I find it interesting the Japanese are going for the outer Aleutians ITTL with so much unfinished business elsewhere.
OTL the Aleutians were used as a bait for the US "they must defend every inch of their sacred homeland, we would" to draw forces away from Midway. If the Japanese are playing the same game here, guess Rabaul is the new Midway. Even the Japanese knew the Aleutians were, by themselves, pretty worthless. Sure crappy weather hides you, but makes flight ops just as hard for you as anyone else...
I get some of the events of our current three great WW2 timelines confused (GB's, Zheng He's, and Fester's).
Have the Japanese figured out yet the level of effectiveness for US radar guided gunnery at this point? As I understand it, Japanese gunnery optics and night/bad weather fighting techniques were superior early in the war; so might that be part of their calculations?
Ditto on all countsSo do I, and I'm writing of the TLs...
Not true, OPERATION AL was not bait for the US, it was a legitimate operation in its own right to secure the northern flank of Japan's perimeter against what they viewed as a possible route the US could take to get to Japan. They also grossly overestimated US strength in the Aleutians.
Now, I agree that the Aleutians were not a good route to get to Japan for a variety of physical reasons but on a map it looks like a viable route and sometimes strategists love to make strategy via map with little else.
I find it interesting the Japanese are going for the outer Aleutians ITTL with so much unfinished business elsewhere.
With enough of their carrier fleet sunk, might the Japanese view the crappy weather of the Aleutians as an equalizer (neutering the US carriers) for the "decisive battle" between battleships?
I would need to see what assets GB has assigned to the operation.
Not true, OPERATION AL was not bait for the US, it was a legitimate operation in its own right to secure the northern flank of Japan's perimeter against what they viewed as a possible route the US could take to get to Japan. They also grossly overestimated US strength in the Aleutians.
Now, I agree that the Aleutians were not a good route to get to Japan for a variety of physical reasons but on a map it looks like a viable route and sometimes strategists love to make strategy via map with little else.
They were actually pretty worried about a US move from this part of the world. It seems silly now, but it wasn't until both sides experienced the terrible conditions first hand that it was ruled out as a serious route of advance by the US
It should probably be remembered that very few people had any experience with conditions in that part of the world before World War II, Japanese or American, so a certain underestimation of the difficulties was probably reasonable
IIRC The Japanese were particularly guilty of this and gave the threat of an American advance through the Aleutians far more credence than it deserved. This tied down a large number of aircraft in particular in OTL during several critical battles. Given their reverses in TTL, I could see the Japanese overreacting to American forces in the Aleutians
I wonder - in that time frame, would the US Coast Guard have been one of the few official entities that would have known and kept records of common open sea and coastal conditions? How much/how little would the various navies or air forces of the world have kept track of that general area then? Maybe the Soviets? Fisherman to be sure, but they wouldn't have recorded data - would they?
I wonder - in that time frame, would the US Coast Guard have been one of the few official entities that would have known and kept records of common open sea and coastal conditions? How much/how little would the various navies or air forces of the world have kept track of that general area then? Maybe the Soviets? Fisherman to be sure, but they wouldn't have recorded data - would they?
Did the Japanese ever figure out the Doolittle raid didn’t originate from the Aleutians?