Evil IdeaCould it spread in Lebanon? French intervention could make situatin even messier.
I will say a few words about Lebanon on Monday.Feeble Constitution - A Red-and-Green Russia 1917 Timeline
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I will say a few words about Lebanon on Monday.So... Lebanon!
No, it's not going to become another battleground in the Arabian war. Its government, headed by Émile Eddé, is closely tied to France, both militarily, politically and economically, and it pursues its protector's policy of neutrality. The Lebanese Free State has concluded a treaty with Faisal in which their common border is delineated, free trade and "friendly relations" are stipulated - but of course no Lebanese government would ever rely on that in the David vs Goliath situation they would be in, but they also don't have to, hosting various French military bases... For quite a while, Lebanon has been a conduit for trade with Syria which was essential after the British have brought Egypt on the one hand and the various trucial states on the Persian Gulf on the other hand to participate in their boycott against the Hashemites. This has maddened Britain quite a bit when they got wind of the scale of Syrian imports, and Whitehall went the way of talking to the Quai d`Orsay so they French would dissuade their Lebanese puppets from selling to the Syrians. Eddè's government pointed at British duplicity, demanding from them to enforce an embargo against one Arab belligerent when the British supplied the other side freely, got a stern look from Paris, sighed, and declared the trade contracts with Syria suspended and its borders closed for most of the things the Syrians wanted and needed. Declaration and reality are not the same thing, though, especially given the weak nature of the Lebanese central government, and so legal trade turned into smuggling, but didn't decrease much initially. Then, more British pressure - and ultimately, Eddé's government begins to actually toughen up its border controls, so smuggling is significantly reduced by now.
The whole business has made some waves on Lebanon's political scene, though. Lebanon's 1919 constitution has preserved ample competencies for the various constituent confessional groups - continuing, in a way, old Ottoman traditions of the millets -, and a system of indirect parliamentary elections had made sure that among the country's first parliamentarians and members of government were many notable persons (wealthy patrons, authoritative and respected religious leaders, people with a (often distant) background of Ottoman administrative experience), but not really rivalling political parties. The new government had not undertaken major controversial projects as of yet - it had had its hands full dealing with the aftermath of famines and pandemics and trying to shape a new national administration. Independence had been greeted by the overwhelming majority of Lebanese who had belonged to suspicious or persecuted minorities in the Ottoman Empire, the treaty with Syria had been viewed as satisfactory, and the alliance with France was self-understood.
But now, a new generation has entered the stage, publicly protesting against imperialist British interference and denouncing their government as lackeys of foreign powers (even if the Hashemites aren't super-popular with these people, either: they're the huge neighbor with a suspicious far-reaching Sunni religio-political project, after all). The young Bechara el-Khoury is a leading voice in this Lebanese nationalist movement, which has also brought forth a new political party which also seeks direct suffrage and a stronger central governemtn. Against them, established authorities like Elias Peter Hoayek are positioned who view the new nationalists as dangerous hasardeurs and attempt to calm the situation.
So, there is something going on in Lebanon. But neither side is really jumping into the big horrible conflict which is the Arabian War. As the enumeration of eminent political persons betrays, Lebanon is a predominantly Maronite state, with the Druze playing second fiddle, and a few Alawites, Greeks, and Shi'ites thrown in. None of these people have great sympathies for either the Sharifian Caliphian project, nor the Wahhabist project of the Saudis.
(Thanks to @galileo-034 and @Falecius for their feedback and input on this subject!)
No, it's not going to become another battleground in the Arabian war. Its government, headed by Émile Eddé, is closely tied to France, both militarily, politically and economically, and it pursues its protector's policy of neutrality. The Lebanese Free State has concluded a treaty with Faisal in which their common border is delineated, free trade and "friendly relations" are stipulated - but of course no Lebanese government would ever rely on that in the David vs Goliath situation they would be in, but they also don't have to, hosting various French military bases... For quite a while, Lebanon has been a conduit for trade with Syria which was essential after the British have brought Egypt on the one hand and the various trucial states on the Persian Gulf on the other hand to participate in their boycott against the Hashemites. This has maddened Britain quite a bit when they got wind of the scale of Syrian imports, and Whitehall went the way of talking to the Quai d`Orsay so they French would dissuade their Lebanese puppets from selling to the Syrians. Eddè's government pointed at British duplicity, demanding from them to enforce an embargo against one Arab belligerent when the British supplied the other side freely, got a stern look from Paris, sighed, and declared the trade contracts with Syria suspended and its borders closed for most of the things the Syrians wanted and needed. Declaration and reality are not the same thing, though, especially given the weak nature of the Lebanese central government, and so legal trade turned into smuggling, but didn't decrease much initially. Then, more British pressure - and ultimately, Eddé's government begins to actually toughen up its border controls, so smuggling is significantly reduced by now.
The whole business has made some waves on Lebanon's political scene, though. Lebanon's 1919 constitution has preserved ample competencies for the various constituent confessional groups - continuing, in a way, old Ottoman traditions of the millets -, and a system of indirect parliamentary elections had made sure that among the country's first parliamentarians and members of government were many notable persons (wealthy patrons, authoritative and respected religious leaders, people with a (often distant) background of Ottoman administrative experience), but not really rivalling political parties. The new government had not undertaken major controversial projects as of yet - it had had its hands full dealing with the aftermath of famines and pandemics and trying to shape a new national administration. Independence had been greeted by the overwhelming majority of Lebanese who had belonged to suspicious or persecuted minorities in the Ottoman Empire, the treaty with Syria had been viewed as satisfactory, and the alliance with France was self-understood.
But now, a new generation has entered the stage, publicly protesting against imperialist British interference and denouncing their government as lackeys of foreign powers (even if the Hashemites aren't super-popular with these people, either: they're the huge neighbor with a suspicious far-reaching Sunni religio-political project, after all). The young Bechara el-Khoury is a leading voice in this Lebanese nationalist movement, which has also brought forth a new political party which also seeks direct suffrage and a stronger central governemtn. Against them, established authorities like Elias Peter Hoayek are positioned who view the new nationalists as dangerous hasardeurs and attempt to calm the situation.
So, there is something going on in Lebanon. But neither side is really jumping into the big horrible conflict which is the Arabian War. As the enumeration of eminent political persons betrays, Lebanon is a predominantly Maronite state, with the Druze playing second fiddle, and a few Alawites, Greeks, and Shi'ites thrown in. None of these people have great sympathies for either the Sharifian Caliphian project, nor the Wahhabist project of the Saudis.
(Thanks to @galileo-034 and @Falecius for their feedback and input on this subject!)
One Hundred and Eleven: Arabia, Britain and the Jews (June 1922)
London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland): The Jewish Chronicle, June 9th, 1922, p. 1:
UNITED WE STAND – DIVIDED WE DROWN IN THE TURNING TIDE
by Leopold Kessler {1]
Developments in Eretz Israel and the entire Middle East are coming thick and fast after the death of Emir Abdullah ibn Saud [2] two weeks ago. Syrian and Iraqi forces have seized the opportunity which the disunity among the Najdi [3] has presented them with, with renewed air raids on Rafha and attacks on scattered bases of Ikhwan forces in the lands of the Banu Ruwalla. Marches of jubilating Arab youths in Haifa, chanting the names of their “heroic princes of the air”, have degenerated into orgies of violence aimed against our brethren. As the self-defense is organising, fears of a renewed Gan Schmu’el [4] are rising. And while no definitive qualification has been made by His Majesty’s government with regards to the proposals of Mr Clayton [5] yet, the heated debates about it are already threatening to tear apart the unity in defense. Mr Yabotinsky [6] has announced that, should the organizations of the Yishuv agree to such a “caricature of a dwarf state”, he would not feel bound by agreements concluded by them, and should self-defense groups which the Empire supports [7] abandon settlers, then these settlers should organize themselves outside of such structures.
But Mr Yabotinsky is deluding himself if he thinks that the Yishuv can win this fight alone, and even less so if lacking in unity. If a secure foundation should be offered, then everyone should support it whole-heartedly. The Zionist endeavour has no better friend than the Empire, and it can only find security and grow if it is guaranteed by His Majesty’s government and by the Syrians, too. Syria has recovered and appears to be prepared to push back against its enemies. Those who may have hoped to win a state for the Yishuv by defeating the House of Hashim must realize the futility of their endeavour now. In this pivotal hour, we must stand together in concordance, or else the entire Zionist project might be lost for our generation.
[1] This is the most long-standing and prestigious Jewish newspaper of the world, and since 1906, it’s pursuing a Zionist course.
[2] Here is how Ibn Saud’s early death came about: The two remaining Hashemite kingdoms/emirates, Syria and Iraq, and especially the former, have slowly and under really difficult circumstances built up and diversified their military forces over the past year. This specifically included the creation of a serious Syrian air force. Unemployed German aircraft engineers have been hired by Faisal’s army to assemble parts brought to Syria on adventurous ways, and – privately hired – German, Austrian and Italian pilots and other specialists have been training Syrian pilots, mechanics etc. It all took a bit of time, and that has cost the Hashemites dearly, but now the force is slowly entering the fray, and for the past 2-3 months, Syrian planes have sortied, at first attacking only raiding parties, but lately also bombing entire key strategic oases like Sakaka, where Ikhwan forces of several thousands had assembled, into the ground. After the first crashes, the Syrians now also have their first glorified airborne heroes. The setbacks have caused some frictions between the various groups in Ibn Saud’s alliance, and the Emir of the Nejd, Protector of the Holy Sites, deemed it necessary to ride with the so-far largest Ikhwan force which, endowed with heavy guns by the British, headed North from Tabuk to attack Aqaba, the last Syrian Red Sea port, and perhaps raid into the Jordan valley. The Syrian forces marching against them were accompanied by Faisal’s air force which came out in their largest sortie so far. Although air-ground coordination was a nightmare at this point in time, the unprepared Ikhwan were still easy targets in the flat and clear territory, repeatedly suffering losses in both men and materiel, and although not all Syrian aircraft made it back to their base in Aqaba safely, either, the attacking force was in a much less integrated and mobile condition when they met their numerically superior enemy. Already, the first Ikhwan leaders suggested to call off the attack and retreat, but Khaled ibn Luway convinced the emir that what could be read as cowardice and defeat could endanger the course of the entire war now that time seemed to be playing into Hashemite hands, and the loyal desert warriors followed their glorious leader. Fighting did not last long, for after only a few hours, news that Emir Ibn Saud and various of his closest advisors had been killed in an explosion spread among the Saudi forces first, and then also those of their enemies. The remaining leaders took too long to come to the decision to try for an orderly retreat, for their forces had already begun to disintegrate, and now the retreat turned into rout, which turned into a bloodbath, as the Ikhwan often fled without their heavy guns and were mowed down by the machine guns of enthusiastic and elated Syrian pilots. The “Battle of Halat Ammar”, as it would come to be called, was not only where the Saudi emir found his death; it was also the single worst defeat suffered by the Saudis in the war so far.
[3] I can’t delve too much into the depths of these conflicts – just a very quick overview: ITTL, the “Spanish” Flu has killed a different son of Abdulaziz ibn Saud: Faisal instead of Turki . Therefore, Turki is the eldest living male descendant of the deceased Abdulaziz ibn Saud now. After the defeat at Halat Ammar, different Ikhwan factions with different regional powerbases now blame each other for the ill turn the war has taken. Turki ibn Abdulaziz ibn Saud is perceived to be close to the two Otaibi leaders Eqab ibn Mohaya and Khaled ibn Luway, a perception also based on a marriage alliance which also isn’t OTL. Faisal al-Duwaish , leader of Ikhwans from the Mutayr tribe, now blames Khaled ibn Luway for the colossal failure at Halat Ammar and sees it as Allah’s punishment for the other Otaibi Ikhwan leader's, Eqab ibn Mohaya’s, opportunistic behavior and his misconduct surrounding the conquest and administration of the Holy Sites. (BTW, Eqab ibn Mohaya had indeed already betrayed the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca before by joining Ibn Saud’s side with a group of Otaibi fighters, like IOTL. He is responsible IOTL and ITTL for the Massacre of Ta’if), and he supports Saud ibn Abdulaziz, the second son, , as the new emir. Turki, who has acquired some education in Cairo – among the “infidels”, as the orthodox Wahhabi Ikhwan point out – is seen as unsuitable by them. The Otaibi leaders, on the other hand, stand by Turki as new emir and, for their part, blame the Mutayr for not having done enough to bind more Hashemite forces in the East, which in their eyes was the reason why the attack on Aqaba has failed. While no large-scale confrontations have emerged and Riyadh remains quiet for the moment, the rest of the world has, by now, realised that the Saudi alliance is somehow distracted and standing in their own way.
[4] The name of a kibbuz which has been the target of a devastating Syrian air raid in retaliation for attacks by the (continually British) Jewish Brigade on local Arab militia / police / security forces who, in their turn, had taken the side of local Muslims in an escalating dispute over land use rights.
[5] This guy: who ITTL is responsible for British relations with the Jews in Palestine, has formulated one of the historically notorious “white papers” of British imperial policy for the Middle East and India was so full of, pointing in this and then in that direction and managing to antagonise almost everyone over time. The “Clayton White Paper” discusses various possible demarcations of an independent Jewish state protected by Britain and states “negotiations” with the Syrian King Faisal as an option to reach it. The borders proposed are similar to those of OTL’s Peel Commission i.e. much smaller than the post-WW2 UN Partition Plan, but there are also WAY FEWER Jews in Palestine around at this point in time, and ITTL even less than IOTL because there is no Mandate and, more importantly, because there has not been much of a “Third Aliya” (in the absence of the Russian Civil War, Petlyurite pogroms, White Russian pogroms, Bolshevik executions etc.
Talking about negotiating a deal with Syria has made great waves – just like the proposed Jewish state, of course – because it has sparked rumours of whether the British are considering conditions under which they might desist in aiding and pushing the Saudis to attack the Hashemites, especially now that the Saudis are losing cohesion.
[6] This guy.
[7] There is still a Jewish Brigade of the British, whose role is more important ITTL than under the Mandate IOTL, and beyond them, the Haganah has formed, like IOTL, also amply supported by the British.
UNITED WE STAND – DIVIDED WE DROWN IN THE TURNING TIDE
by Leopold Kessler {1]
Developments in Eretz Israel and the entire Middle East are coming thick and fast after the death of Emir Abdullah ibn Saud [2] two weeks ago. Syrian and Iraqi forces have seized the opportunity which the disunity among the Najdi [3] has presented them with, with renewed air raids on Rafha and attacks on scattered bases of Ikhwan forces in the lands of the Banu Ruwalla. Marches of jubilating Arab youths in Haifa, chanting the names of their “heroic princes of the air”, have degenerated into orgies of violence aimed against our brethren. As the self-defense is organising, fears of a renewed Gan Schmu’el [4] are rising. And while no definitive qualification has been made by His Majesty’s government with regards to the proposals of Mr Clayton [5] yet, the heated debates about it are already threatening to tear apart the unity in defense. Mr Yabotinsky [6] has announced that, should the organizations of the Yishuv agree to such a “caricature of a dwarf state”, he would not feel bound by agreements concluded by them, and should self-defense groups which the Empire supports [7] abandon settlers, then these settlers should organize themselves outside of such structures.
But Mr Yabotinsky is deluding himself if he thinks that the Yishuv can win this fight alone, and even less so if lacking in unity. If a secure foundation should be offered, then everyone should support it whole-heartedly. The Zionist endeavour has no better friend than the Empire, and it can only find security and grow if it is guaranteed by His Majesty’s government and by the Syrians, too. Syria has recovered and appears to be prepared to push back against its enemies. Those who may have hoped to win a state for the Yishuv by defeating the House of Hashim must realize the futility of their endeavour now. In this pivotal hour, we must stand together in concordance, or else the entire Zionist project might be lost for our generation.
[1] This is the most long-standing and prestigious Jewish newspaper of the world, and since 1906, it’s pursuing a Zionist course.
[2] Here is how Ibn Saud’s early death came about: The two remaining Hashemite kingdoms/emirates, Syria and Iraq, and especially the former, have slowly and under really difficult circumstances built up and diversified their military forces over the past year. This specifically included the creation of a serious Syrian air force. Unemployed German aircraft engineers have been hired by Faisal’s army to assemble parts brought to Syria on adventurous ways, and – privately hired – German, Austrian and Italian pilots and other specialists have been training Syrian pilots, mechanics etc. It all took a bit of time, and that has cost the Hashemites dearly, but now the force is slowly entering the fray, and for the past 2-3 months, Syrian planes have sortied, at first attacking only raiding parties, but lately also bombing entire key strategic oases like Sakaka, where Ikhwan forces of several thousands had assembled, into the ground. After the first crashes, the Syrians now also have their first glorified airborne heroes. The setbacks have caused some frictions between the various groups in Ibn Saud’s alliance, and the Emir of the Nejd, Protector of the Holy Sites, deemed it necessary to ride with the so-far largest Ikhwan force which, endowed with heavy guns by the British, headed North from Tabuk to attack Aqaba, the last Syrian Red Sea port, and perhaps raid into the Jordan valley. The Syrian forces marching against them were accompanied by Faisal’s air force which came out in their largest sortie so far. Although air-ground coordination was a nightmare at this point in time, the unprepared Ikhwan were still easy targets in the flat and clear territory, repeatedly suffering losses in both men and materiel, and although not all Syrian aircraft made it back to their base in Aqaba safely, either, the attacking force was in a much less integrated and mobile condition when they met their numerically superior enemy. Already, the first Ikhwan leaders suggested to call off the attack and retreat, but Khaled ibn Luway convinced the emir that what could be read as cowardice and defeat could endanger the course of the entire war now that time seemed to be playing into Hashemite hands, and the loyal desert warriors followed their glorious leader. Fighting did not last long, for after only a few hours, news that Emir Ibn Saud and various of his closest advisors had been killed in an explosion spread among the Saudi forces first, and then also those of their enemies. The remaining leaders took too long to come to the decision to try for an orderly retreat, for their forces had already begun to disintegrate, and now the retreat turned into rout, which turned into a bloodbath, as the Ikhwan often fled without their heavy guns and were mowed down by the machine guns of enthusiastic and elated Syrian pilots. The “Battle of Halat Ammar”, as it would come to be called, was not only where the Saudi emir found his death; it was also the single worst defeat suffered by the Saudis in the war so far.
[3] I can’t delve too much into the depths of these conflicts – just a very quick overview: ITTL, the “Spanish” Flu has killed a different son of Abdulaziz ibn Saud: Faisal instead of Turki . Therefore, Turki is the eldest living male descendant of the deceased Abdulaziz ibn Saud now. After the defeat at Halat Ammar, different Ikhwan factions with different regional powerbases now blame each other for the ill turn the war has taken. Turki ibn Abdulaziz ibn Saud is perceived to be close to the two Otaibi leaders Eqab ibn Mohaya and Khaled ibn Luway, a perception also based on a marriage alliance which also isn’t OTL. Faisal al-Duwaish , leader of Ikhwans from the Mutayr tribe, now blames Khaled ibn Luway for the colossal failure at Halat Ammar and sees it as Allah’s punishment for the other Otaibi Ikhwan leader's, Eqab ibn Mohaya’s, opportunistic behavior and his misconduct surrounding the conquest and administration of the Holy Sites. (BTW, Eqab ibn Mohaya had indeed already betrayed the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca before by joining Ibn Saud’s side with a group of Otaibi fighters, like IOTL. He is responsible IOTL and ITTL for the Massacre of Ta’if), and he supports Saud ibn Abdulaziz, the second son, , as the new emir. Turki, who has acquired some education in Cairo – among the “infidels”, as the orthodox Wahhabi Ikhwan point out – is seen as unsuitable by them. The Otaibi leaders, on the other hand, stand by Turki as new emir and, for their part, blame the Mutayr for not having done enough to bind more Hashemite forces in the East, which in their eyes was the reason why the attack on Aqaba has failed. While no large-scale confrontations have emerged and Riyadh remains quiet for the moment, the rest of the world has, by now, realised that the Saudi alliance is somehow distracted and standing in their own way.
[4] The name of a kibbuz which has been the target of a devastating Syrian air raid in retaliation for attacks by the (continually British) Jewish Brigade on local Arab militia / police / security forces who, in their turn, had taken the side of local Muslims in an escalating dispute over land use rights.
[5] This guy: who ITTL is responsible for British relations with the Jews in Palestine, has formulated one of the historically notorious “white papers” of British imperial policy for the Middle East and India was so full of, pointing in this and then in that direction and managing to antagonise almost everyone over time. The “Clayton White Paper” discusses various possible demarcations of an independent Jewish state protected by Britain and states “negotiations” with the Syrian King Faisal as an option to reach it. The borders proposed are similar to those of OTL’s Peel Commission i.e. much smaller than the post-WW2 UN Partition Plan, but there are also WAY FEWER Jews in Palestine around at this point in time, and ITTL even less than IOTL because there is no Mandate and, more importantly, because there has not been much of a “Third Aliya” (in the absence of the Russian Civil War, Petlyurite pogroms, White Russian pogroms, Bolshevik executions etc.
Talking about negotiating a deal with Syria has made great waves – just like the proposed Jewish state, of course – because it has sparked rumours of whether the British are considering conditions under which they might desist in aiding and pushing the Saudis to attack the Hashemites, especially now that the Saudis are losing cohesion.
[6] This guy.
[7] There is still a Jewish Brigade of the British, whose role is more important ITTL than under the Mandate IOTL, and beyond them, the Haganah has formed, like IOTL, also amply supported by the British.
Hah hah, the Saudis are having a bad time. Which is good, incidentally. The cat would really be among the canaries, not that anyone would realize the full magnitude of it yet, if the Hashemites get control of the southern shore of the Persian Gulf from the Saudis (leaving Kuwait and the various minor Gulf emirates and states alone, of course; they're still protected by the British more directly). But considering the (rather peculiar, all things considered) British attitude towards the Gulf, I doubt that will happen.
That would be a thorough Saudi-screw and a British betrayal of them of the first order. @galileo-034 even thinks that "status quo ante bellum" would be viewed as a major British betrayal of the Saudis, unless the Hashemites can win back the Hejaz militarily, which he deemed unlikely in the absence of Saudi internal strife. But now we have the latter. I think status quo ante bellum between the Hashemites and the Saudis is what Abdallah (and Faisal and Husayn) aims at. The Shi'ite inhabitants of al-Hasa and Qatif might be quite happy to escape from under the Wahhabite thumb, but the British would never let the Hashemites extend themselves that far. If the Saudis really collapse, they'd create more trucial states, I suppose, instead of letting the Hashemites have it all.
What gives you that idea? I certainly did not get that impression.
Well, the trick in this case is that they don't know the Saudis have oil yet--those fields weren't discovered until the 1930s, and they certainly won't be discovered in the middle of a war. Of course, the Iranians have oil, which the British are well aware of at this point, and keeping the Hashemites away from the southern shores of the Gulf could probably be vaguely justified as keeping them away from those shipping routes. But overall at this point in time there isn't actually a whole lot that interesting going on in the Persian Gulf, certainly not with oil and gas.
(This is why I referred to the British attitude towards the area as "peculiar"; there really was not a lot of rational justification through a good chunk of the 19th and early 20th centuries for them to be as...interested in the Persian Gulf as they actually were)
Not discovered yet, but suspected, which might be as good for the British government as if oil wells were running, at least in a context where the British are firmly pro Saud instead of playing both sides. For instance, Frank Holmes went at some lengths to get a concession in the region from Ibn Saud in the early 1920s.
That seems to have been more of a private venture with a less than entirely supportive government...
Britain has supplied Jewish forces in Palestine against the Hashemites, Just like they supplied Saudis, Sorani Kurds, Persian counter-government, Kuwaitis etc.
So far, the Clayden White Paper has not yet become official government policy. Even if it would, Britain would have to weigh priorities.
If the small Israel becomes a reality, it would begin as a state protected by Britain (like Lebanon is by France). That would be a firmer commitment and less ambivalence.
The whole question is certainly not uncontroversial. But compared to the OTL mandate, there is less at their hands.
I am struggling to envisage the vast distances of Arabia and thus how these states currently look in regards to their borders and where their armies are. Am I correct in that from what I can gather the situation on the ground militarily in Arabia is pro-Hashemite? And the diplomatic situation is currently equal between the Hashemites and the Saudi's.
I can totally relate to this problem. As for the military situation on the ground: The going had gone very well for the Saudis for quite a while. Now, they've hit a wall and the tide is turning. I've made a very rough GIF map showing everything from the status quo ante bellum over the conquest of Jabal Shammar, then of the Hejaz, and Saudi advances in the North. In the last frame, the stars indicate where Hashemites have struck Saudi forces, with the largest star in the West indicating the rough location of the Battle of Halat Ammar. Unfortunately, it's too large - I hope you can access it here:
Quite generally, ground warfare in Arabia around this time doesn't feature clear territorial front lines. Forces are concentrated in places with water and food, and from there, they can attack the next - well, for want of a better word, let's call it "oasis".
Greater concentration of Ikhwan forces are in the West (Northern Hejaz, where a sizable part of them was killed at Halat Ammar) and in the East (the lands of the Mutayr, at the border with Kuwait which was claiming more land than it holds today back then). Then, there's quite a number of bedouins whose allegiance is potentially more flexible.
As for the diplomatic situation... depends on whose opinion you focus on.
In the Arab world, the Hashemites started as the shining star to many, of course especially to liberal religious reformers, but also to non-religious and even non-Sunni nationalists or other opponents of colonial rule, while conservative groups viewed them with skepticism, but didn't like the Wahhabi Saudis much either. The Saudis had very limited sympathies beyond opportunistic interests and fringe groups.
Among the great powers, things looked very different, of course: Britain had been allied with the Hashemites and the Saudis, but the Hashemites had been the closer allies. But the Caliphial project scared British administration so much that, when they realised they couldn't dissuade them, they tried what they could to contain the wildfire. British protected states in Egypt, Kuwait and along much of the rest of the Gulf coast as well as new British allies in Southern Kurdistan all followed this anti-Hashemite policy, to different degrees of belligerence and offensive action, and each for their very different reasons. Most of them probably don't care a bit about whether the border between the Hashemite kingdoms and the Saudis is drawn, as long as they get what they want.
The UoE favours the Hashemite side and supports them cautiously. France and Italy are officially neutral, but while Paris seeks to continue a harmonious Middle East policy with Britain, Italy is acting more independently and trading where it can with the Hashemites etc. and hoping for good relations with a Hashemite Arabia in the future, while also doing nothing which would bring them on the bad side of the Saudis should these prevail.
Since the beginning of the war, the atrocities committed by the Ikhwan have further antagonised non-Wahhabi Arabs, but the caliphial project has also lost much steam as the Hejaz has been so ungloriously lost and the Syrian and Iraqi governments were forced to implement unpopular policies to be able to build up militarily. Conservatives are further alienated by now because the war policies have strengthened centralised "modern" state structures and royal as well as party-political powers and weakened traditional authorities. In the UoE, the topic is debated among presidential candidates, with some urging more active involvement and others complete non-interference.
To the British, the whole quagmire has not been cheap, but it has gone quite well so far except for the bitter pill that the Hashemites are now hostile to them: the Kurds allied with the Brits in what IOTL is Northern Iraq and Eastern Iran are holding their ground against the elected Kurdish and Persian governments respectively, the Saudis have snatched the Hejaz and denied the sharifian caliphs the source of their legitimacy... Now that the tide seems to turn and the Saudis are in danger of collapsing and losing all their gains, many British politicians and administrators are probably looking for exit strategies in which the gains in terms of British-protected states are secured, without antagonising yet another major Arab force (this time the Saudis, whoever comes out on top there).
Manfred von Richthofen's death was post-PoD, so, theoretically, he could live. But he really was such a daredevil that at some point in time, it simply had to happen. Also, someone of his social background would be quite expensive to hire, more an ornament than a practical instructor...
Udet and Göring are both possible, and the latter might be the most logical choice since IOTL he has served in similar such functions for the Danish and Swedish militaries respectively around that time.
That is what I thought too. Göring is most likely.
...buuuut if Richthofen somehow made it out alive would his social background be worth a much? And he would surely be itching for action.Any info about the status of T.E. Lawrence? I'm really curious to find out what he's been up to ITTL, with such a different Middle East. If he's not in Syria or Iraq helping the Hashemite monarchies, you have to give us a reeeeeally good reason for his absence, @Salvador79 ! (He's still alive, right? With my past experiences with this TL, it's entirely possible he was killed in a previous update and I completely forgot that particular plot point 😅 )
T.E. Lawrence is not dead, no
He also won't enlist in the RAF under the given circumstances. He also wouldn't have worked in the British administration 1919ff. in the first place because he did that IOTL as a close associate of Churchill, who was still a Liberal then, and the Liberals have been out of office ITTL for quite a while already, and Churchill is an important voice of the Liberal opposition in Westminster.Lawrence is predictably very, very dissatisfied with British policies vis-a-vis Arabia, and he could be a potent voice arguing against the current government's policy. But I don't see him doing much Liberal party work, either. On the other hand, working for the Hashemites would be one step too far. He's always treaded the grey zone, sought his own way at the edges, but IOTL he's never actively fought against British-backed forces. He might have had more time at his disposal to write his memoirs. Or he might have taken to drinking and drugs. Returned to doing archaeology - Egypt is a great place for that around this time. Or he might go to some other place where whatever grey zone engagement for the British side is less against his own interests, like maybe China, though I don't think this is really very likely. I'll probably go for a combination of writing, archaeology, drugs, flying the first Egyptian planes left by the British, and spitting Liberal venom against the British policy on the Arabian peninsula whenever someone presents him with a stage.
Makes sense, yeah.
For sure. Tutankhamon's tomb was opened in November 1922, after all. If Mr. Lawrence is in Egypt, he could even end up joining Carter and Carnarvon's expedition. IOTL, the duo had been in Egypt since 1917, meaning that they likely survived the butterfly effect.
One other thing, you mentioned in the last update that, without a Russian Civil War and all the unpleasantness that caused to practitioners of the Jewish faith, the vast majority of the latter didn't feel the need to leave the territory of the UoE. How widespread is the liberalization of attitudes towards the Jews ITTL? Is it exclusive to the big population centres or are attitudes changing in the countryside too?