War, violence, riots and political turmoil defined Fabius’ presidency. By 2007, Fabius had been abandoned by his own party, blamed for the rot which had set into French politics and left office with cataclysmic approval ratings. Even if 2002 was a poisoned chalice, Fabius was blamed for the the worst excesses of the post-Noël e
ra.
Looking with hindsight however, Laurent Fabius was not meant to suffer such a fate. In 2002, Fabius almost resembled a Robert Kennedy-esque figure, with the 2002 presidential a mirror of the 1968 US presidential election. Fabius, on a clear “
Stop the War” pledge, rallied the support of left-wingers and minorities and 'took' the Socialist party from then-incumbent Jacques Delors and his close ally Dominique Strauss-Khan. Unlike with Kennedy, the assassin's bullet had already been fired and had already killed another leading light of the party, in Lionel Jospin.
A photo finish between Jean-Marie Le Pen for the conventional centre-right candidate Jean-Louis Debré heightened fears of another divisive and difficult election. Luckily for Fabius, Debré kept putting his foot in it. Supporting the War in Algeria, now in its seventh year, moving to the right on immigration and attacking refugees did little to boost Debré’s campaign. Fabius got Delors’ endorsement and won the election relatively comfortably, even if Union kept the election closer than opinion polls suggested.
Fabius’ election marked the highpoint of the ‘
boom du millénaire’, or Millenium Boom. Public spirits were high, people optimistic that the wars could end, the ecu and Europe could bring about a new age of prosperity and France could return to a state of normalcy.
As with most European leaders in the early 2000s, Fabius had to deal with the minor recession caused by the introduction of the Ecu. In part because of this recession and the legislative elections held in 2000 which had delivered a large Socialist majority already meant that Fabius chose not to hold snap elections after winning in 2002 and chose to wait until 2005. Afterall Fabius had been PM, and had a pretty good claim to retain the mandate in the legislature.
Choosing his close ally Arnaud Montebourg, a left-winger to become Prime Minister, ambitious proposals to boost intelitech provisions in education and business were passed, a “Living Wage” was instituted, and environmental policies prioritised. However, these victories came because of the collapse of the main opposition, rather than the legislative abilities of the PM. Montebourg was a difficult PM, trying to dominate domestic politics but often doing little to help by this domination. A show-horse, not a work-horse, after a flurry of legislative activity (bills which had begun under Fabius and before Montebourg's tenure), the legislature ground to a halt and inertia set in.
This inertia was even more surprising considering that the centre-right conglomeration 'Union', in the immediate aftermath of the 2002 election, collapsed into a quagmire of corruption, personal sleaze scandals and sensational arrests including both a former president and prime minister, Union, like RPR before, collapsed in on itself. While the centre-right would eventually reform into the
Union Républicaine (UR), the collapse of the party gave them time to lick their wounds and leave the political spotlight. As such Fabius, was almost alone at the top of French politics.
It was in these early months that Fabius sealed his political fate. Having ran on a “
Stop The War” pledge, Fabius oversaw French troops finally leave Algeria. The troops in Libya (numbering around 35,000, before ballooning to 50,000 just before the signing of the Dakar Accords in April 2006) however, were left in the desert sands. With men and women still fighting, dying and spilling blood, it became clear that the War was still on.
Whilst true that if French troops (alongside other NATO troops, especially the Americans) had withdrawn from Libya in 2003, it’s likely that terrorist groups and militias would’ve decimated the fragile democratic government and caused untold misery for millions, this excuse did little to improve Fabius' standing with his base and those who voted him into office. Whilst Fabius promised that troops were now acting as peace-keepers, 'the betrayal' narrative went public. When Newt Gingrich won the presidency and surged troops in Libya in 2005, (to get the Dakar Accords over the line) France was forced to call up reserves, with Fabius’ “Stop the War” pledge having been buried in the desert sands and the '
betrayal' narrative having now gone mainstream. When Libya collapsed into civil conflict and sectarian violence once Western troops left in 2010, Fabius made a statement in which he spoke of his "
deep regret" for keeping troops in Libya for as long as he did.
It was those on the fringes of politics which benefited most from this 'betrayal'. Hard-right and Gaullist politicians kept hoping for another De Gaulle, another figure to end the wars in Northern Africa which France had been locked into. A man who could stop the deaths of the now-hundreds of young French men and women. Someone who could bring about order and stability. Meanwhile, hard-left politicians, unions and activists would march on the streets, protesting the 'betrayal' of Fabius. Afterall, French troops were still in the quagmire that was Libya. This anger would only be multiplied in the aftermath of 7/17 and the West’s response to the attacks.
Even respected newspapers such as The Economist began to comment on whether the French Fifth Republic would survive or whether the next riot, the next assassination, the next news report about more blood split in Northern Africa.
The far-right, also went built electoral and political strength, with he
cordon sanitaire placed on the FN by most voters had been lifted in the years since Noël and the Fabius presidency. When FN placed second in the 2004 European parliament elections, and the PS sunk to levels unprecedented for a governing party in modern times, Fabius had ran out of political capital, barely two years into his term.
These dire results, a replication of the absymal 2004 regional elections, forced the resignation of Montebourg as Prime Minister. His replacement, François Hollande, a critic of Fabius was nonetheless appointed as Prime Minister, a return to the balancing act of keeping the different factions within the PS happy with the other. Cynically, Hollande was also believed to have been appointed to take the heat from the upcoming 2005 legislative elections.
Greater consternation came for Fabius with the European constitution. Fabius, privately, was against the idea of a European constitution, due to its potential to erode social democracy and French sovereignty. However, during an intra-party meeting of the Socialists, he admitted that he would not publicly oppose the constitution and instead would delegate to the National Assembly, which would quickly and quietly vote in favour of adopting the constitution. Former PM Montebourg attempted to force Fabius and Hollande to hold a referendum on the constitution and then co-ordinated with far-left and far-right wing legislators in the assembly to vote down the constitution. Both these efforts failed but divided the Socialist Party irrevocably and saw Montebourg fall out of favour with both Fabius and the PS establishment. Ironically, when the UK voted against the European constitution a year later, it made all this political blood-letting useless and built pressure in the French political system, which a referendum might of helped release.
As such, the 2005 legislative elections saw UR win in a landslide and saw France return to a period of cohabitation government. The PS fell into deeper political turmoil, with Hollande publicly turning against the President, in a similar vein that Michel Rocard did to Mitterrand back in 1988. Fabius would complicate matters as when in a leaked tape, during an off-the-record conversation with a
Le Monde reporter, said that his relationship with UR PM Jean-Pierre Raffarin was far better than his relationship with Hollande. Fabius's leaked quote that “[Raffarin]
doesn’t stab me in the back” epitomised the state of the PS. Fabius shortly after announced he would not run for a second term, and given his approval ratings and stature both within and outside the Socialist Party, was a reilef to many.
In this light, with two controversial former Prime Ministers in Montebourg and Hollande in a fighting match against the other, the Socialist Party instead rallied behind Martine Aubry, the daughter of former President Jacques Delors and herself a long-time and prominent figure in the party. Pledging a return to the more conciliatory and centrist president that her father had been and a pledge to return to some form of normalcy, (with voters looking back on Delors with some sense of nostalgia), was a tonic to Socialist Party members, sick of the psychodrama of the Fabius/Montebourg/Hollande era.
However, to the shock and horror of millions, Jean-Marie Len Pen did it once again and came second in the first round, piping Aubry to the campaign by a few percentage points.
UR meanwhile had chosen Foreign Affairs Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie, who while not as charismatic as some of her rivals, was a party insider with deep connections in and outside of UR. As expected, the French establishment unified around Alliot-Marie, but unlike in 1995, significantly more voters were willing to hear Le Pen out this time. Frequent sexist attacks on Alliot-Marie hurt her standing with voters and the corruption, scandal and the still-remembered and disastrous Chirac presidency was a drag of Alliot-Marie’s campaign.
In one of the ugliest and divisive campaigns in modern times, Alliot-Marie, both thanks to the French right have finally united into an effective electoral vehicle, and centrist and centre-left voters forced to back her campaign, won the election in a landslide. However, with almost a third of French voters choosing Le Pen, it was clear that the a political earthquake had occurred.
Fabius nonetheless has gone down better in history books than his contemporaries of the time expected him to be regarded as. A poignant example of this was that it was during Fabius' term that the Eiffel Tower was rebuilt, and re-opened to the public. A symbol of France, with its scorched remains having been the shattering of the post-Cold War optimism, was back.