For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures

You had the British going 'Harumph' enough to dissuade that issue
Not in 1829.

Strictly speaking, not even in 1878: a note that if the British squadron will sail into the Straits the Russian troops would enter Constantinople stopped the whole "harumph" thingy; however, even prior to the British activities, Alexander II ordered not to occupy the city. It simply did not make any practical sense and would not serve any Russian purposes.
 
what is left of A-H being made the scapegoat of 1914-1918
If Germany blames Austria-Hungary/the Habsburgs for either losing the war dragging them into the war, does that mean the German right accepts that Germany has really lost the war and the German wasn’t betrayed or robbed of its victory by a stab in the back? Russia staying in the war, Germany experiencing less success in their last offensives in 1918, before experiencing serious setbacks on all fronts, their allies possibly collapsing months before Germany does, and the possibility of Russian troops on German soil at the end of the war, make that quite likely IMO. The absence of a stab-in-the-back-myth or at least the myth only taken seriously among the far-right fringe would change German politics in the 20s and 30s a lot and would be a huge boon for the stability of constitutional government. Even though large parts of the right might still be unhappy with democracy, other parts of the rights might be willing to accept democracy and constitutional government under a monarch and we might see the emergence of a serious democratic conservative party in Germany in the 20s.
 
How well known internationally was the extent of the Armenian Genocide at this time? An offensive into Anatolia would liberate the deportation camps. Photographs and films of the Ottomon atrocities could do something to consolidate Russian resolve to see the war through.
By that point the adult males are kaput or at least some survivors are in Syria.
If Russia wants to make propaganda though, they can utilize the enslavement / forced conversion as war spoils/ sex slaves of Armenian children and women.
Academic source on the topic:


The Russians would be most interested in getting Armenia and not the territories with a hostile Turkish majority. As for Constantinople, IIRC, the issue was control over the Straits (or at least Bosphorus) rather than possession of the city: the traditional goal starting from the XIX was to prevent sailing of the "3rd party" warships through the Straits into the Black Sea. Even with a fully implemented program of updating the Black Sea Fleet Russian Empire would not have clearly defined interests on the Med. However, the old London Protocol of 1841 proved to be disadvantageous for Russia allowing Sultan's allies to sail through the Straits during the wartime. Obviously, the Russians would not be satisfied either with this agreement or with the Ottoman continued control. Probably, the acceptable (for the Entante members ;) ) solution would be Russian control of the Bosphorus and British of the Dardanelles.
A couple of years ago I had read a paper by Dimitrii Likharev titled "Constantinople and the Black Sea Straits as Russia's War Aims in 1914‐1917: A Comparison of Russian and American Interpretations". I searched and found it yesterday.

He presents different perspectives on the issue. One that stands is of Notovich, who suggests that Grey brought up the issue of giving the Straits to Russia in order " to keep Russia in the ranks of the Entente and to motivate the Russians to fight the war through to its victorious end". France was the one in 1915 that didn't want Russian Straits.
It cost the British diplomatically, and Sir Edward Grey personally, “to bring the French to reason” and to receive their consent for a solution to the problem of Constantinople and the Straits “in accordance to the desires of Russia.”
C.J. Smith -an American historian- wrote in the 60s that
Turkey moved forward voluntary at this point as the answer to the problem—the victim whose partition might yet secure the European balance.… But as things actually stood, it was necessary during October–November 1914 to evolve a British policy whose interlocking points were as follows: to diminish the power of Germany and AustriaHungary, but to leave them in existence as Great Powers; to destroy the Ottoman Empire; to keep Russia out of Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sophia but installing it in Constantinople

Willian Renzi held similar views to Notovich
Renzi reduced the factors that induced Great Britain to consent to Russia’s annexation of Constantinople and the Straits after the war to three groups. The first group consisted of strategic considerations. As early as 1903, British generals and admirals concluded, after analyzing a hypothetical situation in which Russia occupied the Black Sea Straits, that Russia would not get any advantage from it. The probable results of the Russian occupation of Constantinople were discussed and recorded at the Committee of Imperial Defense meetings on 11 February and 10 March 1903. The finding was that even if the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet moved 400 miles closer to the Mediterranean Sea after moving from Sevastopol to Constantinople, Russian warships would not be able to undertake large-scale operations in the open sea. As long as it enjoyed naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, the British fleet could still keep the entrance from the Dardanelles closed.46 In November 1914, Maurice Hankey obtained Asquith’s permission to circulate these papers among the members of the War Cabinet in order to obtain their support for the concession of Constantinople and the Straits to Russia.

Renzi defined the second group of factors as “situational.” At the very beginning of the First World War, there existed an acute problem of mutual distrust among the Allies. In the case of opposition to the claims of Petrograd about Constantinople and the Straits, no one in London or Paris could guarantee that Russia might not consider a separate peace with Germany and its allies. So Russia should be offered something substantial as a reward for its war efforts and sacrifices. By promising Constantinople and the Straits, Grey meant to demonstrate confidence to the eastern ally, on the one hand, and to tie Russia more closely to the war chariot of the Entente.

Renzi defined the third group of factors as the “strategy for the future.” The Entente leaders, especially Grey and Haldane, realized that even “the most crushing defeat” could not prevent a possible resurrection of German power. By using “her great power of scientific and industrial organization,” Germany might be able to construct an even more powerful military machine in the future. Grey therefore viewed the cession of the Straits to Russia as the best available guarantee against future German attempts to reduce Turkey to a satellite state and imperil British interests in the Levant.

As I see it, a Russia that suffers revolution, even though Stolypin crushes it, will be rightfully viewed by Britain and France as a Russia that might seek a separate peace with Germany. The previously mentioned reasons are still valid and there is no better bribe than the Straits, to stay in the war. If the ottoman field armies collapse, then it is an easily deliverable bribe to soothen russian public opinion - as the Western Powers understand said public opinion.

Here is the map of the Straits Zone that would have been given to Russia (source: wikipedia)

As you may notice, the asiatic shore of the Dardanelles is not included. Possibly to be given to a british proxy/ close ally named Venizelos. Therefore the Russians would control Bosporus, would be able to block enemy access to the Sea of Marmara by controlling rhe Gallipoli peninsula, yet they won't be able to project serious power in the Mediterranean, as they do not hold the asiatic shore of the Dardaneless. Win-win for everybody.

There are many advantages there for Russia. Firstly, there won't be any danger of having an enemy naval force in the Black Sea. Even if Britain blockades the Dardanelles, there is a safe trade zone with Bulgaria and Romania. Secondly, Russia controls sea access of both Bulgaria (as they will lose their Aegean access and be deeper in russian orbit) and Romania. Half of the Balkans instantly become an easily controlled sphere of influence. Thirdly, it breaks a major (even if weak) power - the Ottoman Empire. Now there won't be a big neighbor to the south, able to field a large army and close the Straits. Smaller entities will exist, in Turkey, Greece, French Syria and British Iraq - perhaps even Italian Anatolia/Caria/Lycia. These smaller entities will be easier to bully or at least influence according to russian interests: the south flank is secure. British Iraq will exist only as long as Russia allows it, since Britain won't be able to protect it from a land invasion.
 
With regards to Hitler and the German far right, even if Hitler survives the war and goes into politics as IOTL National Socialism will be quite different without the influence of White exiles like Alfred Rosenberg or Max von Scheubner-Richter, who were shaped by Russian anti-Semitism and violent anti-Bolshevism and were quite influential in the early years of National Socialism and Hitler's political development from 1920-1923.
This also makes it interesting, what ideas from the Russian (far) right arrive in Germany IATL and how the influence the German conservative and right-wing discourse.

Antisemitism is still going to be a problem TTL. Russian remains under an autocracy that was culturally and nationalistically antisemitic. A wealthy, victorious, and still autocratic one to boot.

I can picture Jews might get more rights, but the very people who promoted things like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion still hold positions of power.
 
Antisemitism is still going to be a problem TTL. Russian remains under an autocracy that was culturally and nationalistically antisemitic. A wealthy, victorious, and still autocratic one to boot.

I can picture Jews might get more rights, but the very people who promoted things like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion still hold positions of power.
Anti-Semitism will definitely not disappear in Russia, agreed.

My point was more about what the absence of White exiles (Rosenberg, Scheubner-Richter…) might have on Hitler’s political development and the development of German right-wing discourse in general. For example, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were first translated into German in 1920 and might have been brought to Germany by these White exiles and they were definitely influential in spreading them and influencing Hitler’s political thinking (not saying that Hitler wasn’t an anti-Semite before or that there wasn’t plenty of anti-Semitism present in Germany before, but they had an impact).
If the protocols and the virulent anti-Semitism and anti-socialism that IOTL came with the White exiles arrive in Germany differently, maybe a couple of years later than OTL, maybe toned down, maybe isn’t taken as seriously because there hasn’t been a Bolshevist revolution, maybe because its coming from a former enemy, maybe because Muscovism is a more attractive alternative…, then German right-wing political thought might develop differently (also if Hitler still goes into politics this will definitely impact his political development).
 
Anti-Semitism will definitely not disappear in Russia, agreed.

My point was more about what the absence of White exiles (Rosenberg, Scheubner-Richter…) might have on Hitler’s political development and the development of German right-wing discourse in general. For example, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were first translated into German in 1920 and might have been brought to Germany by these White exiles and they were definitely influential in spreading them and influencing Hitler’s political thinking (not saying that Hitler wasn’t an anti-Semite before or that there wasn’t plenty of anti-Semitism present in Germany before, but they had an impact).
If the protocols and the virulent anti-Semitism and anti-socialism that IOTL came with the White exiles arrive in Germany differently, maybe a couple of years later than OTL, maybe toned down, maybe isn’t taken as seriously because there hasn’t been a Bolshevist revolution, maybe because its coming from a former enemy, maybe because Muscovism is a more attractive alternative…, then German right-wing political thought might develop differently (also if Hitler still goes into politics this will definitely impact his political development).

Uh...

It certainly is going to be very, very complicated.

But here is a the key issue: Russia TTL is going to rise to economic, political, and geopolitical heights that it didn't rise to OTL, and not just because of a victory.

Simply by avoiding the Bolshevik Revolution, it can avoid other disasters like the Russian Civil War, the 1921 famine and typhus epidemic. Those disasters killed 9 million people ALONE between 1918-1922.

Also without the economic destruction of the civil war, it is unlikely that a future Russian government needs to pursue hyperindustrialization and kill millions of peasants.

Thanks to not being Bolshevik, Russia is not going to nearly as diplomatically isolated as the early Soviet Union was.

Combined with potential war gains, like lands in Eastern Europe and some tasty chunks of Ottoman Turkey, Russia is in a really, really good position going forward.

Whether or not Nazi-style antisemitism becomes prominent depends on who ends up in control of Rusisa or not.

If Russia becomes a moderate consitutional monarchy, virulent antisemitsm, while still existing in many forms, might not be as nearly systematic as OTL. If TTL, some nutcase general comes to power, and launches pogroms, than the situation for Jews in Europe could become very, very dire, because Russia's TTL greater size, prestige, and economic power means nations are unlikely to defend Jews.

Remember, Mussolini was not a particularly antisemitic person, until Hitler became a powerful figure on the world stage.
 
If Russia becomes a moderate consitutional monarchy, virulent antisemitsm, while still existing in many forms, might not be as nearly systematic as OTL. If TTL, some nutcase general comes to power, and launches pogroms, than the situation for Jews in Europe could become very, very dire, because Russia's TTL greater size, prestige, and economic power means nations are unlikely to defend Jews.
On the other hand, Hitler and the Nazis didn't invent the ‘Jewish bolshevism’ trope, plenty of right-wingers in Russia believed that before the Nazis were a thing. Russia won’t cool down completely anytime soon (author hinted that something is going to happen right after the peace conference and that the 1920s will be features plenty of left-wing terrorism and agitation) and an embattled czarist autocracy (even if they reform somewhat plenty of people will feel unhappy about the political situation, the glory of having the won war will not be enough to paper over all of Imperial Russia’s political divisions, even if lessens them somewhat) might decide that whipping up anti-Semitic sentiment (which many of its supporters honestly believe in) might be a good distraction plus a useful tool to try turning people against socialists and other radical leftists.
The political development of Russia will be very interesting. I'm looking really forward to learning what Muscovism is all about and how it might influence right-wing political thought in Germany and other parts of Europe, but that is still way off.

Simply by avoiding the Bolshevik Revolution, it can avoid other disasters like the Russian Civil War, the 1921 famine and typhus epidemic. Those disasters killed 9 million people ALONE between 1918-1922.
ATL Russia definitely will be having a much better 20th century, but it still won’t be a smooth ride by any means. The 1920s will very likely still feature a lot of social/political unrest, demands for liberalizations (that the regime is very unlikely to grant in full), terrorism and repression that can radicalize more people or turn people against the terrorists depending on how things play out, and the likely global economic crisis will severely test the stability of Imperial Russia. It isn’t inconceivable that Russia could fall to some sort of Russian fascism or dictatorship in the 1930s despite having won the war, but the author of this timeline seems to be going into another direction.
 
Remember, Mussolini was not a particularly antisemitic person, until Hitler became a powerful figure on the world stage.
Mussolini isn't guaranteed to be handed power by Victor Emmanuel III and the Italian traditional right-wing elites. Depending on what happens at the peace conference there might not be a ‘mutilated victory’ or at least disappointment with the peace, which reduces fascist support. Also even if the Italian Biennio Rosso (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biennio_Rosso) happens roughly as IOTL the absence of the February and October Revolutions might embolden the king enough that he decides he doesn’t need the fascists to suppress the radical left and decide not to give into Mussolini’s pressure campaign that was the March on Rome, orders the army to disperse the march and arrest the ringleader (Mussolini, who wasn’t at the March, likely flees to Switzerland), and afterwards declares a state of emergency and starts to govern more authoritarian even if the trappings of constitutional monarchy aren’t abolished (Victor Emmanuel III clearly wasn’t a friend of parliamentary democracy and in a world where traditional autocracy still looks like a reasonable option might take this course). Alternatively, the march is dispersed Italian democracy muddles through a couple of tumultuous years until things stabilize in the mid-1920s as the economy starts to look a lot better and democracy stabilizes.

Apart from that, you are right, that even if fascism comes to power in an European state it isn’t guaranteed to be particularly anti-Semitic.
 
On the other hand, Hitler and the Nazis didn't invent the ‘Jewish bolshevism’ trope, plenty of right-wingers in Russia believed that before the Nazis were a thing. Russia won’t cool down completely anytime soon (author hinted that something is going to happen right after the peace conference and that the 1920s will be features plenty of left-wing terrorism and agitation) and an embattled czarist autocracy (even if they reform somewhat plenty of people will feel unhappy about the political situation, the glory of having the won war will not be enough to paper over all of Imperial Russia’s political divisions, even if lessens them somewhat) might decide that whipping up anti-Semitic sentiment (which many of its supporters honestly believe in) might be a good distraction plus a useful tool to try turning people against socialists and other radical leftists.
The political development of Russia will be very interesting. I'm looking really forward to learning what Muscovism is all about and how it might influence right-wing political thought in Germany and other parts of Europe, but that is still way off.

I'm aware that antisemitic anti-socialism was a Tsarist invention. One of the few recordings of Lenin's voice dissects this.

But there is a difference between the antisemitism of tsars and the systematic ethnic cleansing of Nazism, although both should be rightly condemned.

Perhaps an alt-Russian demagogue might tolerate the existance of Jews, while keeping them around as a target? Or perhaps he gives them a seperate autonomy somewhere Siberia, like Stalin tried to do in the JAO? Or he sets up an immigration scheme to Palestine, like Hitler did in his first few years in office.

ATL Russia definitely will be having a much better 20th century, but it still won’t be a smooth ride by any means. The 1920s will very likely still feature a lot of social/political unrest, demands for liberalizations (that the regime is very unlikely to grant in full), terrorism and repression that can radicalize more people or turn people against the terrorists depending on how things play out, and the likely global economic crisis will severely test the stability of Imperial Russia. It isn’t inconceivable that Russia could fall to some sort of Russian fascism or dictatorship in the 1930s despite having won the war, but the author of this timeline seems to be going into another direction.

Yeah.

OTL, even the "winners" of World War I didn't feel like they won anything. France and Britain were so drained by the war, they remained pacifist even as Hitler re-armed. Even the biggest winner, America, was so disgusted by the war, it retreated into isolationism.

Russia may "win" World War I, but this won't erase the feeling of loss by many Russians, the problems of restructuring a war economy to a peacetime setting, and the continued divides between rich and poor.

Let's not forget good ol'Nicky is still in a position to fuck things up completely.

Not to mention social dislocations, industrialization driven urban development, nationalist dissent in Central Asia, concerns about social values, and potential xenophobic backlash.

But these could go into all kinds of directions.

Mussolini isn't guaranteed to be handed power by Victor Emmanuel III and the Italian traditional right-wing elites. Depending on what happens at the peace conference there might not be a ‘mutilated victory’ or at least disappointment with the peace, which reduces fascist support. Also even if the Italian Biennio Rosso (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biennio_Rosso) happens roughly as IOTL the absence of the February and October Revolutions might embolden the king enough that he decides he doesn’t need the fascists to suppress the radical left and decide not to give into Mussolini’s pressure campaign that was the March on Rome, orders the army to disperse the march and arrest the ringleader (Mussolini, who wasn’t at the March, likely flees to Switzerland), and afterwards declares a state of emergency and starts to govern more authoritarian even if the trappings of constitutional monarchy aren’t abolished (Victor Emmanuel III clearly wasn’t a friend of parliamentary democracy and in a world where traditional autocracy still looks like a reasonable option might take this course). Alternatively, the march is dispersed Italian democracy muddles through a couple of tumultuous years until things stabilize in the mid-1920s as the economy starts to look a lot better and democracy stabilizes.

Apart from that, you are right, that even if fascism comes to power in an European state it isn’t guaranteed to be particularly anti-Semitic.

I'm aware under different circumstances, Mussolini might not come to power.

But my point is, geopolitics can determine the course of history.
 
Is there going to be a Balfour Declaration IATL?
A paper by Mark Levene (https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/397065/) makes the case that the Balfour Declaration was at least partly driven (British imperialist goals in the Middle East being another important part of the equation) by British and French foreign policy elites (including none other than Lloyd George) having bought into the idea than in post-February Revolution Russia Jews were a driving force among the political left, were the main agitators for peace and that if Britain were to promise Russian Jews Israel then Russian Jews would change their stance and work to keep Russia in the war; the British decision-makers had bought into conspiracy theories of Jewish influence and wrong or misleading Zionist statement that most Jews worldwide were supportive of Zionism and the status of Israel was thus among their main political priorities.
With Czarist Russia surving the political calculus obviously looks very different.

Levene is quoted by Adam Tooze (of Wages of Destruction fame) in his book The Deluge. The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931, so I think Levene’s theory is worth thinking into account even if it looks really weird at first glance.

To make things absolutely clear and to avoid any potential misunderstandings the paper doesn’t say anything about Zionist or Jewish influence being responsible for the Balfour Declaration, but rather that British (and French) foreign policy thinkers had bought into Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and acted accordingly, both drastically overestimating the influence of Jews upon events in Russia and misreading the political goals of most Russian goals, who mostly were much concerned about the status of Jews in Russia.

The Balfour Declaration might of course still happen, there is a lot of academic debate what led to the Balfour Declaration and British imperialist designs in the Middle East are still a factor. But a Middle East without the Balfour Declaration would develop quite different, which would be very interesting.
 
But there is a difference between the antisemitism of tsars and the systematic ethnic cleansing of Nazism, although both should be rightly condemned.
I didn’t mean to imply otherwise, though it isn’t out of the realm of possibility that Russian anti-Semitism turns genocidal.
I think if you had asked people at the beginning of the 20th century which state was most likely to slaughter its Jewish citizens than most people would have answered with Russia, and that was for a reason.
Perhaps an alt-Russian demagogue might tolerate the existance of Jews, while keeping them around as a target? Or perhaps he gives them a seperate autonomy somewhere Siberia, like Stalin tried to do in the JAO? Or he sets up an immigration scheme to Palestine, like Hitler did in his first few years in office.
Interesting possibilities. How a Jewish Autonomous Region in Russia might develop would be both tragic and fascinating to see and an exodus of Russian Jews to Israel/Palestine, among them many Jewish leftists who surely would be among the first to be ‘encouraged’ to leave, would have interesting consequences for the Middle East.
Coupled with the possibility of the Balfour Declaration not happening, Russia taking over Ottoman Armenia and possibly helping in suppressing an ATL Turkish War of Independence (maybe helping keep a puppet Ottoman Sultan on the throne and thus as a caliph, which would have global consequences, among them for British India: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khilafat_Movement) and we are potentially at a wholly unrecognizable Middle East and a much differently Islam by modern times; there is also the possibility of the Saudis not taking over the Hashemite territory in modern Saudi-Arabia.
If the Sultan keeps his throne and stays on as caliph, then there is the possibility of a competition developing between him and whoever holds Mecca and Medina as ‘guardians of the Holy Sites’ (Hashemites or Saudis) over who speaks for the Ummah (the status of Jerusalem might also play a role).

Going back for a minute, another possibility for a Russian regime looking for a solution for the ‘Jewish Problem’ could be deporting them to Congress Poland in divide-and-conquer scheme: Jews would be out of Russia proper and the Jews in Poland would have to support Russian rule in Poland otherwise they would find themselves at the mercy of an anti-Semitic Polish majority. Of course, this scheme might backfire and lead to some sort of accommodation between the deported Jews and the Polish people as both have ample reason to dislike Russian rule over Poland and the Russian regime.
 
But here is a the key issue: Russia TTL is going to rise to economic, political, and geopolitical heights that it didn't rise to OTL, and not just because of a victory.

Simply by avoiding the Bolshevik Revolution, it can avoid other disasters like the Russian Civil War, the 1921 famine and typhus epidemic. Those disasters killed 9 million people ALONE between 1918-1922.

Also without the economic destruction of the civil war, it is unlikely that a future Russian government needs to pursue hyperindustrialization and kill millions of peasants.
It will be very interesting what a future Russian government will do, economically. While a Russia that avoids Brest-Litovsk and the Civil War will be significantly better off in the early 1920s than OTL, it will still have plenty of problems. By European stands, it is still underdeveloped, and there is little capital available for development (most of the pre-war industrialisation was funded by foreign loans). The agricultural sector is backward, the infrastructure is inadequate and the administration often chaotic and corrupt. Oh, and a significant percentage of the peasantry, the urban workers and the intelligentsia are deeply hostile to the government.

Take agriculture - the government needs to expand production and improve efficiency, both to keep prices down and to avoid politically-disastrous shortages. But the peasants, individually and collectively, lack the money for tractors or fertilisers even if they are available. The old system of every peasant family working their own patch of the village land is a recipe for continuing inefficiency and chronic food insecurity, so some sort of consolidation is essential - but how? A rightist government won't go for forced collectivisation, but privatisation of land is a massive political hot potato.
The last thing the government will want is mobs of angry peasants descending on the cities, claiming that "capitalists" and "speculators" are driving them off their land - unless it's mobs of hungry workers beating up against the gates of the Palace. And of course, there's always the temptation for an authoritarian government to go for price controls, forcibly buying grain from the peasants at a "fair" price to supply bread to the cities. That didn't work for Lenin, and it's unlikely to work for the Tsar.
 
I didn’t mean to imply otherwise, though it isn’t out of the realm of possibility that Russian anti-Semitism turns genocidal.
I think if you had asked people at the beginning of the 20th century which state was most likely to slaughter its Jewish citizens than most people would have answered with Russia, and that was for a reason.

Whereas Germany had the most assimilated Jewish population in all of Europe.

Interesting possibilities. How a Jewish Autonomous Region in Russia might develop would be both tragic and fascinating to see and an exodus of Russian Jews to Israel/Palestine, among them many Jewish leftists who surely would be among the first to be ‘encouraged’ to leave, would have interesting consequences for the Middle East.
Coupled with the possibility of the Balfour Declaration not happening, Russia taking over Ottoman Armenia and possibly helping in suppressing an ATL Turkish War of Independence (maybe helping keep a puppet Ottoman Sultan on the throne and thus as a caliph, which would have global consequences, among them for British India: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khilafat_Movement) and we are potentially at a wholly unrecognizable Middle East and a much differently Islam by modern times; there is also the possibility of the Saudis not taking over the Hashemite territory in modern Saudi-Arabia.
If the Sultan keeps his throne and stays on as caliph, then there is the possibility of a competition developing between him and whoever holds Mecca and Medina as ‘guardians of the Holy Sites’ (Hashemites or Saudis) over who speaks for the Ummah (the status of Jerusalem might also play a role).

Going back for a minute, another possibility for a Russian regime looking for a solution for the ‘Jewish Problem’ could be deporting them to Congress Poland in divide-and-conquer scheme: Jews would be out of Russia proper and the Jews in Poland would have to support Russian rule in Poland otherwise they would find themselves at the mercy of an anti-Semitic Polish majority. Of course, this scheme might backfire and lead to some sort of accommodation between the deported Jews and the Polish people as both have ample reason to dislike Russian rule over Poland and the Russian regime.

Probably not Poland.

The reason why pogroms happened during World War I is because the very racist Russian army thought Jews were a fifth colum of the Germans (a really tragic irony, ain't it).

I doubt a nationalist would send Jews to a vulnerable borderland that would be heavily defended for survival, when it would be more "convenient" to send Jews to some backwater periphery like the Far East.
 
Whereas Germany had the most assimilated Jewish population in all of Europe.
One of history's tragic ironies.
Probably not Poland.

The reason why pogroms happened during World War I is because the very racist Russian army thought Jews were a fifth colum of the Germans (a really tragic irony, ain't it).

I doubt a nationalist would send Jews to a vulnerable borderland that would be heavily defended for survival, when it would be more "convenient" to send Jews to some backwater periphery like the Far East.
You are probably right, I didn't think that entirely through.
 
By European stands, it is still underdeveloped, and there is little capital available for development (most of the pre-war industrialisation was funded by foreign loans).
Also, western capital might not be enthusiastic about investing in a Russia that still looks not entirely stable and is very much disliked by Western intelligentsia after the suppression of the February riots and whatever happens after the peace conference that the author hinted at. Plus, France has much less reason to prop up Russia against Germany with loans and they need the money at home. Russia might struggle to find the foreign loans it desperately needs for continued industrialization and in addition has to use valuable foreign exchange to pay back the French loans from before the war and the foreign loans from during the war.

Especially during IATL’s Great Depression a sufficiently authoritarian government might be tempted to take a page from the OTL Stalinist playbook and seize grain by force, sell it abroad and buy the technology, machinery and resources needed for industrialization cheaply with the foreign exchange from the grain sales. It might not become as brutal as Stalinist industrialization but could still lead to untold human suffering and famines not on the scale of the OTL Soviet famines (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_famine_of_1932–33) as there won’t be collectivization nor intentional government moves to exacerbate/create the famines in Ukraine and Kazakhstan making the situation but the OTL droughts will still happen, and the famines could still potentially cause hundreds of thousands of deaths.
 
The problem with the land was that it was not too much of it physically available in the European Russia. The same goes for the “landless peasants”: there were not too many of them (except for those totally incapable of the independent activities). The real problem was in the communal ownership with the resulting “cherespolositsa” and physical impossibility to improve agricultural methods and increase efficiency. Majority of the Russian (not to be confused with the Ukrainian or Baltic) peasants still had a communal mentality so in the real terms not too much could be done except for promoting mass migration into the Southern Siberia and the suitable parts of the Russian Far East.
Do you know any good sources in English where I can learn more about the land situation in the Russian Empire in the 19th and early 20th century before the February Revolution, the situation of the Russian peasantry and possibly how Russian peasants differed from their Ukrainian/Baltic counterparts during that time?
 
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