For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures

[Hertog Jann]

If I manage to successfully deal with the February Uprising and its aftermath, some interesting perspectives will open: How would the Conference of Paris and the post-war order change with Imperial Russia amongst the victors ? How would Russia's society, politics, arts, culture, evolve in the 20's ? Fascinating stuff, endless possibilities.

Exactly!

I wonder also, what it means that Russia stays in the war. First of all, the Germans cannot launch their 1918 Kaiserschlacht if there is an active Eastern Front. Could Austria-Hungary endure almost a year without the russian annus horribilis? With an active and menacing Eastern Front, could the CP launch the Caporetto Offensive? What happens to the Romanian Front where the Russians and Romanians were able to concentrate huge forces by summer 1917?

I am also looking forward to what will happen to the single front where the Russians enjoy both qualitative and quantitative superiority: the Caucasian Front. According to Erickson ("Ordered to die: a history of the Ottoman army in the First World War) , who uses official Turkish Army sources, the Ottoman 3rd Army in December 1916 had an effective rifle strength of 36,382 men, with each division having 5,000-8,000 men (a total of 7 divisions). Similarly, the Ottoman 2nd Army was reduced by December in 6 divisions. By December 1916, the Ottomans were left without any divisions in reserve: they could only recall 2 divisions from Galicia, 3 from Romania and 2 from Macedonia, but such move would put additional strain on the CP deployment, as the Germans would have to cover these sectors. Even in that case, that gave only 7 divisions as a strategic reserve to cover extensive fronts. Basically, the February Revolution and its afternath saved the Ottoman Army from total collapse.

In OTL the strategic reserve from Galicia/Romania/ Macedonia was used to beef up the Palestinian Front. Erickson maintains that without the use of this reserve (Yildirim Army), Cemal Pasha's 4th Army would have collapsed. Therefore it seems that the last ottoman reserves could cover either Palestine or the Caucasus, not both. Actually, it took both the use of the Yildirim Army and reinforcements from the Caucasus Front (3rd Cavalry Division, artillery) to slow down the British.

Even if the whole reserve was used in Caucasus, I doubt it would have been enough when we take into account Yudenich's army.

 

[fasquardon]

Honestly, Russia's fate in the XXe century is something upon which I obsess over and over. Contrary to what the boy-scouts of "historical necessity" would have us think, neither February nor October had the character of inevitability. There are literally dozens of realistic POD's littered all over the place, from the XIXe century (Alexander II's assassination and reforms, for instance) to the last minute (Gurko still being Chief-of-Staff when the Revolution starts is a particularly potent one). Military POD's like an altered Russo-Japanese war or having the Stavka sticking to the Palytsin plan of 1913 (focusing on Galicia and staying on the defensive vis-à-vis Prussia) are also quite interesting.

If I manage to successfully deal with the February Uprising and its aftermath, some interesting perspectives will open: How would the Conference of Paris and the post-war order change with Imperial Russia amongst the victors ? How would Russia's society, politics, arts, culture, evolve in the 20's ? Fascinating stuff, endless possibilities.

I think the February and October revolutions were far from inevitable, but their ramifications for the whole world were so enormous that I wouldn't trust myself to do a good job of imagining a world without them.

I do like your choice of PoD. Stolypin being Russia's Clemenseau is subtle and believable to me.

fasquardon

 

[Stenkarazin]

January 1917 – Food shortages and forebodings

Despite the slow improvement of Russia’s war economy, the situation was worsening in Petrograd. In some ways, it was actually the reorganization of Russia’s economy which was making life worse for the working classes of the capital. Polivanov had deployed herculean efforts to redirect the economy towards the war effort, and this had had the effect of thoroughly destabilizing the supply and economic tissue of the great northern cities. Food supply was especially erratic: coupled with a particularly harsh winter, this had the effect of thoroughly depressing the workers and their families.

But there was more. On paper, Petrograd was well garrisoned, with prestigious Life-Gard regiments whose proud tradition harked back to the glorious times of Peter the Great; trusted regiments who acted loyally and efficiently during the revolution of 1905. In truth, the city of Peter was too much garrisoned for its own good. Most of the Life-Guards of 1914 had died on the frontline, sacrificed by inept commanders in senseless assaults, those pillars of the regime dying like everyone else in the swamps of Mazuria or on the frozen heights of Galicia. Their successors were not up to the task, and that is a severe understatement: the Life-Guard regiments had been refilled hastily with untrained, undisciplined conscripts, who dreaded to be sent to the front. The brave and talented officers had died with their men on the front-line, and their successors, more afraid of their men than of the enemy, didn’t dare to try and impose some discipline on their men: they mostly left them to their own devices, idling the days in the caserns of the city. The officers may be incompetent, but they were not blind. They knew that the morale of the garrison was low. Their worries were, by mysterious and muted ways, making their way to the higher-ups. They were dismissed by S.S. Khabalov, the ineffectual commander of the Petrograd Military District, but by the end of January, War Minister Polivanov and Interior Minister Schcherbatov were aware that the reliability of most of the garrison was uncertain. Schcherbatov was taking no chance, and made sure in the following weeks that the police forces were duly equipped and ready.

The officers were not the only ones to feel a vague sense of unease. Many contemporaries would later report, maybe with more retroactivity than accuracy, that there was something in the air. Some of you who have lived during these days may remember the unreal atmosphere that seemed to linger over Petrograd, whose artificiality seemed to intensify, almost as if that giant theater stage of a city was prepping itself for the grandest play of all, a play full of sound and fury, directed and played by the vast, faceless masses that for too long we had been accustomed to see as merely a part of the scenery.​

 

[Stenkarazin]

February 1917 – Unrest in Petrograd – Quarrel at the Stavka

In late February 1917, food shortages were still at a critical point, despite the government's frantic efforts to assure the food supply of the great industrial neighborhoods of Petrograd. Actually, it was partly because of Stolypin's and Krivoshein's efforts to implement the Razvyorstka system that riots started on 23 February, International Day of Woman's rights : the managers of the Putilov plants, wary of their workers' empty stomachs, had secured priority access to the first batches of grain brought to Petrograd under the Razvyorstka system. When, on the morning of the 23 February, workers of nearby factories saw the Putilovski queuing for, and receiving bread, they threw a fit. Soon a violent riot embraced the whole Putilov neighbourhood. The police arrived and dispersed the crowd with necessary violence. This lead only to more riots: many workers were now persuaded that they were going to starve, while the privileged workers working for the war effort were stuffing themselves with food. Many directed their anger towards their own managers. Other aimed at passers-by who looked "German" or "burjui", or well-fed. Others blamed the government.

Soon, disgruntled workers and their families were taking the street in angry riots, which were becoming more violent by the hour. The police and Cossacks reacted with their customary heavy-handed ways, but it was not enough to break the unrest. Soon, most of the city was paralyzed by unrest and violence.

Stolypin, who knew, through his contacts at the Court and at Moguilev (notably Gurko), that his days in office were numbered, seized upon the situation like a drowning man to a raft. This, he knew, was the kind of stuff where he would prove his worth. After all, hadn’t his career started that way, during the bloody days of 1905, where, as governor of Saratov, he alone, with strength and energy, managed to subdue the revolution, while everywhere else governors were fleeing for their life?

Contrary to some his colleagues who were eager not to disturb the Emperor and still hoped that the insurrection would subside, the Prime Minister had, by the evening of the second day of protests (24 February), both seized the gravity of what was unfolding and his personal interest to raise the Emperor’s attention to it. In the night of the 24th, Peter Arkadyevich sent a telegram to Mogilev, painting the situation in grave terms and requesting the immediate dispatch of a mobile elite force to the Capital.

This was not mere caution or foresight: it was above all a political play. Stolypin, who knew that his dismissal was imminent, had an interest in painting the situation in the gravest terms, so as to convince the Emperor to allow him a few more weeks, a delay that Stolypin intended to use to salvage his political position in the eyes of the Court by doing what he did best: crushing a revolution.

The telegram arrived in Mogilev as Alekseyev was just resuming his functions as Chief-of-Staff. Most crucially, Gurko, who had been given to believe that he would keep the job, had not yet left. Encouraged by Stolypin’s support, he had remained around, hoping to secure a worthy new affectation.

Puzzled by the telegram of Stolypin, the Emperor convoked a council to discuss it. Nicholas was inclined to dismiss it as exaggeratedly alarmist. Alekseyev argued that sending troops from the front to Petrograd was uncalled for, and then carefully suggested that the Tsar could contemplate a ministerial reshuffle to include more liberal ministers, for instance Duma Chairman Rodzianko. Most attendants agreed that it was unnecessary and potentially disruptive to pull forces from the front at that point. Gurko alone, who hated Alekseyev and the liberal political class with a passion, took the opposite position: this was grave news, he said, and the request of the Prime Minister should be met at once. Going further, Gurko snidely suggested that Alekseyev playing down the situation may be due to his well-known links with notorious demagogues[1] (“Tell me, Mikhail Vasilyevich, what say your good friends in the Capital of all this?”). Maybe more to annoy Alekseyev rather than anything else, Gurko forcefully pleaded that the “Special Army” (a rapid-intervention force made of Guard troops stationed at Mogilev) should be sent in all haste to Petrograd, and he offered himself to lead it.

This proved decisive. If there was something that Nicholas hated above all else, it was conflict. He had always been terribly embarrassed to see people arguing in front of him, something that his overbearing Romanov uncles had done quite a lot during his whole reign. Resenting the palpable tension between Alekseyev and Gurko, Nicholas was only too glad to see the latter leave the Stavka. He gave his assent, if only to get rid of Gurko. It would always be possible, thought Nicholas, to countermand the order a day or two later. The next morning at dawn (26 February), Gurko and the Special Army departed to Petrograd.
​

---

[1] Somewhere during the war, Guchkov had made public (or widely shared) a letter of Alekseyev to him. Something like that, I do not remember exactly the particulars. In any case it was an embarrassment to the Chief-of-Staff, whose closeness to Guchkov would surely not be to the Emperor’s taste. But it is interesting to note that Nicholas, despite loathing Guchkov, did not dismiss Alekseev. As a matter of fact, most of the front commanders were lukewarm monarchists at best, and closeted Octobrists at worst.​

 

[alexmilman]

Had to give that one a "thumbs-up" for the "headless chicken in a hurricane"

Well, I was trying to be nice and stuck to the optimistic assessment.

Presently, I'm trying to read "From the life of the State Council 1907-17" by D. D. Grimm. "Trying" because it is incredibly boring and, IMO, the right title would be (at the risk of plagiarism) "Importance of being a liberal".

The author, a distinguished professor of jurisprudence, was elected to the State Council from the class of "professors" (half of the SC was elected by the designated groups "gentry", "clergy", etc.) and in the first 350 pages he mostly (*) describes how the liberal faction was formed, how he outplayed a reactionary Minister of Education who was trying to remove him (long quotations from the documents he wrote to prove illegality of such a move, etc.) and how important was for a person with the principles to stick to these principles.

The only issue of real importance he mentioned so far was discussion regarding construction of the Amur Railroad (the Eastern sector of the TransSib) on which the liberal faction took a principal position and .... voted against. Of course, one may ask why the persons with no technical, financial or political background had been asked to express any opinion on the subject or what was so "liberal" in their protest (wasn't the existing Eastern China Railroad somewhat "imperialistic/colonialistic" and as such opposite to "liberal"?) but the point is that the elected members of the SC were mostly incompetent in the issues they had to consider (some of the appointed members of the SC had at least some experience in the government and at least some of them were not yet completely senile) and, strictly speaking, should not have any definite opinion on most of the subjects they were facing. Interestingly enough, the author was denouncing Witte for the lack of "principles" when he sided with the liberal group to which he belonged. An idea that this was not a matter of ideology simply does not come to author's mind (Witte was, with a benefit of a hindsight, wrong in his approach to the expansion into China and Eastern China Railroad was his "brainchild" and had been rather profitable so he was, understandably, defending it even if the events of the RJW started demonstrating a danger of having connection with the Russian Far East going through a foreign territory with a weak government and being unprotected by the geographic obstacles).

To make a long story short, I'm quite skeptical about ability of the SC members to handle a crisis situation in a meaningful manner and the same goes for Duma. With very few (or none) truly competent people in the Council of Ministers and meddling coming from Alexandra and her clique, what is there to expect?

__________
(*) To be fair, when it came to his area of competence (high education), he proved to be quite intelligent but (one more demonstration of a general incompetence) the government did not listen to the advice of a specialist.

As a way to deal with the revolutionary unrest in the universities he proposed to close them for an year. As he explained, this would hit in two ways. Majority of the students would be pissed off because graduation is postponed, because during this year they are not going to get the stipends and because they became "eligible" to the army conscription. Combination of these factors should seriously change their attitude toward the few revolutionary activists. On the other side of equation, the professors (they had been paid royalties from the attendance of their lectures) would be hit on a pocket and this should cool down the most "enthusiastic" ones.

 

[alexmilman]

February 1917 – Unrest in Petrograd – Quarrel at the Stavka

In late February 1917, food shortages reached a critical point. Soon, the workers and their families were taking the street in angry protests, which were becoming more violent and more political by the hour. The police and Cossacks reacted with their customary heavy-handed ways, but it was not enough to break the unrest. Soon, most of the city was paralyzed, and tremoring with revolutionary fervour.

Stolypin, who knew, through his contacts at the Court and at Moguilev (notably Gurko), that his days in office were numbered, seized upon the situation like a drowning man to a raft. This, he knew, was the kind of stuff where he would prove his worth. After all, hadn’t his career started that way, during the bloody days of 1905, where, as governor of Saratov, he alone, with strength and energy, managed to subdue the revolution, while everywhere else governors were fleeing for their life?

Contrary to some his colleagues who were eager not to disturb the Emperor and still hoped that the insurrection would subside, the Prime Minister had, by the evening of the second day of protests (24 February), both seized the gravity of what was unfolding and his personal interest to raise the Emperor’s attention to it. In the night of the 24th, Peter Arkadyevich sent a telegram to Mogilev, painting the situation in grave terms and requesting the immediate dispatch of a mobile elite force to the Capital.

This was not mere caution or foresight: it was above all a political play. Stolypin, who knew that his dismissal was imminent, had an interest in painting the situation in the gravest terms, so as to convince the Emperor to allow him a few more weeks, a delay that Stolypin intended to use to salvage his political position in the eyes of the Court by doing what he did best: crushing a revolution.

The telegram arrived in Mogilev as Alekseyev was just resuming his functions as Chief-of-Staff. Most crucially, Gurko, who had been given to believe that he would keep the job, had not yet left. Encouraged by Stolypin’s support, he had remained around, hoping to secure a worthy new affectation.

Puzzled by the telegram of Stolypin, the Emperor convoked a council to discuss it. Nicholas was inclined to dismiss it as exaggeratedly alarmist. Alekseyev argued that sending troops from the front to Petrograd was uncalled for, and then carefully suggested that the Tsar could contemplate a ministerial reshuffle to include more liberal ministers, for instance Duma Chairman Rodzianko. Most attendants agreed that it was unnecessary and potentially disruptive to pull forces from the front at that point. Gurko alone, who hated Alekseyev and the liberal political class with a passion, took the opposite position: this was grave news, he said, and the request of the Prime Minister should be met at once. Going further, Gurko snidely suggested that Alekseyev playing down the situation may be due to his well-known links with notorious demagogues[1] (“Tell me, Mikhail Vasilyevich, what say your good friends in the Capital of all this?”). Maybe more to annoy Alekseyev rather than anything else, Gurko forcefully pleaded that the “Special Army” (a rapid-intervention force made of Guard troops stationed at Mogilev) should be sent in all haste to Petrograd, and he offered himself to lead it.

This proved decisive. If there was something that Nicholas hated above all else, it was conflict. He had always been terribly embarrassed to see people arguing in front of him, something that his overbearing Romanov uncles had done quite a lot during his whole reign. Resenting the palpable tension between Alekseyev and Gurko, Nicholas was only too glad to see the latter leave the Stavka. He gave his assent, if only to get rid of Gurko. It would always be possible, thought Nicholas, to countermand the order a day or two later. The next morning at dawn (26 February), Gurko and the Special Army departed to Petrograd.
​

---

[1] Somewhere during the war, Guchkov had made public (or widely shared) a letter of Alekseyev to him. Something like that, I do not remember exactly the particulars. In any case it was an embarrassment to the Chief-of-Staff, whose closeness to Guchkov would surely not be to the Emperor’s taste. But it is interesting to note that Nicholas, despite loathing Guchkov, did not dismiss Alekseev. As a matter of fact, most of the front commanders were lukewarm monarchists at best, and closeted Octobrists at worst.​

In OTL in December of 1916 the government introduced prodrazverstka, which was no effectively implemented until the Bolsheviks came to power and used it in a draconian way: the government kept buying the bread on free market and the volumes had been quite low. The Provisional Government turned this program into the "bread monopoly" (all produced bread was going to the government) but failed to enforce it.

Now, with Stolypin in charge one may expect that the program is adopted earlier and enforced in the efficient way. Within your TL if it is still introduced in the late 1916 but in the form of a monopoly and strictly enforced, the bread should start arriving to Petrograd in the early 1917 (February) thus eliminating one of the important grievances at the most important moment: the people would be too busy staying in the bread lines (inevitable in the firs few days) to join any revolutionary activities.
A timely abolishing of the prohibition (which was an extreme stupidity to start with) would be another killing move and arrival of the disciplined and battle-experienced troops is going to bury the revolution for good especially after all these reservists of Petrograd garrison are getting themselves drunk senseless (*) .

________________________
(*) Can't guarantee truthfulness of the story but in the Soviet times the tourists visiting Fortress of Peter and Paul had been told that the whole day prior to the Bolshevik coup artillery of the fortress had been firing into the Winter Palace (few hundred meters away, across the Neva) and did not score a single hit. Taking into an account size of a target, if the story is true, we are talking about very serious level of intoxication.

 

[Stenkarazin]

In OTL in December of 1916 the government introduced prodrazverstka, which was no effectively implemented until the Bolsheviks came to power and used it in a draconian way: the government kept buying the bread on free market and the volumes had been quite low. The Provisional Government turned this program into the "bread monopoly" (all produced bread was going to the government) but failed to enforce it.

Now, with Stolypin in charge one may expect that the program is adopted earlier and enforced in the efficient way. Within your TL if it is still introduced in the late 1916 but in the form of a monopoly and strictly enforced, the bread should start arriving to Petrograd in the early 1917 (February) thus eliminating one of the important grievances at the most important moment: the people would be too busy staying in the bread lines (inevitable in the firs few days) to join any revolutionary activities.
A timely abolishing of the prohibition (which was an extreme stupidity to start with) would be another killing move and arrival of the disciplined and battle-experienced troops is going to bury the revolution for good especially after all these reservists of Petrograd garrison are getting themselves drunk senseless (*) .

________________________
(*) Can't guarantee truthfulness of the story but in the Soviet times the tourists visiting Fortress of Peter and Paul had been told that the whole day prior to the Bolshevik coup artillery of the fortress had been firing into the Winter Palace (few hundred meters away, across the Neva) and did not score a single hit. Taking into an account size of a target, if the story is true, we are talking about very serious level of intoxication.

Re bread monopoly: thanks you very much, this is extremely useful ! I'm going to edit the previous chapters to hint at that (thus lowering the magnitude of the protests), and then exploit it in the next installment.

Alcohol will also play a role, of course. I have something in mind for the huge cellars of the Winter Palace.

 

[alexmilman]

Re bread monopoly: thanks you very much, this is extremely useful ! I'm going to edit the previous chapters to hint at that (thus lowering the magnitude of the protests), and then exploit it in the next installment.

Alcohol will also play a role, of course. I have something in mind for the huge cellars of the Winter Palace.

Not just the Winter Palace: it seems that there were huge liquor warehouses in Petrograd which in OTL the Bolsheviks were encouraging to loot well before the coup: with a prohibition established the alcohol did no disappear and was just there and you can imagine effect of all these desirable goodies made available.....

 

[fasquardon]

The only issue of real importance he mentioned so far was discussion regarding construction of the Amur Railroad (the Eastern sector of the TransSib) on which the liberal faction took a principal position and .... voted against. Of course, one may ask why the persons with no technical, financial or political background had been asked to express any opinion on the subject or what was so "liberal" in their protest (wasn't the existing Eastern China Railroad somewhat "imperialistic/colonialistic" and as such opposite to "liberal"?)

At least in the UK at the time, the liberals were the ones really driving imperialism.

fasquardon

 

[Aghasverov]

Well, I was trying to be nice and stuck to the optimistic assessment.

Presently, I'm trying to read "From the life of the State Council 1907-17" by D. D. Grimm. "Trying" because it is incredibly boring and, IMO, the right title would be (at the risk of plagiarism) "Importance of being a liberal".

The author, a distinguished professor of jurisprudence, was elected to the State Council from the class of "professors" (half of the SC was elected by the designated groups "gentry", "clergy", etc.) and in the first 350 pages he mostly (*) describes how the liberal faction was formed, how he outplayed a reactionary Minister of Education who was trying to remove him (long quotations from the documents he wrote to prove illegality of such a move, etc.) and how important was for a person with the principles to stick to these principles.

The only issue of real importance he mentioned so far was discussion regarding construction of the Amur Railroad (the Eastern sector of the TransSib) on which the liberal faction took a principal position and .... voted against. Of course, one may ask why the persons with no technical, financial or political background had been asked to express any opinion on the subject or what was so "liberal" in their protest (wasn't the existing Eastern China Railroad somewhat "imperialistic/colonialistic" and as such opposite to "liberal"?) but the point is that the elected members of the SC were mostly incompetent in the issues they had to consider (some of the appointed members of the SC had at least some experience in the government and at least some of them were not yet completely senile) and, strictly speaking, should not have any definite opinion on most of the subjects they were facing. Interestingly enough, the author was denouncing Witte for the lack of "principles" when he sided with the liberal group to which he belonged. An idea that this was not a matter of ideology simply does not come to author's mind (Witte was, with a benefit of a hindsight, wrong in his approach to the expansion into China and Eastern China Railroad was his "brainchild" and had been rather profitable so he was, understandably, defending it even if the events of the RJW started demonstrating a danger of having connection with the Russian Far East going through a foreign territory with a weak government and being unprotected by the geographic obstacles).

To make a long story short, I'm quite skeptical about ability of the SC members to handle a crisis situation in a meaningful manner and the same goes for Duma. With very few (or none) truly competent people in the Council of Ministers and meddling coming from Alexandra and her clique, what is there to expect?

__________
(*) To be fair, when it came to his area of competence (high education), he proved to be quite intelligent but (one more demonstration of a general incompetence) the government did not listen to the advice of a specialist.

As a way to deal with the revolutionary unrest in the universities he proposed to close them for an year. As he explained, this would hit in two ways. Majority of the students would be pissed off because graduation is postponed, because during this year they are not going to get the stipends and because they became "eligible" to the army conscription. Combination of these factors should seriously change their attitude toward the few revolutionary activists. On the other side of equation, the professors (they had been paid royalties from the attendance of their lectures) would be hit on a pocket and this should cool down the most "enthusiastic" ones.

Me personally, I'm a big admirer of Sergei Witte - intelligent and pragmatic, a rare combination in those days. Of course, Nicky stopped listening to him around 1906 or so... A giant (physically and mentally ) in an environment of mental pygmies

 

[lukedalton]

Exactly!

I wonder also, what it means that Russia stays in the war. First of all, the Germans cannot launch their 1918 Kaiserschlacht if there is an active Eastern Front. Could Austria-Hungary endure almost a year without the russian annus horribilis? With an active and menacing Eastern Front, could the CP launch the Caporetto Offensive? What happens to the Romanian Front where the Russians and Romanians were able to concentrate huge forces by summer 1917?

Regarding Caporetto, it's usually forgotten in the middle of the enormous success of the offensive, the principal reason why it was launched...A-H line were almost broken in the last italian offensive and the Hapsburg brass believed that another attack will have been succesfull and so they needed breathing space. If they can't launch an offensive in October aka the last moment possible or the attack is half assed due to commitment in other front...the moment Cadorna can launch an assault the Austrian lines will be broken.

Hell, even something like the Kerensky offensive, if done with troops better motivated or with the officer corps more in control will cause greater damage to the Kuk, probably enough to stop any offensive in other front

 

[Stenkarazin]

So, I have edited the last chapter to use the very useful bit provided by @alexmilman.

I post it here for those who have already read the chapter:

In late February 1917, food shortages were still at a critical point, despite the government's frantic efforts to assure the food supply of the great industrial neighborhoods of Petrograd. Actually, it was partly because of Stolypin's and Krivoshein's efforts to implement the Razvyorstka system that riots started on 23 February, International Day of Woman's rights : the managers of the Putilov plants, wary of their workers' empty stomachs, had secured priority access to the first batches of grain brought to Petrograd under the Razvyorstka system. When, on the morning of the 23 February, workers of nearby factories saw the Putilovski queuing for, and receiving bread, they threw a fit. Soon a violent riot embraced the whole Putilov neighbourhood. The police arrived and dispersed the crowd with necessary violence. This lead only to more riots: many workers were now persuaded that they were going to starve, while the privileged workers working for the war effort were stuffing themselves with food. Many directed their anger towards their own managers. Other aimed at passers-by who looked "German" or "burjui", or well-fed. Others blamed the government.

Soon, disgruntled workers and their families were taking the street in angry riots, which were becoming more violent by the hour. The police and Cossacks reacted with their customary heavy-handed ways, but it was not enough to break the unrest. Soon, most of the city was paralyzed by unrest and violence.

So, in a nutshell: the riots still start on schedule, but the cause is different : it actually starts because of Razvyorstka public-controlled grain supply. Basically workers are furious at other workers (the Putilovski) who, trough corruption and favouritism, got to line up for bread before the others. I think it is an interesting irony, as OTL the Putilov workers were the first to strike against the govt.

How does this impact the TL : I have edited out mentions of "revolutionary fervour" and "protests", because these are, at this point, violent riots rather than anti-governement protests. Workers are going to fight against each other as much as they fight police. The revolutionary turn of the protests won't be as fast, or as widely-shared as it was OTL. But it will still happen.

This of course does not prevent Stolypin from painting it as an anti-governement uprising, for his own political reasons, as described in the rest of the chapter.

 

[Stenkarazin]

Exactly!

I wonder also, what it means that Russia stays in the war. First of all, the Germans cannot launch their 1918 Kaiserschlacht if there is an active Eastern Front. Could Austria-Hungary endure almost a year without the russian annus horribilis? With an active and menacing Eastern Front, could the CP launch the Caporetto Offensive? What happens to the Romanian Front where the Russians and Romanians were able to concentrate huge forces by summer 1917?

I am also looking forward to what will happen to the single front where the Russians enjoy both qualitative and quantitative superiority: the Caucasian Front. According to Erickson ("Ordered to die: a history of the Ottoman army in the First World War) , who uses official Turkish Army sources, the Ottoman 3rd Army in December 1916 had an effective rifle strength of 36,382 men, with each division having 5,000-8,000 men (a total of 7 divisions). Similarly, the Ottoman 2nd Army was reduced by December in 6 divisions. By December 1916, the Ottomans were left without any divisions in reserve: they could only recall 2 divisions from Galicia, 3 from Romania and 2 from Macedonia, but such move would put additional strain on the CP deployment, as the Germans would have to cover these sectors. Even in that case, that gave only 7 divisions as a strategic reserve to cover extensive fronts. Basically, the February Revolution and its afternath saved the Ottoman Army from total collapse.

In OTL the strategic reserve from Galicia/Romania/ Macedonia was used to beef up the Palestinian Front. Erickson maintains that without the use of this reserve (Yildirim Army), Cemal Pasha's 4th Army would have collapsed. Therefore it seems that the last ottoman reserves could cover either Palestine or the Caucasus, not both. Actually, it took both the use of the Yildirim Army and reinforcements from the Caucasus Front (3rd Cavalry Division, artillery) to slow down the British.

Even if the whole reserve was used in Caucasus, I doubt it would have been enough when we take into account Yudenich's army.

Regarding Caporetto, it's usually forgotten in the middle of the enormous success of the offensive, the principal reason why it was launched...A-H line were almost broken in the last italian offensive and the Hapsburg brass believed that another attack will have been succesfull and so they needed breathing space. If they can't launch an offensive in October aka the last moment possible or the attack is half assed due to commitment in other front...the moment Cadorna can launch an assault the Austrian lines will be broken.

Hell, even something like the Kerensky offensive, if done with troops better motivated or with the officer corps more in control will cause greater damage to the Kuk, probably enough to stop any offensive in other front

Thanks, these are very useful comments. I kind of underestimated the absolute weakness of the Austrian-Hungarian forces by 1917. An Anatolian offensive is also quite interesting, as it presents the advantage of being relatively "risk-free" for the Stavka.

Come to think of it, once the February Crisis is sorted out, one good "Russian summer" could very well see Turkey and Austria-Hungary fold in short order.

 

[lukedalton]

Thanks, these are very useful comments. I kind of underestimated the absolute weakness of the Austrian-Hungarian forces by 1917. An Anatolian offensive is also quite interesting, as it presents the advantage of being relatively "risk-free" for the Stavka.

Come to think of it, once the February Crisis is sorted out, one good "Russian summer" could very well see Turkey and Austria-Hungary fold in short order.

The OTL Kerensky offensive started in July, while the 11th battle of the Isonzo started in middle August...a more succesfull russian offensive can mean a more succesfull italian offensive and force the A-H to exit the war.

 

[Stenkarazin]

The OTL Kerensky offensive started in July, while the 11th battle of the Isonzo started in middle August...a more succesfull russian offensive can mean a more succesfull italian offensive and force the A-H to exit the war.

It shouldn't be too difficult for the "2n Brusilov offensive" to be vastly more successful than the ill-fated Kerensky offensive.

But I also think about a push on the Romanian front. Do you have any knowledge about that ?

 

[Hertog Jann]

To add my two cents regarding the state of the Austro-Hungarian Army, I 'd like to mention a few things from Alexander Watson's "Ring of Steel".

- During the Brusilov Offensive, the KuK didn't just lose half of its Eastern Front men, but the casualties were concentrated on Croatian, part-Polish and German divisions that were considered loyal to Vienna. Granted, the famed disloyalty of some people of the Dual Monarchy was mostly propaganda of officers to cover their incompetence or the systemic problems of the KuK. However, the psychological impact of these specific losses is bound to further sap the AH morale/

- Morale aside, the human cost was staggering. Too many officers lost, too many veterans troops, too many whole formations. A second Brusilov-style attack (not the Kerensky farce), even if in smaller scale, would be the end of the KuK.

- Regarding war economy, AH lost the Jakobeny manganese mine in Bukovina and had to reduce the percentage of manganese in their steel.

- Austria-Hungary’s wartime public-health crisis was even worse than Germany's. Infant mortality was higher as well.

Quotes from the "Ring of Steel"

Ration allowances also indicate that life was harder even in the relatively well-supplied east of the Habsburg Empire. In April 1917, German daily rations of meat, fat, flour and potatoes totalled 615 grams per head. Hungarian potato-producing regions received 595 grams, other Magyar districts 331 grams, and even less went to people in the Austrian half of the Empire

The worst conditions were to be found in Vienna. There, starvation, not mere malnutrition, did kill. Doctors estimated lack of food to be the direct cause of around 10 per cent of wartime deaths and a contributory factor to 20–30 per cent of deaths. Germany teetered on the brink of starvation during the second half of the war. In the Habsburg lands, parts of Austria went over the brink

Even in peacetime, Austria could cover only two-thirds of its population’s flour, one-third of its beef and just under half its pork consumption. Hungary, which had produced large agricultural surpluses despite the backwardness of its farms, had supplied over 90 per cent of the necessary imports. Vienna had been especially dependent on Magyar trade, most of the meat consumed in the city before 1914 having come from across the nearby border. For the Austrian population, it was therefore a catastrophe that, by 1916, Hungarian imports had dropped to around half of the milk and meat, less than a third of the fat and just 3 per cent of the cereals that had been supplied in peacetime. Hungary took sole responsibility for military provisioning from mid1916, which partly explains the collapse of its exports to Austria. The 500 million kilograms of flour and grain that were delivered to the army during the following year approximated the amount sent to the western half of the Empire during 1915. However, as already in 1915 the cereal exported to Austria had been a mere 37 per cent of what it had received in 1913, this was not much of a justification. Moreover, Austrian civilians did not benefit from the new arrangement as, despite Hungarian promises, the soldiers’ needs were not met and the army consequently requisitioned 290 million kilograms of Romanian grain marked for the Austrian population’s consumption. Austria, in spite of its straitened circumstances, also supplied most of the military’s sugar and 4,100,000 head of cattle, well over half of all provided.

Hungary, as Austria’s politicians and public were well aware, did not contribute its fair share to the Habsburg war effort. The Dualist system rendered Austria powerless to insist, however. Minister President Tisza not only refused to equalize rations across the Empire but also used Hungary’s unusually strong position to advantage in the decennial negotiations to renew the Compromise in 1917.

Theoretically, the Reich’s basic daily ration at first offered 1,985 calories, but this quickly dropped to 1,336 and then, in the summer of 1917, to 1,100 calories. Hungarians received 1,273 calories, which was less, as a contemporary expert pointed out, than a sleeping person needs for life. Austrians, and especially the Viennese, were even worse fed. The basic ration in the Habsburg capital started at 1,300 calories and had fallen to 830.9 by the Armistice

 

[alexmilman]

So, I have edited the last chapter to use the very useful bit provided by @alexmilman.

I post it here for those who have already read the chapter:



So, in a nutshell: the riots still start on schedule, but the cause is different : it actually starts because of Razvyorstka public-controlled grain supply. Basically workers are furious at other workers (the Putilovski) who, trough corruption and favouritism, got to line up for bread before the others. I think it is an interesting irony, as OTL the Putilov workers were the first to strike against the govt.

How does this impact the TL : I have edited out mentions of "revolutionary fervour" and "protests", because these are, at this point, violent riots rather than anti-governement protests. Workers are going to fight against each other as much as they fight police. The revolutionary turn of the protests won't be as fast, or as widely-shared as it was OTL. But it will still happen.

This of course does not prevent Stolypin from painting it as an anti-governement uprising, for his own political reasons, as described in the rest of the chapter.

Very interesting twist. But the gran echelons keep arriving....

 

[lukedalton]

It shouldn't be too difficult for the "2n Brusilov offensive" to be vastly more successful than the ill-fated Kerensky offensive.

But I also think about a push on the Romanian front. Do you have any knowledge about that ?

Frankly just more troops discipline and no soldier's democracy will make the offensive more succesfull (it's not that hard to be more succesfull than OTL), the 'problem' is that once the Germans are succesfull in sending reinforcements the advance will probably stop...still i expect that the KuK will be severely weakened enoungh to not be capable of offensive action for a while.
Still the redeployment will mean also for them no offensive actions, especially if the russian army/govermernt is a more choesive force and that will have serious repercussion in the western front...or in any case it will not the OTL walkover

For Romania, well not very much.

Edit: naturally there is the fact that the CP can launch their offensive first, OTL their limited their attack hoping that the political chaos mean the exit from the war of Russia, ITTL this type of thoughs can be butterflyed away if the situation become more stable after a short while

 

[alexmilman]

Me personally, I'm a big admirer of Sergei Witte - intelligent and pragmatic, a rare combination in those days. Of course, Nicky stopped listening to him around 1906 or so... A giant (physically and mentally ) in an environment of mental pygmies

And don’ forget, highly competent. Which does not mean that he did not make questionable and outright wrong decisions like promoting the naval bases in Port Arthur and especially Dalni (his brainchild) but, unlike us, he did not have a benefit of a hindsight and had at least seemingly valid economic justification for his ideas instead of being ideology-driven as the author I was talking about.

 

[moro]

otl le forze armate rumene durante l'offensiva kerensky hanno avuto alcuni importanti successi (battaglia di Mărăşti); se riescono a coordinarsi meglio con i russi, "potrebbe" liberare una parte significativa dei territori rumeni occupati (i rumeni erano concentrati sulla liberazione del loro stato, non parteciparono in modo significativo alle offensive in Galizia).

P.S. buon lavoro, seguirò con piacere i prossimi aggiornamenti