…55 Anglo-French and Dutch divisions had been destroyed in Case Grey. Remaining were 75 divisions, responsible for holding a line from the Swiss Border to the sea, something that had required over 120 in the previous war. Worse many of these divisions had only been raised in the past month, often severely understrength and few of them were armored, mechanized or motorized. Anglo-French morale was pitiful and defeatism was rampant in both the military and civilian populations
Against them, after dealing with the need to occupy the Netherlands, screen Antwerp and secure lines of Communications the Germans could send 120 divisions against the French, admittedly not at full strength and somewhat exhausted. Among these were a solid corps of 12 Panzer and 12 motorized divisions as an armored fist to break French lines. They had excellent morale and every expectation that they would win as long as they fought.
In the air the situation remained in German favor. The French had pulled off a minor miracle and by June 10th had more fighters flying, and better ones, than on May 10th. This was mitigated by the fact that their bomber force was either destroyed or in Algeria and that the British were no longer flying save in defense of Britain itself. As such the Luftwaffe maintained air superiority over the battle front and continued to be able to bomb at will with only the accumulated wear and tear of a long campaign really harming their performance…
…The German objectives for Case Green were simple. Army Group South would probe and launch attacks of opportunity on the Maginot line to prevent the troops there from influencing the battle to the north. Army Group Center, reduced in strength by the transfer of five of its Panzer divisions and a similar number of motorized units, would attack in the direction of Reims from its position between Laon and Arlon. After breaking French lines Army Group Center would then hook east to outflank the Maginot line from behind. Army Group North, heavily reinforced with diversions from Army Group Center, would attack southwest to encircle Paris and then advance into the French heartland.
To stop this Weygand planned a defense in depth. His infantry units, reinforced with extra 75mm guns pulled out of reserve as ersatz AT guns, would form a defensive line. Rather than a single continuous line as prewar French doctrine entailed Weygand directed them to form a series of hedgehog positions in every single town, village and hamlet on the front, where they would fast and force the Germans to besiege them individually, preventing a rapid breakthrough and exploitation. His mobile reserves would then be able to counterattack and relieve the trapped infantry after the Germans were exhausted. This plan depended on the infantry holding out long enough to be relieved and the mobile forces being strong enough to be relieved, things that were very questionable…
…Winston Spencer Churchill should in a rational world never have been considered to replace Anthony Eden as Prime Minister. He was after all the driving force behind the Norway fiasco in his role as First Lord of the Admiralty, a position he had already failed at in WWI with the Gallipoli fiasco. Unfortunately Churchill had learned from Gallipoli and managed to shift the blame for his second naval fiasco onto his superior.
His appointment as Prime Minister came about as a result of a perfect storm of conditions. The disaster in France and Belgium convinced many MPs that a grand coalition was necessary and Labour refused to be part of one led by Samuel Hoare or John Simon. The successor in this case would have been Edward Wood, Viscount Halifax, who had taken over the Foreign Office after the death of Neville Chamberlain. Halifax was well liked, competent, acceptable to all parties and had just pulled off a minor miracle in minimizing the diplomatic fallout from the Norway debacle. Halifax however was a lord, and no lord had served as Prime Minister since Marquess Salisbury in 1902 and Halifax was unwilling to break with that tradition and refused to take the position despite multiple efforts to convince him otherwise. That left Churchill as the best known Conservative from the Commons willing to take the position.
Churchill was an arrogant belligerent alcoholic prone to arguments and fits of irrational fancy. He had spent 10 years in the political wilderness after his mismanagement of the British economy during his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer and before that had been responsible for the Ten Year rule which gutted British military potential. Yet he had managed to be the first British politician to see Hitler for the warmongering madman he was, namely because he saw him as a clone of Sanna who Churchill believed was also a warmongering madman rather than a shrewd nationalist politician. Because of this opposition to Hitler Churchill’s reputation had recovered and by 1941 he was among the best known Conservative politicians and with the expected choices unacceptable the position defaulted to him…
-Excerpt From The Fall of Europe, Scholastic American Press, Philadelphia, 2005
…Winston Churchill was in many ways the worst man to replace Anthony Eden. His worst characteristics have been oft exaggerated, such as his drunkenness, but he was still the wrong man for the job. He was a marvelous orator and very charismatic but that was not what Britain needed, not when the Ministry of Information was perfectly competent. What Britain needed was a cold eyed realist who could recognize the perilous situation the empire was in and make the hard decisions needed to triage it. A PM who could maintain good relations with the Americans and Dominions, who the Empire was more dependent on than ever, who could prevent infighting in the government and keep the ship of state running smoothly and who could let the experts do their jobs without interference.
Winston Spencer Churchill was not this man and despite his good intentions was unsuited for the job. While undeserving of comparisons with Herbert Henry Asquith or David Lloyd George, much less Johnathan Turner, he remains one of the worst Prime Ministers of the 20th century, if not all time. It is exceptionally unfortunate that the cabinet and King were unable to persuade Viscount Halifax to accept the position in June 1941…
-A Setting Sun, the Decline and Fall of the British Empire, Bodley Head, Nottingham, 2015
…The choice of Winston Spencer Churchill to succeed Anthony Eden seriously sped up the decline of the Empire. Churchill acted as if the geopolitical situation was the same as it had been in 1914, if not in 1900 rather than 1941. Britain was no longer the dominant force it once was even within the empire let alone without. Militarily, industrially, economically and diplomatically it was far weaker than it had once been and need to act cautiously and preserve its strength. Churchill did not see that and acted as if this was still the time of Queen Victoria I and not King Edward VIII. He dictated to the Dominions rather than treated them as equals, viewed the other members of the empire as subjects and acted as thought Britain was the senior party in the relationship with the United States, rather than the junior. This did not even mentioned the damage caused by his meddling in the armed forces…
-Excerpt from The End of Empire: The British Empire from 1914 to 1964, Southern Hemisphere Press, Wellington, 2005