For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures

[Stenkarazin]

Hitler's rise to power depended on the economic crisis in Germany and fear of the German left, especially the German communists, and not the existence of the Soviet Union. Weimar’s right-wing elites didn’t fear the Soviet Union, they were all too happy to work with the Soviets to circumvent armament restrictions, use it as a counterweight against the Western powers (Rapallo treaty…) and entertained ideas of partitioning Poland with the Soviets (though planned to leave a Polish rump state unlike Hitler). What sort of political opportunities exist for Hitler or someone like him (he isn’t guaranteed to survive to war or necessarily go into politics) depends on what happens with the German left (radicalization and militarism after suppression of a German revolution is still a possibility) and the economic situation in Germany and how Weimar (or its ATL equivalent German Republic; though with the Czar still in power in Russia and the war possibly ending a bit earlier the Hohenzollern monarchy may the political turmoil after the war, though Wilhelm II has to go and democratic reforms will have to be conceded) deals with the global economic crisis (some sort of global economic crisis is likely after the economic dislocations of WW1 but it will likely play out differently). Even if things go roughly the same as IOTL in Weimar Germany Hitler’s rise to power depended on a lot of factors (including quite a bit of luck) and is unlikely to be replicated with a POD in 1911; of course Weimar being replaced with an authoritarian regime in the 1930s is still very much a possibility, possibly with right-wing conservatives looking to Russia and Muscovism for inspiration for their ‘conservative revolution’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservative_Revolution).
Likewise, Mussolini’s rise to power was enabled by nationalist sentiment (anger about the ‘mutilated victory’) and elite fear about Italian communists/socialists (whose militancy still remains a possibility), not fear of the Soviet Union.

Exactly. I should really focus on writing the next installments instead of reading all those fascinating comments, but I can say that for Germany I envision the survival of a much diminished monarchy under "Wilhelm the Turd" (the Kronprinz), and a growing right-wing movement born of the alliance between old-school conservatives and mass-politics nationalists. Foreign policy wise, Germany will strongly consider getting closer with Russia (in order to get back at Paris and London ), but this won't be unanimous, as there also will be strong apocalyptic rhetoric of "the eternal struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons", as well as hopes of carving a new "colonial empire" in Mitteleuropa (what is left of A-H being made the scapegoat of 1914-1918).

 

[Bookmark1995]

Hitler's rise to power depended on the economic crisis in Germany and fear of the German left, especially the German communists, and not the existence of the Soviet Union. Weimar’s right-wing elites didn’t fear the Soviet Union, they were all too happy to work with the Soviets to circumvent armament restrictions, use it as a counterweight against the Western powers (Rapallo treaty…) and entertained ideas of partitioning Poland with the Soviets (though planned to leave a Polish rump state unlike Hitler). What sort of political opportunities exist for Hitler or someone like him (he isn’t guaranteed to survive to war or necessarily go into politics) depends on what happens with the German left (radicalization and militarism after suppression of a German revolution is still a possibility) and the economic situation in Germany and how Weimar (or its ATL equivalent German Republic; though with the Czar still in power in Russia and the war possibly ending a bit earlier the Hohenzollern monarchy may the political turmoil after the war, though Wilhelm II has to go and democratic reforms will have to be conceded) deals with the global economic crisis (some sort of global economic crisis is likely after the economic dislocations of WW1 but it will likely play out differently). Even if things go roughly the same as IOTL in Weimar Germany Hitler’s rise to power depended on a lot of factors (including quite a bit of luck) and is unlikely to be replicated with a POD in 1911; of course Weimar being replaced with an authoritarian regime in the 1930s is still very much a possibility, possibly with right-wing conservatives looking to Russia and Muscovism for inspiration for their ‘conservative revolution’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservative_Revolution).
Likewise, Mussolini’s rise to power was enabled by nationalist sentiment (anger about the ‘mutilated victory’) and elite fear about Italian communists/socialists (whose militancy still remains a possibility), not fear of the Soviet Union.

Remember, the fear of communism was driven by the rise of radical socialism in the dying days of the German Republic, and the early years of Weimar.

Hitler's ability to denounce "Jewish Bolshevisim" is weakened without that Bolshevik nation.

 

[TimTurner]

good TL. I binge-read all 5 pages. Looking forward to more updates.

 

[Drunkrobot]

How well known internationally was the extent of the Armenian Genocide at this time? An offensive into Anatolia would liberate the deportation camps. Photographs and films of the Ottomon atrocities could do something to consolidate Russian resolve to see the war through.

 

[Bloodraven]

Remember, the fear of communism was driven by the rise of radical socialism in the dying days of the German Republic, and the early years of Weimar.

Exactly, the fear of German radical socialism.

Hitler's ability to denounce "Jewish Bolshevisim" is weakened without that Bolshevik nation.

Weakened a bit, sure. But the scared middle class and elites care less about what is happening in Russia and more about what the radical left is doing in Germany and there is still plenty of opportunity for a strong radical and militant left (lost war, political turmoil, economic crises, possible a suppressed uprising by radical elements of the left at the end of the war…) to arise in Germany and other European nation; though the ATL militant radical left will obviously different than the OTL one, but a KPD-equivalent that isn't taking orders from Moscow but making its own political decisions and tailoring them to the specific context of German politics might be even more popular than the KPD was IOTL.
Anyway, Hitler's great breakthrough in politics came after the Great Depression and we will have to wait and see how that plays out IATL.

 

[Bloodraven]

Foreign policy wise, Germany will strongly consider getting closer with Russia (in order to get back at Paris and London ), but this won't be unanimous, as there also will be strong apocalyptic rhetoric of "the eternal struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons", as well as hopes of carving a new "colonial empire" in Mitteleuropa (what is left of A-H being made the scapegoat of 1914-1918).

Right-wing politics in Germany after the war are going to be fascinating and how they influence Germany's foreign policy as well. Depending on where Russian armies stand when the war ends there could be plenty of stories about 'Russian savages pillaging German lands and raping German women' (doesn't have to be true to scare plenty of people) which will incite anger and hatred in parts of the Volkisg right-wing, other parts of the right-wing, including parts of the Volkish movement, might look admiringly at an authoritarian, anti-western Russia and how it deals with the 'Jewish question' (repression of Jews and anti-semitism are unlikely to disappear, especially if Muscovism foreshadows a conservative Russian resurgence later on), while German business is torn between appreciating the opportunity to buy raw materials from Russias and wanting more access to propserous Western markets and thus closer relations with the West (the Russian market is also an oppurtunity, but in the end cannot compete with Western markets).

 

[alexmilman]

Thank you everybody for the feed-back, much food for thoughts. I apologize, won't be able to address all of it here, but will try to hint at most of your arguments in the next installments.



Negotiations between the govt and the Duma Committee will take place, but I fear they won't be really successful. I toyed with the idea of trying to solve the crisis through negotiation, but the problem is that, with the city deep into anarchy, I don't see how the KD and Octobrists could keep a steady midway course without being swept by an increasingly radicalized Soviet. Negotiating and temporizing will be helpful to delay an all-out attack on the Government square, but at the end of the day... brute force will probably decide the outcome.



Yes, indeed. The purpose of this TL is to allow the Monarchy to survive WW1, and then try and figure if, in the afterglow of victory, Russia can successfully reform so as to avoid (or substantially weaken) the threat of revolution. But fear not, Russia won't magically become a Western liberal country once the threat of violent revolution has been weakened. I can see Russia in the late 20's turning inwards towards something that could be called "Muscovism", especially in the context of growing estrangement with her Western allies. This would, I think, play a massive role on politics.

And of course all of that will take place against a very fluid international situation, awash with all kind of threats, renewed rivalries (Britain, anyone ?), and diplomatic crossroads.




Yes, that's the ticket. This is more or less the outline that I have in mind.



Again, very well put. Once we are out of the frying pan, the govt and the Stavka, who have felt "le vent du boulet" (how do you say that in English?) will work overtime to restore the situation within the armed forces (I already hinted that, thanks to having a more stable and competent govt, the situation is already slightly better than OTL), so that a glorious Russian summer may be possible by June 1917. Anatolia is a likely candidate for a "risk-free" offensive that will improve Russia's image both abroad and domestically. Turkish forces being in full disarray, it seems that only Russian logistics could prevent Yudenich from breaking out in Western Anatolia. Greece joins the war more or less as OTL (difference being that King Constantin eventually gets around the idea thanks to added Russian pressure) Germany rushes extra divisions to Bulgaria and/or Turkish Thracia, but cannot do much else, and Turkey is probably going to seek terms before the end of summer. Then, a "2nd Brusilov offensive" in Galicia may be the last nail in the coffin, especially if Caporetto is butterflied and the Italians launch their own offensive around the same time. The US would probably still enter the war, but at a later date though (accounting the extra efforts to convince the American public to enter war alongside the "despotic and cruel regime of the Czar". Hence American involvement will be seen as less decisive than OTL.

The irony in this would be that Russia, arguably the weakest of the Allies on the domestic front, would be seen as the decisive winner of the war... Massive consequences for the Paris Conference and the drawing of Europe's new order.



Central African Republic. But I am back since yesterday to a safer corner of Africa. So real history shouldn't be creeping to much into this alternate history. But you never know, Kalashnikov-slinging tribesmen may pop up here in there in Petrograd !

The 1st Brusilov Offensive proved to be very costly for Russia so I’m not sure if one major offensive even against AH would be a wise thing in such a precarious domestic situation. But one thing is more or less clear: the major offensives (preferably avoided) should be coordinated with the allies in such a way that the Germany can’t move significant reserves into the endangered sector. One of the pre-requisites would be for allied high command to finally figure out something more intelligent than their modus operandi with a prolonged bombardment of a narrow sector that was removing any element of surprise and minimizing gains while still resulting in the huge losses.

The “glory” can be achieved by combination of the major strategic success against the Ottomans (and linking with the Brits) and small-scale successful offensives against AH and perhaps even Germany. The rest is a matter of propaganda: small success can be presented as a great victory and few of them are elevated into the glorious picture even if the frontline did not change substantially. The most important thing is to keep the army well-fed and supplied and the “rear“ willing to work for war.

 

[Drunkrobot]

Right-wing politics in Germany after the war are going to be fascinating and how they influence Germany's foreign policy as well. Depending on where Russian armies stand when the war ends there could be plenty of stories about 'Russian savages pillaging German lands and raping German women' (doesn't have to be true to scare plenty of people) which will incite anger and hatred in parts of the Volkisg right-wing, other parts of the right-wing, including parts of the Volkish movement, might look admiringly at an authoritarian, anti-western Russia and how it deals with the 'Jewish question' (repression of Jews and anti-semitism are unlikely to disappear, especially if Muscovism foreshadows a conservative Russian resurgence later on), while German business is torn between appreciating the opportunity to buy raw materials from Russias and wanting more access to propserous Western markets and thus closer relations with the West (the Russian market is also an oppurtunity, but in the end cannot compete with Western markets).

There's two Germanies, really - Germany, and Prussia. Germany faces France and the Lowlands, and wants to project power outwards with economic, naval, and imperial means. Prussia faces Poland, and wants a large army with which it can conquer land. It should be obvious that one of them is likely to view Russia as a potential partner, and the other as a direct opponent.

 

[Bloodraven]

I have to disagree here.
According to "Caucasian Battlefields" by Muratoff and Allen, the ottoman situation was dire.

Since you mention logistics, the russian logistics were far far better than the ottoman ones. Yudenich proved to be a capable administrator by taking care of his logistics and the welfare of his soldiers. Almost from the beginning of the war, he gave special attention in building new single-track narrow gauge railroads. Until winter 1915, he had expanded the railway to Karaurgan. In spring 1916 he expanded the line to Erzurum. His plans for the next campaining season was to expand it to Erzincan, just behind the front line. Considering his previous success in railroad building and that he had specialized railroad construction battalions from Manchuria, I believe that without the February Revolution, he would have built it until summer 1917.

In contrast, each ottoman formation sent to the front had to walk on foot 400-500km from their closest railhead. Formations were not sent by sea at this point of the war, as the Russian Black Sea Fleet had achieved supremacy (the Goeben was in dire need of time at a german yard).

Didn't know about the good state of the Russian logistics in the Caucasus, thanks.
Looking at the map, the logical target for Yudenich's offensive seems to be Sivas, though I could be wrong. Do you know what Yudenich might have planned or even had planned for the 1917 campaign?
Can he take Sivas? And if he does, does he have the necessary logistics to push on?
The more he advances the more the bad state of the Ottoman transport infrastructure will work against him and he might be forced to stop at Sivas in 1917 and build up the necessary logistics for a push towards Ankara or towards the Mediterranean to cut off the Ottoman forces in Palestine and Syria in 1918 after which the British make short work off the cut-off and undersupplied Ottoman forces.
Also, if Wikipedia can be twisted Enver moved 5 divisions from the Caucasus front to the Palestine front (which obviously he won’t be doing IATL, which means that the British do better than in Palestine), and that suggest to me that if the situation is dire enough the Ottomans might be able to transfer units to contain Yudenich’s outbreak (the Ottoman Empire would very likely prioritize defending Anatolia over defending Palestine, if push comes to shove).
Or am I reading the situation completely wrong?

Definitely, the Ottomans will have a significantly worse 1917 (Sivas might fall to Yudenich, maybe Jerusalem falls to the British in the Summer rather than December of 1917 and by December 1917 the British are pushing into Jordan, possibly even Syria), but is that enough to force the Ottomans to sue for peace? I don’t think so, IOTL the Ottomans were willing to sacrifice its Arabian territories in order to safeguard its Turkish core territories and only surrendered after Bulgaria did and Constantinople was in danger of being attacked. The Ottomans have every reason to believe that if they ask for peace that the terms will be harsh and not only will they lose most of their Arabian territories but the Russians are very likely to demand significant territory in the Caucasus plus they have designs on Constantinople. The Ottomans might very well hope that somehow the Germans will be able to turn things around in the West or force a compromise peace with Russia that lets the Ottomans keep their Turkish territories and decide to hang on.

IMO Ottomans very likely will only sue for peace in 1917 if one or more of the following things happen:
a) Yudenich’s offensive is really successful and he is able to destroy the Ottoman forces in the Caucasus as a coherent fighting force and Yudenich not only takes Sivas but is able to push towards Ankara (don’t know how likely or unlikely that is though)
b) the British destroy the weakened Ottoman forces in Palestine in the summer-autumn of 1917 (basically the September 1918 situation happening a year earlier) and the Ottomans have reason to believe that the British will soon push into Anatolia (don’t know if the British can achieve all of that a year ahead of schedule even if Ottomans are weakened on the Palestine front)
c) the Germans experience serious setbacks in 1917 (more than IOTL) that convince the Ottomans that Germany is definitely losing the war (unlikely IMO)
d) the Entente and Russia offer a reasonable peace to the Ottomans in which they lose all or most of their Arabian territories but Russian gains in Anatolia are limited and Constantinople stays fully with the Ottomans (very unlikely IMO)

 

[alexmilman]

[]
d) the Entente and Russia offer a reasonable peace to the Ottomans in which they lose all or most of their Arabian territories but Russian gains in Anatolia are limited and Constantinople stays fully with the Ottomans (very unlikely IMO)

The Russians would be most interested in getting Armenia and not the territories with a hostile Turkish majority. As for Constantinople, IIRC, the issue was control over the Straits (or at least Bosphorus) rather than possession of the city: the traditional goal starting from the XIX was to prevent sailing of the "3rd party" warships through the Straits into the Black Sea. Even with a fully implemented program of updating the Black Sea Fleet Russian Empire would not have clearly defined interests on the Med. However, the old London Protocol of 1841 proved to be disadvantageous for Russia allowing Sultan's allies to sail through the Straits during the wartime. Obviously, the Russians would not be satisfied either with this agreement or with the Ottoman continued control. Probably, the acceptable (for the Entante members ) solution would be Russian control of the Bosphorus and British of the Dardanelles.

 

[Bookmark1995]

The Russians would be most interested in getting Armenia and not the territories with a hostile Turkish majority. As for Constantinople, IIRC, the issue was control over the Straits (or at least Bosphorus) rather than possession of the city: the traditional goal starting from the XIX was to prevent sailing of the "3rd party" warships through the Straits into the Black Sea. Even with a fully implemented program of updating the Black Sea Fleet Russian Empire would not have clearly defined interests on the Med. However, the old London Protocol of 1841 proved to be disadvantageous for Russia allowing Sultan's allies to sail through the Straits during the wartime. Obviously, the Russians would not be satisfied either with this agreement or with the Ottoman continued control. Probably, the acceptable (for the Entante members ) solution would be Russian control of the Bosphorus and British of the Dardanelles.

I wonder if another failed Treaty, that causes the Russians to not get Constantinople, could lead to a right-wing backlash in the vein of Mussolini, who's justification for coming to power was Italy getting badly screwed by the negotiations.

 

[alexmilman]

I wonder if another failed Treaty, that causes the Russians to not get Constantinople, could lead to a right-wing backlash in the vein of Mussolini, who's justification for coming to power was Italy getting badly screwed by the negotiations.

I would not overestimate Russia obsession with Constantinople, which was mostly XVIII century pipe dream (they did not even try to get it in 1829 and in 1878 with the Russian troops being in Adrianople and no serious Ottoman force between them and Constantinople): IIRC, by the time of WWI it was mostly substituted with "the Straits" and Bosporus would fit the bill by providing control over the access of the foreign warships into the Black Sea. In the practical terms Russian priority was not to let the major naval powers "in" rather than allowing its own warships "out".
Anyway, if Russian Empire is among the victors, it is getting some considerable pieces of the real estate (Galicia and Armenia) and control over at least Bosporus, to satisfy the expansionists.

 

[Bloodraven]

The Russians would be most interested in getting Armenia and not the territories with a hostile Turkish majority.

Which the Ottomans regard as rightfully Turkish territory and aren't going to give up unless they have no other choice. If the choice is between giving up Treaty of Sevres Armenia and peace or continuing the war, as long as there is hope that the war might turn around, they IMO will choose to continue the war.
Demands for something like Russian control of the Bosphorus and British of the Dardanelles would only cement that. This makes it likely that the Ottomans only exit the War when it is absoltely and irrevocably lost.

 

[Hertog Jann]

Looking at the map, the logical target for Yudenich's offensive seems to be Sivas, though I could be wrong. Do you know what Yudenich might have planned or even had planned for the 1917 campaign?
Can he take Sivas? And if he does, does he have the necessary logistics to push on?
The more he advances the more the bad state of the Ottoman transport infrastructure will work against him and he might be forced to stop at Sivas in 1917 and build up the necessary logistics for a push towards Ankara or towards the Mediterranean to cut off the Ottoman forces in Palestine and Syria in 1918 after which the British make short work off the cut-off and undersupplied Ottoman forces.

The logical target would indeed be Sivas for two reasons: it was covered by the 3rd army, the weakest of the two caucasian ottoman armies and it opens up the Central Anatolian Plateau. The atrocious terrain of eastern Anatolia is over after a few tens of kilometers across the Upper Euphrates valley. It is also an easier target when it comes to logistics, as it is connected to Erzincan with a paved road according to the map I posted.

Now the 3rd Army was thoroughly thrashed by Yudenich in every campaign season since 1914. Every time it had to be rebuilt almost from scratch. According to Erickson in September 1916 the 3rd Army was constituted by 7 divisions with an strength of 5,000-8,000 men. Each division had a total of 12-18 artillery pieces. The army had just one cavalry brigade. In total, by December 1916 the army had an effective rifle strength of 36,832 men.

The veteran 2nd Army, the last proper reserve of the Ottoman Empire, had suffered horrendous losses in summer 1916. By December, the 2nd Army had 6 divisions with fewer than 60,000 men in October. From what I gather, the artillery strength seems to have been similar to the 3rd Army. In the rear of the 2nd Army, Kurdish tribes turned against the Ottomans, raiding supply convoys and slaughtering small bands of soldiers. By March 1917, the effective strength of the 2nd Army had fallen to around 30,000 infantrymen and a weak cavalry division of ~2,000 men. According to the "Caucasian Battlefields", the effective strength of the 3rd Army fell to less than 30,000 men during the winter, with desertions (50,000 in Central Anatolia), typhus and cholera keeping the number of effectives stable despite reinforcements. So, in March 1917 the total strength of the 2 ottoman armies was around 60,000 men.

In the whole Ottoman Empire there were about 400,000 men in uniform - half of the 800,000 there were in 1915.

Now if we are looking at a plan that repeats 1916, then Yudenich may field the 200,000 men he had in summer 1916 along with 400 artillery pieces. As he didn't lose any significant number of guns, any reinforcements in artillery would only push his numbers above 400. He can crush both ottoman armies with overwhelming force and capture Sivas. I think this will be enough for the Ottomans to sue for peace, as their situation would be far worse than the OTL September 1918. They have no large reserves and if they try to move divisions from Palestine or Iraq, they need more than two months to send them to central Anatolia (a single division in 1916 took 41 days to march from Istanbul to the front, with the infrastructure being better in Anatolia compared to Syria and especially Iraq). By that time, Central Anatolia around Sivas becomes a cossack heaven: great horse country and they would face only small bands of broken soldiers with limited automatic weapons. I doubt that the main russian armies can advance much further than Sivas in the west and Diyarbakir in the south (the British wanted a smaller russian attack to the south). However their cavalry can raid far away in Central Anatolia, if the field armies are broken.

It is game over by summer 1917.

 

[alexmilman]

Which the Ottomans regard as rightfully Turkish territory and aren't going to give up unless they have no other choice. If the choice is between giving up Treaty of Sevres Armenia and peace or continuing the war, as long as there is hope that the war might turn around, they IMO will choose to continue the war.
Demands for something like Russian control of the Bosphorus and British of the Dardanelles would only cement that. This makes it likely that the Ottomans only exit the War when it is absoltely and irrevocably lost.

You are talking about the Ottoman ultimate loss as if this was an impossibility. In OTL they already lost a big part of Armenia before February of 1917 and if the Russian Revolution is not happening, they are losing even more territory to the Russians and Brits. Why the Armenians are more "Turkish" then the Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, Romanians or Georgians is anybody's guess. Anyway, in OTL they lost huge territories after the WWI. More or less the same goes for the Straits. AFAIK, access to both had been already blocked by the Entante.

 

[Hertog Jann]

You are talking about the Ottoman ultimate loss as if this was an impossibility. In OTL they already lost a big part of Armenia before February of 1917 and if the Russian Revolution is not happening, they are losing even more territory to the Russians and Brits. Why the Armenians are more "Turkish" then the Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, Romanians or Georgians is anybody's guess. Anyway, in OTL they lost huge territories after the WWI. More or less the same goes for the Straits. AFAIK, access to both had been already blocked by the Entante.

Not only that but the terms they agreed in the Mudros Armistice, gave the Entente the right to occupy the Six Vilayets. And their situation was much better in 1918, with a victorious Caucasian Front and having lost only non-turkish parts of the state. Not to mention that didn't have a big bad bald bear with a huge mustache sitting in the very heart of Anatolia with a huge victorious army. Not to mention that they signed away the right for the Entente to occupy the Straits.

http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/armistice_turk_eng.pdf

And I forgot to mention that there would be no reserves worth their name left. A Russia that stays in the war, means that by summer 1917 the Ottoman Empire doesn't have the ability to further conduct a war. Even the most-turkish historians such as Erickson recognize that.

 

[alexmilman]

The logical target would indeed be Sivas for two reasons: it was covered by the 3rd army, the weakest of the two caucasian ottoman armies and it opens up the Central Anatolian Plateau. The atrocious terrain of eastern Anatolia is over after a few tens of kilometers across the Upper Euphrates valley. It is also an easier target when it comes to logistics, as it is connected to Erzincan with a paved road according to the map I posted.

Now the 3rd Army was thoroughly thrashed by Yudenich in every campaign season since 1914. Every time it had to be rebuilt almost from scratch. According to Erickson in September 1916 the 3rd Army was constituted by 7 divisions with an strength of 5,000-8,000 men. Each division had a total of 12-18 artillery pieces. The army had just one cavalry brigade. In total, by December 1916 the army had an effective rifle strength of 36,832 men.

The veteran 2nd Army, the last proper reserve of the Ottoman Empire, had suffered horrendous losses in summer 1916. By December, the 2nd Army had 6 divisions with fewer than 60,000 men in October. From what I gather, the artillery strength seems to have been similar to the 3rd Army. In the rear of the 2nd Army, Kurdish tribes turned against the Ottomans, raiding supply convoys and slaughtering small bands of soldiers. By March 1917, the effective strength of the 2nd Army had fallen to around 30,000 infantrymen and a weak cavalry division of ~2,000 men. According to the "Caucasian Battlefields", the effective strength of the 3rd Army fell to less than 30,000 men during the winter, with desertions (50,000 in Central Anatolia), typhus and cholera keeping the number of effectives stable despite reinforcements. So, in March 1917 the total strength of the 2 ottoman armies was around 60,000 men.

In the whole Ottoman Empire there were about 400,000 men in uniform - half of the 800,000 there were in 1915.

Now if we are looking at a plan that repeats 1916, then Yudenich may field the 200,000 men he had in summer 1916 along with 400 artillery pieces. As he didn't lose any significant number of guns, any reinforcements in artillery would only push his numbers above 400. He can crush both ottoman armies with overwhelming force and capture Sivas. I think this will be enough for the Ottomans to sue for peace, as their situation would be far worse than the OTL September 1918. They have no large reserves and if they try to move divisions from Palestine or Iraq, they need more than two months to send them to central Anatolia (a single division in 1916 took 41 days to march from Istanbul to the front, with the infrastructure being better in Anatolia compared to Syria and especially Iraq). By that time, Central Anatolia around Sivas becomes a cossack heaven: great horse country and they would face only small bands of broken soldiers with limited automatic weapons. I doubt that the main russian armies can advance much further than Sivas in the west and Diyarbakir in the south (the British wanted a smaller russian attack to the south). However their cavalry can raid far away in Central Anatolia, if the field armies are broken.

It is game over by summer 1917.

And as I understand, Admiral Kolchak mined exit from Bosporus so that the Russian Black Sea Fleet can start shelling the Ottoman ports on the Black Sea and support supplies by the sea if the goal of the Russian offensive is Sivas.

 

[Hertog Jann]

And as I understand, Admiral Kolchak mined exit from Bosporus so that the Russian Black Sea Fleet can start shelling the Ottoman ports on the Black Sea and support supplies by the sea if the goal of the Russian offensive is Sivas.

By that point, the Black Sea was a russian lake. Even in 1916 it was safe enough to unload not just supplies but formations as well in Trabzon. I think Giresun and especially Samsun would have been the next targets in the Black Sea coast.

 

[Bloodraven]

You are talking about the Ottoman ultimate loss as if this was an impossibility. In OTL they already lost a big part of Armenia before February of 1917 and if the Russian Revolution is not happening, they are losing even more territory to the Russians and Brits. Why the Armenians are more "Turkish" then the Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, Romanians or Georgians is anybody's guess. Anyway, in OTL they lost huge territories after the WWI. More or less the same goes for the Straits. AFAIK, access to both had been already blocked by the Entante.

And I forgot to mention that there would be no reserves worth their name left. A Russia that stays in the war, means that by summer 1917 the Ottoman Empire doesn't have the ability to further conduct a war.

Of course, the Ottoman Empire losing the war clearly isn't impossible, but it isn’t clear to me that them suing for peace in 1917, even after a dramatic loss to Yudenich, is a foregone conclusion.
As far as I know, the Ottoman leadership at the time regarded Armenia as a core Turkish territory (however little sense that makes) and would only be willing to agree to a peace that loses them that territory (or the Straits), if they think all hope is lost and there is no possibility of somehow achieving an end to war (with German help) that lets them keep full control over this ‘core Turkish territory’. IOTL they only surrendered when Bulgaria collapsed and Constantinople was threatened not when it was losing large parts of its Arabian territories (that were clearly a 2nd priority compared to the Turkish territories for the Pan-Turkish leadership of the Ottoman Empire).
I’m simple not (fully) convinced that 1917 is going to be the year that Ottoman leadership decides that the war is hopelessly lost and there is no chance whatsoever of turning things around. Equally likely IMO is that in 1917 the Ottomans experience very painful defeats in 1917 but manage to scrap together enough troops to somewhat contain Yudenich at Sivas by abandoning much of its Arab territories and tethers on the brink of collapse but needs one more push in 1918 to collapse.

In the end, the question is if the after the defeats of 1917 the Ottoman leadership is willing to accept a very painful peace or if it deludes itself into thinking that somehow things can be salvaged (in their minds maybe Germany will achieve victory in the West or the East and force a compromise peace that leaves the Ottomans with most of its ‘Turkish’ core territories) and holds out for 1918. I think that depends also on the performance of Germany in 1917 and I wouldn’t dismiss the possibility that with its allies screaming for help against the Russians Germany conducts its own offensive against Russia that hurts the Russian army and gives the Ottomans a deluded sense of optimism that not all is lost.
This opens up the interesting possibilities that the Three Pashas are deposed by more realistic parts of the Ottoman government/military that sues for peace or that the Ottoman home front collapses as people feel the war is lost and, tired of their families dying for a lost war and Cossacks are threatening Central Anatolia. The possibility of a revanchist Turkey with its own stab-in-the-back myth (either traitors that deposed the Three Pashas or traitors within the home front) is interesting.
The Ottoman Empire collapsing in autumn of 1917 and suing for peace on any terms possible is also certainly possible, but I don’t think it is a foregone conclusion.

And their situation was much better in 1918, with a victorious Caucasian Front and having lost only non-turkish parts of the state.

Objectively, the military situation of the Empire might have been slightly better in OTL October 1918 than IATL autumn 1917 but not by much; in October 1918 Germany clearly had lost the war, Bulgaria had collapsed, thus presenting a clear threat to Constantinople, the heart of the Empire and the Ottomans had little forces , the front in Syria had collapsed entirely and the Ottomans no longer had anything resembling an army there and the British could potentially push into Anatolia from Syria. Since Constantinople is unlikely to be threatened in ATL autumn 1917 nor will Bulgaria have collapsed and there is a chance that the Ottomans can contain Yudenich at Sivas and stabilize the front against the British somewhere in Syria, at least for the moment, and Germany is still in the war it is possible that the Ottoman leadership is deluded enough to decide to continue and hope. Their mindset might that no matter if they sue for peace or lose in the next year the peace will be equally painful (losing ‘core Turkish territories’ that is anathema to the Three Pashas) and that there might be a chance of things turning around in 1918 (German success elsewhere bailing them out) if only they hold out.
Do we know if the Ottomans had any plans, preparations or discussions about suing for peace after the defeats of 1916 or in 1917 before the February Revolution changed the picture?

 

[Bloodraven]

With regards to Hitler and the German far right, even if Hitler survives the war and goes into politics as IOTL National Socialism will be quite different without the influence of White exiles like Alfred Rosenberg or Max von Scheubner-Richter, who were shaped by Russian anti-Semitism and violent anti-Bolshevism and were quite influential in the early years of National Socialism and Hitler's political development from 1920-1923.
This also makes it interesting, what ideas from the Russian (far) right arrive in Germany IATL and how the influence the German conservative and right-wing discourse.