Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon

[Driftless]

Driftless,



Agreed and that's the rub. There already was a horrendous amount of political pressure on those politicians for having failed to adequately prepare our defenses and thus "left our boys to die" in the Philippines. At least in OTL, the Philippines had already fallen before any relief expedition could've been mounted in response to that political pressure and thus no sales job was needed.

Using my best Foghorn Leghorn voice: "harumpf, harumpf, harumpf,... If those scurrilous, I say scurrilous dogs, on the other side of the aisle/War Department had done their job as I told them, our brave boys wouldn't be in this predicament..." "Furthermore, harumpf, bargle, babble, double-speak, blah-blah...."

 

[avernite]

I'm sure the military hotshots could make up stories about capturing bases along the way to get to the Philippines, and bogging down in (say) Rabaul sufficiently that the Philippines are fallen anyway, OR succeeding so wildly beyond anyone's imagination that reinforcing the Philippines becomes non-crazy.

 

[thorr97]

Driftless,

Using my best Foghorn Leghorn voice: "harumpf, harumpf, harumpf

Yup, pretty much. Look at the difficulties Lincoln had to put up with in the conduct of the US Civil War. There's veritable libraries worth of alternate history tales which use popular political sentiment as their POD which drove this or that change in the North's strategy that had some war altering result. The point being that the American public's support of the war was not an immutable thing and that our politicians would have to respond to popular sentiment to at least some degree.

A truly dire scenario here, as Kratman speculated, was that the "Brave Boys of Bataan" held out long enough that the American public demanded an immediate rescue operation be mounted. And that the politicians being politicians demanded the military make such an effort - despite their dire warnings to the contrary. The expedition would be a last-minute lash-up thing and thus be torn apart by the IJN long before the IJA could get it in their sights. While on the scale of things such a small loss wouldn't matter in comparison to what the US military would eventually become - losing even a small number of ships and troops at that early stage of the war would have a magnified impact. It would've reduced our ability to respond in other areas and thus increased the likelihood of the Japanese attaining a success - or of attaining a greater and more damaging success - where they didn't in OTL.

The Battle of Midway was a near run thing. A few more ship loses in the months prior to it, a few more skilled US Naval aviators dead, the loss of even a single US Navy carrier, and so on, could've meant defeat instead of victory. There's plenty of such ATLs here on this discussion board alone. That's obviously not the case with this tale as GB has already established one POD here that takes care of all that.

It could however, serve as a POD for some other Pacific War tale...

 

[Athelstane]

Once the Americans are bottled up in Bataan in TTL I see no reason why Japan would take substantial numbers of troops and ships away from the invasion of the DEI to reduce them any earlier than they did in OTL. As long as they can contain the American force they should be content with continuing their offensive south.

Indeed.

The East Indies oil fields are the whole reason they went to war. They have no choice but to do whatever it takes to secure them as soon as possible.

All the rest can wait a little longer, if necessary.

 

[Workable Goblin]

Your basic assumption when the Krat-man says something should be that it's wrong. At best, it's correct in the "stopped clock, twice a day" sense.

That being said, I think he has a point here, astonishingly enough. The longer the Philippines hold out, the more and more intense the pressure to Do Something to help them will become, because a great many Americans felt that we had a moral obligation to the Filipinos. However, given that the Navy has an equally if not more intense interest in not sending its ships haring off through a net of Japanese bases to strike against the fully rested and prepared Japanese fleet, public pressure will have to be extremely intense for Nimitz to commit capital ships (versus cruisers or ADBDACOM ships) to such a relief effort, which probably means that the islands will have had to hold out until well into 1942. Even then, the standing orders for such a fleet would probably look more like the Wake Island relief effort, i.e. run away if you run into anything past a very slight amount of trouble, for exactly the purpose of preserving those valuable ships.

 

[Workable Goblin]

I'm sure the military hotshots could make up stories about capturing bases along the way to get to the Philippines, and bogging down in (say) Rabaul sufficiently that the Philippines are fallen anyway, OR succeeding so wildly beyond anyone's imagination that reinforcing the Philippines becomes non-crazy.

They wouldn't be making up those stories; that had been a bedrock of American naval planning for a war against Japan for over a decade by the time Pearl Harbor was bombed. Once war began, the United States Navy was supposed to expand, then begin an offensive against Japan's Central Pacific bases to capture some of them and neutralize the others, clearing a safe corridor of sea with nearby repair bases extending eventually the Philippines, which would then be recaptured before the fleet turned north and erected an iron net around Japan itself to starve them into submission. In other words, exactly what actually happened, which is no coincidence.

It's just that they rightly expected this offensive to take 2-3 years, which would obviously be too long for the islands to hold out against Japanese attacks.

 

[sloreck]

Nobody expected the PI, in particular Luzon and Manila Bay to hold out until relieved. Additionally with the impending independence of the PI the US government was not going to spend much money on improving the defenses of the PI, even ITTL things are being done on the cheap and relatively last minute. OF COURSE the politicians are going to try and make hay demanding the military do the impossible, made even more impossible after years of cheeseparing. Even when something bad happens as a result of decisions made by the politicians, who are in charge and making the final decisions, it is never their fault. I'm sure that goes back to the first tribe of cave men..."me leader, me decide not make spears so me a woman can have nicer cave, but is Ugg's fault we lose to other tribe in fight."

 

[Athelstane]

On an other discussion board the subject of a more successful American defense of the Philippines was deeply discussed and an interesting observation came of it. Namely, that such a success might lead to disaster for the US in the overall Pacific war.

I think it was the author, Tom Kratman, who advanced this premise.

In the scenario, the US is able to hold off the Japanese in the Philippines with better results. The Japanese aren't driven off the islands but their advance and conquest is greatly slowed. Slowed enough that public pressure builds in the US for a relief expedition to be mounted in an effort to save the heroic defenders trapped by the Japanese in the Philippines. In OTL the Philippines fell to quickly for that sentiment to gain ground and certainly too quickly for any realistic relief force to be assembled and arrive. A longer holding out however, would alter that calculus. In the scenario Kratman described, this would force the US to commit forces to a relief / rescue mission without have built-up sufficient strength to deal with the Japanese forces at their strongest. This bowing to public opinion pressure to "save our boys" would thus lead to defeats in detail as one too small force after another is sacrificed in that vain attempt at rescue.

Imagine the effect of a loss of even a single US Navy carrier task force in February or March of '42. And if that task force had troop transports assigned it would be far worse.

The pressure from the home front to mount such a rescue / relief attempt will be strong indeed and only increase the longer the troops in the Philippines hold out. The pressure wouldn't be based on reality but on emotions and that would be difficult to deny. In OTL, Wainwright had surrendered in May. If the more prepared Philippine defenders in this ATL hold out longer than that then the domestic political pressure will play an even larger - and more dangerous - role.

In fact, Calbear actually has the USN and RN mounting an op like this in his Pacific War Redux - OPERATION BLAZER. More of a raid than a serious relief effort, I recall.

 

[galveston bay]

In fact, Calbear actually has the USN and RN mounting an op like this in his Pacific War Redux - OPERATION BLAZER. More of a raid than a serious relief effort, I recall.

it should probably be noted that as of the end of December 1941 the US Pacific Fleet has 3 CV, 2 BB, 10 cruisers (heavy and light), and around 40 destroyers and none of the carriers have intact air groups just yet (plus of course several cruisers being repaired, the old BBs damaged at Pearl are not included in this equation)

by June the fleet will still only have 3 CV (after the Saratoga is torpedoed and goes into the shop and the Hornet reaches the Pacific) although at least the air groups will be at strength and some more cruisers and destroyers.

of course the Japanese are not in a lot better shape, but they will still have 4 fleet carriers and several light carriers and of course will have added a super battleship

 

[zert]

Well the retreat back to Bataan is on and the stockpiling of medicine, food, ammo, fuel, and now men is ongoing. Just how many will get to Bataan, which units might be diverted to set up secondary bases and guerilla groups, and would there be enough boats to allow men and units to be ferried to the Southern Islands?

 

[galveston bay]

Well the retreat back to Bataan is on and the stockpiling of medicine, food, ammo, fuel, and now men is ongoing. Just how many will get to Bataan, which units might be diverted to set up secondary bases and guerilla groups, and would there be enough boats to allow men and units to be ferried to the Southern Islands?

details on that this weekend, hopefully

 

[zert]

details on that this weekend, hopefully

Yay. Update when you can and I always appreciate your dedication to the details.

 

[sloreck]

IMHO very soon movement of inter island ships of any size is going to be very difficult. Night time runs are certainly doable, but any vessels are a very narrow window to transit to Bataan, load/unload, and then clear the area before light. Both approaching Manila Bay/Bataan and departing the ships need to be relatively war away as long as there is light. They can lay up camouflaged during the day before/after making runs to Bataan and the preceding/following night continue on to the destination. Maritime patrol air will, except relatively close to Bataan/Manila Bay will not be concentrated on inshore traffic. Having said that any surface ships close to the area where fighting is going on will be very juicy targets for the Japanese who have complete air superiority.

By the time the Japanese landed Bataan had been fortified and supplied well above the levels of OTL - roughly enough food and medicine for everyone there for perhaps 6 months or more. While I'm sure moving "stuff" there will continue to be movement up to the last minute, although this is not the vital element it was OTL. Similarly movement of units south has happened already, there may be continuing evacuation of wounded or key individuals out of Bataan/Corregidor like OTL but major personnel movements or equipment other than small bits, nope.

 

[Knightmare]

By the time the Japanese landed Bataan had been fortified and supplied well above the levels of OTL - roughly enough food and medicine for everyone there for perhaps 6 months or more. While I'm sure moving "stuff" there will continue to be movement up to the last minute, although this is not the vital element it was OTL. Similarly movement of units south has happened already, there may be continuing evacuation of wounded or key individuals out of Bataan/Corregidor like OTL but major personnel movements or equipment other than small bits, nope.

And I reckon anything that can't be moved, like say food, weapons, or other supplies, get cached around for guerilla movements, if not outright destroyed.

After all, no sense in keeping that crate of 1903 Springfields around if they can be given out to potential guerillas....

 

[Catsmate]

Using my best Foghorn Leghorn voice: "harumpf, harumpf, harumpf,... If those scurrilous, I say scurrilous dogs, on the other side of the aisle/War Department had done their job as I told them, our brave boys wouldn't be in this predicament..." "Furthermore, harumpf, bargle, babble, double-speak, blah-blah...."

SO lot's of political pressure to Do Something. Probably leading to an ill-advised, ill-prepared and ill-equipped rescue/supply convoy or something of that sort.

 

[Catsmate]

Your basic assumption when the Krat-man says something should be that it's wrong. At best, it's correct in the "stopped clock, twice a day" sense.

Yeah, in this he's quite possibly correct.
Or dear Jeebus I'm actually agreeing with the Space Marine, I need to shower.

 

[Athelstane]

it should probably be noted that as of the end of December 1941 the US Pacific Fleet has 3 CV, 2 BB, 10 cruisers (heavy and light), and around 40 destroyers and none of the carriers have intact air groups just yet (plus of course several cruisers being repaired, the old BBs damaged at Pearl are not included in this equation)

by June the fleet will still only have 3 CV (after the Saratoga is torpedoed and goes into the shop and the Hornet reaches the Pacific) although at least the air groups will be at strength and some more cruisers and destroyers.

Right. And even worse, CINCPAC hardly has the logistical tail - even with the extra oilers you gave Richardson - to support an offensive that deep into Japanese-controlled waters.

Calbear's excellent timeline notwithstanding, I think King and Richardson would sooner resign under protest than agree to undertake such a foolhardy relief mission.

of course the Japanese are not in a lot better shape, but they will still have 4 fleet carriers and several light carriers and of course will have added a super battleship

Fortunately, though, they don't have to go anywhere; and any U.S. offensive would take place under Japanese land-based air cover.

 

[viperjock]

I believe that Eisenhower would give Washington a no bullshit assessment of the current situation in the Philippines. He would advise Marshall and the President to not launch a risky rescue attempt. In this timeline Ike has already sent the Marines to Darwin so he is showing that he is thinking ahead to stopping the Japanese at their next stop.

 

[Driftless]

How much detail of the Hawaiian battles and other developments would be shared with Ike?

 

[Look More Closely Later]

If the Japanese advance into Burma is messed up by the Philippines holding out, that possibly keeps the Burma Road open as far as routes for the US to shift stuff into China goes. (And also if enough of Burma is still producing cereal/grains for the Allied market, massively reduces the negative effects of the OTL Bengal Famine.)