Coulsdon Eagle
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I did "like" the touch where at least some brave KM sailors fought back against overwhelming odds. The other side does occasionally have heroes too.
I'm trying to not make this a wank, which means the Allies can't win everything, and if they win, it can't be effortlessly.I did "like" the touch where at least some brave KM sailors fought back against overwhelming odds. The other side does occasionally have heroes too.
The events in the next few days will decide thatCould norway become a stalemate with northern Norway under allies and southern Norway under Germany duverting resources from both sides that are needed somewhere else
There were hardly any German aircraft in Trondheim, Ark and Glorious are loaded with Gladiators.So the RN is using Skuas for FAA fighter cover and dive bombing at this point I guess, at least in the north. I imagine they are overall as good as or better than Sea Gladiators then.
If France doesn't fall, the Battle of the Atlantic may be over almost before it beganWith the liberation of Trondheim confirmed, even if France is in extremis soon, there is no excuse not to follow through with whatever the Norwegians need to finish liberating south Norway. Even if it means depleting Britain's own interceptor cover somewhat, Hitler cannot be imagined now to have any prospect of landing troops in Britain, and without that capability, securing Norway is well worth some reduced air defense of Britain. Long term, with Norway largely intact and an ally, the job of impeding U-boats trying to go north around Britain is much better done--I imagine OTL they hewed close to Norwegian shores on these sorties, where Luftwaffe air cover could hold RN units at some distance off to open a corridor, but assuming the British do not scant Norway, Allied planes flying out of Norwegian bases will have the opposite effect and the combined Allied fleet elements in the region can patrol from shore to shore, with spotter aircraft, soon to be upgraded to be able to strike at such targets of opportunity as surfaced subs by themselves. By soon, I mean a couple years anyway, planes in the early battle of the Atlantic could not generally do that, but the capability is desired and being worked on--before small high performance planes can do that, as they eventually will, heavy planes like B-24 variants (aka "Liberators") and Sunderland, perhaps even Catalina, flying boats can do it. Maybe not yet but soon! Meanwhile the U-boats have no Luftwaffe in the region to run interference and distract the surface vessels (also, other submarines can help in sub hunting I believe).
Two, actually, The Channel DashIIRC a capital ship that OTL had survived that long was able to run the gauntlet from the French coast to pre-war German coastal waters despite the RAF and RN hot on the hunt for it.
The Norwegians need some reinforcements before they can drive the Germans out, parts of the Army is still being taken to the front line. Yeah, a few Hurricane squadrons plus Gladiators for the Norwegians and some strike aircraft(Skua's seem to work for me) are what is needed.Back in Norway in April 1940, the confirmation of Trondheim's liberation definitively means that Norway can concentrate what forces it has to contain and eventually capture the forces landed in the south. Britain need not send a lot of men, Norway has those; as noted mostly Norway needs some material aid, with British pilots being needed only for a few of the most advanced models of plane, which practically speaking boils down to Hurricanes just to parry the Bf-109s--Norwegian aircraft, supplemented by British replacements for their losses in Gladiators and some attack planes, can even do a lot of the tactical dive bombing and so forth. Since Norway cannot manufacture planes of any kind as far as I know, the air front which must be maintained must be suppled by allied nations, which if France is to fall along with Netherlands and Belgium, practically means Britain must supply them all. (Or the credits to buy American models, either way the production capacity is not greater than OTL and must spread over a larger air front). But after all the Luftwaffe cannot do anything to decimate any squadrons defending the south air approaches to Norway without tying down their own planes and risking losing some of them in engaging them, and that takes pressure off British air defense requirements; the broader front means it is easier to punch through any particular stretch of coast.
I mean, you're not wrongGerman reaction to almost sinking a Royal navy cruiser: YEAH. THAT WILL SHOW THEM
Royal navy in a dry English accent: Show us what? Our forces around Norway are bigger than your entire fleet
My bold, I don't think it should be "few." It should be as many as the British can sustain there, at least until the number of Hurricanes per mile of southern Norwegian coastline comes up to the level in southern Britain.Yeah, a few Hurricane squadrons plus Gladiators for the Norwegians and some strike aircraft(Skua's seem to work for me) are what is needed.
D'oh! I didn't even think of that, OTL distraction of Fighter Command by the Bergen-Scotland transit being used by the Luftwaffe! Probably because they never actually tried it, or rarely, what with the most desirable targets being in the south of England (with exceptions such as Scapa Flow base, but a naval base is a hard target!) Yet another reason not to let Norway slip, even if it costs Britain something. I've only ever been thinking of a) can good fighters get there--yes, to Bergen anyway and b) what can the RAF do from there (not a lot more than they could do from Britain, but just as you say, it gives them a new vector to come from as well as bringing some targets into range at all and others in closer range).Another thought, assuming there's a Battle of Britain, the lack of any major threat from Norway would allow the RAF to move more aircraft south to help defend the country that way, especially if there's fighters in Norway that can intercept anything heading for the North.
Don't such remarks apply just the same to any other fighter? This is exactly why I felt that the paper range of the Hurricanes, which certainly ought to be enough to get them to Bergen, would however not be enough to allow them to fight their way to Bergen. Meanwhile Emils can certainly reach Kristiansand, Stavanger, and the German held field south of Oslo--if there aren't any Hurricanes to oppose them that is! So we have to reset the combat radius to those bases, not out of Aalborg--if again, the Luftwaffe is allowed air supremacy on those routes. Hurricanes based at Bergen however can surely interdict the approaches to Stavanger despite their having even shorter legs than the Emils.Combat range of the Bf109 is problematical, it depends if it is doing fighter sweeps or if its escorting bombers. Again based on the Battle of Britain, escorting bombers further than London from the Pas de Calais was not possible and that would give an effective radius of maybe 120 nm at most.
Now you seem to be stressing that basing a complete array of air defense assets in southern Norway would not in fact reduce the costs of the fields in northern Britain, because these are still needed for training, rest and recuperation as much as ever--more so, actually, given how hot the Norway air front would probably be.OTL Fighter Command used the Northof England to rest and recuperate squadrons as well as train. This meant that when an attack from Norway was tried, on the assumption the RAF had moved all its fighters South , it was pretty much massacred.
My bold, I don't think it should be "few." It should be as many as the British can sustain there, at least until the number of Hurricanes per mile of southern Norwegian coastline comes up to the level in southern Britain.
I should bear in mind that the Germans have had little time yet to build up airfields in Jutland. OTL they intended at a minimum (when they were considering leaving much of Denmark not directly occupied) to capture Aalborg, which had an airfield; I get the impression further airfield assets in the region had to be developed, and presumably there are constraints at Aalborg as conquered. Someone who can say how tight those limits were, in terms of sorties of various types of aircraft per day possible before upgrades, can put a partial cap on what the Luftwaffe can send over Norway. Not total; more distant airfields can serve too if the aircraft involved have range.
In April 1940, the best air superiority fighter available to them is the Bf-109 E "Emil" model. It is these the Hurricanes must match and parry. If the RAF can do that, then other types of plane such as Gladiators or Skuas can handle slower less maneuverable planes, and of course any spare capacity the Hurricanes have can mow those down too. OTOH if we can only engage say half the Emils, those that get through will wreck havoc on lower performance planes, be they FAA, RAF or Norwegian. It behooves the British then not to be stingy with the Hurricanes, and send over lots of them! There is a maximum number desirable, based on what the Germans can throw at Norway and the waters around it.
It isn't like the British (or the Germans for that matter) need concrete runways miles long for anything they have yet; the beginning of the war air superiority fighters still operate out off of grass fields. Big British bombers might be getting to the point of absolutely needing paved runways by now, but the Germans never went for those kinds of bombers anyway; their giant transports were I believe few in number OTL and relied on huge numbers of wheels for primitive field capability. The Luftwaffe's best then can operate out of simple airfields at this time, and that's pretty much all the British best fighters need either--it isn't time to be thinking of bombing the Reich out of Norway yet...though
D'oh! I didn't even think of that, OTL distraction of Fighter Command by the Bergen-Scotland transit being used by the Luftwaffe! Probably because they never actually tried it, or rarely, what with the most desirable targets being in the south of England (with exceptions such as Scapa Flow base, but a naval base is a hard target!) Yet another reason not to let Norway slip, even if it costs Britain something. I've only ever been thinking of a) can good fighters get there--yes, to Bergen anyway and b) what can the RAF do from there (not a lot more than they could do from Britain, but just as you say, it gives them a new vector to come from as well as bringing some targets into range at all and others in closer range).
OK so if it is at all possible the British should do what it takes to win in Norway, clear all resistance out, it is clearly worth a lot to hold it free of occupation, just to deny it to the Germans, and worth more to actually use it--mainly to clamp down on submarines sneaking north, but clearly Norway is handy for other purposes. Including, aside from far fetched perhaps Jutland or worse, Finland, invasion scenarios, standing by to give any Swedes worried Hitler can gobble them up the comfort of knowing the Allies can be reinforcing their defense right quick, and to deter any Reich-sympathizing Swedes or Germans with ideas about Sweden being a grape to eat.
Also, while Narvik and even Trondheim might not be enough of ports to enable the Swedes to trade on quite the same scale they did in peacetime and certainly not with their own merchant shipping, Norway being an ally safe from occupation guarantees neutral Sweden can trade via the railroads to these ports to a great extent--in goods that the Allies approve of course. This also weakens the leverage Hitler had on Sweden OTL, and strengthens that of the Allies.
Wikipedia's BF-109 performance figures are for the G model, "Gustav," which is not yet on hand, so the "Emils" that are might have shorter legs, but for G model, they give 475-618 nautical miles general range, Combat range 238-309 NM "until the front and to back home" which, this range being half that above means they could fly out of Jutland and return to that safe base--maybe a little less to allow for fuel consumption in combat or indirect routes, patrolling etc, realistically--and ferry range 618 NM without a drop tank and 1077 with one. Dunno if they already have drop tanks with the Emil model or not. I quote NM not km or statue miles because we just divide NM by 60 to get range in degrees--a nautical mile is a minute of Earth's circumference arc. At a conservative 240 NM combat range, allowing a reserve for operations, that is 4 degrees, whereas looking at G.Projector, the tip of Jutland--let's say Aalborg--that would take them out and back to Bergen or any other point currently held--depending on how many sorties the Germans can fly out of that field and of course how many planes and flow of fuel and munitions they choose to pour in and what the logistic limit possible currently is--they can cover flights to all of their current holdings now that Trondheim is lost to them, without even having to refuel or rearm anywhere in Norway. Aalborg to Stavanger is just 172 NM!
Here is a G.Projector image, using Azmuthial Equidistant projection, of the coastlines (and national borders postwar, in light green) of what lies within 4 degrees of Aalborg:
View attachment 539456
The latitude-longitude graticule is 1 degree, so two of them side by side are going to be squares about 60 NM on a side, approximately, around 72 diagonally.
The scale of RAF Hurricane deployment to Norway must match the number of Bf-109s that Goering can send through Aalborg then, plus any multiplication of sortie effectiveness the Germans get by securing some field and managing to ship in fuel and ammo, either by airlift or by giving heavy air cover to merchant hulls--heavy RN units might possibly be able to dodge into that range out of Aalborg and survive aerial attacks, for a while, but the deeper into that zone they go, the more damage they take, and so I figure looking at the above map that just maybe perhaps the RN can interdict seaborne shipping to Stavanger and perhaps Kristiansand, though I would doubt the latter--but without friendly air cover they are not going to make it to the east side of the Skagerrak to sink even a rowboat, Perhaps I overestimate the damage German attack planes can do at this date? But I suspect not.
Given air cover with planes the match of a Bf-109 then, plus more planes, of that type or lower performance to mow German lower performance planes down and strike at their hulls on the water, it is the Germans who can't move, past whatever radius the RAF fighters--Hurricanes at this point we assume--can establish air superiority.
The British should not stint with the Hurricanes then. It is true that if they rush a big percentage of their Hurricanes to Norway, Britain's air defenses are weakened, but it is also true that if the Luftwaffe holds back and avoids expending their Emils trying to sustain their communications with the southern footholds, then rather few Hurricanes would indeed suffice to neutralize lesser Luftwaffe planes, along with the Gladiators and so forth, whereas if the British pour in as many Hurricanes as needed, Goering must use up the Emils and anything they try to escort quite rapidly, which weakens the Luftwaffe threat against Britain for a time--therefore fewer are needed in Britain. (And as steamboy noted, OTL they had to maintain cover in Scotland they will not need to if they hold Norway--in effect those reserves are shifted to Norway at a low additional cost, mainly relating to the logistics involved.
Logistics, I think, not a worried fear of deploying too many interceptors, would be the limit on how many Hurricanes it is rational to deploy. There is little point in overrunning the ability of operators at Bergen and soon a second field just north of Oslo to keep them fueled and armed and maintained--but as you said, the Hurricanes are in fact easier than Spitfires in this respect and this is why we prefer them despite their shorter legs and moderately less superlative performance--on paper a Spitfire is measurably better in many ways, but in combat the fast turnaround time covers a multitude of such shortfalls. Still, it is not clear to me that their machine guns for instance can be fed with anything but British imported ammunition. I suppose they use pretty much the same aviation gas the Norwegians use but the relatively small air force the kingdom could maintain means that intensive use will guzzle it all up fast. Fortunately Bergen is a port and there are railroads connecting Bergen to the northern surrounds of Oslo; in a pinch all Hurricanes might have to fly out of Bergen but only if either they just can't ship avgas and ammo in fast enough to feed two airfields, or the Germans manage to interdict the land route to Oslo--now of course it is again possible to ship stuff in to Trondheim and then send it south again, so cutting off Oslo is not that easily done. Holding the remnant of the southeast is a big priority of course.
So I don't know if your remark about a "few" Hurricanes reflects careful study of what can be shipped into Bergen, versus a judgement about how limited the air pipeline out of Jutland is for Goering, versus just figuring the British would only dare commit token numbers of Hurricanes.
The latter is what I am arguing against. They should send in as many as they can support, because the German grip on north Jutland is not going away soon and Luftwaffe capabilities will only improve for some time to come (provided Goering can prevent Hitler from ordering him to send it all the way of the Kriegsmarine surface fleet!) Since Hitler needs to maintain a certain level of force for Fall Gelb, the spare padding of extra Luftwaffe resources is going to be burnt through fast if the British send in all the Hurricanes they can; the only way the Germans can conserve their air force is to cut their losses and pull out.
In the longer run, Norway must be treated as part of the British air perimeter, protected every bit as well as Britain's own shores. (As noted to an extent this is compensated by consolidating in resources that had to be deployed to Scotland OTL, but to be honest, I expect the Luftwaffe to probe this front a lot more, it will be quite an active front. But while that means more costs to the Allies it also means more drains on the Axis). This pays off in many ways; the allies can take better advantage of achieving local air supremacy than the Reich can here, since they have a navy (two navies; the Norwegian force is a substantial augmentation of what the RN can afford to tie up in these waters) and inherent advantages, if the air balance is merely a push, fighting on Norwegian soil with Norwegian soldiers for Norway's freedom and integrity--and honor and revenge. If they can push the invaders out, capturing most of them I suppose, then bringing the air defenses up to the evolving British standard will cost something, but free Norway can pay a fair amount. Adding the credit of a free Norway that already repelled Hitler's best shot to British should buy the alliance more machines of various kinds in America to supplement any stressing of British domestic supply chains--they can buy ammo from the Swedes too I would think, though the Swedes might listen to Hitler's tantrums on that subject and decline to sell it.
Subjectively speaking, I think the story of brave fierce little Norway will put the Allied cause in a better light and the Axis in a worse one in the USA; FDR will have that much more leeway to favor the Allies.
Inquisitor I smell a bad pun, which is Hersey. Bring me my flamerI guess you could say the British got 'Repulsed.'
Yessir.The German sub commander, wasn't he the guy who sunk HMS Royal Oak?
What? Never!Yeah that's going to be a major propaganda victory.
Are the readers trying to mess with the story?And we have yet to read about a certain Austrian Corporals reaction to both the gutting of the Kriegsmarine and the lost of a German war hero.
Then you contradict yourself by saying :As soon as it was light, 20 Ju 88 bombers roared into the air from Sola, carrying 250 kg bombs, headed for Repulse, which had been sighted in a correct position.
Repulse actually had done some damage at Sola; twelve aircraft had been destroyed, along with several hangars, an aviation fuel tank had received a direct hit with predictable results, and the airfield was out of commission for several days. In exchange for taking out an airfield for a few days, the British would have a battlecruiser in repair for months.