marathag
Banned
You had the British going 'Harumph' enough to dissuade that issuethey did not even try to get it in 1829 and in 1878 with the Russian troops being in Adrianople and no serious Ottoman force between them and Constantinople
You had the British going 'Harumph' enough to dissuade that issuethey did not even try to get it in 1829 and in 1878 with the Russian troops being in Adrianople and no serious Ottoman force between them and Constantinople
Not in 1829.You had the British going 'Harumph' enough to dissuade that issue
like pissing off the British?It simply did not make any practical sense and would not serve any Russian purposes.
If Germany blames Austria-Hungary/the Habsburgs for either losing the war dragging them into the war, does that mean the German right accepts that Germany has really lost the war and the German wasn’t betrayed or robbed of its victory by a stab in the back? Russia staying in the war, Germany experiencing less success in their last offensives in 1918, before experiencing serious setbacks on all fronts, their allies possibly collapsing months before Germany does, and the possibility of Russian troops on German soil at the end of the war, make that quite likely IMO. The absence of a stab-in-the-back-myth or at least the myth only taken seriously among the far-right fringe would change German politics in the 20s and 30s a lot and would be a huge boon for the stability of constitutional government. Even though large parts of the right might still be unhappy with democracy, other parts of the rights might be willing to accept democracy and constitutional government under a monarch and we might see the emergence of a serious democratic conservative party in Germany in the 20s.what is left of A-H being made the scapegoat of 1914-1918
They were permanently pissed off anyway so the answer is “no”. 🤪like pissing off the British?
By that point the adult males are kaput or at least some survivors are in Syria.How well known internationally was the extent of the Armenian Genocide at this time? An offensive into Anatolia would liberate the deportation camps. Photographs and films of the Ottomon atrocities could do something to consolidate Russian resolve to see the war through.
A couple of years ago I had read a paper by Dimitrii Likharev titled "Constantinople and the Black Sea Straits as Russia's War Aims in 1914‐1917: A Comparison of Russian and American Interpretations". I searched and found it yesterday.The Russians would be most interested in getting Armenia and not the territories with a hostile Turkish majority. As for Constantinople, IIRC, the issue was control over the Straits (or at least Bosphorus) rather than possession of the city: the traditional goal starting from the XIX was to prevent sailing of the "3rd party" warships through the Straits into the Black Sea. Even with a fully implemented program of updating the Black Sea Fleet Russian Empire would not have clearly defined interests on the Med. However, the old London Protocol of 1841 proved to be disadvantageous for Russia allowing Sultan's allies to sail through the Straits during the wartime. Obviously, the Russians would not be satisfied either with this agreement or with the Ottoman continued control. Probably, the acceptable (for the Entante members ) solution would be Russian control of the Bosphorus and British of the Dardanelles.
C.J. Smith -an American historian- wrote in the 60s thatIt cost the British diplomatically, and Sir Edward Grey personally, “to bring the French to reason” and to receive their consent for a solution to the problem of Constantinople and the Straits “in accordance to the desires of Russia.”
Turkey moved forward voluntary at this point as the answer to the problem—the victim whose partition might yet secure the European balance.… But as things actually stood, it was necessary during October–November 1914 to evolve a British policy whose interlocking points were as follows: to diminish the power of Germany and AustriaHungary, but to leave them in existence as Great Powers; to destroy the Ottoman Empire; to keep Russia out of Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sophia but installing it in Constantinople
Renzi reduced the factors that induced Great Britain to consent to Russia’s annexation of Constantinople and the Straits after the war to three groups. The first group consisted of strategic considerations. As early as 1903, British generals and admirals concluded, after analyzing a hypothetical situation in which Russia occupied the Black Sea Straits, that Russia would not get any advantage from it. The probable results of the Russian occupation of Constantinople were discussed and recorded at the Committee of Imperial Defense meetings on 11 February and 10 March 1903. The finding was that even if the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet moved 400 miles closer to the Mediterranean Sea after moving from Sevastopol to Constantinople, Russian warships would not be able to undertake large-scale operations in the open sea. As long as it enjoyed naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, the British fleet could still keep the entrance from the Dardanelles closed.46 In November 1914, Maurice Hankey obtained Asquith’s permission to circulate these papers among the members of the War Cabinet in order to obtain their support for the concession of Constantinople and the Straits to Russia.
Renzi defined the second group of factors as “situational.” At the very beginning of the First World War, there existed an acute problem of mutual distrust among the Allies. In the case of opposition to the claims of Petrograd about Constantinople and the Straits, no one in London or Paris could guarantee that Russia might not consider a separate peace with Germany and its allies. So Russia should be offered something substantial as a reward for its war efforts and sacrifices. By promising Constantinople and the Straits, Grey meant to demonstrate confidence to the eastern ally, on the one hand, and to tie Russia more closely to the war chariot of the Entente.
Renzi defined the third group of factors as the “strategy for the future.” The Entente leaders, especially Grey and Haldane, realized that even “the most crushing defeat” could not prevent a possible resurrection of German power. By using “her great power of scientific and industrial organization,” Germany might be able to construct an even more powerful military machine in the future. Grey therefore viewed the cession of the Straits to Russia as the best available guarantee against future German attempts to reduce Turkey to a satellite state and imperil British interests in the Levant.
With regards to Hitler and the German far right, even if Hitler survives the war and goes into politics as IOTL National Socialism will be quite different without the influence of White exiles like Alfred Rosenberg or Max von Scheubner-Richter, who were shaped by Russian anti-Semitism and violent anti-Bolshevism and were quite influential in the early years of National Socialism and Hitler's political development from 1920-1923.
This also makes it interesting, what ideas from the Russian (far) right arrive in Germany IATL and how the influence the German conservative and right-wing discourse.
Anti-Semitism will definitely not disappear in Russia, agreed.Antisemitism is still going to be a problem TTL. Russian remains under an autocracy that was culturally and nationalistically antisemitic. A wealthy, victorious, and still autocratic one to boot.
I can picture Jews might get more rights, but the very people who promoted things like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion still hold positions of power.
Anti-Semitism will definitely not disappear in Russia, agreed.
My point was more about what the absence of White exiles (Rosenberg, Scheubner-Richter…) might have on Hitler’s political development and the development of German right-wing discourse in general. For example, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were first translated into German in 1920 and might have been brought to Germany by these White exiles and they were definitely influential in spreading them and influencing Hitler’s political thinking (not saying that Hitler wasn’t an anti-Semite before or that there wasn’t plenty of anti-Semitism present in Germany before, but they had an impact).
If the protocols and the virulent anti-Semitism and anti-socialism that IOTL came with the White exiles arrive in Germany differently, maybe a couple of years later than OTL, maybe toned down, maybe isn’t taken as seriously because there hasn’t been a Bolshevist revolution, maybe because its coming from a former enemy, maybe because Muscovism is a more attractive alternative…, then German right-wing political thought might develop differently (also if Hitler still goes into politics this will definitely impact his political development).
On the other hand, Hitler and the Nazis didn't invent the ‘Jewish bolshevism’ trope, plenty of right-wingers in Russia believed that before the Nazis were a thing. Russia won’t cool down completely anytime soon (author hinted that something is going to happen right after the peace conference and that the 1920s will be features plenty of left-wing terrorism and agitation) and an embattled czarist autocracy (even if they reform somewhat plenty of people will feel unhappy about the political situation, the glory of having the won war will not be enough to paper over all of Imperial Russia’s political divisions, even if lessens them somewhat) might decide that whipping up anti-Semitic sentiment (which many of its supporters honestly believe in) might be a good distraction plus a useful tool to try turning people against socialists and other radical leftists.If Russia becomes a moderate consitutional monarchy, virulent antisemitsm, while still existing in many forms, might not be as nearly systematic as OTL. If TTL, some nutcase general comes to power, and launches pogroms, than the situation for Jews in Europe could become very, very dire, because Russia's TTL greater size, prestige, and economic power means nations are unlikely to defend Jews.
ATL Russia definitely will be having a much better 20th century, but it still won’t be a smooth ride by any means. The 1920s will very likely still feature a lot of social/political unrest, demands for liberalizations (that the regime is very unlikely to grant in full), terrorism and repression that can radicalize more people or turn people against the terrorists depending on how things play out, and the likely global economic crisis will severely test the stability of Imperial Russia. It isn’t inconceivable that Russia could fall to some sort of Russian fascism or dictatorship in the 1930s despite having won the war, but the author of this timeline seems to be going into another direction.Simply by avoiding the Bolshevik Revolution, it can avoid other disasters like the Russian Civil War, the 1921 famine and typhus epidemic. Those disasters killed 9 million people ALONE between 1918-1922.
Mussolini isn't guaranteed to be handed power by Victor Emmanuel III and the Italian traditional right-wing elites. Depending on what happens at the peace conference there might not be a ‘mutilated victory’ or at least disappointment with the peace, which reduces fascist support. Also even if the Italian Biennio Rosso (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biennio_Rosso) happens roughly as IOTL the absence of the February and October Revolutions might embolden the king enough that he decides he doesn’t need the fascists to suppress the radical left and decide not to give into Mussolini’s pressure campaign that was the March on Rome, orders the army to disperse the march and arrest the ringleader (Mussolini, who wasn’t at the March, likely flees to Switzerland), and afterwards declares a state of emergency and starts to govern more authoritarian even if the trappings of constitutional monarchy aren’t abolished (Victor Emmanuel III clearly wasn’t a friend of parliamentary democracy and in a world where traditional autocracy still looks like a reasonable option might take this course). Alternatively, the march is dispersed Italian democracy muddles through a couple of tumultuous years until things stabilize in the mid-1920s as the economy starts to look a lot better and democracy stabilizes.Remember, Mussolini was not a particularly antisemitic person, until Hitler became a powerful figure on the world stage.
On the other hand, Hitler and the Nazis didn't invent the ‘Jewish bolshevism’ trope, plenty of right-wingers in Russia believed that before the Nazis were a thing. Russia won’t cool down completely anytime soon (author hinted that something is going to happen right after the peace conference and that the 1920s will be features plenty of left-wing terrorism and agitation) and an embattled czarist autocracy (even if they reform somewhat plenty of people will feel unhappy about the political situation, the glory of having the won war will not be enough to paper over all of Imperial Russia’s political divisions, even if lessens them somewhat) might decide that whipping up anti-Semitic sentiment (which many of its supporters honestly believe in) might be a good distraction plus a useful tool to try turning people against socialists and other radical leftists.
The political development of Russia will be very interesting. I'm looking really forward to learning what Muscovism is all about and how it might influence right-wing political thought in Germany and other parts of Europe, but that is still way off.
ATL Russia definitely will be having a much better 20th century, but it still won’t be a smooth ride by any means. The 1920s will very likely still feature a lot of social/political unrest, demands for liberalizations (that the regime is very unlikely to grant in full), terrorism and repression that can radicalize more people or turn people against the terrorists depending on how things play out, and the likely global economic crisis will severely test the stability of Imperial Russia. It isn’t inconceivable that Russia could fall to some sort of Russian fascism or dictatorship in the 1930s despite having won the war, but the author of this timeline seems to be going into another direction.
Mussolini isn't guaranteed to be handed power by Victor Emmanuel III and the Italian traditional right-wing elites. Depending on what happens at the peace conference there might not be a ‘mutilated victory’ or at least disappointment with the peace, which reduces fascist support. Also even if the Italian Biennio Rosso (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biennio_Rosso) happens roughly as IOTL the absence of the February and October Revolutions might embolden the king enough that he decides he doesn’t need the fascists to suppress the radical left and decide not to give into Mussolini’s pressure campaign that was the March on Rome, orders the army to disperse the march and arrest the ringleader (Mussolini, who wasn’t at the March, likely flees to Switzerland), and afterwards declares a state of emergency and starts to govern more authoritarian even if the trappings of constitutional monarchy aren’t abolished (Victor Emmanuel III clearly wasn’t a friend of parliamentary democracy and in a world where traditional autocracy still looks like a reasonable option might take this course). Alternatively, the march is dispersed Italian democracy muddles through a couple of tumultuous years until things stabilize in the mid-1920s as the economy starts to look a lot better and democracy stabilizes.
Apart from that, you are right, that even if fascism comes to power in an European state it isn’t guaranteed to be particularly anti-Semitic.
I didn’t mean to imply otherwise, though it isn’t out of the realm of possibility that Russian anti-Semitism turns genocidal.But there is a difference between the antisemitism of tsars and the systematic ethnic cleansing of Nazism, although both should be rightly condemned.
Interesting possibilities. How a Jewish Autonomous Region in Russia might develop would be both tragic and fascinating to see and an exodus of Russian Jews to Israel/Palestine, among them many Jewish leftists who surely would be among the first to be ‘encouraged’ to leave, would have interesting consequences for the Middle East.Perhaps an alt-Russian demagogue might tolerate the existance of Jews, while keeping them around as a target? Or perhaps he gives them a seperate autonomy somewhere Siberia, like Stalin tried to do in the JAO? Or he sets up an immigration scheme to Palestine, like Hitler did in his first few years in office.
It will be very interesting what a future Russian government will do, economically. While a Russia that avoids Brest-Litovsk and the Civil War will be significantly better off in the early 1920s than OTL, it will still have plenty of problems. By European stands, it is still underdeveloped, and there is little capital available for development (most of the pre-war industrialisation was funded by foreign loans). The agricultural sector is backward, the infrastructure is inadequate and the administration often chaotic and corrupt. Oh, and a significant percentage of the peasantry, the urban workers and the intelligentsia are deeply hostile to the government.But here is a the key issue: Russia TTL is going to rise to economic, political, and geopolitical heights that it didn't rise to OTL, and not just because of a victory.
Simply by avoiding the Bolshevik Revolution, it can avoid other disasters like the Russian Civil War, the 1921 famine and typhus epidemic. Those disasters killed 9 million people ALONE between 1918-1922.
Also without the economic destruction of the civil war, it is unlikely that a future Russian government needs to pursue hyperindustrialization and kill millions of peasants.
I didn’t mean to imply otherwise, though it isn’t out of the realm of possibility that Russian anti-Semitism turns genocidal.
I think if you had asked people at the beginning of the 20th century which state was most likely to slaughter its Jewish citizens than most people would have answered with Russia, and that was for a reason.
Interesting possibilities. How a Jewish Autonomous Region in Russia might develop would be both tragic and fascinating to see and an exodus of Russian Jews to Israel/Palestine, among them many Jewish leftists who surely would be among the first to be ‘encouraged’ to leave, would have interesting consequences for the Middle East.
Coupled with the possibility of the Balfour Declaration not happening, Russia taking over Ottoman Armenia and possibly helping in suppressing an ATL Turkish War of Independence (maybe helping keep a puppet Ottoman Sultan on the throne and thus as a caliph, which would have global consequences, among them for British India: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khilafat_Movement) and we are potentially at a wholly unrecognizable Middle East and a much differently Islam by modern times; there is also the possibility of the Saudis not taking over the Hashemite territory in modern Saudi-Arabia.
If the Sultan keeps his throne and stays on as caliph, then there is the possibility of a competition developing between him and whoever holds Mecca and Medina as ‘guardians of the Holy Sites’ (Hashemites or Saudis) over who speaks for the Ummah (the status of Jerusalem might also play a role).
Going back for a minute, another possibility for a Russian regime looking for a solution for the ‘Jewish Problem’ could be deporting them to Congress Poland in divide-and-conquer scheme: Jews would be out of Russia proper and the Jews in Poland would have to support Russian rule in Poland otherwise they would find themselves at the mercy of an anti-Semitic Polish majority. Of course, this scheme might backfire and lead to some sort of accommodation between the deported Jews and the Polish people as both have ample reason to dislike Russian rule over Poland and the Russian regime.
One of history's tragic ironies.Whereas Germany had the most assimilated Jewish population in all of Europe.
You are probably right, I didn't think that entirely through.Probably not Poland.
The reason why pogroms happened during World War I is because the very racist Russian army thought Jews were a fifth colum of the Germans (a really tragic irony, ain't it).
I doubt a nationalist would send Jews to a vulnerable borderland that would be heavily defended for survival, when it would be more "convenient" to send Jews to some backwater periphery like the Far East.
Also, western capital might not be enthusiastic about investing in a Russia that still looks not entirely stable and is very much disliked by Western intelligentsia after the suppression of the February riots and whatever happens after the peace conference that the author hinted at. Plus, France has much less reason to prop up Russia against Germany with loans and they need the money at home. Russia might struggle to find the foreign loans it desperately needs for continued industrialization and in addition has to use valuable foreign exchange to pay back the French loans from before the war and the foreign loans from during the war.By European stands, it is still underdeveloped, and there is little capital available for development (most of the pre-war industrialisation was funded by foreign loans).
Do you know any good sources in English where I can learn more about the land situation in the Russian Empire in the 19th and early 20th century before the February Revolution, the situation of the Russian peasantry and possibly how Russian peasants differed from their Ukrainian/Baltic counterparts during that time?The problem with the land was that it was not too much of it physically available in the European Russia. The same goes for the “landless peasants”: there were not too many of them (except for those totally incapable of the independent activities). The real problem was in the communal ownership with the resulting “cherespolositsa” and physical impossibility to improve agricultural methods and increase efficiency. Majority of the Russian (not to be confused with the Ukrainian or Baltic) peasants still had a communal mentality so in the real terms not too much could be done except for promoting mass migration into the Southern Siberia and the suitable parts of the Russian Far East.