Battle of France finally revealed to the Wehrmacht that the Panzer force was an arm of decision of its own and not merely an adjunct to the infantry. The Panzers could be used for decisive effect on their own and had been so used to great success. The Panzerwaffe received enormous prestige and became the symbol of German military might and martial success. In consequence t moved from being a middling priority as far as resource allocation went to a much higher one…
…After the fall of France the decision was made to increase the Panzerwaffe to 25 Panzer divisions. This was partly due to the increased prestige of the Panzerwaffe, partly due to the increased role foreseen for the Panzer Divisions, partly due to Hitler’s desire for large numbers and partly due to simple practicality. The Battle of France had shown that the Panzer divisions had too few supporting troops for the number of Panzers that they had and the Panzers sometimes suffered unnecessarily heavy losses because of this.
Rather than add support troops to each division it was decided to reduce the strength of each Panzer division to a single regiment of Panzers and to increase the number from 14 to 25, in addition to forming a number of independent units and attaching a battalion to of tanks to 7 motorized infantry divisions to upgrade them to Panzergrenadier divisions. A similar expansion of the motorized infantry was also planned however there was a lack of motor transportation even with the looting of French vehicle parks and with the Panzers having high priority ordinary infantry units were left behind…
…The Battle of France had shown that the German panzer force was significantly deficient in quality. The Panzer VG “bunker buster” was their best machine, but even it found itself lacking the armor to deal with the newest British and French anti-tank guns and the firepower to deal with the newest British and French infantry tanks. Other models of Mark V performed even more poorly and the IV, III, 38(t) and 35(t) ranged from inadequate, in the case of the 38(t), to death traps in the case of the Mark III.
Experience showed that Germany would need 4 types of Panzer to replace their current fleet. A fast scout Panzer, a general purpose medium, a spearhead heavy and a fortress destroying super heavy. The first would need to have roughly the firepower and protection of the current Mark VG with far greater mobility, the second greater mobility than the Mark V with an 88mm class gun and ability to resist fire from an 88mm at long range, the third mobility similar to a Mark V but with a gun a class up from an 88mm and the ability to resist an 88mm at point blank range and the final a massive 120mm+ weapon and the ability to resist heavy field artillery.
This however was far too ambitious for the near future. As a stopgap the next generation would consist of an uparmored Mark V with a longer barreled 7.5cm gun as a medium, a light Mark VII with a high velocity 5cm gun and resistance to 4.7cm class weapons, a heavy Mark VIII with a standard 88mm and resistance to the same at range, and a super heavy Mark IX with a 105mm gun and functional immunity to 88mm class weapons…
…The Battle of France had reinforced the need for more self-propelled guns in the German Army, not just infantry support weapons but anti-tank weapons and proper artillery so that the Panzer divisions and motorized infantry would have proper fire support without losing the benefit of mobility.
With the Panzer III to be moved out of combat units they were available for conversion to Tank Destroyers. In that role they would be supplemented by more powerful anti-tank guns on captured French tractors and on surplus Panzer IV or 38(t) chassis as production of the designs converted to recon variants in preparation for replacement by the Panzer VII in 1943.
For assault guns the existing turretless variant of the Panzer V would be procured in greater number, supplemented by a variant of the 38(t) with a 15cm infantry support howitzer. Proper artillery support would be provided by 10.5cm howitzers on Panzer IV chassis and 15cm howitzers on Panzer V. Supplemental self-propelled artillery would take the form of rocket launchers on halftrack chassis
With the exception of the tank destroyers, the Sturmgeschutz V and the halftracks production of these weapons did not start in large scale until 1943…
…With the defeat of the French the Germans captured two very important pieces of military research. The first was the French research into Sabot rounds to improve their older anti-tank guns, the second was their copy of the American 3” infantry rocket, one the French had hastily grafted a shaped charge warhead on to create a last ditch AT weapon…
-Excerpt from The Iron Blooded Eagle, Germany in WWII, Bishop Press, New York, 2000
…The Invasion Panic, while less crippling than the Fall of France itself or the Battle of Britain, was still a crippling blow the Empire could ill afford and one that was completely unneeded. The Royal Navy had a far greater margin of superiority over the Kriegsmarine than it ever had over the Kaiserliche Marine and there was no concern about an invasion then. If even a handful of British Captains showed a sliver of Nelson’s spirit then any German invasion would be defeated in a sea of blood and the Germans were aware of this. The Royal Navy reported that there was no potential of a German invasion before 1943 given the odds at sea and lack of preparation, and the secret service concurred. That the government chose to ignore this was a mistake with great consequences…
…In the rush to prepare against an invasion that would not come the changeover to a new generation of weaponry was paused mid stride, not only continuing to produce obsolete equipment but complicating logistics and preventing economics of scale in the name of short term production. The 2 pounder AT gun was built alongside the 6 pounder and the 6” 26cwt howitzer alongside the 5.5” gun howitzer that was supposed to replace it. This was most prevalent in armored vehicle production where no fewer than 6 models of tank were being built.
The first two were the Mark VII and VIII light tanks, continuing to be built after the Armoured Corps considered the type useless after the Battle of France revealed that there was nothing they could do a cheaper armored car could not. The Mark III Infantry Tank and Mark IV Cruiser were produced alongside the Mark IV Infantry Tank and Mark V Cruiser, despite the latter being better armored and having the option of a 6 pounder rather than a 2 pounder gun. Admittedly there was some cause to keep the older Cruiser and Infantry tanks in production given that the newer models had major suspension issues, but the nature of the panic prevented those issues from being looked at until after hundreds of each had been produced…
…The Invasion Panic led to a severe lack of resources for North Africa, with the early deliveries of heavy equipment from Commonwealth donations and the stripping of India proving entirely inadequate…
…The Home Guard, for all the fond memories, was given far too many resources. While vital for purposes of morale a significant quantity of scarce resources were used to bolster an ultimately unnecessary organization. The story of the Pikes and Maces is well known, 500,000 of each produced to a standard pattern on the insistence of Churchill after hearing that almost 60% of the Home Guard lacked firearms. These were then delivered in October and November, after every member who felt a need had improvised their own and the unarmed members had found roles as grenadiers, drivers or heavy weapons operated. These however were but the most infamous of the boondoggles in arming the Home Guard.
The Home Guard Shotgun while a cheap and easy to produce weapons and useful for morale purposes should not have been kept in production into 1943, and the Home Guard Rifle, inferior in most respects to the old Martini-Henry, should have never been made let alone seen 400,000 produced at a time the Regular Army lacked a working semi-automatic rifle, having had to switch to a bolt action after the failure of the Model 39. The situation for pistols was no better and for all the weapons that were actually issued thousands of skilled manhours were wasted on various prototypes, including muskets, air guns and even crossbows that could have been used developing real weapons.
The situation in heavier weapons was even more of a travesty with only the dubiously effective 3” AA rockets, “John Boy” Grenade launcher and the “Hoover” Pneumatic AA mortar actually in service by fall of 1941, with the other designs not even starting to be built until late 1942, well after there was any need for them…
…Rationing in Britain began in 1940 with the start of the war but only started to effect food by 1941 and only limited varieties until the Fall of France. After the Fall of France rationing tightened and only fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, bread and a few odds and ends were left unrationed, a situation that would only get worse by wars end…
…Rationing would only end in 1980 after a 40 year period that saw a generation reach middle age with it as a constant factor…
…By Fall of 1941 the resources of the British Empire were strained to their utmost and the decision was made to go hat in hand to the United States. It was a decision that would ruin the Empire, yet thanks to Hitler it was the only possible one…
-A Setting Sun, the Decline and Fall of the British Empire, Bodley Head, Nottingham, 2015
…The Battle of France was a terrifying revelation to the United States Army. Ever since the Revolution the US had seen the French Army as the acme of skill in land based warfare. That it was destroyed, and in six weeks no less, was purely terrifying. That the US Army was in many ways a copy of the French Army made that all the worse, for whatever weaknesses the French had the US probably shared. The US Army would need to completely reevaluate its tactical, operational and organizational practices in light of these new revelations.
An enormous series of wargames and field exercise were scheduled to start developing and testing the new changes…
…There were three major deficiencies identified with the equipment of the US Army, in addition to a host of minor ones, anti-armor, mobile anti-aircraft, and mobile artillery.
In the case of the first the US Army had standardized on a French 25mm towed AT gun, without any ancillary weapons. The 25mm had proved inadequate in France and that the US only issued 3 guns per battalion with no higher reserve meant that even if the guns were useful they would not be concentrated enough to stop an armored fist. The US needed a better anti-tank gun, it needed that anti-tank gun to be mobile and it needed reserves of them. As a stop gap 75mm field guns in storage were converted to AT guns and mounted on halftracks to form independent battalions to be held in reserve and the infantry were issued with AT rifles to supplement their AT guns. As a medium term solution a license for the British 6 pounder was purchased, at an inflated price to subsidize the British, to provide an adequate towed anti-tank gun and in addition to a 3 per battalion issue each regiment would have a 9 gun company and each division headquarters an additional 3 gun platoon. For the longer term design work began on a series of fast full tracked tank destroyers, open topped and lightly armored but with a rotating turret and a powerful new 76mm gun. These would be formed into battalions and brigades as a mobile first available to army group commanders to counter any massed armored attacks.
In the case of anti-aircraft weaponry, while the new 90mm was judged as sufficient for heavy AA in concert with the prototype 120mm, the 25mm Bofors autocannon, .60 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns used for light AA were judged as both lacking in mobility to cover mobile troops against dive bombers and lacking the range and firepower to stop them. A longer range piece with greater firepower was needed and one was available, the 40mm counterpart to the 25mm Bofors the Army was already using. With the Navy already having a license expanding production to a land based variant was simple. New half-track mounts were to be designed for both the 40mm and the existing 25mm cannon and .60 caliber machine guns.
Finally there was the case of artillery. France had shown that mobile forces were needed for counterattacks, and those forces needed considerable firepower. While the United States possessed a superb train of towed artillery, this was all towed. A fully tracked 105mm gun was to be developed based on the standard medium tank chassis, as a first step, with larger guns to follow…
…As summer of 1941 turned to fall the British financial situation grew more desperate. This was problematic for the United States as it was felt by the establishment in both parties that it was in the interests of the United States for Britain to keep fighting Germany, and thus to aid Britain. At the same point the Neutrality Acts tied American hands, money could not be loaned to belligerents who had previously defaulted on American war loans. Even if they had Britain had precious little unencumbered collateral and no private business would risk an unsecured loan to a belligerent who had already defaulted from a much better position. A government to government loan would be needed, yet public opinion was firmly against that at this point.
As a stopgap President McNutt arranged for the sale of a large amount of war equipment to Britain at less than scrap value to allow Britain to stretch out its reserves of hard currency. This however could only do so much and did nothing to stem the amounts Britain was forced to spend on new arms and raw materials. A workaround was needed.
Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace proposed one such. He pointed out that Britain was importing food from the United States, and paying for that with hard currency. If the United States organized a food aid program, that could save the British currency, support American farmers and be easier to get through Congress. This was taken as the basis for the Wartime Food Relief Program.
Nominally open to all European countries as a sop to Congress, the verification requirements ensured that only Britain and the governments in exile in London would be eligible for it. The program provided food and auxiliary items to the UK free of charge to ensure that there was adequate nutrition for the whole population under wartime conditions. While not fully covering the food imports of the UK, or even coming close, it did free up a substantial amount of cash and included quite a few ancillary items, some of which had military value.
The program passed in October after heavy debate and was a model for a Wartime Medical Relief Program in November and a Wartime Shelter Relief Program in December. These however while useful merely kicked the can down the road. Sooner or later Britain would run out of assets to liquidate and have to cut back on her purchases, crippling her war effort. A comprehensive program was needed…
-Excerpt From Before the Storm: American Neutrality in WWII, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2000
Holy-lee-shit rationing last till 1980? What the fuck happens to make it so the average people don't bloody riot?
Britain really is an organizational shitshow TTL.
EDIT: Another way is if Germany deploys its own equivalent of Operation Vegetarian and long-term cripples British agriculture, but I don't think there's precedence for that.
Holy shit HOW? Peacetime trade should prevent that, The only way this can happen is if Britain has such a severe falling out with America that they get embargoed post war!
EDIT: Another way is if Germany deploys its own equivalent of Operation Vegetarian and long-term cripples British agriculture, but I don't think there's precedence for that.
I think the only way rationing last that long is if the British are so fucking in the debt hole and get hit with WWIII. IIRC rationing in OTL lasted till 1954.
That said I don't think economically the British are going to be that hot going forward
RamscoopRaider
Donor
What the author doesn't mention is that from 1950-1965 and 1970-1980 rationing was basically a tool to improve the British balance of trade and not needed from a keeping people fed perspective, and that for a good deal of the period rationing was only for a few things, such as tobacco and gasoline
Even then that fact the British need to do so till 1980 to balance out their trade is absolutely insane when you realize that as bad off as they were economically OTL they were still able to full stop rationing things just fine in 1954.
Lack of Lend Lease and Churchill pissing off the Americans is my hunch.