Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon

Would there have been any US inventory left of the old Krag's - especially the carbines by the mid 30's? - no irony intended. Even into the 1970's, I saw Springfield Krags used for deer hunting rifles in my area, so at some were still serviceable for a long time.

I owned a .30-40 Krag carbine, through college in the late 1960's. It worked well,. The gun store near campus, bought 2 cases from a sale at Rock Island. Would have worked well on short really stature trops. I paid like $30,00 sold it in 1970 for $75.00
 
True. The one thing he has going for him is his friendship with Pershing, who saw him as one of the army's rising officers. But that was some years prior, and Pershing's influence by this point was minimal.

his record at the Army War College and Army Industrial College, as well as really outstanding fitness reports will help a lot with General Craig
 
I've just got to ask this question...I know McArthur is not well thought of on this site, but it doesn't matter. If you are a Big Mac fan, even, his performance during the 1st few hours of WW2 was absolutely dismal, to say the least. So, Ike would do a better job than Mac at organizing the defense of the P.I., had he gotten the chance. Well, maybe he would, and maybe, he wouldn't! Be pretty hard not to, given how low the bar was set in this particular case...doesn't change the facts of AH scenario writing, Ike ITTL is not Ike OTL. This Eisenhower is more like the hero of Foresight Wars, embued with perfect knowledge of what needs to be done, not the real life guy. So my question is, "What gets Eisenhower to the P.I. and what's in his (timeline appropriate) resume that would cause me to believe he'd actually make a difference?"
 
I've just got to ask this question...I know McArthur is not well thought of on this site, but it doesn't matter. If you are a Big Mac fan, even, his performance during the 1st few hours of WW2 was absolutely dismal, to say the least. So, Ike would do a better job than Mac at organizing the defense of the P.I., had he gotten the chance. Well, maybe he would, and maybe, he wouldn't! Be pretty hard not to, given how low the bar was set in this particular case...doesn't change the facts of AH scenario writing, Ike ITTL is not Ike OTL. This Eisenhower is more like the hero of Foresight Wars, embued with perfect knowledge of what needs to be done, not the real life guy. So my question is, "What gets Eisenhower to the P.I. and what's in his (timeline appropriate) resume that would cause me to believe he'd actually make a difference?"



Though not the author of the timeline I would highlight that Eisenhower shares with other famous generals such as Wellington the rare skill of being able to manage to a multi-cultural army over a prolonged period.

The Phillipines and the surrounding area of operations would involve multiple nationalities and cultural differences. Skills here might mean better pre-war preparation and potentially a more coordinated response with the British, Dutch and Australians. I don't think MacArthur comes across particularly well in this regard in any aspect.
 
Though not the author of the timeline I would highlight that Eisenhower shares with other famous generals such as Wellington the rare skill of being able to manage to a multi-cultural army over a prolonged period.

The Phillipines and the surrounding area of operations would involve multiple nationalities and cultural differences. Skills here might mean better pre-war preparation and potentially a more coordinated response with the British, Dutch and Australians. I don't think MacArthur comes across particularly well in this regard in any aspect.

That's an obvious skill, but that comes from knowledge of what he accomplishes after 1941...again, perfect hindsight or foresight, but not a reason to expect anything other than staff officer work.
 

Driftless

Donor
I've just got to ask this question...I know McArthur is not well thought of on this site, but it doesn't matter. If you are a Big Mac fan, even, his performance during the 1st few hours of WW2 was absolutely dismal, to say the least. So, Ike would do a better job than Mac at organizing the defense of the P.I., had he gotten the chance. Well, maybe he would, and maybe, he wouldn't! Be pretty hard not to, given how low the bar was set in this particular case...doesn't change the facts of AH scenario writing, Ike ITTL is not Ike OTL. This Eisenhower is more like the hero of Foresight Wars, embued with perfect knowledge of what needs to be done, not the real life guy. So my question is, "What gets Eisenhower to the P.I. and what's in his (timeline appropriate) resume that would cause me to believe he'd actually make a difference?"

He was Mac's historical choice as top assistant in the Phillipines pre-war, and apparently demonstrated some real organizational and diplomatic skill

from wiki:
His primary duty was planning for the next war, which proved most difficult in the midst of the Great Depression.[66] He then was posted as chief military aide to General MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff. In 1932, he participated in the clearing of the Bonus March encampment in Washington, D.C. Although he was against the actions taken against the veterans and strongly advised MacArthur against taking a public role in it, he later wrote the Army's official incident report, endorsing MacArthur's conduct.[67][68]

In 1935, he accompanied MacArthur to the Philippines, where he served as assistant military adviser to the Philippine government in developing their army. Eisenhower had strong philosophical disagreements with his patron regarding the role of the Philippine Army and the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates. The dispute and resulting antipathy between Eisenhower and MacArthur lasted the rest of their lives.[69]

Historians have concluded that this assignment provided valuable preparation for handling the challenging personalities of Winston Churchill, George S. Patton, George Marshall, and General Montgomery during World War II. Eisenhower later emphasized that too much had been made of the disagreements with MacArthur, and that a positive relationship endured.[70] While in Manila, Mamie suffered a life-threatening stomach ailment but recovered fully. Eisenhower was promoted to the rank of permanent lieutenant colonel in 1936. He also learned to fly, making a solo flight over the Philippines in 1937 and obtained his private pilot's license in 1939 at Fort Lewis.[71] Also around this time, he was offered a post by the Philippine Commonwealth Government, namely by then Philippine President Manuel L. Quezon on recommendations by MacArthur, to become the chief of police of a new capital being planned, now named Quezon City, but he declined the offer.[72]

Eisenhower returned to the United States in December 1939
 
Just out of curiosity in OTL did MacArthur expect to be asked to lead the Invasion of France? Did he ever confide to the "Bataan Gang" that he expected Marshall and the President to at least ask him to consult in planning an invasion or am I over estimating Mac's ego?
 
IMHO Mac preferred being in the Pacific - first because of his connections with the PI, and "I shall return", and also because the Pacific was much more an American run show whereas in Europe would have to deal with the British as co-equals...and also imagine DeGaulle and MacArthur in the same room ever. He was going to be in charge of the invasion of Japan, even bigger than Normandy and basically minimal Allied involvement. He had managed to push that invasion over blockade/mining/bombing to force surrender (what Navy and USAAF wanted) so was the big dog there. (whether or not the "blockade" strategy would have worked is cause for another discussion)

If Mac was in Europe, his Bataan gang, especially Willoughby, would not have been able to control information and estimates like they did in the Pacific. Controlling access to Mac by his staff, the giving of intel that only agreed with mac simply could not have worked in the ETO environment.
 

Driftless

Donor
IMHO Mac preferred being in the Pacific ..........whereas in Europe would have to deal with the British as co-equals...and also imagine DeGaulle and MacArthur in the same room ever. ....

Throw in Monty, Bomber Harris, and then contemplate the idea of George Patton as peace maker....o_O
 
I don't know if these are real quotes or myth, but I always thought they hit the mark:

they have been around for some time

but here is what Macarthur wrote about Eisenhower officially

"This is the best officer in the Army. When the next war comes this officer should go right to the top" (from the 1930s)

https://books.google.com/books?id=aO5zAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA44&lpg=PA44&dq=eisenhower+fitness+report+from+macarthur&source=bl&ots=DYyQ07oFhX&sig=vI6IHqAEyyHcTGOJy5ZIjxJEFWI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjElPzY3YbSAhWH2yYKHadoB8cQ6AEIKTAC#v=onepage&q=eisenhower fitness report from macarthur&f=false
 

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I've just got to ask this question...I know McArthur is not well thought of on this site, but it doesn't matter. If you are a Big Mac fan, even, his performance during the 1st few hours of WW2 was absolutely dismal, to say the least. So, Ike would do a better job than Mac at organizing the defense of the P.I., had he gotten the chance. Well, maybe he would, and maybe, he wouldn't! Be pretty hard not to, given how low the bar was set in this particular case...doesn't change the facts of AH scenario writing, Ike ITTL is not Ike OTL. This Eisenhower is more like the hero of Foresight Wars, embued with perfect knowledge of what needs to be done, not the real life guy. So my question is, "What gets Eisenhower to the P.I. and what's in his (timeline appropriate) resume that would cause me to believe he'd actually make a difference?"

The important thing in the actually development of the Philippine Commonwealth Army is that Eisenhower and Ord (until his death) did the actual staff work and everything along with it, and were well thought of by Quezon (which matters a lot in this case). Everything I posted in the first chapter is from the historical record

The ripples of the POD are about to begin

I am pretty cautious about giving people in my timelines the advantages of our historical perspective

My Pearl Harbor timeline resulted in higher casualties for both sides
 
I feel that Mac was vain enough to think that his presence would be requested in Europe. I wouldn't be surprised if he already had a prepared statement turning down the offer that was never going to come.
 
A New Direction in the Philippines May - July 1937
A New Direction May 1937 – July 1937
MacArthur's death is a complete shock to Quezon, who is en route to France from Mexico and still 4 days from port when the message arrives. FDR too is shocked, as is Secretary of War Woodring and General Craig. However as both men have had plenty of head aches from MacArthur (as have both Quezon and Roosevelt) in Washington opportunity is seen. The Commonwealth needs an army and the Philippine Department will need a new commander soon as General Holbrook is expected to retire when is term of duty as department head ends in February 1938. What is needed is someone who can advise and prepare the Commonwealth Army for its role upon independence, as well as prepare it to support the Philippine Department in its wartime mission.

For now that mission is to hold as long as possible to keep the Japanese busy for as long as can be reasonably expected as the priority for now remains the Panama/Hawaii/Alaska line due to financial constraints and limits of available forces. Someone who can work with a prickly Quezon is also needed. General Hughes is slated for that assignment, but Craig now decides he has someone better in mind. Quezon is due to return to the United States on May 22, so with the permission of FDR and Woodring, General Craig sends a telegram to Quezon. Looking through the last fitness reports from MacArthur he decides to immediately promote Eisenhower to Colonel (permanent rank) and gives him a brevet rank of Brigadier General both as a nod to his responsibilities but also as while as impressing upon Quezon the importance the US Government views the Commonwealth Army and the Philippines in general. Craig also suggests that Quezon consider General James Parsons who has experience commanding a brigade of the Philippine Division as recently as 1933, and who was well liked by his troops who also happens to have experience commanding coast artillery, the tank school, and is a proponent of integration and a strong supporter of non White troops in general.

For Parsons it will mean an immediate jump in responsibilities but as he was already slated to assume command of the III Corps at Fort Sam Houston next year, one Craig feels he can more than handle. Once Holbrook retires, Craig tells Quezon that Parsons will also have command of the Philippine Department which will improve coordination between the US and Commonwealth armies.

Quezon wires back that he agrees to interview the general, and on May 30, after a couple of meetings Quezon decides he has his man. Parsons is not offered a Field Marshal's baton, nor an elaborate hotel suite and insists that all he needs is his army salary. In a stroke the political and command difficulties are resolved.

For Eisenhower, who just got a permanent and a brevet promotion, and no longer has the difficult task of pleasing MacArthur or putting up with his difficult personality, the sudden change in circumstances is almost heaven sent. He and his close friend Ord have been working on a revised plan for the Commonwealth Army and on July 10 their plan is sent to Craig, Quezon and Parsons for approval and suggestions.

The new military advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines and President Quezon travel together in July, while Quezon continues his official visit, and both men get along well. Quezon sends word to his supporters to amend the Commonwealth National Defense Act to take into account what both men privately call “The Eisenhower Plan”.
 
authors notes:
General Parsons is an interesting man, he invented the M1941 field jacket. Seems such a waste he didn't get to serve in World War II due to his age (he was retired at age 64 in 1941).

Quezon was indeed prickly, and the promotion of Eisenhower is in part a political move to appease him after his speech asking for independence right away. In part it is to show support for the Commonwealth and that even with MacArthur dead the US has not abandoned the Philippines and considers the need for its defense seriously (although not yet seriously enough to put some money into yet)

FDR probably would have sighed in genuine relief at the death of Douglas MacArthur. He was a headache to all concerned.
 
What do the Japanese think about the situation in the Philippines or are they too preoccupied with China?

they are waiting to see what happens

According to "MacArthur and the Defeat in the Philippines" the Quezon government was very penetrated by Japanese intelligence agents, indeed the largest Japanese community in any of the Western colonies was in the Philippines (particularly around Davao and Manila).

The weakness of that intelligence is that it was very good at determining capabilities and assets, but not very good (a problem hardly unique to them) in determining intentions
 
The Eisenhower Plan
The Eisenhower Plan
By June 1937 it has become clear that the MacArthur plan is unworkable due to financial reasons, not to mention lack of sufficient cadre, training facilities, weapons and a host of other less critical but still important factors. Eisenhower and Ord determine that the Philippine Army is not going to become large enough to provide the deterrent to Japan that MacArthur hoped. But it is possible to build an army able to deal with banditry, revolts by separatists in the southern islands and provide extra manpower that would help the US Army hold out in the Philippines long enough to weaken Japan sufficiently so that War Plan Orange can liberate the islands once the war starts. It is also possible to build a national army big enough to force the Japanese to divert very large forces to deal with partisan war, something that history shows the Filipinos are good at and one that the geography and terrain of the nation is very suitable for.

The basis of the national army will be two parts.

The Philippine Constabulary, a cross between soldiers and policemen, maintain order and deal with low level insurgencies and banditry and have been highly effective. There are already 4 regiments of them in service, around 8,000 men. Many of their NCOs and officers were detached to train the class of 1937 conscripts. Eisenhower plans to expand this force to eventually 24 small regiments of 2,000 men each, organized into 12 brigades, with half in Luzon and the rest in the other islands. This force would in peacetime consist of 24 battalions (600 men each), but upon mobilization would expand to 48,000 men able to function as military police and light infantry. To support this force there will be 6 brigades (each of 2 regiments of 1,500 men each) of construction engineers, who during peacetime would build and maintain Philippine Army camps (as well as do road construction, much needed in the islands) and in wartime they would provide plenty of manpower to build defensive works and repair them. They would also function as light infantry in a pinch. The construction engineers would have 12 battalions active during peacetime, with a mobilization strength of 18,000 men. Between the military police brigades and construction engineer brigades a total of 66,000 men will be needed, and by conscripting 11,000 men a year between 1939 and 1945 this target can be achieved by independence. In peacetime this force of 36 battalions (24,000 men including support personnel and units) should be more than capable of keeping order and ensuring that the authority of the national government is not threatened while in wartime this force is not only capable of forcing an invader to invest a sizable force to successfully invade, but would also provide a large light infantry and construction force to support the Philippine Scouts and US Army.

For 1938, the construction brigades will be called up for 4 months between January – April to build camps and support facilities for the expansion planned for next year, while conscription will be limited to the number needed to replace any conscripts found unsuitable for service. The engineers also will provide a useful place to send conscripts who are unsuitable for constabulary work. The class of 1937 conscripts will remain in the construction troops with future classes assigned to constabulary regiments or to fill out the engineers. Engineers are allowed to volunteer or can be selected for transfer to constabulary units.

The real fighting strength consists of the 11,000 men in the Philippine Scouts, which are currently as of 1937 organized into 2 infantry regiments, 1 cavalry regiment, 2 field artillery regiments, 2 coast defense regiments, and 1 engineer regiment, plus various support units in the Philippine Division and Harbor Force. This force will consist of volunteers and will expand to 4 infantry regiments, 1 cavalry regiment, 4 field artillery regiments, 4 coast defense regiments (2 of which will be anti aircraft) and 2 engineer regiments. As this force is paid at American pay scales (higher than the Constabulary troops), and volunteers are frequently turned away due to financial limitations, all that is needed to expand this force is more money. Once this force is brought up to strength a reserve infantry division will be formed consisting of 2 regular and 2 reserve infantry regiments, plus a regiment of artillery and engineers. The original 4 infantry regiments will be assigned to one of 4 regional commands (South and Central Philippines, plus the Luzon and Manila Bay Commands) with remaining engineers and artillery as a mobile reserve and the coast defense units assigned to defend the Manila Bay forts as well as new positions planned for Lingayan Gulf. Upon independence the Philippine Scouts will join the Constabulary as the Phillippine National Army, with the former Scouts being the backup to the garrison type forces of the old Constabulary.

To support this and to provide at least minimal protection of Philippine sovereignty, an air force and coast guard are needed.

The Inshore Patrol will be renamed the Philippine Coast Guard, with a similar mission in peacetime as the American version. It will ultimately consist of 2,500 regulars, who will have 4 stations (Lingayen, Bataan, Cebu and Mindanao) and 1 major facility (Cavite when it is transferred to Filipino control). It will have 24 armed motor launches (or PT boats when or if they become available), 12 armed patrol craft (converted fishing boats, yachts and tugs), 4 former US Navy gunboats, 4 minesweepers and 4 transport ships to support the ground forces if they need to deal with a problem on one of the many isands. This force will begin forming in 1939, with the armed patrol craft as the initial vessels along with the transports.

The Air Force is slated to eventually have 2,500 men organized into 3 Groups. The 1st Group will consist of training aircraft, ideally dual purpose aircraft that can perform light attack missions. The 2nd Group will consist of transport and liaison aircraft (which along with the trainers can also be used for observation missions), and the 3rd Group will have 2 fighter squadrons, 1 patrol squadron and 1 attack squadron. This is seen as sufficiently large enough to support the ground forces while being within budgetary constraints in the long run. It is scheduled to begin forming in 1938 and orders are being placed for primary and advanced trainers and a training field at Batangas is under construction. The training group will also have twin engine aircraft (that will be stationed at Clark).


 
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