For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures

[Bookmark1995]

While I quite agree with your evaluation of Nicholas and his wife (even the members of Romanov family considered her to be very bad in PR and unsuitable for the state affairs), it is probably only fair to remark that the non-monarchic regimes did not work too well either in post-revolutionary Russia and that the Provisional Government was a disaster and the SU was much more oppressive than the Russian monarchy. So what IS the well-performing government model for Russia?

The simple problem Russia has faced throughout its history is this: Reforming society is always, always, always one of the most dificults things a leader can do. For one thing, you are not always rewarded for reforming society, because you have to contend with angry elites who don't want their priveleges taken away, and angry revolutionaries who want more than what you promise.

Secondly, your reforms might do more harm than good.

And Russia is not alone in this.

In America, the end of slavery required a horrible, World War style conflict. And Lincoln himself would die with a bullet in his head because of the caprices of one angry Confederate sympathizer. While you can't condone the antebellum politicians for compromising with slavery, it is understandable why they would be hardpressed to deal with it.

In the second-half of the 20th century, the Democratic Party came to priortize the rights of its minority populations. And how were they rewarded? They were derpived of the once solid south. LBJ's own Texas Democratic Party would become a nonentity by the end of the 20th century, and he knew this too, despite putting all his legislative chops into the Civil Rights Act.

The Shah of Iran sought a secular society, but in the end, he pleased no one by being too secular for the clerics, too capricious for liberal reformers, and too out of touch for the common man.

Russia's history reflects how "reform" is always a slippery concept.

Ivan the Terrible wanted to reform Russian society. But living amidst the corruption of the boyars gradually warped his mind to the point where he killed his son in an argument.

Peter the Third wanted a more modern Russia, and he paid for it by being overthrown and cast in history as a selfish manchild, although there is some truth to those assertations.

Catherine the Great sought a more modern Russia, with more Enlightenment. But when those Enlightenment ideals led to the execution of a king, she was disgusted with the concept of modernity.

Paul I wanted to reform Russia's army, and was himself overthrown in a coup by his own son, who in turn would also try and reform Russia, only to turn away from liberalism after some Corsican upstart ravaged his country.

Tsar Alexander II wanted to reform Russia, and was rewarded with a bomb to the face. And Alexander III saw this as proof that liberalism was a poison.

Khrushchev wanted to reform Soviet society, and he found himself under house arrest and practically blacklisted and unpersoned from Soviet society.

Despite presiding over an era of stagnation, Brezhnev is well regarded in Russia for presiding over an age of stability.

His successor, Gorbachev, would try and reform this lumbering giant...only to be caught up between conservatives on one side, and reformists and nationalists on the other side. And in the end, Gorbachev would see the USSR crumble, and become heavily despised in his own country for destroying Russia's geopolitical power for the drunken incompetence of Yeltsin.

The tragedy of all of Russia's leaders is none of them have been able to properly thread the needle, and reform society in a way that benefits everyone.

Will the person after Putin be able to do this? Or will Russians find themselves longing for Putin one day?

 

[alexmilman]

The simple problem Russia has faced throughout its history is this: Reforming society is always, always, always one of the most dificults things a leader can do. For one thing, you are not always rewarded for reforming society, because you have to contend with angry elites who don't want their priveleges taken away, and angry revolutionaries who want more than what you promise.

Secondly, your reforms might do more harm than good.

And Russia is not alone in this.

In America, the end of slavery required a horrible, World War style conflict. And Lincoln himself would die with a bullet in his head because of the caprices of one angry Confederate sympathizer. While you can't condone the antebellum politicians for compromising with slavery, it is understandable why they would be hardpressed to deal with it.

In the second-half of the 20th century, the Democratic Party came to priortize the rights of its minority populations. And how were they rewarded? They were derpived of the once solid south. LBJ's own Texas Democratic Party would become a nonentity by the end of the 20th century, and he knew this too, despite putting all his legislative chops into the Civil Rights Act.

The Shah of Iran sought a secular society, but in the end, he pleased no one by being too secular for the clerics, too capricious for liberal reformers, and too out of touch for the common man.

Russia's history reflects how "reform" is always a slippery concept.

Ivan the Terrible wanted to reform Russian society. But living amidst the corruption of the boyars gradually warped his mind to the point where he killed his son in an argument.

Peter the Third wanted a more modern Russia, and he paid for it by being overthrown and cast in history as a selfish manchild, although there is some truth to those assertations.

Catherine the Great sought a more modern Russia, with more Enlightenment. But when those Enlightenment ideals led to the execution of a king, she was disgusted with the concept of modernity.

Paul I wanted to reform Russia's army, and was himself overthrown in a coup by his own son, who in turn would also try and reform Russia, only to turn away from liberalism after some Corsican upstart ravaged his country.

Tsar Alexander II wanted to reform Russia, and was rewarded with a bomb to the face. And Alexander III saw this as proof that liberalism was a poison.

Khrushchev wanted to reform Soviet society, and he found himself under house arrest and practically blacklisted and unpersoned from Soviet society.

Despite presiding over an era of stagnation, Brezhnev is well regarded in Russia for presiding over an age of stability.

His successor, Gorbachev, would try and reform this lumbering giant...only to be caught up between conservatives on one side, and reformists and nationalists on the other side. And in the end, Gorbachev would see the USSR crumble, and become heavily despised in his own country for destroying Russia's geopolitical power for the drunken incompetence of Yeltsin.

The tragedy of all of Russia's leaders is none of them have been able to properly thread the needle, and reform society in a way that benefits everyone.

Will the person after Putin be able to do this? Or will Russians find themselves longing for Putin one day?

I never knew that Brezhnev was well regarded during his life time and under his rule stability evolved into stagnation.

However, 3 persons are absent from your list, all of whom (with the addition of Ivan IV) are (or were) surprisingly highly regarded in Russia:
Peter I - by the end of his reign Russia got few pieces of territory but was in a terrible state economically and politically: his laws led to a century of the military coups and economic reforms caused the long term economic disaster. BTW, he was probably a greater drunkard than Yeltsin.
Lenin - founder of the tyrannical regime which lasted for 7 decades.
Stalin - made that regime "institutionalized" with even more suffering of the population.

All 4 (Ivan including) caused huge losses of population, worsened life conditions, etc. and still had been considered by some as the great leaders. In other words, to be popular, one does not need to benefit everyone or even a big part of a population. One does not even have to do something positive in the terms of life improvement, etc.

Oh, BTW, unlike the rest of the bunch, Yeltsin was democratically elected and enormously popular before he became head of the state (and proved to be not up to the task even if he tried a lot of "progressive" reforms). Gorby was disliked even before he was trying any reforms (most of which foolish and unpopular). So go figure.

 

[Bookmark1995]

I never knew that Brezhnev was well regarded during his life time and under his rule stability evolved into stagnation.

However, 3 persons are absent from your list, all of whom (with the addition of Ivan IV) are (or were) surprisingly highly regarded in Russia:
Peter I - by the end of his reign Russia got few pieces of territory but was in a terrible state economically and politically: his laws led to a century of the military coups and economic reforms caused the long term economic disaster. BTW, he was probably a greater drunkard than Yeltsin.
Lenin - founder of the tyrannical regime which lasted for 7 decades.
Stalin - made that regime "institutionalized" with even more suffering of the population.

All 4 (Ivan including) caused huge losses of population, worsened life conditions, etc. and still had been considered by some as the great leaders. In other words, to be popular, one does not need to benefit everyone or even a big part of a population. One does not even have to do something positive in the terms of life improvement, etc.

Oh, BTW, unlike the rest of the bunch, Yeltsin was democratically elected and enormously popular before he became head of the state (and proved to be not up to the task even if he tried a lot of "progressive" reforms). Gorby was disliked even before he was trying any reforms (most of which foolish and unpopular). So go figure.

The reason why a leader might be liked it because of a perceived notion of "strength."

Many Russians had two reasons for liking the Brezhnev years: his reign was considered the zenith of Soviet power, and because at least under his rule, the ruling class did provide for the population, unlike the plutocrats of modern Russia who don't.

My father studied Russian history under a right-wing Soviet defector when he was in college. In an essay he wrote, he pointed out that building St. Petersburg led to the deaths of thousands of serfs. This right-wing professor failed him, defending Peter the Great as a man who built a "strong" Russia.

Stalin was a terrible human being, but Russian nationalists like him for emerging triumphant in the Second World War.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin saw Russia lose much of its geopolitical presitge, territory, and "respect" on the world stage, which is why people hate them.

 

[Bloodraven]

The time is going to be used by the revolutionary agitators who are going to penetrate the loyalist troops (as was happening during Kornilov's failed putsch) and in no time Gurko finds himself without an army.

If regime support among the army is that low and fragile, how can the regime survive 12 to 18 more months of war? Any offensives in the summer of 1917 will most likely only exacerbate that problem because while a better planned offensive mostly against Austria-Hungary or the Ottomans can produce gains it is unlikely to knock either opponent out of the war and the German army still can inflict harsh defeats on the Russian army. If Stolypin doesn’t act cautious he could face widespread mutiny in the summer to autumn of 1917 (demanding at the very least an end to offensives and better leadership among the military but could easily include political demands) which could lead to revolution, even if he suppresses the February riots in St. Petersburg.

A smart move may be to offer negotiations to Germany about a white peace of no annexations, no reparations (stealing the slogans of his leftist enemies and robbing them one of their most potent talking points) and when Germany inevitably declines or the negotiations fail transform the war into a war for the defense of the fatherland which might allow Stolypin and the regime to last until the end of the war and the peace conference (although afterwards some reforms and concessions are inevitable), especially if Russia mostly remains on the defensive and waits for the Americans to win the war in the west. Russian liberals will hate such a peace offer but they hate Stolypin anyway, France and Great Britain have no love for Stolypin and Czarist autocracy but if Stolypin backchannels carefully that he is confident that Germany will decline the offer and that he needs this to keep Russia in the war they might gnash their teeth but have no choice but to let him continue for the moment.

 

[alexmilman]

The reason why a leader might be liked it because of a perceived notion of "strength."

Many Russians had two reasons for liking the Brezhnev years: his reign was considered the zenith of Soviet power, and because at least under his rule, the ruling class did provide for the population, unlike the plutocrats of modern Russia who don't.

Let's not confuse Brezhnev and "Brezhnev years". I did not met a single person (myself including ) who "liked" Brezhnev: he was thoroughly disrespected and a butt of the countless jokes. I have no clue from where did you get an idea about the ruling class providing for the population because during his rule the supply situation was steadily going down the drain and spreading the Soviet influence all over the world did not compensate for the empty shelves. Now, the "Brezhnev years" is another story because they were marked by a steady growth of "screw you all" attitude and corresponding attitude toward the work and the discipline on the work place. So the life stunk but it was also a fun. Needless to say that the ruling class had providing themselves (as the most important part of a population) as the top priority and the attitude was spreading down the social ladder all the way to the seemingly unprivileged classes like employees of the shops.

My father studied Russian history under a right-wing Soviet defector when he was in college. In an essay he wrote, he pointed out that building St. Petersburg led to the deaths of thousands of serfs. This right-wing professor failed him, defending Peter the Great as a man who built a "strong" Russia.

Well, building a "strong state" was one of the popularity criteria (especially with a benefit of the hindsight). Not sure what's so right-wingish in it because, as far as Peter is involved, this was an official position of the communist (aka, left-wing) history adopted since Stalin's times. "Nationalist" would be probably more to the point.

Stalin was a terrible human being, but Russian nationalists like him for emerging triumphant in the Second World War.

Well, they also like Ivan IV even if he had his ass kicked in the Livonian War.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin saw Russia lose much of its geopolitical presitge, territory, and "respect" on the world stage, which is why people hate them.

Gorby was hated well before the Soviet system started falling apart and, AFAIK (on that period I don't have the first hand experience), Yeltsin's rule was associated with a free fall of economy, raise of the crime and other domestic things which hurt people directly. International failures came as the last straw.

 

[alexmilman]

If regime support among the army is that low and fragile, how can the regime survive 12 to 18 more months of war? Any offensives in the summer of 1917 will most likely only exacerbate that problem because while a better planned offensive mostly against Austria-Hungary or the Ottomans can produce gains it is unlikely to knock either opponent out of the war and the German army still can inflict harsh defeats on the Russian army. If Stolypin doesn’t act cautious he could face widespread mutiny in the summer to autumn of 1917 (demanding at the very least an end to offensives and better leadership among the military but could easily include political demands) which could lead to revolution, even if he suppresses the February riots in St. Petersburg.

A smart move may be to offer negotiations to Germany about a white peace of no annexations, no reparations (stealing the slogans of his leftist enemies and robbing them one of their most potent talking points) and when Germany inevitably declines or the negotiations fail transform the war into a war for the defense of the fatherland which might allow Stolypin and the regime to last until the end of the war and the peace conference (although afterwards some reforms and concessions are inevitable), especially if Russia mostly remains on the defensive and waits for the Americans to win the war in the west. Russian liberals will hate such a peace offer but they hate Stolypin anyway, France and Great Britain have no love for Stolypin and Czarist autocracy but if Stolypin backchannels carefully that he is confident that Germany will decline the offer and that he needs this to keep Russia in the war they might gnash their teeth but have no choice but to let him continue for the moment.

Well, this was always my favorite scenario, especially the part regarding the motherland (to be closer to the Russian terminology ) demagoguery.

To start with, the OTL offensives had been often started on the request of the Allies who did not really care about situation on the Russian side and just looked for their own interests. Of course, a complete static defense is not quite practical but as a general policy it could save lives and resources and small-/medium-scale offensives at the weak spots could help keeping enemy off balance. Actually, the Turkish front would be a good area for the offensive actions because even with the relatively small force engaged the Ottomans are being beaten and this can be used for propaganda purposes.

Now, as far as situation in the army is involved, in this TL Stolypin is presumably addressing one of the important factors at the front: food supply. According to Brusilov, food situation at the front was steadily deteriorating with the increasing number of the meatless days per week and understandable negative impact upon the morale. Then, if (as more or less hinted by author) a competent administrator is in charge, there should be noticeable improvements in the weapons/ammunition production. Otherwise, the whole idea of this TL does not make too much sense: what's the point of having Stolypin in power if he performs as the OTL nincompoops? Intelligent distribution of the orders for military production and keeping the professional workers working at the plants instead of being sent to the front could make a LOT of difference. The same goes for more efficient handling of the supplies coming from the allies: in OTL a big part of them had been just accumulating in the ports of entry.
So, if the soldiers are well-fed, have enough ammunition and are not being wasted in the pointless offensives, the spirit of the frontline troops is higher than in OTL and they can hold for a longer time.

The last component, the demagoguery part, had been really badly handled in OTL and the soldiers were not motivated. Combination of the lies about the evil Germans planning to occupy European Russia and to grab their land could provide some motivation and the empty promise of the land reform (the nobility already owned only few percentages of agricultural land and percentage was steadily shrinking) also could be helpful.

 

[Bloodraven]

Well, this was always my favorite scenario, especially the part regarding the motherland (to be closer to the Russian terminology )

Of course!

Of course, a complete static defense is not quite practical but as a general policy it could save lives and resources and small-/medium-scale offensives at the weak spots could help keeping enemy off balance.

Strategic defense coupled with effective and beneficial tactical offensives would be the name of the game, agreed.

Then, if (as more or less hinted by author) a competent administrator is in charge, there should be noticeable improvements in the weapons/ammunition production.

Of course, more food and better weapons/ammunitions might not be enough if the Russian soldiers, who by this point have fought more than two years under pretty miserable conditions and were led by mostly idiots, feel like they are still fighting and dying for the imperialist dream of the Czarist regime. Stolypin IMO has to do something drastic to change that perception and so he can't merely say the war suddenly is only for the defense of the Motherland after years of saying otherwise (fighting for Serbia and Pan-slavism or a piece of the Ottoman Empire might have been popular in 1914 and is still popular with the liberal elites, but no longer with the soldiers), he has to show it and thus I think he has to make a white peace offer to Germany and then run the propaganda campaign of Germany trying to conquer and subjugate Russia after it is rejected (it might even be an advantage to draw out negotiations to gain some time in which the supply situation at the front could be improved) and that he is now only defending Mother Russia. Coupled with much better management of supplies and a more defensive posture, this could indeed be the magic formula that brings Stolypin's Russia over the finnishing line of WW1.

empty promise of the land reform (the nobility already owned only few percentages of agricultural land and percentage was steadily shrinking) also could be helpful.

Do the promises necessarily have to be empty though? Stolypin could promise land grants for landless peasants fighting in the army and cheap credit for those wanting to buy more land or modernize their or communal land. He could also promise generous pensions, housing, guaranteed employment... for urban workers in the army. This not only nips radicalism in the army in the bud pretty effectively, it also separates the army from the workers and peasants at home (reducing the risk of them making common cause with the soldiers), plays into the theme of everybody having to make sacrifices for Mother Russia and the government forcing everybody to work together to defend Mother Russia (the state forces the rich to reward the heroes that defended Mother Russia ), and secures Stolypin and the regime a constituency for the troubled times after war has been won (I think he knows that social unrest won’t just go away after the war has been won).
Also, this could (coupled with some more or less empty vague promises in regards to political reform after the war) make the Wilson administration more sympathetic to Stolypin’s government (after all Wilson was more than willing to work with authoritarians if they were willing to conform to his rhetoric of working towards responsible self-government and Stolypin can play into his racist stereotypes of Russia not being ready for democracy) and cause it to be more generous with loans, which would be a huge plus.

 

[alexmilman]

Of course!

Strategic defense coupled with effective and beneficial tactical offensives would be the name of the game, agreed.

Of course, more food and better weapons/ammunitions might not be enough if the Russian soldiers, who by this point have fought more than two years under pretty miserable conditions and were led by mostly idiots, feel like they are still fighting and dying for the imperialist dream of the Czarist regime. Stolypin IMO has to do something drastic to change that perception and so he can't merely say the war suddenly is only for the defense of the Motherland after years of saying otherwise (fighting for Serbia and Pan-slavism or a piece of the Ottoman Empire might have been popular in 1914 and is still popular with the liberal elites, but no longer with the soldiers), he has to show it and thus I think he has to make a white peace offer to Germany and then run the propaganda campaign of Germany trying to conquer and subjugate Russia after it is rejected (it might even be an advantage to draw out negotiations to gain some time in which the supply situation at the front could be improved) and that he is now only defending Mother Russia. Coupled with much better management of supplies and a more defensive posture, this could indeed be the magic formula that brings Stolypin's Russia over the finnishing line of WW1.

Do the promises necessarily have to be empty though? Stolypin could promise land grants for landless peasants fighting in the army and cheap credit for those wanting to buy more land or modernize their or communal land. He could also promise generous pensions, housing, guaranteed employment... for urban workers in the army. This not only nips radicalism in the army in the bud pretty effectively, it also separates the army from the workers and peasants at home (reducing the risk of them making common cause with the soldiers), plays into the theme of everybody having to make sacrifices for Mother Russia and the government forcing everybody to work together to defend Mother Russia (the state forces the rich to reward the heroes that defended Mother Russia ), and secures Stolypin and the regime a constituency for the troubled times after war has been won (I think he knows that social unrest won’t just go away after the war has been won).
Also, this could (coupled with some more or less empty vague promises in regards to political reform after the war) make the Wilson administration more sympathetic to Stolypin’s government (after all Wilson was more than willing to work with authoritarians if they were willing to conform to his rhetoric of working towards responsible self-government and Stolypin can play into his racist stereotypes of Russia not being ready for democracy) and cause it to be more generous with loans, which would be a huge plus.

The problem with the land was that it was not too much of it physically available in the European Russia. The same goes for the “landless peasants”: there were not too many of them (except for those totally incapable of the independent activities). The real problem was in the communal ownership with the resulting “cherespolositsa” and physical impossibility to improve agricultural methods and increase efficiency. Majority of the Russian (not to be confused with the Ukrainian or Baltic) peasants still had a communal mentality so in the real terms not too much could be done except for promoting mass migration into the Southern Siberia and the suitable parts of the Russian Far East. Of course, with most of its active part leaving for the new areas, the Russian village communities could get some land and, with the addition of few bought out estates and perhaps the land owned by Romanov family there can be enough to conduct at least some pretense of a meaningful reform to maintain for a while a low-efficiency agriculture in European Russia.

OTOH, objectively, government would be interested in attracting the new workers to the industrial plants (of course, capital would be needed) and this can be achieved by continued improvement of the labor laws. Actually, they were already quite extensive so this would be just a logical continuation of what was already there. The industrial workers did not really have to worry about security of their places because of the shortage of skillful workers. But the state pensions for the wounded, etc. would definitely be a nice touch (not sure if they did or did not exist).

 

[TheRealDeal]

wait did I read right, you woke up to rebels shooting outside your city? Where do you live, if I can ask

 

[Sam R.]

Remember please that the Time Line is talking about the Pathos of February at the moment. The Pathos of July. Of November. Of March. Of June. All these are in the future.

 

[Salvador79]

Depending on how gruesome this gets, it is still going to seal the fates of Nikky and His hanger-in-chief as the butchers of Petrograd.
That is not the foundation upon which to build a continued war effort, calm and integrate the centrifugal national movements and broaden the support base of the state.
The revolutionaries - both liberals and radicals - will have to reflect on why February failed (like they had to reflect why 1905 failed), and many bright minds are still abroad out of Stolypin's reach anyway. Liberal exodus, too, now?
Also, I wonder how such a bloodbath in Russia is going to influence US opinion and their entry into the war...
and socialist opinion in various countries, too...

 

[Stenkarazin]

Thank you everybody for the feed-back, much food for thoughts. I apologize, won't be able to address all of it here, but will try to hint at most of your arguments in the next installments.

I'm not sure cutting off Petrograd so thoroughly would be a smart move, or any Stolypin, shrewd and ruthless efficient as he is, would follow.

While cutting telegraph lines is not so much of a problem, at least so far as it doesn't prevent Stolypin to communicate with the outside world himself, and is indeed of utmost importance to control the news and the narrative across Russia and the world ("what happens in Petrograd is what Stolypin says what happens, you wouldn't want others to get wrong ideas" style), cutting off food supply is very ill advised.
Why? Well, for one, Stolypin and the government are still in Petrograd, besieged in their barricaded bastion. If Stolypin wants to keep the mobs and the mutined garrison as passive as they have been, and if he wants to avoid them storming the palaces, the last thing he would want is cutting off food supply and put the revolutionaries' back against the wall. Even in the best scenario, that would mean a far more complicated crackdown. I contrast, keeping the revolutionaries in passive mode so far is keeping them in a stage where the wannabe revolution is basically about getting food and not in one where they are radicalized by marxists and anarchists and become politically interested in overthrowing the whole social and political order. It's a classical divide and rule tactic I would see someone as shrewd as Stolypin pursuing.

Negotiating, temporizing and paralyzing (with both duma and soviets to play and set radicals and liberals against one another), posturing (with Gurko encirclement of the city in full sight to show the muscles but without attacking or cutting food supplies), agitating carots and sticks, and when the fruit is rotten, strike a swift and decisive death blow to the revolution.

Negotiations between the govt and the Duma Committee will take place, but I fear they won't be really successful. I toyed with the idea of trying to solve the crisis through negotiation, but the problem is that, with the city deep into anarchy, I don't see how the KD and Octobrists could keep a steady midway course without being swept by an increasingly radicalized Soviet. Negotiating and temporizing will be helpful to delay an all-out attack on the Government square, but at the end of the day... brute force will probably decide the outcome.

To be fair, when one reads about the reign of Nicholas and Alexandra, you get a sense that Imperial Russia was destined for disaster because of how utterly terrible those two were.

Alexandra herself was a trainwreck of a ruler. Self-centered, weak-willed, unwilling to adopt the culture of her new domain, and completely deaf to the suffering of the people. She was quoted as saying the people of Russia should listen to her just BECAUSE of her husband's pedigree. On a more serious level, she did severe damage to the Russian war effort by constantly dismissing cabinet members over her own selfish whims. Seriously, she could be the labeled the avant-la-lettre "Karen".

Nicholas II also made the wrong turns every time he came to an intersection, like appointing himself the head of a poorly performing army.

Things got so bad, even Nicholas' own mother nearly started a coup against him (which would be an interesting POD as well).

When you read about them, you can understand why Russians were so sick and tired of the monarchy, because those two are perfect examples of why absolute dynastic rule doesn't work in the modern age.

Yes, indeed. The purpose of this TL is to allow the Monarchy to survive WW1, and then try and figure if, in the afterglow of victory, Russia can successfully reform so as to avoid (or substantially weaken) the threat of revolution. But fear not, Russia won't magically become a Western liberal country once the threat of violent revolution has been weakened. I can see Russia in the late 20's turning inwards towards something that could be called "Muscovism", especially in the context of growing estrangement with her Western allies. This would, I think, play a massive role on politics.

And of course all of that will take place against a very fluid international situation, awash with all kind of threats, renewed rivalries (Britain, anyone ?), and diplomatic crossroads.

Well, subduing the mutiny while keeping the mutineers well-supplied with food is an interesting idea but I'm not sure if anybody ever tried it with any success. The next logical step in your scenario should be to keep them supplied with ammunition because otherwise they'll be unhappy.

To start with, as OTL experience demonstrated, even availability of the food did not prevent the revolutionaries (and the mob they incited) from storming the palaces, etc. OTOH, putting their backs against the wall surely is an ultimate goal: their backs are against the wall and there is a firing squad on the other side. Negotiating with them would be a waste of time and counterproductive because if they are let free they'll start again. Negotiating with the rebels would be taken as a show of weakness (as in OTL but not in this TL) and a loyalist army simply posted outside the city doing nothing and letting supplies in is a complete absurdity: what "muscles" would it be showing? The time is going to be used by the revolutionary agitators who are going to penetrate the loyalist troops (as was happening during Kornilov's failed putsch) and in no time Gurko finds himself without an army.

Of course, a big part of the revolutionary mob are just the ordinary looters who, by the time of action, are drunk and busy looting so the resistance can be expected from a relatively limited core (some sailors and soldiers of the garrison) lacking the leadership. Majority of the population is by that time fed up with what's going on and, anyway, are not a fighting fighting force. Restoring supplies to the districts under government control and gradually expanding it with the advance of the loyalist troops would be a big argument in favor of law and order. Besides, the whole premise of "cutting off food supply" is rather meaningless: the people are not eating grain, they are eating bread. With Petrograd in the state of a drunken anarchy, organization of the grain delivery to the mills, then of the flour to the bakeries and then bread to the shops/distribution centers would be impossible. Duma is not in charge of anything (and mostly useless in organization of something meaningful or there would be no hunger to start with) and the Soviets are a bunch of the demagogues with even less experience in organizing things. They can't handle the process. Period. Inability of the self-proclaimed government to provide supplies would cool down majority of the mob while a big part of the population would not be active to start with and even less so with the looting and bandits roaming the city.


The only negotiations possible are after the demonstration of strength (beating the rebels outside the city and/or taking part of the city) and then the promised carrot could be conditioned upon delivery of the leaders including the implicated members of the Duma and the Soviet. After this is done, a general amnesty is declared but the caught looters are executed on the spot, garrison is first disarmed and then sent piecemeal to various parts of the front. The martial law is declared with the curfew, the echelons with grain are arriving, grain is distributed for processing and then bread is sent to the shops.

Yes, that's the ticket. This is more or less the outline that I have in mind.

Well, this was always my favorite scenario, especially the part regarding the motherland (to be closer to the Russian terminology ) demagoguery.

To start with, the OTL offensives had been often started on the request of the Allies who did not really care about situation on the Russian side and just looked for their own interests. Of course, a complete static defense is not quite practical but as a general policy it could save lives and resources and small-/medium-scale offensives at the weak spots could help keeping enemy off balance. Actually, the Turkish front would be a good area for the offensive actions because even with the relatively small force engaged the Ottomans are being beaten and this can be used for propaganda purposes.

Now, as far as situation in the army is involved, in this TL Stolypin is presumably addressing one of the important factors at the front: food supply. According to Brusilov, food situation at the front was steadily deteriorating with the increasing number of the meatless days per week and understandable negative impact upon the morale. Then, if (as more or less hinted by author) a competent administrator is in charge, there should be noticeable improvements in the weapons/ammunition production. Otherwise, the whole idea of this TL does not make too much sense: what's the point of having Stolypin in power if he performs as the OTL nincompoops? Intelligent distribution of the orders for military production and keeping the professional workers working at the plants instead of being sent to the front could make a LOT of difference. The same goes for more efficient handling of the supplies coming from the allies: in OTL a big part of them had been just accumulating in the ports of entry.
So, if the soldiers are well-fed, have enough ammunition and are not being wasted in the pointless offensives, the spirit of the frontline troops is higher than in OTL and they can hold for a longer time.

The last component, the demagoguery part, had been really badly handled in OTL and the soldiers were not motivated. Combination of the lies about the evil Germans planning to occupy European Russia and to grab their land could provide some motivation and the empty promise of the land reform (the nobility already owned only few percentages of agricultural land and percentage was steadily shrinking) also could be helpful.

Again, very well put. Once we are out of the frying pan, the govt and the Stavka, who have felt "le vent du boulet" (how do you say that in English?) will work overtime to restore the situation within the armed forces (I already hinted that, thanks to having a more stable and competent govt, the situation is already slightly better than OTL), so that a glorious Russian summer may be possible by June 1917. Anatolia is a likely candidate for a "risk-free" offensive that will improve Russia's image both abroad and domestically. Turkish forces being in full disarray, it seems that only Russian logistics could prevent Yudenich from breaking out in Western Anatolia. Greece joins the war more or less as OTL (difference being that King Constantin eventually gets around the idea thanks to added Russian pressure) Germany rushes extra divisions to Bulgaria and/or Turkish Thracia, but cannot do much else, and Turkey is probably going to seek terms before the end of summer. Then, a "2nd Brusilov offensive" in Galicia may be the last nail in the coffin, especially if Caporetto is butterflied and the Italians launch their own offensive around the same time. The US would probably still enter the war, but at a later date though (accounting the extra efforts to convince the American public to enter war alongside the "despotic and cruel regime of the Czar". Hence American involvement will be seen as less decisive than OTL.

The irony in this would be that Russia, arguably the weakest of the Allies on the domestic front, would be seen as the decisive winner of the war... Massive consequences for the Paris Conference and the drawing of Europe's new order.

wait did I read right, you woke up to rebels shooting outside your city? Where do you live, if I can ask

Central African Republic. But I am back since yesterday to a safer corner of Africa. So real history shouldn't be creeping to much into this alternate history. But you never know, Kalashnikov-slinging tribesmen may pop up here in there in Petrograd !

 

[Stenkarazin]

Depending on how gruesome this gets, it is still going to seal the fates of Nikky and His hanger-in-chief as the butchers of Petrograd.
That is not the foundation upon which to build a continued war effort, calm and integrate the centrifugal national movements and broaden the support base of the state.
The revolutionaries - both liberals and radicals - will have to reflect on why February failed (like they had to reflect why 1905 failed), and many bright minds are still abroad out of Stolypin's reach anyway. Liberal exodus, too, now?
Also, I wonder how such a bloodbath in Russia is going to influence US opinion and their entry into the war...
and socialist opinion in various countries, too...

Yes, Stolypin is doomed to go in the short term. No victory parade for him. But I don't see the regime deciding to open peace feelers with the CP because of what happened in Petrograd. They will try to concentrate on the improvement of the war effort, so as to be able to deal a blow to the CP in the summer.

Failure of February impact on revolutionaries: Yes, will be huge and will go in two opposite directions: some will be vaccinated against the temptation of violent revolution and try to work within a legalist framework, others will radicalize even deeper. The 20's will be rife with terrorism.

The exodus of many radicals to Western Europe will steadily worsen Russia's image abroad, as will a certain event that will take place in 1918-1919, just after the peace Conference...

 

[Bookmark1995]

Yes, indeed. The purpose of this TL is to allow the Monarchy to survive WW1, and then try and figure if, in the afterglow of victory, Russia can successfully reform so as to avoid (or substantially weaken) the threat of revolution. But fear not, Russia won't magically become a Western liberal country once the threat of violent revolution has been weakened. I can see Russia in the late 20's turning inwards towards something that could be called "Muscovism", especially in the context of growing estrangement with her Western allies. This would, I think, play a massive role on politics.

And of course all of that will take place against a very fluid international situation, awash with all kind of threats, renewed rivalries (Britain, anyone ?), and diplomatic crossroads.

Yeah, the situation is not going to be easy for Russia going forward.

But there is a lot to hope for.

Remember that while revolutions can fail, the ideas they promote can often be co-opted by the ruling elite to deter future action.

While the revolt of 1848 failed to topple the Hapsburgs, they were forced to abolish serfdom. Ol'Otto came around to the idea of social insurance and health care, if only to avoid the fate of Metternich.

So it is possible that postwar Russia could see some serious reforms that, while preserving the power of the Romanovs, could also lead to the monarchy stabilizing.

Also, the absence of a socialist state may deter the interwar polarization that led to the rise of figures like Adolf Hitler.

 

[Salvador79]

The exodus of many radicals to Western Europe will steadily worsen Russia's image abroad, as will a certain event that will take place in 1918-1919, just after the peace Conference...

Ooh, ominous

 

[Salvador79]

Yes, Stolypin is doomed to go in the short term. No victory parade for him.

That is plausible!

But I don't see the regime deciding to open peace feelers with the CP because of what happened in Petrograd. They will try to concentrate on the improvement of the war effort, so as to be able to deal a blow to the CP in the summer.

I agree that this is the likely course. But not an easy one to maintain. Well, OTL sets a low bar. Still, I'm not convinced how strong that blow can be in summer.

 

[Bloodraven]

Congratulations on a great TL! I'm looking very much forward to where you are planning to take Russia and what the hinted at ideology of Muscovism entails in detail.

But I don't see the regime deciding to open peace feelers with the CP because of what happened in Petrograd. They will try to concentrate on the improvement of the war effort, so as to be able to deal a blow to the CP in the summer.

Is that going to be enough to restore morale in the army, especially at the Northwestern Front? News about the unrest in Petrograd and the bloody of it will spread, which won't do the regime any favors in the PR department. A better supply situation at the front will help reduce immediate discontent, defeatism and radicalism among the soldiers, but I'm not sure if it is going to be enough to make the soldiers willing to fight and die for a regime that has just slaughtered its citizens. Making/publicizing a peace offer on the basis of a white peace (restoration of the status quo, no reparations), which the Germans are almost sure to reject, would allow Stolypin in one stroke to transform the war into a defense of Mother Russia and paint those that oppose the war and the government as betraying the Motherland (of course he is doing that anyway, but such a move would make his propaganda that much more potent).
Otherwise Stolypin/the Czarist regime can gamble that they can without changing course the improved supply situation and the coming summer offensives will be enough to get Russia through the war, but that is a huge gamble. If the offensives are successful, but fall short of their objectives and Russia is still at war with all of its enemies come autumn 1917 while social unrest continues at home (it can be suppressed but will not disappear even with improved supply situation for the home front as well) there might very well be a new round of unrest in the winter of 1917 (unpopular regime, social unrest, still no end in sight for the war, soldiers dying and fighting for the goals of the butchers of Petrograd…), possibly even more widespread than the February riots. Is Stolypin willing to take such a gamble?

A more conservative strategy is building up support for the war effort at home (with the peace offer an important part of it, but it can be done without it; social welfare promises, especially for veterans could be another part of it), mostly staying on the strategic defense (apart from the Caucasus front), preserving the morale and fighting capabilities of the army, and waiting for the Americans to come and focus on preserving the regime instead of gambling that the war can be won this year.

Anatolia is a likely candidate for a "risk-free" offensive that will improve Russia's image both abroad and domestically. Turkish forces being in full disarray, it seems that only Russian logistics could prevent Yudenich from breaking out in Western Anatolia. Greece joins the war more or less as OTL (difference being that King Constantin eventually gets around the idea thanks to added Russian pressure) Germany rushes extra divisions to Bulgaria and/or Turkish Thracia, but cannot do much else, and Turkey is probably going to seek terms before the end of summer. Then, a "2nd Brusilov offensive" in Galicia may be the last nail in the coffin, especially if Caporetto is butterflied and the Italians launch their own offensive around the same time.

A successful offensive into Anatolia in the summer of 1917 is definitely in the cards and would improve morale a lot, but IMO knocking the Ottomans out of the war is too optimistic. Russian logistics still won't be great, especially once they advance, and if Russia is threatening the Anatolian heartland of the Empire the Ottomans can withdraw in Palestine and shift units around to stabilize the front with the Russians. Plus, the Ottomans know that a peace (especially with Imperial Russia at the peace table) will be a very harsh peace and even with additional setbacks in 1917 are IMO more likely to hang and hope that their German ally can turn things around.

A better Russian performance of Russia against Austria-Hungary (especially in conjunction with the still motivated and effective Romanian army) is likely as well but if the Russians are putting a lot of pressure on its allies Germany could very well go on the offensive to reduce the pressure on its allies, maybe an earlier advance on Riga (this would definitely butterfly away the Battle of Caporetto as German troops are needed on the Eastern front and can’t be send to Italy). If the offensives are properly planned and army morale holds (the Russian army will be more competent than IOTL in 1917 but still has its problems and some deadweight leadership) and German counter-offensives are reasonably contained Russia can have a good year in 1917 (compared to OTL a fantastic year), but in order to knock out the Ottoman Empire and maybe even Austria-Hungary IMO all the stars would have to align perfectly and even then it is a tall order. Of course, it is your TL and it is within the realm of possibility though IMO unlikely.

A good performance in 1917 (even if the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary are still in the war) would set up Russia very nicely for 1918 as the Germans are likely to strip the Eastern front bare in order to try and deliver a knockout blow in France before American troops arrive en masse and make that impossible (Russia may be the weaker link in the Entente but focusing on Russia in 1918 is not a strategy that the Germans can pursue because even if Germany could knock out Russia in 1918 they still would have to contend with the Western allies and they know that they would lose that fight, whereas if the win in France, they can at least hope to force Russia to the peace table), the Ottomans and Austria-Hungary are tethering on the brink of collapse, Romania is still in the war and Greece is in a much better position. The war could very well end a couple of months earlier and with Russian army deep in enemy territory (Ottomans and Austria-Hungary) and having retaken much if not all of Russian Poland and Lithuania, maybe even having crossed the border into East Prussia and Silesia.

The US would probably still enter the war, but at a later date though (accounting the extra efforts to convince the American public to enter war alongside the "despotic and cruel regime of the Czar")

How important was the February revolution for changing US opinion about joining the war IOTL? As far as I know US opinion shifted decisively as a result of German actions (unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmermann telegram and not much as a result of the February revolution). Even if more members of congress are unhappy with fighting as a de facto ally of Czarist Russia the OTL vote to declare war was pretty decisive and Wilson can afford to lose some votes. Wilson can also point to the fact that the US won’t enter the war as an ally of Russia but merely a co-belligerent and that US presence in the war and at the peace conference will be beneficial to stop the spread of Czarist tyranny and help make the world safe for democracy. US entry into the war might be delayed, but not by much and unless the military situation shifts really dramatically in the summer of 1917, the promise of American troops arriving en masse in 1918 will be an important part of keeping up morale, though IATL it will be more 'after 3 years of war the Americans will end the war next year' instead of IOTL after the setbacks o 1917 (Russia, Caparetto, the French mutinies) 'the Americans will save us'.

 

[marathag]

especially if Caporetto is butterflied and the Italians launch their own offensive around the same time.

Cardona will be pleased, a chance to eliminate more cowardly Italian Soldiers when they fail his next brilliant attack along the Isonzo

 

[Bloodraven]

Also, the absence of a socialist state may deter the interwar polarization that led to the rise of figures like Adolf Hitler.

Hitler's rise to power depended on the economic crisis in Germany and fear of the German left, especially the German communists, and not the existence of the Soviet Union. Weimar’s right-wing elites didn’t fear the Soviet Union, they were all too happy to work with the Soviets to circumvent armament restrictions, use it as a counterweight against the Western powers (Rapallo treaty…) and entertained ideas of partitioning Poland with the Soviets (though planned to leave a Polish rump state unlike Hitler). What sort of political opportunities exist for Hitler or someone like him (he isn’t guaranteed to survive to war or necessarily go into politics) depends on what happens with the German left (radicalization and militarism after suppression of a German revolution is still a possibility) and the economic situation in Germany and how Weimar (or its ATL equivalent German Republic; though with the Czar still in power in Russia and the war possibly ending a bit earlier the Hohenzollern monarchy may the political turmoil after the war, though Wilhelm II has to go and democratic reforms will have to be conceded) deals with the global economic crisis (some sort of global economic crisis is likely after the economic dislocations of WW1 but it will likely play out differently). Even if things go roughly the same as IOTL in Weimar Germany Hitler’s rise to power depended on a lot of factors (including quite a bit of luck) and is unlikely to be replicated with a POD in 1911; of course Weimar being replaced with an authoritarian regime in the 1930s is still very much a possibility, possibly with right-wing conservatives looking to Russia and Muscovism for inspiration for their ‘conservative revolution’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservative_Revolution).
Likewise, Mussolini’s rise to power was enabled by nationalist sentiment (anger about the ‘mutilated victory’) and elite fear about Italian communists/socialists (whose militancy still remains a possibility), not fear of the Soviet Union.

 

[Hertog Jann]

The US would probably still enter the war, but at a later date though (accounting the extra efforts to convince the American public to enter war alongside the "despotic and cruel regime of the Czar". Hence American involvement will be seen as less decisive than OTL.

I think the US will enter the war at the same date. The USW is not butterflied or postponed by the butterflies. A somewhat stronger Russia under Stolypin would make the chances of winning a long war even dimmer. The same applies to the Zimmermann Telegram. As soon as the first american ships are sunk, the US will enter the war tsar or no tsar. I find more plausible that the presence of a tsarist regime, instead of postponing the american entry, it will make the US more reluctant to send a massive army in Europe. Credits to the Entente to safeguard their previous loans yes. Material help yes. A battlefleet in Scapa and destroyers in the Channel yes. But no preparation for a major deployment of land forces, or perhaps a symbolic force of some divisions that will be comabt ready in spring 1918. In that case, the american involvement will be seen as much less decisive by all the participants.

A successful offensive into Anatolia in the summer of 1917 is definitely in the cards and would improve morale a lot, but IMO knocking the Ottomans out of the war is too optimistic. Russian logistics still won't be great, especially once they advance, and if Russia is threatening the Anatolian heartland of the Empire the Ottomans can withdraw in Palestine and shift units around to stabilize the front with the Russians. Plus, the Ottomans know that a peace (especially with Imperial Russia at the peace table) will be a very harsh peace and even with additional setbacks in 1917 are IMO more likely to hang and hope that their German ally can turn things around.

I have to disagree here.
According to "Caucasian Battlefields" by Muratoff and Allen, the ottoman situation was dire.

Since you mention logistics, the russian logistics were far far better than the ottoman ones. Yudenich proved to be a capable administrator by taking care of his logistics and the welfare of his soldiers. Almost from the beginning of the war, he gave special attention in building new single-track narrow gauge railroads. Until winter 1915, he had expanded the railway to Karaurgan. In spring 1916 he expanded the line to Erzurum. His plans for the next campaining season was to expand it to Erzincan, just behind the front line. Considering his previous success in railroad building and that he had specialized railroad construction battalions from Manchuria, I believe that without the February Revolution, he would have built it until summer 1917.

In contrast, each ottoman formation sent to the front had to walk on foot 400-500km from their closest railhead. Formations were not sent by sea at this point of the war, as the Russian Black Sea Fleet had achieved supremacy (the Goeben was in dire need of time at a german yard).

The map is from Erickson's book "Ordered to die".