Feeble Constitution - A Red-and-Green Russia 1917 Timeline
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What about the Oder-Neisse line for Poland, is it justified at this point?
And in Hannover, if the British would have a client state, is there any possibility of a restauration of Hannover's independence from Prussia under the House of Hannover, one which ruled the British Empire not so long ago. Even though Duke Ernst August III had been deprived of his British titles during the war, he's better than anything.
Plus, if it's hard imagining to impose that on the locals, the British are shy from making deals with local politicians.
For instance, in Lithuania IOTL, the crown was proposed to a German prince just to avoid being absorbed. One can imagine local governments in Hannover area to think of a restored Hannovrian monarchy as a mean to safeguard independence, speed up the withdrawal of occupation forces and get a more lenient treatment as to the application of Versailles 2.0 terms.
And in Hannover, if the British would have a client state, is there any possibility of a restauration of Hannover's independence from Prussia under the House of Hannover, one which ruled the British Empire not so long ago. Even though Duke Ernst August III had been deprived of his British titles during the war, he's better than anything.
Plus, if it's hard imagining to impose that on the locals, the British are shy from making deals with local politicians.
For instance, in Lithuania IOTL, the crown was proposed to a German prince just to avoid being absorbed. One can imagine local governments in Hannover area to think of a restored Hannovrian monarchy as a mean to safeguard independence, speed up the withdrawal of occupation forces and get a more lenient treatment as to the application of Versailles 2.0 terms.
Map will come first thing next week. Sorry I wasn't able to produce it today.
I think that's a bit much. Lower Silesia is very solidly non-Polish, and Polish contribution to defeating Germany was there, but not exactly very effective.
There was something similar IOTL. This party would certainly love the idea. I think, though, that electing a constituent assembly for Hannover (or on the whole Northern German sphere of British influence) and have it decide on this question would be the smooth way. For that to happen, Britain must change its mind first, though (in May and into June, they stick with Wilson's line of Germany's right to re-unify). Can I PM you on my idea as to how to bring this change of mind about?
Here is the promised map:
The little flags indicate which troops are present in which places.
As you can see, I am not yet decided on the exact nature of Brunswick and Hannover (merger? as monarchy or republic?), and while I'm clear on Oldenburg's becoming a Free State even under British influence, I wasn't sure with Schaumburg-Lippe and Lippe-Detmold, either. The British zone of influence is all the pink parts of former Prussia plus the other tiny little parts encircled by the British pink line. As you can see, several PRussian provinces have been split between the British and EFP powers this way: Westphalia, Saxony, and Brandenburg. Here, continuing with the provincial institutions does not look the most logical choice. Oh, and one Hohenzollern branch does get to keep a little principality in their original dynastical base for the time being, which was fairly un-proletarian and non-socialist IOTL.
I've gone for more Polish annexations than negotiated earlier in the spring, also, Danish Schleswig and Belgian Eupen-Malmedy have been marked.
The Saxony and Westphalia EFP mandate zones (as well as Berlin, on whose status I am also not 100 % set) are where the socialist council movement is strongest, and they can count on some degree of support from Bavaria (how the UoE deals with them, i.e. how much support they will lend them we shall find out).
The little flags indicate which troops are present in which places.
As you can see, I am not yet decided on the exact nature of Brunswick and Hannover (merger? as monarchy or republic?), and while I'm clear on Oldenburg's becoming a Free State even under British influence, I wasn't sure with Schaumburg-Lippe and Lippe-Detmold, either. The British zone of influence is all the pink parts of former Prussia plus the other tiny little parts encircled by the British pink line. As you can see, several PRussian provinces have been split between the British and EFP powers this way: Westphalia, Saxony, and Brandenburg. Here, continuing with the provincial institutions does not look the most logical choice. Oh, and one Hohenzollern branch does get to keep a little principality in their original dynastical base for the time being, which was fairly un-proletarian and non-socialist IOTL.
I've gone for more Polish annexations than negotiated earlier in the spring, also, Danish Schleswig and Belgian Eupen-Malmedy have been marked.
The Saxony and Westphalia EFP mandate zones (as well as Berlin, on whose status I am also not 100 % set) are where the socialist council movement is strongest, and they can count on some degree of support from Bavaria (how the UoE deals with them, i.e. how much support they will lend them we shall find out).
I see the Poles got east Prussia and a bit more of Upper Silesia, but given they were actively fighting Germany I'm a little surprised they didn't go further beyond their OTL interwar western borders. I didn't expect anything near Oder-Niesse line of course, but still Then again, presumably the poles are among the troops involved in occupying Brandenburg, and if Prussian Militarism is suppressed they'd be OK without more territorial gains.
Salvador mentioned that Poles like to only occypy what they are allowed to keep. And if given too much it would make people in UoE held areas bit restless. So they get what UoE can not hold and no more. I think.
The consequences of the fracturing of Germany for the European economy will be bad, at least in the medium term unless something isn't done like trying to at least form a new custom union between the various new states or trying at least to form some confederal structure...plus once the 'revolutionary fever' will be submised, all side will want reunification...the problem is that they will want on their term.
IMVHO division in the medium term will be in 3
- Bavaria plus Austria on the south (plus probably Wuttemberg)...EFP aligned (but Italy will try to be the patner of majority here)
- Prussia plus the British (and american) zone of influence...probably revanchist (there are too many Germans/Prussian in Poland) and British aligned
- Hesse, Westphalia and Baden probably form an enlarged Rhenish Republic (New Confederation?)...EFP aligned (but probably in reality a French pupp...ehm ally).
The French occupation zone in the Saarland will be in part annexed to France and what remain given to the Rhenis Republic.
The Czech occupation zone aka Saxoni will be probably something of fought (diplomatically) between UK and EFP to be 'united' to one of their allies/puppet (and internally at the EFP will be a serious discussion on which allies get Saxony), IMVHO a division of the land is very probable
IMVHO division in the medium term will be in 3
- Bavaria plus Austria on the south (plus probably Wuttemberg)...EFP aligned (but Italy will try to be the patner of majority here)
- Prussia plus the British (and american) zone of influence...probably revanchist (there are too many Germans/Prussian in Poland) and British aligned
- Hesse, Westphalia and Baden probably form an enlarged Rhenish Republic (New Confederation?)...EFP aligned (but probably in reality a French pupp...ehm ally).
The French occupation zone in the Saarland will be in part annexed to France and what remain given to the Rhenis Republic.
The Czech occupation zone aka Saxoni will be probably something of fought (diplomatically) between UK and EFP to be 'united' to one of their allies/puppet (and internally at the EFP will be a serious discussion on which allies get Saxony), IMVHO a division of the land is very probable
The map is probably slightly inaccurate insofar as Kashubian-speaking parts of Pommerania have not been awarded to Poland, which they should be. Other than that, it's like @Nuka1 said: the Poles don't do EFP occupation duty yet, where they go, they intend to stay. They did participate in the common offensive across the Oder, though - which failed. Polish forces fared rather disappointingly even IOTL against only unofficial German resistance; ITTL they have several full German armies against them. The map above is a description of de facto developments, including negotiations, but not a final Versailles 2.0 yet. Poland may yet gain even more at the green table if events turn favourably for them - on the battlefield, I deemed that rather implausible. By the way, there are still considerable German military and paramilitary (now all paramilitary) forces around in Poland, not all of whom will demobilise smoothly. So the Poles have their work cut out for them, and they rely to a great extent on UoE help in this endeavour. Prussian militarism is actively combatted by both; it won't be easy to kill, but so far, the Poles are confident that the UoE remains both ideologically and geostrategically committed to the goal of uprooting it, which aligns with Polish security interests.
No long term thinker of Metternich or Castlereagh status among the Czechs obviously. In the longer term, when ideological fervour has died down, the little monarchies would ultimately have made pleasanter and more malleable neighbours than a regional rival of approximately the same size, population and economic strength.
That is quite true, although whether such a level of ultra-tiny statelets could persist without reforming back into a greater German entity is also questionable. Also, Rosa Luxemburg might be one of the best chances the Czechoslovaks have (besides some factions in the BAvarian government) to have a German person of some political legitimacy to officially write off the Sudetenland.
But yes, I think Czechoslovakia politicians, although they did a great job in keeping their country on a democratic path IOTL until the Nazis crushed them, were - like the UoE's politicians ITTL, too, were to a great extent relatively inexperienced in government matters.
Thank you!
Both a Zollverein and no unification seem probable from this moment's perspective, I agree. I think between a Zollverein and joining the EFP, a German-only proto-EU would only be a plausible middle ground option if they are denied from entering the EFP for a long time, because otherwise joining the EFP makes so much more sense in terms of trade, political influence, rehabilitation, safety etc.
Yes, a new Zollverein is going to be very high on the list of priorities, although both the Frankfurt assembly and the Elberfeld supreme soviet will probably label it differently.
Indeed, that is the big issue. The longer separate structures and political cultures consolidate, the more difficult negotiations become - and that's just the internal troubles; the big powers also have to all agree to it, the chances for which could become slimmer and slimmer over the next years.
Still, nothing is impossible. Key to the project of restoration of German national unity is the position of the Social Democrats (SPD and SDAP). If they remain committed to it, it could have a chance in the middle or long run. But if they adapt fast to the EFP project, and the EFP develops well, and German lands are admitted, then such a European project could take the wind out of Social Democratic reunification sails.
Interesting idea. So you think the UoE will withdraw fast from their half of Prussia? Because otherwise, a fourth bloc would be in the game.
Who in Italy would back such an engagement in Austria and Southern Germany (what would they expect to gain?) and who would be opposed to it (Bring our boys back home, and all that?)?
Lumping together Hesse, the Red Ruhr (which is what the EFP Westphalia zone basically is), Baden and Adenauer's Catholic Rhineland makes geographic sense, but it would require major political changes from the current situation. Plus I think France would prefer having the individual statelets join the EFP at some (late) point rather than form a new Rheinbund. (Just my mid-1919 idea of the French, though.)
The map is not very clear here, either, but I intended the coal mines of the Saar to already be included in the "to France" portion.
Prussia: honestly everybody is tired of war and as OTL nobody of the victors had that gret stomach and will for some long occupation duty in hostile zone (and even if the Prussian become if not friendly at least apathetic regarding the UoE presence for some reason, there is the situation with the Polish ), plus the British will look at the EFP and the map of Germany and will want something to restore balance (aka some strong regional ally ) and Prussia will be the key for this plan and it's probable that they can bring Wilson with them by making him thing that they will rebuild Prussia as a modern nation but not a socialist one; and frankly while the land seem ready for a revolution the Russian will be seen as an ally of the Polish and so their potential influence will be severerly diminished.
France will prefer the individual statelets, but honestly it will soon made clear that the little nations are hardly economically and politically sustaintable as single entity even in the medium run and something need to be done so, like OTL demonstrated many and many time... it's stupid scheme time and a somewhat unstable Rehinbund under Fran ehm EFP control/membership will probably seem the perfect compromise (even because Paris will fear that the Anglo-American will try to pick the single little state one by one for their Prussian project)
Italy will expect to gain influence and an ally in this theoretically 'catholic confederation', sure the italians are EFP members but as the Frencha and Russian (UoE) are still great power (plus nobody know if the EFP thing will work) and representative of the catholic party will want 'protect' the germans catholics by the protestant one, expecially if they are socialist, the liberals will want to do it for 'sacro egoismo'.
Said that, there will be some limit at Italy will to stay, like the russian in Prussia there is little stomach for long occupation in hostile territory and while a more or less pacific occupation will be tollerated (expecially if the job is basically act like the police force and mantain pubblic order) but an organizated revolt against them, even if unsuccesfull will have the effect to create an uproar in Italy, there are already soldiers in Albania and Croatia that fight to keep the locals from killing each others and to help rebuild and that's enough (and many will thing that's even too much), the Germans can go...themselfs
I think that that would read "to have a German person formerly of some political legitimacy to officially write off the Sudetenland". OTL for instance even the Communists wanted the Polish corridor and Danzig back. I think even Rosa Luxemburg might not be able to carry her party with her.
Fifty-Six: Lloyd George Criticised in the Commons (June 1919)
London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland): The Times, June 26th, 1919, p. 3:
COALITION ON BORROWED TIME
by Wickham Steed
His Majesty’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, has received a resounding slap in the face in the House of Commons’ debate on foreign affairs. In particular, a majority of the parliament does not follow the Premier’s criticisms of his Foreign Secretary. The leader of the Majority, Mr. Law, defended Mr. Balfour’s plans for a separate entendre with France regarding Germany and her former colonies as well as the Ottoman Empire’s former provinces and the oversight over its foreign debt [1]. He admonished every member of the government to fulfill their responsibilities as dutifully as Mr. Balfour; a not-very-covert criticism at the address of the Prime Minister himself, whom many Conservative and Unionist MPs have come to view as weak for his concessions to the labour unions, which have failed to stop the devastating wave of strikes, for his failure to restore order in Ireland, pursue a coherent strategy for Arabia [2], and defend imperial stability in India [3]. Also, except for Mr. Cecil, the faith of leading Conservatives in the wisdom of Mr. Lloyd George’s allegiance to the goals of U.S. President Wilson’s agenda seems to wane. There appears to be some reason to think that Mr. Lloyd George is betting on the wrong horse indeed, when the dominating opinion in America’s Congress apparently has moved away from its ultra-progressive interlude [4], and Russia’s foreign minister, Mr. Kerensky, has already bluntly called Mr. Wilson “castrated by his Senate” [5]. Under these circumstances, many parliamentarians bemoan how the Prime Minister has neglected relations with France, driving Mr. Clemenceau’s government into the arms of the Russians and their socialist project. The pragmatic settlement prepared by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Pichon, which Mr. Lloyd George so quickly excluded from consideration, appears perfectly reasonable to many M.P.s, on the other hand. How long will this Coalition last and sustain Mr. Lloyd George in his position?
[1] The Balfour-Pichon agreement redraws Anglo-French zones of influences in the Middle East, extending the British zone far beyond the Sykes-Picot lines – more on the Middle East in an upcoming update currently written by @Falecius ! – while compensating the French in a pre-arrangement for the division of Germany’s former colonies with all of Togo and Cameroon, and beyond that a scheme for the Ottoman Public Debt Administration which would allow it to be de facto controlled mostly by Britain and France, plus an acceptance of the possibility of both powers to conclude separate peace treaties with individual German states instead of either Wilson’s insistence on peace with a reunified Germany or the Kerensky-Benes plan, which would give the EFP far-reaching control over Germany’s future.
[2] As I said, more on the Middle East by Falecius – but we ought to remember that, just like IOTL, the British are faced with a “revolution” in Egypt, trouble with unreliable Kurds, and of course between the Hashemites and the Saudis, all very much like IOTL.
[3] That’s just an allusion to Afghanistan’s attacks, also very much on OTL’s schedule.
[4] The Senate is as opposed to any League of Nations, World Federation of Peace or any similar proposals. The existence of the latter idea, even more far-reaching the former, associated with socialist internationalism, which begins to appear somewhat scary to some in the US (not as bad as OTL’s Bolshevism, but remember Seattle went worse than IOTL, and there have been more strikes and protests since), has not succeeded in rallying Congress around the more moderate proposal of their President, but rather caused an even more severe isolationist reaction than IOTL. Henry Cabot Lodge’s counter-proposal, ITTL, is therefore to give up on the whole idea of a League of Nations and just strengthen the International War Court in The Hague a little instead.
[5] Kerensky did it. There has been a build-up to this point. The way I envision it, Kerensky doesn’t get along well neither with Foreign Minister Lansing, who was an anti-socialist Anglophile, nor with Wilson, who would lecture the Russians on “Germany’s right to self-determination”, at which Kerensky probably murmured under his breath “What about the Philippines’ right to self-determination?”, but when Wilson would, which he inevitably would have to, make concessions to the British imperialists who were actively oppressing and killing "small nations" like Ireland and colonial populations in various continents at the moment, while still lecturing the Russians on the true rule of law, or on how to write a proper constitution where conflicts like the one the UoE has undergone throughout June on the matter of whether and how to establish more federative republics in Russia’s Muslim South – a key requirement for the formation of the coalition in the Duma, which is on the way to become reality: more on that soon in an update, now only so much: there is intense debate in the Council of the Union as to how to re-calculate the votes of each federative republic, and that is what Wilson referred to when he lectured Kerensky or, more probably, Avksentiev –, that was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Given how much Wilson wanted the League of Nations, the Senate’s position has indeed politically “castrated” him, but of course that wasn’t a nice thing to say.
COALITION ON BORROWED TIME
by Wickham Steed
His Majesty’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, has received a resounding slap in the face in the House of Commons’ debate on foreign affairs. In particular, a majority of the parliament does not follow the Premier’s criticisms of his Foreign Secretary. The leader of the Majority, Mr. Law, defended Mr. Balfour’s plans for a separate entendre with France regarding Germany and her former colonies as well as the Ottoman Empire’s former provinces and the oversight over its foreign debt [1]. He admonished every member of the government to fulfill their responsibilities as dutifully as Mr. Balfour; a not-very-covert criticism at the address of the Prime Minister himself, whom many Conservative and Unionist MPs have come to view as weak for his concessions to the labour unions, which have failed to stop the devastating wave of strikes, for his failure to restore order in Ireland, pursue a coherent strategy for Arabia [2], and defend imperial stability in India [3]. Also, except for Mr. Cecil, the faith of leading Conservatives in the wisdom of Mr. Lloyd George’s allegiance to the goals of U.S. President Wilson’s agenda seems to wane. There appears to be some reason to think that Mr. Lloyd George is betting on the wrong horse indeed, when the dominating opinion in America’s Congress apparently has moved away from its ultra-progressive interlude [4], and Russia’s foreign minister, Mr. Kerensky, has already bluntly called Mr. Wilson “castrated by his Senate” [5]. Under these circumstances, many parliamentarians bemoan how the Prime Minister has neglected relations with France, driving Mr. Clemenceau’s government into the arms of the Russians and their socialist project. The pragmatic settlement prepared by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Pichon, which Mr. Lloyd George so quickly excluded from consideration, appears perfectly reasonable to many M.P.s, on the other hand. How long will this Coalition last and sustain Mr. Lloyd George in his position?
[1] The Balfour-Pichon agreement redraws Anglo-French zones of influences in the Middle East, extending the British zone far beyond the Sykes-Picot lines – more on the Middle East in an upcoming update currently written by @Falecius ! – while compensating the French in a pre-arrangement for the division of Germany’s former colonies with all of Togo and Cameroon, and beyond that a scheme for the Ottoman Public Debt Administration which would allow it to be de facto controlled mostly by Britain and France, plus an acceptance of the possibility of both powers to conclude separate peace treaties with individual German states instead of either Wilson’s insistence on peace with a reunified Germany or the Kerensky-Benes plan, which would give the EFP far-reaching control over Germany’s future.
[2] As I said, more on the Middle East by Falecius – but we ought to remember that, just like IOTL, the British are faced with a “revolution” in Egypt, trouble with unreliable Kurds, and of course between the Hashemites and the Saudis, all very much like IOTL.
[3] That’s just an allusion to Afghanistan’s attacks, also very much on OTL’s schedule.
[4] The Senate is as opposed to any League of Nations, World Federation of Peace or any similar proposals. The existence of the latter idea, even more far-reaching the former, associated with socialist internationalism, which begins to appear somewhat scary to some in the US (not as bad as OTL’s Bolshevism, but remember Seattle went worse than IOTL, and there have been more strikes and protests since), has not succeeded in rallying Congress around the more moderate proposal of their President, but rather caused an even more severe isolationist reaction than IOTL. Henry Cabot Lodge’s counter-proposal, ITTL, is therefore to give up on the whole idea of a League of Nations and just strengthen the International War Court in The Hague a little instead.
[5] Kerensky did it. There has been a build-up to this point. The way I envision it, Kerensky doesn’t get along well neither with Foreign Minister Lansing, who was an anti-socialist Anglophile, nor with Wilson, who would lecture the Russians on “Germany’s right to self-determination”, at which Kerensky probably murmured under his breath “What about the Philippines’ right to self-determination?”, but when Wilson would, which he inevitably would have to, make concessions to the British imperialists who were actively oppressing and killing "small nations" like Ireland and colonial populations in various continents at the moment, while still lecturing the Russians on the true rule of law, or on how to write a proper constitution where conflicts like the one the UoE has undergone throughout June on the matter of whether and how to establish more federative republics in Russia’s Muslim South – a key requirement for the formation of the coalition in the Duma, which is on the way to become reality: more on that soon in an update, now only so much: there is intense debate in the Council of the Union as to how to re-calculate the votes of each federative republic, and that is what Wilson referred to when he lectured Kerensky or, more probably, Avksentiev –, that was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Given how much Wilson wanted the League of Nations, the Senate’s position has indeed politically “castrated” him, but of course that wasn’t a nice thing to say.
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Could you elaborate a little? I'm not familiar with the OTL 'revolution' in Egypt.
Speaking of the Kurds, with the UoE troops sitting on Anatolia's rear end Kemal isn't going to accomplish much. Is there a possibility of a successful Kurdish revolt?
I saw no reason why the Third Anglo-Afghan War would not happen right on schedule. Like IOTL, the winds of change blow but as a soft breeze in Afghanistan, but it's enough to make Afghanistan ask for a seat at the Paris Peace Conference, and I see no reason for it not to be denied just like IOTL. So Habibullah, who did a decent job for the British for quite a long time, gets assassinated by British agents just like IOTL. Nasrullah and Amanullah vie for power, and Amanullah prevails with the same promises of reform and sovereignty. Like IOTL, that means challenging the British, also to deflect internal criticism (among other things allegations that he had been complicit to his father's assassination) and rally the population behind his banner. Like IOTL, British/Indian forces are way superior, so the war isn't going well for the Afghans, which Amanullah must have anticipated both IOTL and ITTL.
Where things might change, though, is with regards to the final outcome. OTL's Treaty of Rawalpindi meant that while the Afghans recognised the Durand Line (which cut straight through Pashtun lands), the British gave up on exerting direct influence on Afghanistan and stopped paying the emir his subsidy. This had a bit to do with the weakness of Russia embroiled in its Civil War and British hopes that Afghanistan as a buffer state could lose its relevance. ITTL, the UoE is more united and stronger than IOTL, and it is beginning to change its "Muslim" and by extension Central Asian policies, so it is seen as a more potent rival. In this context, the British government (also depending on how it looks...) may not want to give up its Afghan buffer state.
The Egpytian Revolution of 1919, led by the Wafd Party, aimed at real independence for the Sultanate of Egypt (or any other form of Egyptian state), i.e. the ending of its status as a British Protectorate. There had been protests and civil disobedience before, and the Wafd Party collected signatures for a petition demanding full British withdrawal, but things escalated in March when the Wafd leader was apprehended by the British. The British High Commissioner Reginald Wingate retaliated and killed many hundreds, if not thousands in the suppression of the revolt. Afterwards, a commission was installed to determine future British policy towards Egypt (the Milner Commission). Ultimately, Britain would recognise Egyptian independence a few years later IOTL, but retain control over the Suez Canal and a high degree of less formal influence.
All the causes for the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 are there ITTL, too, (well, the talk about "League of Nations Protectorates" isn't really taking off, but OTOH a lot of time has already passed and the British are still there and the Egyptians are still not asked what they think about the future of this world and how it should look). And so are the reasons why the British ruthlessly oppressed it: Suez is vital to them. But I believe Falecius will be able to tell us a lot more about all this.
Oh my God the Kurds. IOTL there were Kurds who revolted against the British in Mossul, and Kurds who revolted against Kemal's nationalist and secular project. Again, more info from Falecius - in advance, only this much: Yes, the Turkish nationalists are stuck between a rock and a hard place, but the effects on the Kurds are manifold and ambivalent. On the one hand, they have more space for their own maneuvres (if they acted united, which isn't the case). On the other hand, there is much less of a motivation for them to turn against the Turks. IOTL, they were, to some extent, simply ignored. ITTL, the great powers in the region are probably paying more attention to them than might be good for them...
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