Det som går ned må komme opp-An Alternate Royal Norwegian Navy TL

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
I did "like" the touch where at least some brave KM sailors fought back against overwhelming odds. The other side does occasionally have heroes too.
 
Could norway become a stalemate with northern Norway under allies and southern Norway under Germany duverting resources from both sides that are needed somewhere else
 
I did "like" the touch where at least some brave KM sailors fought back against overwhelming odds. The other side does occasionally have heroes too.
I'm trying to not make this a wank, which means the Allies can't win everything, and if they win, it can't be effortlessly.
Could norway become a stalemate with northern Norway under allies and southern Norway under Germany duverting resources from both sides that are needed somewhere else
The events in the next few days will decide that
 
So the RN is using Skuas for FAA fighter cover and dive bombing at this point I guess, at least in the north. I imagine they are overall as good as or better than Sea Gladiators then.
There were hardly any German aircraft in Trondheim, Ark and Glorious are loaded with Gladiators.
With the liberation of Trondheim confirmed, even if France is in extremis soon, there is no excuse not to follow through with whatever the Norwegians need to finish liberating south Norway. Even if it means depleting Britain's own interceptor cover somewhat, Hitler cannot be imagined now to have any prospect of landing troops in Britain, and without that capability, securing Norway is well worth some reduced air defense of Britain. Long term, with Norway largely intact and an ally, the job of impeding U-boats trying to go north around Britain is much better done--I imagine OTL they hewed close to Norwegian shores on these sorties, where Luftwaffe air cover could hold RN units at some distance off to open a corridor, but assuming the British do not scant Norway, Allied planes flying out of Norwegian bases will have the opposite effect and the combined Allied fleet elements in the region can patrol from shore to shore, with spotter aircraft, soon to be upgraded to be able to strike at such targets of opportunity as surfaced subs by themselves. By soon, I mean a couple years anyway, planes in the early battle of the Atlantic could not generally do that, but the capability is desired and being worked on--before small high performance planes can do that, as they eventually will, heavy planes like B-24 variants (aka "Liberators") and Sunderland, perhaps even Catalina, flying boats can do it. Maybe not yet but soon! Meanwhile the U-boats have no Luftwaffe in the region to run interference and distract the surface vessels (also, other submarines can help in sub hunting I believe).
If France doesn't fall, the Battle of the Atlantic may be over almost before it began
IIRC a capital ship that OTL had survived that long was able to run the gauntlet from the French coast to pre-war German coastal waters despite the RAF and RN hot on the hunt for it.
Two, actually, The Channel Dash
Back in Norway in April 1940, the confirmation of Trondheim's liberation definitively means that Norway can concentrate what forces it has to contain and eventually capture the forces landed in the south. Britain need not send a lot of men, Norway has those; as noted mostly Norway needs some material aid, with British pilots being needed only for a few of the most advanced models of plane, which practically speaking boils down to Hurricanes just to parry the Bf-109s--Norwegian aircraft, supplemented by British replacements for their losses in Gladiators and some attack planes, can even do a lot of the tactical dive bombing and so forth. Since Norway cannot manufacture planes of any kind as far as I know, the air front which must be maintained must be suppled by allied nations, which if France is to fall along with Netherlands and Belgium, practically means Britain must supply them all. (Or the credits to buy American models, either way the production capacity is not greater than OTL and must spread over a larger air front). But after all the Luftwaffe cannot do anything to decimate any squadrons defending the south air approaches to Norway without tying down their own planes and risking losing some of them in engaging them, and that takes pressure off British air defense requirements; the broader front means it is easier to punch through any particular stretch of coast.
The Norwegians need some reinforcements before they can drive the Germans out, parts of the Army is still being taken to the front line. Yeah, a few Hurricane squadrons plus Gladiators for the Norwegians and some strike aircraft(Skua's seem to work for me) are what is needed.

Great analysis as always!
 
Another thought, assuming there's a Battle of Britain, the lack of any major threat from Norway would allow the RAF to move more aircraft south to help defend the country that way, especially if there's fighters in Norway that can intercept anything heading for the North.
 

mattep74

Kicked
German reaction to almost sinking a Royal navy cruiser: YEAH. THAT WILL SHOW THEM

Royal navy in a dry English accent: Show us what? Our forces around Norway are bigger than your entire fleet
 
Yeah, a few Hurricane squadrons plus Gladiators for the Norwegians and some strike aircraft(Skua's seem to work for me) are what is needed.
My bold, I don't think it should be "few." It should be as many as the British can sustain there, at least until the number of Hurricanes per mile of southern Norwegian coastline comes up to the level in southern Britain.

I should bear in mind that the Germans have had little time yet to build up airfields in Jutland. OTL they intended at a minimum (when they were considering leaving much of Denmark not directly occupied) to capture Aalborg, which had an airfield; I get the impression further airfield assets in the region had to be developed, and presumably there are constraints at Aalborg as conquered. Someone who can say how tight those limits were, in terms of sorties of various types of aircraft per day possible before upgrades, can put a partial cap on what the Luftwaffe can send over Norway. Not total; more distant airfields can serve too if the aircraft involved have range.

In April 1940, the best air superiority fighter available to them is the Bf-109 E "Emil" model. It is these the Hurricanes must match and parry. If the RAF can do that, then other types of plane such as Gladiators or Skuas can handle slower less maneuverable planes, and of course any spare capacity the Hurricanes have can mow those down too. OTOH if we can only engage say half the Emils, those that get through will wreck havoc on lower performance planes, be they FAA, RAF or Norwegian. It behooves the British then not to be stingy with the Hurricanes, and send over lots of them! There is a maximum number desirable, based on what the Germans can throw at Norway and the waters around it.

It isn't like the British (or the Germans for that matter) need concrete runways miles long for anything they have yet; the beginning of the war air superiority fighters still operate out off of grass fields. Big British bombers might be getting to the point of absolutely needing paved runways by now, but the Germans never went for those kinds of bombers anyway; their giant transports were I believe few in number OTL and relied on huge numbers of wheels for primitive field capability. The Luftwaffe's best then can operate out of simple airfields at this time, and that's pretty much all the British best fighters need either--it isn't time to be thinking of bombing the Reich out of Norway yet...though
Another thought, assuming there's a Battle of Britain, the lack of any major threat from Norway would allow the RAF to move more aircraft south to help defend the country that way, especially if there's fighters in Norway that can intercept anything heading for the North.
D'oh! I didn't even think of that, OTL distraction of Fighter Command by the Bergen-Scotland transit being used by the Luftwaffe! Probably because they never actually tried it, or rarely, what with the most desirable targets being in the south of England (with exceptions such as Scapa Flow base, but a naval base is a hard target!) Yet another reason not to let Norway slip, even if it costs Britain something. I've only ever been thinking of a) can good fighters get there--yes, to Bergen anyway and b) what can the RAF do from there (not a lot more than they could do from Britain, but just as you say, it gives them a new vector to come from as well as bringing some targets into range at all and others in closer range).

OK so if it is at all possible the British should do what it takes to win in Norway, clear all resistance out, it is clearly worth a lot to hold it free of occupation, just to deny it to the Germans, and worth more to actually use it--mainly to clamp down on submarines sneaking north, but clearly Norway is handy for other purposes. Including, aside from far fetched perhaps Jutland or worse, Finland, invasion scenarios, standing by to give any Swedes worried Hitler can gobble them up the comfort of knowing the Allies can be reinforcing their defense right quick, and to deter any Reich-sympathizing Swedes or Germans with ideas about Sweden being a grape to eat.

Also, while Narvik and even Trondheim might not be enough of ports to enable the Swedes to trade on quite the same scale they did in peacetime and certainly not with their own merchant shipping, Norway being an ally safe from occupation guarantees neutral Sweden can trade via the railroads to these ports to a great extent--in goods that the Allies approve of course. This also weakens the leverage Hitler had on Sweden OTL, and strengthens that of the Allies.

Wikipedia's BF-109 performance figures are for the G model, "Gustav," which is not yet on hand, so the "Emils" that are might have shorter legs, but for G model, they give 475-618 nautical miles general range, Combat range 238-309 NM "until the front and to back home" which, this range being half that above means they could fly out of Jutland and return to that safe base--maybe a little less to allow for fuel consumption in combat or indirect routes, patrolling etc, realistically--and ferry range 618 NM without a drop tank and 1077 with one. Dunno if they already have drop tanks with the Emil model or not. I quote NM not km or statue miles because we just divide NM by 60 to get range in degrees--a nautical mile is a minute of Earth's circumference arc. At a conservative 240 NM combat range, allowing a reserve for operations, that is 4 degrees, whereas looking at G.Projector, the tip of Jutland--let's say Aalborg--that would take them out and back to Bergen or any other point currently held--depending on how many sorties the Germans can fly out of that field and of course how many planes and flow of fuel and munitions they choose to pour in and what the logistic limit possible currently is--they can cover flights to all of their current holdings now that Trondheim is lost to them, without even having to refuel or rearm anywhere in Norway. Aalborg to Stavanger is just 172 NM!

Here is a G.Projector image, using Azmuthial Equidistant projection, of the coastlines (and national borders postwar, in light green) of what lies within 4 degrees of Aalborg:
4 Degrees-240 NM out of Aalborg.jpg


The latitude-longitude graticule is 1 degree, so two of them side by side are going to be squares about 60 NM on a side, approximately, around 72 diagonally.

The scale of RAF Hurricane deployment to Norway must match the number of Bf-109s that Goering can send through Aalborg then, plus any multiplication of sortie effectiveness the Germans get by securing some field and managing to ship in fuel and ammo, either by airlift or by giving heavy air cover to merchant hulls--heavy RN units might possibly be able to dodge into that range out of Aalborg and survive aerial attacks, for a while, but the deeper into that zone they go, the more damage they take, and so I figure looking at the above map that just maybe perhaps the RN can interdict seaborne shipping to Stavanger and perhaps Kristiansand, though I would doubt the latter--but without friendly air cover they are not going to make it to the east side of the Skagerrak to sink even a rowboat, Perhaps I overestimate the damage German attack planes can do at this date? But I suspect not.

Given air cover with planes the match of a Bf-109 then, plus more planes, of that type or lower performance to mow German lower performance planes down and strike at their hulls on the water, it is the Germans who can't move, past whatever radius the RAF fighters--Hurricanes at this point we assume--can establish air superiority.
The British should not stint with the Hurricanes then. It is true that if they rush a big percentage of their Hurricanes to Norway, Britain's air defenses are weakened, but it is also true that if the Luftwaffe holds back and avoids expending their Emils trying to sustain their communications with the southern footholds, then rather few Hurricanes would indeed suffice to neutralize lesser Luftwaffe planes, along with the Gladiators and so forth, whereas if the British pour in as many Hurricanes as needed, Goering must use up the Emils and anything they try to escort quite rapidly, which weakens the Luftwaffe threat against Britain for a time--therefore fewer are needed in Britain. (And as steamboy noted, OTL they had to maintain cover in Scotland they will not need to if they hold Norway--in effect those reserves are shifted to Norway at a low additional cost, mainly relating to the logistics involved.

Logistics, I think, not a worried fear of deploying too many interceptors, would be the limit on how many Hurricanes it is rational to deploy. There is little point in overrunning the ability of operators at Bergen and soon a second field just north of Oslo to keep them fueled and armed and maintained--but as you said, the Hurricanes are in fact easier than Spitfires in this respect and this is why we prefer them despite their shorter legs and moderately less superlative performance--on paper a Spitfire is measurably better in many ways, but in combat the fast turnaround time covers a multitude of such shortfalls. Still, it is not clear to me that their machine guns for instance can be fed with anything but British imported ammunition. I suppose they use pretty much the same aviation gas the Norwegians use but the relatively small air force the kingdom could maintain means that intensive use will guzzle it all up fast. Fortunately Bergen is a port and there are railroads connecting Bergen to the northern surrounds of Oslo; in a pinch all Hurricanes might have to fly out of Bergen but only if either they just can't ship avgas and ammo in fast enough to feed two airfields, or the Germans manage to interdict the land route to Oslo--now of course it is again possible to ship stuff in to Trondheim and then send it south again, so cutting off Oslo is not that easily done. Holding the remnant of the southeast is a big priority of course.

So I don't know if your remark about a "few" Hurricanes reflects careful study of what can be shipped into Bergen, versus a judgement about how limited the air pipeline out of Jutland is for Goering, versus just figuring the British would only dare commit token numbers of Hurricanes.

The latter is what I am arguing against. They should send in as many as they can support, because the German grip on north Jutland is not going away soon and Luftwaffe capabilities will only improve for some time to come (provided Goering can prevent Hitler from ordering him to send it all the way of the Kriegsmarine surface fleet!) Since Hitler needs to maintain a certain level of force for Fall Gelb, the spare padding of extra Luftwaffe resources is going to be burnt through fast if the British send in all the Hurricanes they can; the only way the Germans can conserve their air force is to cut their losses and pull out.

In the longer run, Norway must be treated as part of the British air perimeter, protected every bit as well as Britain's own shores. (As noted to an extent this is compensated by consolidating in resources that had to be deployed to Scotland OTL, but to be honest, I expect the Luftwaffe to probe this front a lot more, it will be quite an active front. But while that means more costs to the Allies it also means more drains on the Axis). This pays off in many ways; the allies can take better advantage of achieving local air supremacy than the Reich can here, since they have a navy (two navies; the Norwegian force is a substantial augmentation of what the RN can afford to tie up in these waters) and inherent advantages, if the air balance is merely a push, fighting on Norwegian soil with Norwegian soldiers for Norway's freedom and integrity--and honor and revenge. If they can push the invaders out, capturing most of them I suppose, then bringing the air defenses up to the evolving British standard will cost something, but free Norway can pay a fair amount. Adding the credit of a free Norway that already repelled Hitler's best shot to British should buy the alliance more machines of various kinds in America to supplement any stressing of British domestic supply chains--they can buy ammo from the Swedes too I would think, though the Swedes might listen to Hitler's tantrums on that subject and decline to sell it.

Subjectively speaking, I think the story of brave fierce little Norway will put the Allied cause in a better light and the Axis in a worse one in the USA; FDR will have that much more leeway to favor the Allies.
 
Bf109 did not have drop tanks in the inital stages of the Battle of Britain. Not so much the Germans did not know of drop tanks , they did , but the 109 not having a bomb rack to attach them to. OTL Fighter Command used the Northof England to rest and recuperate squadrons as well as train. This meant that when an attack from Norway was tried, on the assumption the RAF had moved all its fighters South , it was pretty much massacred.
 
Combat range of the Bf109 is problematical, it depends if it is doing fighter sweeps or if its escorting bombers. Again based on the Battle of Britain, escorting bombers further than London from the Pas de Calais was not possible and that would give an effective radius of maybe 120 nm at most.
 
Combat range of the Bf109 is problematical, it depends if it is doing fighter sweeps or if its escorting bombers. Again based on the Battle of Britain, escorting bombers further than London from the Pas de Calais was not possible and that would give an effective radius of maybe 120 nm at most.
Don't such remarks apply just the same to any other fighter? This is exactly why I felt that the paper range of the Hurricanes, which certainly ought to be enough to get them to Bergen, would however not be enough to allow them to fight their way to Bergen. Meanwhile Emils can certainly reach Kristiansand, Stavanger, and the German held field south of Oslo--if there aren't any Hurricanes to oppose them that is! So we have to reset the combat radius to those bases, not out of Aalborg--if again, the Luftwaffe is allowed air supremacy on those routes. Hurricanes based at Bergen however can surely interdict the approaches to Stavanger despite their having even shorter legs than the Emils.

If the British are so stingy with Hurricane deployment that they cannot shove the fighters coming out of Aalborg back considerably closer than 120 NM, attempting to interdict non-naval sea lift of supplies to Oslofjord would require RN units to cross well over 100 NM of sea way entirely within this much curtailed range I think we must all agree, gives the Emils lots of spare range to trade off in patrolling and fighting.

Now it is not the Emils that are the threat to British capital ships, generally--even RN carriers were armored after all. Rather their role, aside from being one of several types of aircraft spotting, is to give cover to other types of plane that might be much challenged by Skuas or Sea Gladiators, but with Emils running interference for them--have only to brave the ships' own AA firepower, which at this early stage of the war is a lot less than the evolving standard that would be developed later.

So, can the RN dart in and harass merchant ships attempting to carry materiel and men to Kristiansand? Quite possibly. Can they interdict an eastern approach to the mouth of Oslofjord? I don't think they can make it that far east and then also expect to survive going west again.

This is what happens if the Emils are allowed to gain air superiority within that 120 NM range, and trimming it 5-10 NM does not do a lot to let the RN in to the east side. Hurricanes based in Norway however can open that passage right up--if they are there in sufficient numbers!

OTL Fighter Command used the Northof England to rest and recuperate squadrons as well as train. This meant that when an attack from Norway was tried, on the assumption the RAF had moved all its fighters South , it was pretty much massacred.
Now you seem to be stressing that basing a complete array of air defense assets in southern Norway would not in fact reduce the costs of the fields in northern Britain, because these are still needed for training, rest and recuperation as much as ever--more so, actually, given how hot the Norway air front would probably be.

So that's not an economy then.

Still the basic point stands--Norway is worth investing a lot into its defense. The hotter that front is, the more of a drain on the Luftwaffe; if Fritz lets it go cool to deploy elsewhere--well and good; any time the Allies enjoy a surplus of air power they can challenge on that front forcing the Germans to reinforce anyway.

Nothing you are saying suggests that a very small number of Hurricanes are plenty or that the Germans cannot deploy a lot of Bf-109E to Norway.

Note that for the G model, 600+ NM is what is claimed for ferry range without drop tanks. That can be a lot lower for the Emils and still give them plenty of range to pour into Kristiansand, and even Oslofjord, if some model of comparable capability does not stand by to challenge them. The point is to have that challenge brought seriously in play, on whatever scale the Luftwaffe manages to send in Emils--that is the number of Hurricanes to consider adequate, if it is logistically doable at all.
 
I would assume that given time and a surviving, fighting Norway, that we might well see a large number of Beaufighters deployed to the country. They can handle long ranged German fighters like the 110 and 210 and can engage bombers, and sea/ground targets. I'd see a 'battle of the airfields' with attacks against Danish airfields by RAF RNAF planes.
 
My bold, I don't think it should be "few." It should be as many as the British can sustain there, at least until the number of Hurricanes per mile of southern Norwegian coastline comes up to the level in southern Britain.

I should bear in mind that the Germans have had little time yet to build up airfields in Jutland. OTL they intended at a minimum (when they were considering leaving much of Denmark not directly occupied) to capture Aalborg, which had an airfield; I get the impression further airfield assets in the region had to be developed, and presumably there are constraints at Aalborg as conquered. Someone who can say how tight those limits were, in terms of sorties of various types of aircraft per day possible before upgrades, can put a partial cap on what the Luftwaffe can send over Norway. Not total; more distant airfields can serve too if the aircraft involved have range.

In April 1940, the best air superiority fighter available to them is the Bf-109 E "Emil" model. It is these the Hurricanes must match and parry. If the RAF can do that, then other types of plane such as Gladiators or Skuas can handle slower less maneuverable planes, and of course any spare capacity the Hurricanes have can mow those down too. OTOH if we can only engage say half the Emils, those that get through will wreck havoc on lower performance planes, be they FAA, RAF or Norwegian. It behooves the British then not to be stingy with the Hurricanes, and send over lots of them! There is a maximum number desirable, based on what the Germans can throw at Norway and the waters around it.

It isn't like the British (or the Germans for that matter) need concrete runways miles long for anything they have yet; the beginning of the war air superiority fighters still operate out off of grass fields. Big British bombers might be getting to the point of absolutely needing paved runways by now, but the Germans never went for those kinds of bombers anyway; their giant transports were I believe few in number OTL and relied on huge numbers of wheels for primitive field capability. The Luftwaffe's best then can operate out of simple airfields at this time, and that's pretty much all the British best fighters need either--it isn't time to be thinking of bombing the Reich out of Norway yet...though

D'oh! I didn't even think of that, OTL distraction of Fighter Command by the Bergen-Scotland transit being used by the Luftwaffe! Probably because they never actually tried it, or rarely, what with the most desirable targets being in the south of England (with exceptions such as Scapa Flow base, but a naval base is a hard target!) Yet another reason not to let Norway slip, even if it costs Britain something. I've only ever been thinking of a) can good fighters get there--yes, to Bergen anyway and b) what can the RAF do from there (not a lot more than they could do from Britain, but just as you say, it gives them a new vector to come from as well as bringing some targets into range at all and others in closer range).

OK so if it is at all possible the British should do what it takes to win in Norway, clear all resistance out, it is clearly worth a lot to hold it free of occupation, just to deny it to the Germans, and worth more to actually use it--mainly to clamp down on submarines sneaking north, but clearly Norway is handy for other purposes. Including, aside from far fetched perhaps Jutland or worse, Finland, invasion scenarios, standing by to give any Swedes worried Hitler can gobble them up the comfort of knowing the Allies can be reinforcing their defense right quick, and to deter any Reich-sympathizing Swedes or Germans with ideas about Sweden being a grape to eat.

Also, while Narvik and even Trondheim might not be enough of ports to enable the Swedes to trade on quite the same scale they did in peacetime and certainly not with their own merchant shipping, Norway being an ally safe from occupation guarantees neutral Sweden can trade via the railroads to these ports to a great extent--in goods that the Allies approve of course. This also weakens the leverage Hitler had on Sweden OTL, and strengthens that of the Allies.

Wikipedia's BF-109 performance figures are for the G model, "Gustav," which is not yet on hand, so the "Emils" that are might have shorter legs, but for G model, they give 475-618 nautical miles general range, Combat range 238-309 NM "until the front and to back home" which, this range being half that above means they could fly out of Jutland and return to that safe base--maybe a little less to allow for fuel consumption in combat or indirect routes, patrolling etc, realistically--and ferry range 618 NM without a drop tank and 1077 with one. Dunno if they already have drop tanks with the Emil model or not. I quote NM not km or statue miles because we just divide NM by 60 to get range in degrees--a nautical mile is a minute of Earth's circumference arc. At a conservative 240 NM combat range, allowing a reserve for operations, that is 4 degrees, whereas looking at G.Projector, the tip of Jutland--let's say Aalborg--that would take them out and back to Bergen or any other point currently held--depending on how many sorties the Germans can fly out of that field and of course how many planes and flow of fuel and munitions they choose to pour in and what the logistic limit possible currently is--they can cover flights to all of their current holdings now that Trondheim is lost to them, without even having to refuel or rearm anywhere in Norway. Aalborg to Stavanger is just 172 NM!

Here is a G.Projector image, using Azmuthial Equidistant projection, of the coastlines (and national borders postwar, in light green) of what lies within 4 degrees of Aalborg:
View attachment 539456

The latitude-longitude graticule is 1 degree, so two of them side by side are going to be squares about 60 NM on a side, approximately, around 72 diagonally.

The scale of RAF Hurricane deployment to Norway must match the number of Bf-109s that Goering can send through Aalborg then, plus any multiplication of sortie effectiveness the Germans get by securing some field and managing to ship in fuel and ammo, either by airlift or by giving heavy air cover to merchant hulls--heavy RN units might possibly be able to dodge into that range out of Aalborg and survive aerial attacks, for a while, but the deeper into that zone they go, the more damage they take, and so I figure looking at the above map that just maybe perhaps the RN can interdict seaborne shipping to Stavanger and perhaps Kristiansand, though I would doubt the latter--but without friendly air cover they are not going to make it to the east side of the Skagerrak to sink even a rowboat, Perhaps I overestimate the damage German attack planes can do at this date? But I suspect not.

Given air cover with planes the match of a Bf-109 then, plus more planes, of that type or lower performance to mow German lower performance planes down and strike at their hulls on the water, it is the Germans who can't move, past whatever radius the RAF fighters--Hurricanes at this point we assume--can establish air superiority.
The British should not stint with the Hurricanes then. It is true that if they rush a big percentage of their Hurricanes to Norway, Britain's air defenses are weakened, but it is also true that if the Luftwaffe holds back and avoids expending their Emils trying to sustain their communications with the southern footholds, then rather few Hurricanes would indeed suffice to neutralize lesser Luftwaffe planes, along with the Gladiators and so forth, whereas if the British pour in as many Hurricanes as needed, Goering must use up the Emils and anything they try to escort quite rapidly, which weakens the Luftwaffe threat against Britain for a time--therefore fewer are needed in Britain. (And as steamboy noted, OTL they had to maintain cover in Scotland they will not need to if they hold Norway--in effect those reserves are shifted to Norway at a low additional cost, mainly relating to the logistics involved.

Logistics, I think, not a worried fear of deploying too many interceptors, would be the limit on how many Hurricanes it is rational to deploy. There is little point in overrunning the ability of operators at Bergen and soon a second field just north of Oslo to keep them fueled and armed and maintained--but as you said, the Hurricanes are in fact easier than Spitfires in this respect and this is why we prefer them despite their shorter legs and moderately less superlative performance--on paper a Spitfire is measurably better in many ways, but in combat the fast turnaround time covers a multitude of such shortfalls. Still, it is not clear to me that their machine guns for instance can be fed with anything but British imported ammunition. I suppose they use pretty much the same aviation gas the Norwegians use but the relatively small air force the kingdom could maintain means that intensive use will guzzle it all up fast. Fortunately Bergen is a port and there are railroads connecting Bergen to the northern surrounds of Oslo; in a pinch all Hurricanes might have to fly out of Bergen but only if either they just can't ship avgas and ammo in fast enough to feed two airfields, or the Germans manage to interdict the land route to Oslo--now of course it is again possible to ship stuff in to Trondheim and then send it south again, so cutting off Oslo is not that easily done. Holding the remnant of the southeast is a big priority of course.

So I don't know if your remark about a "few" Hurricanes reflects careful study of what can be shipped into Bergen, versus a judgement about how limited the air pipeline out of Jutland is for Goering, versus just figuring the British would only dare commit token numbers of Hurricanes.

The latter is what I am arguing against. They should send in as many as they can support, because the German grip on north Jutland is not going away soon and Luftwaffe capabilities will only improve for some time to come (provided Goering can prevent Hitler from ordering him to send it all the way of the Kriegsmarine surface fleet!) Since Hitler needs to maintain a certain level of force for Fall Gelb, the spare padding of extra Luftwaffe resources is going to be burnt through fast if the British send in all the Hurricanes they can; the only way the Germans can conserve their air force is to cut their losses and pull out.

In the longer run, Norway must be treated as part of the British air perimeter, protected every bit as well as Britain's own shores. (As noted to an extent this is compensated by consolidating in resources that had to be deployed to Scotland OTL, but to be honest, I expect the Luftwaffe to probe this front a lot more, it will be quite an active front. But while that means more costs to the Allies it also means more drains on the Axis). This pays off in many ways; the allies can take better advantage of achieving local air supremacy than the Reich can here, since they have a navy (two navies; the Norwegian force is a substantial augmentation of what the RN can afford to tie up in these waters) and inherent advantages, if the air balance is merely a push, fighting on Norwegian soil with Norwegian soldiers for Norway's freedom and integrity--and honor and revenge. If they can push the invaders out, capturing most of them I suppose, then bringing the air defenses up to the evolving British standard will cost something, but free Norway can pay a fair amount. Adding the credit of a free Norway that already repelled Hitler's best shot to British should buy the alliance more machines of various kinds in America to supplement any stressing of British domestic supply chains--they can buy ammo from the Swedes too I would think, though the Swedes might listen to Hitler's tantrums on that subject and decline to sell it.

Subjectively speaking, I think the story of brave fierce little Norway will put the Allied cause in a better light and the Axis in a worse one in the USA; FDR will have that much more leeway to favor the Allies.

I think you are over estimating the commitment the Luftwaffe will make over Norway and, thus the needed response from the RAF to support the Norwegians.
  1. The Germans have access to only one airfield to provide air escort to attack Norway, Aalborg. This will heavily limit the capacity of the Luftwaffe to commit fighters over Norway (200 or so ?).
  2. From early May, the campaign in the West will drain most of Luftwaffe's fighters. Every Bf-109 or German bomber not fighting over France or the Benelux augment the possibility that the Allies counter the number one German advantage, air power. This works also the other way with the RAF Hurricanes being far more needed in France than in Norway.
  3. Even if France falls (which is still the most likely outcome), the Luftwaffe will be better served in attacking Britain directly than in concentrating against Norway. In a word, knocking out Norway won't make Britain surrender.

On a side note, I think that, during the second part of 1940, Norway might get part of the French aircraft bought in the US, specially the P-36 and the P-40. OTL, the US transferred those to the UK post fall of France, but most weren't used in the front line due to the different logistics. ITTL, I can see the UK transferring some of those aircraft to Norway, as they already have some P-36 entering service.
 
Chapter XXIX
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Chapter XXIX: Setbacks at Sola

Sola Airfield was a major thorn in the side of the Allies. It was one of just five airfields in Norway capable of supporting modern, front-line aircraft, and the other four were in Allied hands. Bombers and fighters based from the airfield attacked Bergen and the Allied units around it. HMS Devonshire had been hit by three bombs in a raid on the city, putting her out of commission, while losses amongst the aircraft in Bergen in aerial battles were mounting. The other problem was that Sola was also a major player in reinforcing the Germans, as aircraft flew in men and supplies, without having to risk a voyage escorted by a torpedo boat from the Great War and a few minesweepers, hardly faster than the ships they were supposed to be protecting from the submarines the Skagerrak was paved with.

On 17 April, 6 Norwegian Hs 123’s, 10 Skua’s from Glorious, and 12 Skua’s flown in from Scotland attacked Sola, covered by 6 Norwegian Gladiators and 12 Hurricanes that had landed days before. They were met by a squadron of Messerschmitt 109 fighters over Haugesund, which resulted in the Allied fighters tangling with the Germans, a fateful decision, as a quartet of 109’s caught up to the squadron when the bombers didn’t have any fighters covering them. Six of the Skua’s, meant to be second-rate fighters as well as bombers, broke formation and engaged the four newcomers, damaging two of them in exchange for losing two of their number with three damaged. More 109’s converged on the attack, but the fighters successfully kept the bulk of them from shooting down bombers. 5 123’s and 19 Skua’s made it to the airfield, and made their bombing runs, the 123’s carrying 250 kg bombs, the Skua’s 500 pounders. Their mission was to make the runway no longer operational, and had all 24 aircraft had unobstructed runs at the airfield, the objective would likely have been achieved. However, German anti-aircraft fire broke up the formation before it reached the airfield, and many aircraft missed. While damage was inflicted, the runway was not cratered, and operations resumed once the bombers left.

The Allies lost one Gladiator, one Hurricane, one Hs 123, and three Skua’s, and shot down one 109 in response, as well as failing the mission. The damage received also reduced the number of operational aircraft in Bergen by a large percentage. A different approach would have to be attempted until more aircraft arrived from the United Kingdom. The Germans launched a large bombing raid that evening on Bergen, killing nearly 30 civilians and shooting down several airborne fighters, but not destroying the airfield.


Ernest Spooner, Captain of the battlecruiser Repulse, which was in Bergen Harbor after escorting the first convoy to Bergen, which had arrived that morning, offered to bombard Sola with Repulse’s powerful 15-inch guns during the night if Sommerville gave him approval. The Allied commanders in Bergen immediately agreed, and Sommerville, nearing Bergen aboard HMS Warspite, the captured Bremen and Europa with his fleet, approved of the idea as long as Repulse attacked during the night and stayed out of range of the coastal guns in Stavanger.

Captain Spooner ordered Repulse and two destroyers to prepare to go to sea, and the ships left Bergen, on course to Stavanger, at 19:22 hours on the night of 17 April. Spooner followed Sommerville’s orders to stay out of range of the coastal guns at first, and fired eleven broadsides at Sola soon after midnight. Believing that the bombardment had been ineffective because he was too far out to sea, Spooner brought Repulse inside of 10,000 yards to be sure of his target, and hit it more accurately. Repulse’s 4-inch guns fired starshells to illuminate the airfield as well. However, in bringing Repulse in so close, Spooner exposed her to the 21cm guns guarding the entrance to Stavanger, which immediately fired on her. Repulse inflicted damage on the airfield, but then the Germans found the range. Repulse was hit three times in four minutes by the old guns. He main belt defeated one shell, her deck another, but one shot punched through the 6-inch upper belt and detonated near her for funnel uptake. A 15cm shell destroyed the aft triple 4-inch mount and detonated a starshell that the crew was loading, starting a fire in the area of the mount.

Recognizing his mistake, Spooner maneuvered the ship to open up the range, still firing on Sola Airfield. Two consecutive 21cm shells pierced the 1-inch deck armor over Repulse’s boilers as she turned, damaging five boilers as they crashed through the ship. Repulse slowed as the boilers went offline, and a 15cm shell put a dent in the side armor of one of the 15-inch turrets, though it didn’t penetrate. Several 4-inch shells from the damaged mount exploded as the fire aft heated up, and Repulse, capable of only about 18 knots, a fire raging onboard, had paid the price for her Captain’s foolishness. Immediately, the other four British destroyers in the harbor escorted Glorious to sea to provide air cover for Repulse’s return if she couldn’t get back to Bergen during the night, which at this rate, she wouldn’t. Sleipner, Odin, and Gyller, the three Norwegian destroyers in Bergen, were dispatched south to drive off any opportunistic U-Boats around Repulse.

When dawn came, Repulse was near Langevag, in sight of the coast, slowly moving north, the five destroyers covering her. As soon as it was light, 20 Ju 88 bombers roared into the air from Sola, carrying 250 kg bombs, headed for Repulse, which had been sighted in a correct position. Repulse could still turn, and had one of the damaged boilers back online, for a speed in the 20-23 knot range, so she was as difficult to hit as a Queen Elizabeth class battleship, but not as well armored. Her aft octuple pom-pom mount had been disabled in the blaze from the triple 4-inch mount below it, so Repulse was missing one-third of her most effective anti-aircraft weapons. Glorious, off Bergen, had six of her 18 Gladiators over Repulse, with another half-dozen on the way when the Ju 88’s appeared. The Gladiators immediately moved to intercept the twin engined intruders, but were only able to engage for a couple of seconds head on. Upon turning and attempting to pursue, the pilots realized that even at full power, the Gladiators were quickly falling further and further behind the bombers. The next six Gladiators met the Ju 88’s less than a kilometer from Repulse, damaging two, but again to little effect.

The Ju 88’s were now almost on top of Repulse, and they began dropping their payloads. The twenty aircraft hit Repulse four times, and near missed her three times. A bomb went down the fore stack and exploded, one destroyed a ship’s boat aft of the funnels on its way to wrecking the hangar, another hit and exploded where the fire had been the night before, the fifth wrecked the catapult when it exploded on the armored deck. A fire sprang up in the hangar, the second major fire in twelve hours for the crew, already tired from the night sortie, while the hit in the funnel brought Repulse back down to under 20 knots. More fighters were brought from Bergen to provide cover for the damaged battlecruiser, including Skua’s flown from Ark Royal, approaching Bergen with the rest of Sommerville’s fleet.

A notable event occurred minutes south of Bergen, when Sleipner, Kommandor Larsen on the bridge, signalled ‘submarine!’ and went flank speed towards the contact, forcing it under before it could fire torpedoes. After unceremoniously depth charging the submersible, Sleipner was rewarded with a U-Boat emergency surfacing, her crew desperately escaping the quickly settling vessel. Sleipner picked up 13 men, one of which later died. This act earned her the admiration of the British military, and once the report made its way to the papers, the public, for saving one of Britain’s battlecruisers from the torpedoes of a U-Boat. Even more endearing to the British public and Royal Navy was that the survivors identified their submarine as the U-47, and after attempting to fool the British with a false name to avoid being used for propaganda, Günther Prien was discovered to be among the living.

Repulse made port that evening, and while the damage wasn’t fatal, it was major, and would require repairs in a yard. The battlecruiser, it was decided, would sail with the empty transports back to Britain for repairs. Spooner was relieved of command for disobeying orders and the damage to Repulse, his reputation never recovering. He would never receive a command at sea again. Repulse actually had done some damage at Sola; twelve aircraft had been destroyed, along with several hangars, an aviation fuel tank had received a direct hit with predictable results, and the airfield wouldn't operate at full efficiency for several days. In exchange for wounding an airfield for a few days, the British would have a battlecruiser in repair for months.

Meanwhile, lessons were learned about the attack. They came in with the apparent ineffectiveness of the strikes on Bismarck, but actually helped the assessment. It was realized that the Fleet Air Arm didn’t have aircraft capable of carrying large enough bombs and torpedoes to harm a modern, heavily armored ship like the Bismarck, while the disgrace of the Gladiators also showed a major need for a modern fighter. The events during the Norwegian Campaign are credited with speeding up development of the Sea Hurricane, as well as bombers capable of carrying larger bombs and torpedoes. In the short term, however, Sola still needed to be taken out.
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The German sub commander, wasn't he the guy who sunk HMS Royal Oak? Yeah that's going to be a major propaganda victory. And we have yet to read about a certain Austrian Corporals reaction to both the gutting of the Kriegsmarine and the lost of a German war hero.
 
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@CV(N)-6
I don't get it. You say :
As soon as it was light, 20 Ju 88 bombers roared into the air from Sola, carrying 250 kg bombs, headed for Repulse, which had been sighted in a correct position.
Then you contradict yourself by saying :
Repulse actually had done some damage at Sola; twelve aircraft had been destroyed, along with several hangars, an aviation fuel tank had received a direct hit with predictable results, and the airfield was out of commission for several days. In exchange for taking out an airfield for a few days, the British would have a battlecruiser in repair for months.

How could a disabled airfield send 20 aircraft ?

Edit : On a side note the Luftwaffe was really not that efficient at hitting ships at sea in 1940 (contrary to 1941).
 
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