Bicentennial Man: Ford '76 and Beyond

1980 Gubernatorial Elections/List of incumbent Governors as of January 1981
  • Arkansas: Bill Clinton (D) Re-Elected
    Delaware: Pete Du Pont (R) Re-Elected
    Indiana: Otis Bowen (R) Term-Limited; Robert Orr (R) Elected
    Missouri: Kit Bond (R) Term-Limited; Jim Spainhower (D) Elected [1] D+1
    Montana: Thomas Lee Judge (D) DEFEATED for Re-Nomination; Ted Schwinden (D) Elected
    New Hampshire: Hugh Gallen (D) Re-Elected
    North Carolina: Jim Hunt (D) Re-Elected
    North Dakota: Arthur Link (D) Re-Elected [2]
    Rhode Island: J. Joseph Garrahy (D) Re-Elected
    Utah: Scott Matheson (D) Re-Elected
    Vermont: Richard Snelling (R) Re-Elected
    Washington: Dixy Lee Ray (D) DEFEATED for Re-Nomination; Jim McDermott (D) Elected [3]
    West Virginia: Jay Rockefeller (D) Re-Elected

    List of incumbent Governors as of January 1981

    Alabama: Bill Baxley (D)
    Alaska: Jay Hammond (D)
    Arizona: Bruce Babbitt (D)
    Arkansas: Bill Clinton (D)
    California: Jerry Brown (D)
    Colorado: Richard Lamm (D)
    Connecticut: Ella Grasso (D)
    Delaware: Pete Du Pont (R)
    Florida: Bob Graham (D)
    Georgia: George Busbee (D)
    Hawaii: George Ariyoshi (D)
    Idaho: Cecil Andrus (D)
    Illinois: James Thompson (R)
    Indiana: Robert Orr (R)
    Iowa: Robert Ray (R)
    Kansas: James Carlin (D)
    Kentucky: Harvey Sloane (D)
    Louisiana: Jimmy Fitzmorris (D)
    Maine: Joseph Brennan (D)
    Maryland: Blair Lee III (D)
    Massachusetts: Mike Dukakis (D)
    Michigan: William Milliken (R)
    Minnesota: Warren Spannaus (D)
    Mississippi: William Winter (D)
    Missouri: Jim Spainhower (D)
    Nebraska: Gerald Whelan (D)
    Nevada: Harry Reid (D)
    New Hampshire: Hugh Gallen (D)
    New Jersey: Brendan Byrne (D)
    New Mexico: Bruce King (D)
    New York: Hugh Carey (D) (for now)
    North Carolina: Jim Hunt (D)
    North Dakota: Arthur Link (D)
    Ohio: Dick Celeste (D)
    Oklahoma: George Nigh (D)
    Oregon: Vic Atiyeh (R)
    Pennsylvania: Arlen Specter (R)
    Rhode Island: J. Joseph Garrahy
    South Carolina: Richard Riley (D)
    South Dakota: Richard Janklow (R)
    Tennessee: Richard Fulton (D)
    Texas: John Luke Hill (D)
    Virginia: Andrew Miller (D)
    Vermont: Richard Snelling (R)
    Washington: Jim McDermott (D)
    Wisconsin: Martin Schreiber (D)
    Wyoming: Edgar Herschler (D)

    Democrats - 41 Governorships
    Republicans - 9 Governorships

    [1] State Treasurer; defeats Bill Phelps, the LG, to win
    [2] IOTL, he was defeated
    [3] IOTL, McDermott - who would later serve in Congress representing Seattle for about 30 years - lost to John Spellman after successfully primarying Ray
     
    1980 United States Senate elections
  • 1980 United States Senate elections

    Alabama - Donald Stewart (D, inc) DEFEATED for renomination; James Folsom (D) defeats Jeremiah Danton (R) [1]
    Alaska - Mike Gravel (D, inc) DEFEATED for renomination; Clark Gruening (D) defeats Frank Murkowski (R) [1]
    Arizona - Bill Schulz (D) DEFEATS Barry Goldwater (R, inc) D+1 [2]
    Arkansas - Dale Bumpers (D) re-elected
    California - Alan Cranston (D) re-elected
    Colorado - Gary Hart (D) re-elected
    Connecticut - Abe Ribicoff (D, inc) RETIRES; Chris Dodd (D) defeats James Buckley (R)
    Florida - Richard Stone (D, inc) DEFEATED for renomination; Bill Gunter (D) defeats Paula Hawkins (R) [1]
    Georgia - Herman Tallmadge (D, inc) DEFEATED for renomination; Jimmy Carter (D) defeats Mack Mattingly (R) [1][3]
    Hawaii - Daniel Inouye (D) re-elected
    Idaho - Frank Church (D) re-elected over Steve Symms (R)
    Illinois - Adlai Stevenson III (D) re-elected
    Indiana - Birch Bayh (D) re-elected over Bud Hillis (R)
    Iowa - John Culver (D) re-elected
    Kansas - Larry Winn (R) DEFEATS Martha Keys (D, inc) R+1 [4]
    Kentucky - Wendell Ford (D) re-elected
    Louisiana - Russell Long (D) re-elected
    Maryland - Charles Mathias (R) re-elected over Barbara Mikulski (D)
    Missouri - Thomas Eagleton (D) re-elected over Kit Bond (R)
    Nevada - Paul Laxalt (R) re-elected
    New Hampshire - John Durkin (D) re-elected
    New York - Jacob Javits (R, inc) DEFEATED for renomination but runs on independent line; Elizabeth Holtzman (D) defeats him and Al D'Amto (R) D+2
    North Carolina - Robert B. Morgan (D) re-elected
    North Dakota - Milton Young (R) RETIRES; Mark Andrews (R) defeats Kent Johanneson (D)
    Ohio - John Glenn (D) re-elected
    Oklahoma - Henry Bellmon (R) RETIRES; Andrew Coats (D) defeats Don Nickles (R) D+3 [5]
    Oregon - Ted Kulongoski (D) DEFEATS Bob Packwood (R, inc) D+4 [5]
    Pennsylvania - Richard Schweiker (R) RETIRES; Pete Flaherty (D) defeats Dick Thornburgh (R) D+5
    South Carolina - Ernest Hollings (D) re-elected
    South Dakota - James Abdnor (R) DEFEATS George McGovern (D, inc) R+2
    Utah - Jake Garn (R) re-elected
    Vermont - Patrick Leahy (D) re-elected
    Washington - Warren Magnusson (D) re-elected
    Wisconsin - Gaylord Nelson (D) re-elected [6]

    Senate Before Election - 68D, 31R, 1I
    Senate After Election - 71D, 28R, 1I

    [1] A lot of 1970s Senate Democrats got primaried out in 1980; while this may have been a Carter admin thing, I chose to keep it because why not
    [2] If he could barely win in the Reagan Revolution, there's no way Barry hangs on with Carey winning comfortably
    [3] This one specifically boils down to how horrible Tallmadge was. Zell Miller did try to primary him in 1980 and fell short; Jimmy Carter is a whole 'nother beast entirely and ousts him successfully
    [4] Dole's old seat was a two year rental, in other words
    [5] OK and OR I went back and forth on; the Pacific Northwest was pretty swingy back then and its voters were a poor fit for an even-more right Reagan. Neither Nickles nor Packwood had that impressive of winning margins in 1980 so I tipped this in their direction
    [6] With all these longterm incumbents getting re-elected across the board... yes, that absolutely does set up 1986 to be the mother of all six-year itch midterms, a 2014 on steroids, with all that ground for Democrats to defend (though politics was also much less polarized back then)
     
    1980 US House of Representatives elections
  • 1980 US House of Representatives elections

    Notable Results differing from OTL:

    Alabama 6th - John Buchanan (R) defeated for re-nomination; Pete Clifford (D) defeats Al Smith (R) (D Gain)
    California 2nd - Norma Bork (D) re-elected
    California 17th - John Hans Krebs (D) re-elected
    California 27th - Casey Peck (D) re-elected
    Connecticut 3rd - Joe Lieberman (D) defeats Lawrence DeNardis (R)
    Illinois 16 - John Andreson (R) re-elected
    Illinois 20 - David Robinson (D) defeats Paul Findley (R, inc) (D Gain)
    Iowa 3 - Lynne Cutler (D) defeats Cooper Evans (R) (D Gain)
    Maryland 3 - Barbara Mikulski (D) retires to fun for Senate; Ben Cardin (D) elected
    Massachusetts 10 - Robert McCarthy (D) defeats Barbara Heckler (R, inc) (D Gain)
    Michigan 5 - Dale Sprik (D) re-elected
    Michigan 6 - Milton Robert Carr (D) re-elected
    Minnesota 6 - Rick Nolan (D) re-elected
    Minnesota 7 - Robert Bergland (D) re-elected
    Missouri 10 - Bill Burlison (D) re-elected
    New Jersey 7 - Andrew Maguire (D) re-elected
    New Mexico 1 - Bill Richardson (D) defeats Manuel Lujan (R, inc) (D Gain)
    New Mexico 2 - David King (D) elected from vacancy (D Gain)
    New York 3 - Jerome Ambro (D) re-elected
    New York 6 - Lester Wolff (D) re-elected
    North Carolina 6 - Richardson Preyer (D) re-elected
    Oregon 2 - Al Ullman (D) re-elected
    South Carolina 1 - Charles Ravenel (D) elected
    South Carolina 6 - John Jenrette (D) re-elected
    Texas 8 - Robert Eckhardt (D) re-elected
    Utah 1 - K. Gunn McKay (D) re-elected
    Virginia 9 - Herbert Harris (D) re-elected
    Virginia 10 - Joseph Fisher (D) re-elected
    West Virginia 3 - John Hutchinson (D) re-elected
    Wisconsin 3 - Alvin Baldus (D) re-elected

    Seats Before - 295D, 140R
    Seats After - 301D, 134R (D+6)
     
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    Assessing the Damage
  • Assessing the Damage

    "I'm often reminded," Richard Nixon quipped in an interview a few weeks after the 1980 Presidential election, "of the earnest questions of whether or not the Republicans would ever win the Presidency again after Goldwater '64, and then lo and behold, four years later, there I am." The same question that seemed to boil up after every major loss by an American party was now circulating again - where did the GOP go from here, and how soon could it win another election?

    It seemed an odd question for a party that had just won three straight Presidential terms, one of them by a 49-state reelection landslide, but during those twelve years they had not once controlled either House of Congress for a single two-year period, the first time that had happened in the history of the party, and the 1976 election had been narrow, scrappy and beyond controversial. The 1978 midterms and 1980 downballot elections had reduced the GOP to one-fifth of the Governors in the country and less than a third of the Senators and Congressmen, and Hugh Carey had decisively defeated Ronald Reagan essentially everywhere sans the suburbanizing Atlantic South and Reagan's native, libertarian-flavored West.

    Carey watched the election returns come in from the Plaza Hotel in New York City and gave a triumphant speech to a crowd on Times Square when it was done; the curious juxtaposition of the President-elect in front of sex shops and porn theaters [1] was fodder for late night comics for the next few months. Reagan, for his part, spoke in Los Angeles and kept his remarks short, polite and circumspect. "There will be an hour to analyze and ask what we missed," Reagan said. "That hour is not now. Right now, the task at hand is to congratulate President-elect Carey, to thank him for a campaign well run, and to let him know the prayers of the whole of America are with him as he looks ahead to a monumental task."

    The recriminations within the GOP were quick to spread by the end of the week. Reagan's camp demanded to know why Ford and Dole hadn't been more diligent about getting out and campaigning for the ticket; Ford testily replied to such insinuations that he had toured Michigan, Ohio and Indiana with Reagan after the convention as a unity ticket and noted that he had a "day job" to tend to. More moderate Republicans, and some conservatives too, placed the blame on Reagan himself for bizarre mistakes such as his "state's rights" rally in Mississippi earning him well over a week of extremely negative coverage, or his choice to not campaign aggressively in the Northeast or Illinois, ceding a huge chunk of electoral votes to Carey. Some worried that his message had been too conservative both in the primary and the general and he had come off as a rigid reactionary, scaring voters; others claimed he had not run on a sufficiently anti-establishment message, turning off Americans looking for a "clear choice" by tacking to the middle after securing the nomination and tying himself to the "Ford failure."

    In all, though, many strategists suspected that the results had fairly little to do with the candidate at all. The headwinds for the GOP - the end of Vietnam, Watergate, the Nixon Shock, stagflation, oil crises in 1973 and 1979, and the debacle in Panama - would have been too great for any candidate to endure, and indeed Reagan may have made the race closer than a less charismatic candidate without as loyal of a following would have. After the loss, Reagan moved on to a quiet retirement at his California ranch fundraising for various charities and conservative advocacy projects - and his endorsement would be fairly valued in primaries featuring more than one candidate from the party's conservative wing for most of the 1980s - and his weekly radio program continued until 1986. In the late 1980s, memory loss and other various health struggles encouraged him to withdraw from his more rigorous public engagements, and he retired from public view entirely in 1991 after a diagnosis of Alzheimers. He would attend the Republican National Conventions in 1984 and 1988, speaking at both, but for "the Gipper," politics was a thing of the past. He died in June 2004, and was buried on his property. When his beloved wife Nancy passed away twelve years later, she was buried next to him.

    The GOP as a whole did not have the option to merely retire quietly to its ranch, of course, and the question of where to go next was not only live but would define it for the next twelve years until it managed to win the Presidency again. [2] Over twelve years, it had had two Presidents and three Presidential candidates, all of a very different breed. They had had the law-and-order, anti-Communist prodigal son returning from the political wilderness who had promised to end the excesses of the 1960s with his trusted and tested leadership; the affable suburban Midwesterner who promised budget orthodoxy, national unity and a more traditional Old Right conservatism; and the insurgent New Right champion who promised a more revolutionary, epochal brand of reform. The first two had failed in office, the third had failed to persuade the American voter of his vision of what America could be. These three GOPs - the Nixonian one, the Fordian one, and the Reaganite one - had more overlap than they had differences, but there were still three distinct factions that detested each other almost as much as they disliked Democrats. What course of action would work in a Washington where they faced Congressional super-minorities, an ascendant brawler as President who was the toughest opponent the party had faced since LBJ, and where they were coming off a dismal record spread out over three terms in office was unclear, but the answer would have to emerge soon - 1982, and more critically 1984, would be here before they knew it...

    [1] New York in the 70s/early 80s, baby!
    [2] Spoiler!
     
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    The Forgotten Elections
  • The Forgotten Elections

    With the transformative elections in the United States in the autumn of 1980, it is easy to forget that two key US allies also went to the polls in October and November of that year, with important results for the ensuing decade in both. In Australia, the incumbent Liberal government of Malcolm Fraser went to the polls and nearly lost its majority to the Labor Party, winning a 1-seat majority in the 125-member House of Representatives - only to see its Senate majority vanish. Fraser would remain on as Prime Minister, but Labor kept its previously unpopular leader Bill Hayden after the surprisingly strong finish and Australian politics promised to have another poll before long, possibly even before the standard three-year term was up.

    It was in West Germany, however, that the real shock came. The sharp-elbowed, aggressive Franz-Josef Strauss of the CSU had become the first-ever leader of his Bavarian regional party to head the conservative CDU/CSU coalition in that country, and ahead of the election with Helmut Schmidt's SDP most suspected that Schmidt would be narrowly returned to office despite a mediocre West German economy, which would likely be what it took to get Strauss's longtime internal rival, CDU leader Helmut Kohl, to be the candidate for the Chancellorship at the next election.

    However, two events changed the calculation dramatically. The first was the detonation of a bomb at Oktoberfest in Munich which killed over a hundred people and was, as most such events were at that point in history, blamed on the Red Army Faction terrorist group. The second wrench was in East Germany, when hardline communist leader Erich Honecker outlined what became known as the "Gera Demands," after the town in which he gave a speech to a party conference. The demands were aimed at West Germany and outlined East German stipulations for continued warming of relations across the Iron Curtain that had been ongoing since the late 1960s had seen the advent of Ostpolitik under Social Democratic leader Willi Brandt. The demands baffled West German voters at best, and along with the outrage sparked by the Oktoberfest bombing proved a key boost at the last minute for Strauss as West Germans headed for the polls. His CDU/CSU gained enough seats for an absolute majority, pushing the SDP-FDP coalition of Helmut Schmidt from power. Germany had seen one of its most shocking election campaigns ever - and now “Germany’s Nixon” was leaving Bavaria for his new role in Bonn…
     
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    1980 Oktoberfest bombing
  • The 1980 Oktoberfest bombing (German: Oktoberfest-Attentat) was a far-right terrorist attack on 26 September 1980, in Munich, West Germany. A bomb exploded at the entrance to the Oktoberfest festival during a crush to exit the grounds for the evening, killing 147 people (including, it turned out, the perpetrator, Gundolf Kohler) and injuring over 300 others. It was the worst terrorist attack and loss of life on German soil since the end of the Second World War.

    The subsequent investigation by Bavarian authorities proved highly controversial, occurring less than two weeks before the 1980 federal election in which Bavarian Minister-President Franz-Josef Strauss was the candidate for Chancellor for the opposition CDU/CSU coalition. With the bombing initially attributed to the leftist Red Army Faction which had carried out other attacks over the 1970s, Strauss saw a late but noticeable surge in polling and his conservative party would win a narrow and unexpected majority government over the incumbent government of Helmut Schmidt; Strauss would serve as Chancellor until his death in 1988. Later investigations by Der Spiegel in the mid-1980s suggested that investigators had missed evidence and created conspiracy theories of a cover up; in 1996, the government of SPD Chancellor Rudolf Scharping requested an inquest be opened and in 1999 a report was released offering disgruntled student Gundolf Kohler as the perpetrator and suggesting sloppiness, rather than conspiracy, was at fault for missing it earlier.

    Conspiracy theories around the Oktoberfest bombing have been a prominent feature of German political life since the incident; Kohler had some loose connections to neo-Nazi groups and suspicions have been raised that he did not act alone, perhaps with the intent to elect the right-wing Strauss, or that sympathetic Bavarian officials covered up evidence that it was not carried out by the RAF in order to prevent the attack from boomeranging back onto Strauss. Chancellor Edmund Stoiber, himself a Bavarian, in 2007 acknowledged, "Mistakes were made in the investigation, but more than anything, the attacker's success was in turning Germans against each other in political life and in poisoning our discourse."

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    Looking Ahead
  • Looking Ahead

    It was a curious moment; for the first time since Eisenhower twenty years earlier, a term-limited incumbent was facing the transition lame duck period in preparation for his successor. Ford had watched the election returns from the White House and invited Carey for a visit the next morning; a week after the election, they toured the West Wing together and met for several hours in the Oval Office as Ford expounded on his thoughts on both domestic and foreign concerns. Carey came away impressed as always with Ford's knowledge of the issues in contrast to his image of a bumbling dunce in the media, while Ford once again appreciated Carey's blunt-talking style and careful politeness.

    The inflation rate had already peaked in October at 14.7%, and the unemployment rate would peak in May of 1981 at 12.1% before its long, slow journey back down. [1] Ford's approval rating was commensurate with those types of numbers; having been the unexpected, unelected President and then scraping into a term of his own, he would finish a Presidency of six-and-a-half years, the President most associated with the 1970s in America even moreso than Nixon, and leave office as one of its most unpopular denizens, even if Americans liked him personally. But Ford was, in the final weeks of his Presidency, fairly chipper. He was eager to leave Washington and return to Michigan to start pondering the next chapter; Betty, for her part, was starting to consider doing philanthropic work around combatting alcoholism and drug abuse, an issue she herself had suffered from. His Cabinet was excited to look ahead, too; though few of them would serve in any official role again sans James Baker, there was a world of think tanks (including founding one, in George Bush's case), corporate boards and political organizations waiting for them to explore the next chapter, and with Ford's exit, and the Democrats subsequently repeating the Nixon-Ford era's 12 years in the White House, for a certain generation of Republican officialdom, it was their swan song, with a newer, younger crop of conservatives waiting in the wings for their opportunity when it arrived in 1993 with the inauguration of America's 41st President.

    Ford journeyed to Las Vegas to speak with survivors and first responders after the devastating MGM Grand fire there in late November which took the lives of three hundred people and sparked a nationwide push for updated fire codes and building safety measures and also badly damaged Las Vegas' reputation for close to a decade; other than that, his last holidays in the White House were uneventful, spent with Betty and the kids for both Thanksgiving and Christmas. Before he knew it, the moving trucks were on Pennsylvania Avenue and he had most of his things back in Michigan well before January 20th. His last night in the Lincoln Bedroom, staring at the ceiling, he could think only one thing:

    "Finally."

    [1] Bear in mind - the early 1980s recession is ITTL more of a late 1970s phenomenon by being dramatically scooted forward by the Panama Shock and in some ways being milder without the 1979 oil crisis being quite as severe. It's still pretty bad, as the numbers suggest, but it also starts wrapping up a bit earlier, but the UE rate and CPI rate won't fall in tandem quite as fast.
     
    Gerald Ford - 38th President of the United States
  • Gerald Rudolph Ford (July 14, 1913 - December 26, 2006) was an American politician who served as the 38th President of the United States from 1974 to 1981. He previously served as leader of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives, and was appointed the 40th Vice President of the United States in 1973. Following the resignation of President Richard Nixon following the Watergate scandal, he became President on August 9th, 1974, the first President to be inaugurated upon the resignation of his predecessor. Ford would be narrowly elected to a term in his own right in 1976, defeating Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, but because he had become President less than halfway through Nixon's term, he was term-limited in 1980 and would be succeeded by Democrat Hugh Carey of New York.

    Ford's record as President is mixed and has been the subject of great debate amongst historians. His most controversial choice as President came early, when he granted his predecessor Nixon a full and unconditional pardon. He faced a bitter primary campaign from his right from former California Governor Ronald Reagan in 1976 and his subsequent reelection over Carter was narrow as he became the first President since 1888 not to win the popular vote, damaging his reputation both with his party's base and the general electorate. During his Presidency, South Vietnam collapsed and the Vietnam War effectively ended, and Congress made moves to retake its influence in foreign policy and curb the power of the Presidency; nonetheless, he saw a continuation of detente with the Soviet Union and improving relations with China, and signed the Helsinki Accords. Early in his full term, the government of Omar Torrijos in Panama attacked the Panama Canal in an effort to push American forces out and surrender it to the Panamanian government, starting the Panama crisis; occurring at a period when the American economy was already in the midst of its greatest ebb in forty years, it badly exacerbated existing issues with unemployment and inflation as a severe supply crisis rippled through the global economy, and when Ford left office both inflation and unemployment were in the double digits. Ford presided over a general deregulation of transportation and logistics industries, however, and in response to the high cost of energy in the 1970s signed the Energy Policy Act of 1979 which poured billions of dollars into the completion of nuclear infrastructure, improving transmission lines, and enhancing domestic oil and gas production, a piece of legislation regarded as his greatest triumph in dramatically bringing down American energy costs over the next decade. Still, due to the domestic, foreign and political circumstances of his Presidency, Ford is ranked low amongst US presidents, generally in the lower quartile.

    Following leaving the Presidency, Ford remained active in Republican politics and was a key leader of its moderate wing even as the party grew more conservative. He served as an elder statesman and was recruited as a backchannel for European diplomacy due to his good relations with many NATO leaders during the 1980s. Following the onset of a series of health problems, he died at his home in Michigan on December 26, 2006.

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    1980 - Pop Culture Roundup
  • 1980 - Pop Culture Roundup

    The moviegoing public was hugely excited in 1980 by the return of the Star Wars franchise with its second, much darker entry, The Empire Strikes Back, which would be the top grossing film of the year even if it failed to reach its predecessor's record-breaking highs. As far as more serious fare went, however, the year was defined by the pitched battle between two of the great 1970s auteurs directing two of their greatest works - Martin Scorcese's Raging Bull, and Michael Cimino's Heaven's Gate. The latter, while hailed by critics as a staggering, violent and brutal modern masterpiece of a revisionist Western [1] and netting Christopher Walken yet another Best Supporting Actor Oscar in partnership with Cimino, fell short to Scorcese's boxing autobiographical film which won four Oscars - Best Picture, Best Director, Best Actor for Robert De Niro and Best Editing. The power of the two films overshadowed the star-making turn of a third legendary film of the year, American Gigolo, which helped establish its star Richard Gere in the same echelon as the era's acting titans Walken, De Niro and Al Pacino [2]. The output of 1980 promised cinephiles a remarkable young rising cohort of actors who promised to make the decade ahead one to remember.

    The Philadelphia Flyers upset the New York Islanders in seven games to win the Stanley Cup, but the biggest sporting event of the year in Philly was the 1980 World Series, which saw the Philadelphia Phillies win their first-ever championship themselves (the Flyers at least were a power in the mid-70s, even with a lull due to the Habs dynasty). The NFL season of 1980-81 proved to be a bit of a bore - for the second straight year and third time in four seasons, the Super Bowl featured the top seeds of both conferences facing off as the defending champion San Diego Chargers faced off against the surprising Atlanta Falcons, who denied Philadelphia a crack at a third title in a calendar year by beating the Eagles at home by a field goal in the NFC Championship game. Super Bowl XV in New Orleans proved a bore, though - Dan Fouts had another outstanding game as his Chargers repeated their dominant run and boatraced the Falcons, 37-13. Repeat champions were the name of the game in basketball, too - the Seattle Supersonics won their third straight championship, vanquishing - you guessed it - the Philadelphia 76ers in seven games. To say the least, few cities have ever had a calendar year stretch as good as Philadelphia's Big Four teams did between spring of 1980 and the following year.

    After college basketball presented a ho-hum win yet again by UCLA, another legendary longtime coach got a chance at redemption in one of the wildest bowl games in history. Presaging efforts to match up the "best" teams, No.1 Alabama and No.2 Florida State faced off in the 1981 Sugar Bowl after the 1980 NCAA football season, both undefeated, as fellow undefeated Georgia - the No.3 team - faced off against Notre Dame in the Cotton Bowl. In a year that featured a defensive end, Hugh Green, winning the Heisman for Pitt, it had a crazy ending as Alabama held on for a 1-point game thanks to a blocked field goal against the Seminoles to earn Bear Bryant his fifth and final national championship after he had come up just short in his previous two seasons. He would retire after the game and die less than a year later.

    EDIT: Hamburg SV denies Nottingham Forest a second straight European Cup, a reversal of the OTL result in the final

    [1] Heaven's Gate is actually... pretty damn good, considering its reputation, but having seen it twice I can also see why it was a commercial flop that killed New Hollywood for good
    [2] Easy to forget today but between American Gigolo and Officer and a Gentleman there was a window in the early 1980s where Gere was, genuinely, considered to be in this tier of actors
     
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    The Carey Cabinet Comes Together - Part I
  • The Carey Cabinet Comes Together - Part I

    Hugh Carey formally resigned as Governor of the State of New York on January 4th, 1981, handing the responsibilities of the office over to Mary Krupsak, who would become the first female Governor of the State. Carey and Krupsak had not gotten along over the years - she had nearly refused to stand on his ticket again and had mulled a primary challenge to him - but all hatchets were buried as she got the top job in Albany.

    Carey prepared for inauguration day 1981 diligently. He took the time to meet with his opponent Reagan at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, where the former California Governor surprised him by urging him to press ahead with all haste with the SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union that had stalled in Ford's last years in office and to perhaps go even further; despite his reputation as a hard-edged hawk, Reagan was privately and eventually publicly committed to dramatically reducing the world's nuclear stockpiles, and in the early Carey years, he emerged as a surprising ally in Republican backchannels for Carey's arms reduction plans as the next "phase" of detente. Carey also met with dozens of diplomats, business leaders, labor officials, and political figures in New York during his "holiday blitz" to rapidly staff up an administration and survey the lay of the land that would greet him on January 20th.

    The most important job, of course, would be Secretary of State. George Bush had been an able administrator and despite the debacle in Panama had built a modestly successful legacy by helping nudge the Iranian government into a workable compromise with rebellious elements, spearheading the Internal Settlement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and deepening and enhancing American ties in Europe. Carey's first instinct was to look back to the Kennedy years for inspiration, and his initial choice for the role was George Ball. It became clear within days of the name being floated as an option, however, that Ball was regarded by a number of key Southern Democrats as too liberal and Ball himself was disinterested in the role due to his advancing age; he was instead made Permanent Representative to NATO, a minor diplomatic post more like a sinecure, as a reward for his long career of public service, and Ball would retire entirely from government service within two years.

    The role of Secretary of State instead fell to Nicholas Katzenbach, a fellow New Yorker and old Cabinet hand of the 1960s. As the "yin to his yang," as it was later put, Carey made good on a promise made during the primaries - Scoop Jackson, Washington's long-serving junior senator and leader of the "neoconservative" hawkish wing of the Democratic Party, would be appointed to the Pentagon as Secretary of Defense. Jackson's tenure at the Pentagon, cut short by his fatal stroke in late 1983, would be among the most impactful in the history of the organization; a slew of young proteges from his office in the early 1970s such as Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Richard Pipes, and most importantly Paul Wolfowitz, who would by the mid-1980s have been appointed to a variety of key positions throughout the national security ecosystem and become the dominant thinkers of "hard liberalism" within the Democratic Party as the anti-Vietnam New Left instincts of the early 1970s became a distant memory. Carey rounded out his national security team by appointing former Army Secretary Cyrus Vance as his CIA chief and Polish-American analyst Zbigniew Brezinski his National Security Advisor. One more man needed a home after that - George McGovern, recently ejected from the Senate, himself rejected the offer of serving as Agriculture Secretary; Askew cannily advised Carey to instead make him Ambassador to the United Nations and elevate it to a Cabinet role, where he could be "kept off doing his thing in New York." And with that, the foreign policy arm of the Carey administration had been built out, resembling the more muscular Cold War Liberalism of the Truman and Kennedy variety.

    It was the domestic offices, with the horse-trading necessary to get buy-in from so many varied constituencies, that would be much more difficult...
     
    The Carey Cabinet Comes Together - Part II
  • The Carey Cabinet Comes Together - Part II

    Hugh Leo Carey was inaugurated as the 39th President of the United States on January 20th, 1981, succeeding Gerald R. Ford and returning Democrats to the White House for the first time in 12 years. After being sworn in on the same Bible as FDR by Chief Justice Warren Burger, his inaugural address was classic Carey - among the shortest in history (indeed, it barely surpassed Ford's 1974 address upon Nixon's resignation), light in soaring rhetoric, and blunt. "The challenge facing this American generation is one of high prices and low wages, few jobs and many problems. Together, we will face them, and God willing, together we will conquer them," was his concluding line, and with that he was driven to the White House as part of the inaugural parade.

    Carey's return to Washington after six years as Governor of New York was anticipated by Democrats, met begrudgingly by Republicans, and most of all seen by the President himself as a daunting challenge. Despite his years in Albany, however, he was no outsider - he had of course been a Congressman and understood the game as well as anyone, and also keenly understood that in the opening hundred days of his administration, his greatest challenge would not come from the defenestrated Republicans in their superminority status but rather from juggling the needs and impulses of the massive big tent of the Democratic coalition that included Southern conservatives, old-school New Deal liberals, and the more radical, young and cosmopolitan agglomeration referred to as "New Left." Other than George McGovern's sinecure in New York at the UN, Carey had largely ignored this final faction in assembling his national security team as a foreign policy prerogative of the White House, but party management would play a big role in building out the team responsible for his domestic agenda.

    Two spots were easy fills - New Left darling and primary opponent Representative Mo Udall of Arizona as Secretary of Interior, a nod to his Western roots and environmentalist instincts, and UAW Chairman Doug Fraser as Secretary of Labor [1], choices that scratched the ears of key constituencies with little pushback from the Senate. Carey, in meetings with several key Senators in New York and DC over the weeks before inauguration day, came to understand what the power dynamic would be on Capitol Hill when he arrived - Robert Byrd may have been Majority Leader and Alan Cranston Majority Whip, but it was Ted Kennedy's Senate majority and Ted Kennedy would be calling the shots on a whole host of issues, both from his perch on the Judiciary Committee and his long background as a health policy wonk.

    This made, ironically enough, the most crucial appointment of Carey's early Presidency the relatively minor Cabinet office of Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, or HEW. It was from this office that the critical policies of anticipated health care reform and welfare expansion would flow, and Kennedy had made it relatively clear in his early background support for Carey that he expected to take the lead on formulating policy. Kennedy was thusly rewarded with his chief counsel Stephen Breyer, an otherwise obscure law professor from Harvard, being appointed as the new HEW chief. The choice was not entirely unorthodox, however; Breyer had a longstanding relationship with the Senator most critical for the coming reforms and for that matter was an expert in administrative law, but Senators understood regardless why Breyer was picked and who that was meant to appease.

    Similar horse-trading had to be done for other Cabinet picks. As a sop to Southern interests, Carey picked former New Orleans Mayor Moon Landrieu to run Housing and Urban Development, building on Landrieu's experience as chair of the National Council of Mayors and his profile as a key ally of Askew and Budget Chairman Russ Long; Patricia Harris of Washington, DC was tapped to head up the Department of Transportation, the first Black woman appointed to a Cabinet, to appeal to the crucial African-American voting bloc. Jewish businessman Phil Klutznick was chosen for Commerce, while Minnesota Representative and farmer Rob Bergland was tapped for USDA.

    The two most maneuvering appointments, however, were for the Treasury and Attorney General. Carey's first choice for Treasury was Irv Shapiro, DuPont's CEO, but he wanted to keep the choice a secret for as long as possible; as a result, he waited to announce the pick until his inauguration, where Shapiro was a guest, and feigned having been turned down by "somebody else." It would be revealed in the early 1990s that there had been nobody else, and that Shapiro was always his first choice, but that Carey did not want opposition to a CEO at the Treasury to build in the Senate by announcing the pick earlier.

    The second was Attorney General. Carey had considered a variety of choices but quietly reached out in late December to Supreme Court Justice Byron White, inquiring whether he was interested in returning to the Cabinet. The federal bench was of great concern to Carey and the pace-setter of the Senate, Judiciary Chairman Kennedy; Nixon had appointed four Justices and Ford two, meaning that six out of nine Justices were appointed by Republican administrations. It was well known in DC circles that White wished to retire under a Democratic administration but that he seemed perfectly happy on the bench; it was also well-established that he was a swingy Justice who was nobody's idea of a liberal's liberal, though he was still towards the left flank of the more conservative Burger Court. A well-concealed, full-court press to get White to retire to take the Attorney General job began behind the scenes after Christmas, including two Kennedy staffers driving to his property in Colorado to make their case. What resulted was Carey not having a formal choice when he was inaugurated, but White announced he would retire to take the job on January 28th, and with that Carey had his full Cabinet and, in one similar fell swoop, his first and most important federal judicial vacancy to fill...

    [1] Thanks for the suggestion, @KingTico
     
    The Saffron Project
  • The Saffron Project

    The USSR in the early 1980s was, by all accounts, internally and externally at a major crossroads. By the spring of 1981, Yuri Andropov was approaching the conclusion of his third year as General Secretary and his efforts to purge the system of "malaise and corruption" and promoting a generation of new, innovative and most importantly modern-minded officials across the nomenklatura and increasingly into the high halls of power in the Presidium, Supreme Soviet and even Politburo seemed to be paying fruit, while his efforts to pursue a new, more aggressive five-year plan to dust off Kosygin's ideas and reorient the Soviet economy out of its late 1970s Brezhnevian stagnation had only just begun. Internationally, the benefits of detente seemed to be paying off as an ebb in tensions with Washington had given breathing room to Moscow. USSR had just pulled off an impressive show at the 1980 Olympics that had greatly burnished its image and as "68ers" of younger, more ideologically intransigent left-wingers in the West came of age in professional, academic and bureaucratic roles and memories of the Prague Spring that same year faded, Soviet prestige seemed elevated at a time that its ideological opponents in the West seemed either hapless, corrupt, or both.

    This more muscular, optimistic veneer projected from the Kremlin in the Andropov years papered over a lot of internal issues, however. The corruption purge had not fallen upon high-ranking party members and the rank-and-file equally; it was whispered, when around safe ears, that the heavyweights who had been rounded up and fired (or given an extended Siberian vacation) seemed to curiously enough be Andropov's intra-party rivals or those who stood in the way of his preferred allies. The Soviet economy, after enjoying robust growth in the late 1960s under the Eighth Five-Year Plan, had fallen into a lengthy malaise that in many ways mirrored the ailments suffered in Western market economies during the 1970s but were in fact considerably worse with a program of inflexible collectivization; Mikhael Gorbachev, one of Andropov's younger "shakers," as Kremlinologists came to term them, was bold enough to decisively name the problem as "stagnation" in official albeit secret internal memorandums, and the lack of punishment attached to the norm-breaking Agriculture Minister for speaking so bluntly against the status quo betrayed how seriously Andropov took this problem. [1]

    The international aspects of Soviet influence were concerning, too. Prague in 1968 had badly shaken the Kremlin's faith in its close-in empire and the cracks seemed to be showing in post-Ceaucescu Romania and now Poland as well. The Sino-Soviet split and the gradual rapprochement with Beijing begun by the United States before the spectacular collapse of Richard Nixon's Presidency [2] had created a considerable wrinkle within world communism, with now two competing poles for the global hard-left, and the ideological purity and convert's fanaticism of Maoism generated considerable appeal to the rising left-wing movements of the Third World. This need to pay ever-closer attention to what China was up to, especially with the debacle that was the third of three terms under the more conservative and fervently anti-communist Republican Party in the United States, led Andropov to gradually reorient Soviet attention from west to south and southeast. Detente and an apparent diminishing Western appetite for military spending and commitments led Andropov and his inner-sanctum cronies such as Aliyev and Ustinov to conclude that the early 1980s would be defined by redefining Sovietism for the Third World and, at a time when the post-Mao China seemed uniquely weak and supine, reorienting world communism back onto Moscow's preferred axis. The world was more complicated in 1981 than it had been even in the postwar chaos of 1945, with the rise of religious fundamentalism in the Middle East, and the Kremlin would need to demonstrate it understood this and had a response.

    Andropov's attention thus fell increasingly on a loosely-related constellation of active measures related to South Asia, what came to be termed internally at the KGB as the Saffron Project, so-named for the color associated with India and, in particular, Indian Hindu nationalism and its various grievances and insecurities. [3] India was a remarkable prize in the global contest for ideas, the backbone of the so-called "Non-Aligned Movement" since the days of Nehru. As the largest domino sans China to fall in the late 1940s collapse of the old colonial-imperial order, it had fallen not to revolutionary communism but rather a type of bureaucratic Fabian socialism nicknamed the "License Raj" but much like the rest of the Third World come to be dominated by a familial dynasty, in this case the Nehru-Gandhi family that now had produced the current Indian Prime Minister returned with a vengeance in 1980 in Indira Gandhi, and her likely successor, her son Sanjay.

    India's problems were myriad. It suffered from crippling levels of poverty and illiteracy, its various economic reforms over the years had done about as much good as the USSR's, and it was riven by sectarian tensions, not just between Hindu and Muslim but increasingly with the Sikhs of Punjab. Pakistan loomed large in India's imagination as a great foe, especially after the brutal Bangladeshi War of Independence that had seen millions killed in Bangladesh (then "East Pakistan"), especially as the flexible and ambitious populist regime of Zulfikar Bhutto had gotten its sea legs and grown more confident as an international player, managing to somehow be close with the USSR and its Marxist client in Afghanistan but also play nice with China and the United States, going so far as to have been the choice of exile for the late Shah of Iran. Critically, the majority of the Punjab was in Pakistan, even if the majority of Sikhs lived on the Indian side of the border, and though Bhutto was no friend to Sikh nationalism, that mattered little to either the paranoiacs of Hindu chauvinism or, increasingly, the smaller-and-smaller circle of confidants around the heir apparent, Sanjay Gandhi.

    Sanjay, both domestically and internationally, had a reputation for being eccentric, if not erratic and perhaps outright unstable. His influence over his mother during the "Emergency" in India, where the country had nearly toppled into the same kind of autocratic morass that so many other similar states had, had been notorious, and his empowerment of party-aligned hooligans, corrupt party hacks like Defense Minister Bansi Lal or personal friends such as Vidya Charan Shukla, head of broadcasting had hollowed out much of the professional core of the Congress Party's lower echelons and rising talent. In a party already sympathetic to the Soviet Union since the time of Nehru, in other words, the ground was fertile for the KGB to start making inroads with the most important and least accountable man in South Asia.

    India was a springboard, in other words, to bigger and greater things. Active measures campaigns began ratcheting up starting in the fall of 1980 and then at a strong clip after the new year, not just in India but across the region. Soviet diplomats, confident that Bhutto had no intention of meddling with their clients in Afghanistan [4], began to step up overt aid in Pakistan. At the same time, efforts began to be made to "penetrate" Sanjay's circle, which was not a particularly difficult task with how careless and carefree many of the people he surrounded himself with were. A few bribes here, some honeypots there, and in less than twelve months Saffron was a vast network of informants, loose-lipped marks, and operatives befuddled at how easy it was to burrow their way remarkably near the beating heart of power in India.

    Once there, the influence campaign began. What if it was the case that Sikh separatism was not a fully indigenous plot? What if, perhaps, Pakistan - and not just Pakistan, but the CIA - had something to do with it...?

    [1] The Soviet economy wasn't quite at breadlines status in early 1981 yet, and is stronger here than in OTL at the same point, but its not exactly strong.
    [2] Kinda wild to think that ITTL Ford was President longer than Nixon
    [3] RSS and Hindutva were not the force they are today in 1981, but INC had just clawed back power in 1980 from the BJP and Hindutva was very much a response to increasing Islamic radicalism in the Middle East in the late 1970s
    [4] Bhutto is a big reason why the USSR has less of a need to intervene in Afghanistan militarily ITTL
     
    The Carey Doctrine Takes Shape - Part I
  • The Carey Doctrine Takes Shape - Part I

    The formulation of a Presidential "doctrine" of foreign policy is not a formal process at all; some, such as Harry Truman, very deliberately declared one, whereas others were more the product of analysts studying for themes in the way a President approached foreign policy. Hugh Carey never outlined or articulated a definitive, clear doctrine in any major address or memorandum, but as early as the transition period and the months thereafter, his approach to international relations became quite clear, and a "Carey Doctrine" could be understood.

    Carey, standing at the historical hinge-point of an Old Left and the New, was very much a Cold War liberal, though he personally described himself in a comprehensive mid-1990s biography as an "idealistic realist." Carey had supported the Vietnam War only to become one of the first Congressmen to turn against it, and he would lean on that example as his guiding light in approaching foreign policy - as he put it to Brzezinski in an early principals meeting, "A sound policy of our interests should be pursued until it no longer serves our interests, or those of our allies." The world was considerably more complicated in 1981 than it had been in 1961, with the final death-knell of colonialism and the replacement of Arab nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism in tandem with petroleum politics in the Middle East. It was for that reason that Carey's attention on foreign policy began largely with the deteriorating situation in the Gulf, and where his pragmatic but firm approach to international relations can be best seen.

    Like Ford, Carey placed a great deal of value in the superstructure of the NATO alliance and the young G7, but unlike Ford, he was eager to do more with the European partners than largely contain his partnerships to the Anglosphere (it was partially Ford who had secured Canadian membership in that group, for a reason). Despite the domestic ideological differences between Republicans and the Labour Party of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, Ford had enjoyed excellent relations with his British counterparts, particularly the latter, but had never formed much of a bond with Denis Healey after his election in March of 1980, perhaps in part due to Ford's Presidency nearing its end. The relationship with Healey had been managed instead largely by George Bush, with whom the former Foreign Secretary did have good rapport with, and indeed it caused some frostiness for David Owen, Healey's Foreign Secretary, that Healey largely bypassed him to deal directly with Bush, Scowcroft or other American officials.

    A new Presidential administration promised a new start. Katzenbach was in London within hours of being sworn in at Foggy Bottom to meet with the British Cabinet, and it was there that he was read into longstanding backchannel talks between the White House and Number 10 about how, exactly, to handle the crisis in Saudi Arabia. Since the terrorist attempt that blew up Saudi 770 above the Eastern Med, the situation in Riyadh and elsewhere in the Kingdom had only grown worse. Riots were a weekly occurrence, as were strikes of oilfield workers; terrorist attacks, often via teams of roving gunmen, against soldiers and policemen were commonplace in cities and towns, leaving many to refuse to come to work for fear of being killed. This led directly to a spike in both violent and petty crime, and ordinary civilians took to arming themselves with black market weaponry. A collapse in global oil prices since their summer 1980 peak and a small but unexpected glut of supply had hit Saudi state finances hard, and the lavish salaries to managerial and bureaucratic roles upon which the royal family had built its prestige with the urban middle class were frozen or in some cases cut, though no layoffs to the state sector occurred.

    The response of the royal family was incoherent. King Khalid had depended upon the affluence of high oil profits to buy the compliance of the population in the first years of his reign and was genuinely flummoxed on how to respond; his brother and successor, the Prime Minister Prince Fahd, responded by tacking right, indulging clericalism while falling short of the revolutionary Islamism preferred by the Ikhwan, hoping that this indulgence would appease the radicals, but also sought to tie the regime more closely to the West, geopolitically. The tricky thing here, though, was that the West - the United States and United Kingdom in particular - had three considerably more reliable partners in the Middle East in Egypt, Israel and Iran, and developments in the late 1970s had satisfied them of the long-term stability of all three as a bulwark against the rising popularity of Arab socialist Ba'athism in Syria and Iraq, and the consequent shift in a pro-Soviet direction by those states, especially once it was clear Iran would not fall to the revolutionaries and Washington did not need a "backup" plan.

    Katzenbach thus found himself seeing the outlines of a British-led agenda to reassert its influence east of the Suez in the Gulf by taking leadership of what happened next vis a vis "the Arabian Problem." Delaying action on this front was Healey's personal mistrust of Carey, and American Irish politicians in general, on the question of "full and total support on the question of Northern Ireland," which pushed a foreign trip by Carey to London all the way until late April, and a journey to Washington by Healey beyond that. Nonetheless, Katzenbach established a "clean line of communication" with Owen early on, found the trip satisfying, and they settled on continuing to support the Saudis "until it was no longer prudent" but agreed that having the Ghawar fields and the rest of eastern Arabia fall into the hands of the Ikhwan was unacceptable to global energy supplies after the great crisis of 1973 and the smaller shocks of the last few years, and began a project to connect Iranian leadership with Shia Saudi citizens along the Gulf in case a breakaway, Western-and-Iranian-backed Shia state would need to be formed to defend the world's access to oil supplies...
     
    The Carey Doctrine Takes Shape - Part II
  • The Carey Doctrine Takes Shape - Part II

    Even with the near-revolution in Iran and the increasing temperature politically elsewhere in the Middle East, the region had actually not been the biggest Achilles' heel for the Ford administration - rather, that was Latin America, right in the United States' backyard, and Ford himself had acknowledged in their transition meeting that his greatest regret as President was "not bagging that bastard Torrijos." The Panama Shock had kneecapped the nascent American economy recovery of 1976-77 and spread the malaise of the Seventies worldwide with the supply chain chokepoint that the closure of the Canal had caused; its full reopening at pre-crisis capacity in late 1980 had been a huge boon to the "green shoots of recovery" and despite high unemployment and inflation, there was in 1981 reason for optimism for the first time in regards to the American economy with the thinking being that perhaps the worst had already happened or the near-depression was at the very least at the bottom.

    From a foreign policy perspective, though, the Americas was a vexing issue for Carey and company, and despite some interest in certain corners of the State Department to look to Africa as an important place to both promote liberal democracy and counter Soviet influence (the growing humanitarian disaster of the Ethiopian civil war was of particular concern), Carey personally made clear to his national security team that Latin America was the priority.

    This was no easy task. The debt crisis that had begun in Mexico and Chile in 1980 was now ballooning elsewhere, and the growth years of the late 1970s had come to a screeching halt across the continent. Brazil suddenly had some of the highest inflation in the world and rapidly receding GDP; Argentina, despite its democratic triumph of the year before, still teetered on the edge of near-economic collapse. [1] And those were countries that were, relatively speaking, the stable major economies of the region. Peru had plunged into massive civil unrest over the last year after a controversial coup d'etat following its elections and a rural insurgency led by a ferociously Maoist group known as the Shining Path. FARC and ELN terrorist attacks still occurred almost daily in Colombia, now countered by right-wing paramilitaries closely affiliated with narco-traffickers that had led to the country becoming the murder capital of the world. Venezuela had narrowly survived an attempted revolution by leftist Army officers that had nonetheless partially crippled its petroleum infrastructure. All of Central America seemed to be on fire save Costa Rica, and Torrijos and his chief lieutenant, Noriega, were still nowhere to be found. In the space of a few years, the influence of Castro's Cuba had skyrocketed in its periphery, and spies from Havana were thought to be embedded everywhere from Tijuana to Tierra del Fuego in a way they had not been just a decade earlier.

    A classified memorandum was thus circulated internally within the Carey administration in late February of 1981 which declared pointedly that European NATO partners would be, for the time being, expected to pick up much of the slack in post-colonial Africa and in regards to defending the frontier with the Warsaw Pact while the United States secured its backyard against communism and Soviet-Cuban influence. Perhaps nothing distilled the Carey Doctrine quite to the extent its policy of "stick and carrot" in the near-abroad of the Western Hemisphere, and the challenges posed by the conflagrations in the region would define much of his Presidency. A complex situation for a country still reeling from the ghosts of Vietnam and the gut punch of Panama was only going to become considerably stranger in the years to come...

    [1] I talked a bit about this in the chapter "Money Bomb" but its hard to overstate just how much the 1980s were a lost decade, economically and in some ways politically, in much of Latin America
     
    Primakov’s Petrol Politics
  • Primakov’s Petrol Politics

    The great oil crisis of 1973-74 and its longer but milder cousin that lasted roughly from early 1978 to mid-1980 had acted as one of the great geopolitical and, in many ways, socioeconomic revolutions of history. Together they had ended the postwar economic boom and shaken the Keynesian assumptions behind it, introduced the malaise of elevated inflation and high unemployment as matters of tremendous public concern for the first time in a generation and created tremendous financial and social strain across the world, in some places already precipitating mass unrest. They had also made what happened in the Middle East a matter of tremendous global concern and interest in a way even the Suez Crisis had not. The nuances of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism and Islamism - and their frequent intersections - were now of critical importance on both sides of the Iron Curtain as the power of the OPEC states was flexed aggressively for all to see.

    In the West, of course, there were a variety of reactions to this. In the United States and France alternatives to oil reliance, particularly nuclear energy, became hugely popular; in Britain, a push to accelerate North Sea oil yields won out. The Soviet Union viewed things through a somewhat different lens. By mid-1981, it became a canard within the Politburo that the Brezhnev Stagnation had not only placed the USSR badly behind the West in terms of economic growth but that they had badly failed to take advantage of the massive oil price spikes of 1973 and 1978-79. Despite the massive petroleum reserves and its strategic importance to the Soviet economy, they had not recycled higher prices into reinvestments in the infrastructure itself, let alone poured it into improved living standards or consumer economies like in Venezuela or bought the acquiescence of a restive populace like the various Arab kingdoms and dictatorships. As much as anti-corruption and macroeconomic reform became pillars of Andropovism in the early 1980s, so too did avoiding further “lost opportunities.”

    This was a precarious balancing act. Middle Eastern countries had discovered how potent the threat of embargoes and production cuts were, but had now also had the world’s eyes turned to them fully for the first time, and the precedent of the CIA and Pentagon intervening behind the scenes to avoid the collapse of Pahlavi Iran - including forcing the Shah’s exile and the imposition of a military junta as a shadow government behind the young new monarch and the ostensibly civilian Majlis - showed the seriousness with which the West took threats to its oil supplies. With the relationships between the Saudi monarchy and its populace fraying just as the conservative Wahhabi ulema seemed to be softening in its support for the ruling House of Saud, Moscow’s strategists sensed that they were about to experience in real time yet another test of exactly how potent petrol politics was.

    This confluence of events at the end of the 1970s created a clear incentive structure for increased Soviet attention in the Middle East, and the two Baathist dictatorships of Syria and Iraq were clear candidates for deepened relationships. Baathism on paper was a very Soviet-friendly ideology, a secularist worldview that synthesized Arab nationalism, socialist economics and muscular cultural revivalism through a vanguard party establishing a single-party state in the mold of Vladimir Lenin. In eschewing Islamism (it’s chief ideologue, Michel Aflaq, had been a Jordanian Christian) it avoided the unpredictability and hostility to the outside world increasingly endemic to religiously fundamentalist movements in the Middle East and made for a cozy bedfellow to the formally athleist Eastern Bloc.

    In reality, Baathism was in practice more fascist than anything else. Syria and especially Iraq had devolved into personalist regimes around their respective despots, Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, enforced through thuggish violence. The commitment to state secularism was skin deep and largely an excuse to keep the religious majorities of both countries under the thumbs of the ruling families that hailed from minority religious sects. Both states had obsessive revanchist worldviews against their peripheries and Saddam in particular was seen as an erratic regional problem, somebody who had concerned American analysts as far back as the Kennedy administration. The decision of the US to back Iran to the hilt despite its unreliability and the consolidation of Turkey as a key Western ally following the coup of October 1980 had spooked Saddam and made him even more repressive, and to Moscow his position at the heart of Mesopotamia and in charge of some of the world’s largest oil fields - and his contempt for the monarchist, pro-Western Arab regimes to his south and west - made him an obvious partner.

    This decided shift in Soviet foreign policy thinking was driven in part by Yevgeniy Primakov, one of the more obscure but crucial ascendants of the Andropov era. Primakov was no politician - he was an academic and journalist by profession, critically an Arabist with deep relationships in the Middle East who understood from his contacts just how close Iran had come to disaster and just how much budding Islamist parties and organizations across the region were determined to get it right the next time. Primakov was also a KGB “optee,” an agent from outside its traditional structure who nonetheless by late 1981 had ascended beyond merely being the most important Russian on Arab matters but indeed the eminence grise of Soviet Middle Eastern - and by proxy petroleum - politics. He was in so many ways the ultimate Andropovite; committed to Soviet hard power above and beyond orthodox Marxism, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy where international revolution gave way to the murkier pragmatism of multipolar realpolitik. It was through his dogged informal diplomacy, cultivation of friends and careful placement of KGB assets and agents that he drew Baathism closer to Moscow, and helped push Soviet resources away from flailing and inept Arab communist parties to Baathist organizations elsewhere. The twin collapses of Nasserism and broader Arab nationalist cooperation had left a wide vacuum, and Primakov was the tip of the spear in seeing to it the Soviet Union would be there to fill it. Arms sales, economic deals, a harder line on Israel - all were part of the overt courting of Damascus and particularly Baghdad by Moscow, and to the alarm of NATO, Tel Aviv and Tehran, they were a huge success.

    That being said, 1981 was nonetheless a “lost opportunity” for Moscow and indeed the OPEC states that had become increasingly cozy with it. The oil cartel hiked prices and slashed production by 15% in the summer of 1981 and a further 10% in early 1982 to prop up the price of oil, with Moscow following suit to a much more modest degree, but retail and wholesale prices remained well below 1979-80 highs. Economists and historians have debated the precise reasons; demand destruction thanks to the slow recovery of the early 1980s is a partial explanation, as is the arrival of additional oil resources from the North Sea, Alaska and Canada. This one-two punch of reduced demand and boosted production would not depress the price as far as the dirt cheap years of the 1960s, but nonetheless helped defang the threat of oil politics for much of the early 1980s.

    The Soviets had thus bought themselves two emerging allies at the heart of OPEC and a greater foothold in the Middle East than before, but at least for now, their ability to create another commodity spike to their benefit was severely dampened, and energy insecurity by late 1982 had somewhat faded as an immediate concern in the West, especially North America…
     
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    A Hundred Days of Action - Part I
  • A Hundred Days of Action - Part I

    The late 1970s economic crisis was easily the most severe postwar downturn and thus the worst macroeconomic conditions since the Great Depression; that high inflation came, counterintuitively, partnered with double-digit unemployment across the Western world was what flummoxed policymakers more than anything. Though nobody knew it yet, in the United States the worst was already passed by the spring of 1981, with inflation having peaked in October of 1980 and unemployment reaching its highest level - nearly 12% - in March of 1981, and the next twelve months would be marked by the slow, arduous decline of both indicators to more manageable levels before the economic recovery began to be felt for the first time starting in the second half of 1982. [1] The recovery of 1982-84 would eventually be seen as the bookend to the horrible macroeconomic conditions of a ten-year stretch begun by the 1971 Nixon Shock, exacerbated by the 1973-74 oil crisis, and then just when it looked like the worm had turned, the chaos of the Panama Shock and small-scale oil crisis in Venezuela, Iran and Saudi Arabia in 1979 to go along with debt defaults across much of the developing world, particularly in Latin America and East Asia, in 1980.

    The Carey administration viewed alleviating the immediate pain that would be felt by the cranking up of interest rates through the end of the year - a process begun belatedly in late 1979 by Arthur Miller's Federal Reserve - as their first priority, indeed the one that had won them the election against Ronald Reagan. The Carey campaign had aggressively courted the Greatest Generation's reliable voters and their fond memories of FDR by drawing very explicit parallels between 1932 and 1980 economically and culturally, and shaped that message to younger, more conservative Silent and Baby Boomer voters by portraying Carey as a gruffer, tougher and more modern update of America's longest-serving President designed for the meaner, leaner 80s. As such, any opportunity to cast Carey as FDR, Version 2.0 was taken with aplomb, and so began the marketing campaign around "A Hundred Days of Action," hearkening back to FDR's own first hundred days.

    The backbone of the Days of Action of course would be the Economic Stabilization Act of 1980, which would feature two of the pillars of "Careynomics" - counter-cyclical infrastructure spending to bring down unemployment and targeted demand-side tax cuts for 65% of Americans to boost their pocketbooks in the near term. While both of these policies were, by definition, inflationary, they would be combined with continued interest rate hikes and thus designed to "balance the scale," in Carey's words. The President appeared before a joint sitting of Congress on February 22nd, at the invitation of Speaker O'Neill, to explain his vision, and then gave a follow-up address from the Oval Office a week later to the general public, outlining the "three planks" of the ESA: energy independence, infrastructure improvements, and small-scale tax reform. Combined with a variety of executive orders - one per day for a hundred days, each targeted at a different piece of the economy or federal regulatory environment - he termed it a "rescue package for every American." The response was positive, but skeptical. Carey enjoyed a honeymoon period approval in the low 70s and polling suggested he was trusted by the American people, but they had heard Gerald Ford declare that the United States would "Whip Inflation Now!" back in 1975 and, everybody had seen how well that had gone. The difference, of course, was that Carey by his nature was not one to sugarcoat things. In his Oval Office address, in his famously blunt style, he stated: "Things are likely to get worse before they get better, but I am confident that by this time next year, we will start seeing green shoots in this very difficult environment, and the spring after this grim economic winter will come soon enough."

    While Republican politicians mocked the "Springtime for America" messaging from the White House, Congress got going on assembling the package, and the first major test of Carey's Presidency in managing the massive big tent of various Democratic factions began. O'Neill had a massive majority but well over fifty right-wing "boll weevil" Southern Democrats, most prominently led by Richard Shelby of Alabama, who were often more conservative than many of their Republican colleagues and were likely to be difficult to drag into whatever final vote occurred. The Senate was a different animal entirely. Though there was a veto-proof majority of Democrats, that majority featured very conservative Southerners, and even though many of them were relatively young and recently elected - with the major caveat being Mississippi's two octogenarian lifers in Jim Eastland and Jim Stennis - they were still fairly skeptical of major new spending programs, unless that spending was lavished on their home states [2], and they were part of the same majority that included progressive firebrands like New York's freshman Elizabeth Holtzman, who within weeks of being sworn-in was already being talked about as the future of the American left and the likely first female President of the United States.

    With the Senate being the most difficult piece of the equation, Carey deployed his "secret weapons," as he called them - Vice President Reuben Askew and Senate Health Committee Chair Ted Kennedy, who he leaned heavily on as a whip operation to cajole both the Southern right and the progressive left in the body and be the point men in building a bill. Despite Askew never having served in the Senate, through his close friendship with Senator Lawton Chiles of his home state of Florida - who crucially was the third-ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee, behind Chairman Ed Muskie of Maine and Fritz Hollings of South Carolina - he quickly built cachet on Capitol Hill and within weeks of inauguration looked likely to the most influential VP since Johnson. Kennedy, meanwhile, swallowed his pride and agreed to set aside his push for a national health insurance scheme until the fall. Unemployment and inflation needed to be tamed first.

    The man whose buy-in was needed the most, it turned out, was Finance Chair Russell Long of Louisiana. Long was a moderate-conservative who was open to playing ball with the administration. The "cheddar," as Carey put it dryly to White House Chief of Staff Basil Paterson [3], for Long was major investments in oil pipelines, drilling rigs and refinery facilities in the final act to benefit his home state of Louisiana and other oil-producing states. This was an easy sell publicly, of course, as a way to improve American energy independence, but risked angering the burgeoning environmentalist movement that had erupted in the 1970s out of the mostly unsuccessful anti-nuclear movement, and which had powerful adherents such as Wisconsin's Gaylord Nelson and Secretary of the Interior Mo Udall, who would be in charge of much of the issuance of future drilling permits, particularly on federal land. As a result, the expansion of American oil infrastructure was paired with a variety of "new energy" provisions. Ignoring the loud and stubborn minority of anti-nuclear activists, the ESA pushed ahead with dramatically expanding the provisions of 1979's Energy Policy Act, upping subsidies not only for under-construction nuclear power plants but research as well, such as the small modular reactor at Clinch River or Princeton's tokamak project, and diverted billions more to boosting the efficiency of hydroelectic, biomass and geothermal projects both extant and proposed while also shoveling billions into research into improved solar and wind energy technology and granted the FERC broad new powers in avoiding litigation over power line permitting and new transformer and switching stations. In addition to this, the ESA would move into law hundreds of thousands of acres of protected land, increase pollution standards for motor vehicles and power plants under the Clean Air Act, and made the Environmental Protection Agency a Cabinet-level department, the Department of Environmental Protection.

    More than anything, though, the ESA - its acronyms chosen to avoid confusion (and association) with the Equal Rights Amendment by foregoing the title "Recovery" or "Renewal" - was an employment bill. The energy provisions were designed to provide new jobs, as was the demand-side management of creating the Employment Services Board, a new body that was designed to target unemployment via job matching, and the Employer Stabilization Fund, which provided cash transfers to employers to have them keep employees on the payroll rather than lay them off, which many on the left - most prominently Holtzman - derided as corporate welfare but begrudgingly acceded to. The ESF was particularly targeted at jobs in the automotive and steel industries, which had suffered grievous job losses in the prior five years, and not coincidentally were heavily unionized and concentrated in important Midwestern swing states which the Democrats had made huge inroads in during the Ford years. Billions more were allocated to the Federal Transport Reserve Fund, which would finance at subsidized interest rates a variety of road, rail and air transport projects to improve the infrastructure for the newly-deregulated transport sector and provide the baseline for innovation in that space - the money earmarked for Conrail in particular provided massive improvements throughout the 1980s to passenger rail travel in the Northeast and helped finance new projects in Philadelphia, New York and Boston.

    The third leg of the ESA was its tax provisions. Carey and Paterson were adamant in negotiations that they would not cut corporate or top-level tax rates, but they did provide a small payroll tax holiday of two years and then a six-year tax cut to marginal tax rates for about 60% of Americans, with a staggered sunset of the rates in 1983, 1985, and 1987. Targeted tax code changes were also included that heavily incentivized the construction of commercial and multifamily real estate in city centers after two decades of construction in suburban areas, meant to revitalize decaying and collapsing urban tax bases; a boom in commercial high rises in city centers was to follow for the next decade. With the three prongs - energy, employment and demand-side tax cuts - the Economic Stabilization Act of 1981 was ready to go, with lots of interest groups unhappy with specific provisions but begrudgingly accepting of other pieces that brought them onboard. Now all that remained was to get it passed, along with a Supreme Court nomination at the same time. Nobody could claim that Carey's first one hundred days didn't have plenty of action...

    [1] This is, shall we say, a marked difference from how the early 80s recession(s) went IOTL, where monetarist shock therapy exacerbated and extended the crisis well into late 1983 before the roar-back of 1984.
    [2] Oink oink, gimme that pork, baby!
    [3] For those keeping track at home, yes, that means we have a Black WHCOS as early as 1981, when there hasn't been one yet IOTL. This arguably makes Paterson the most powerful Black official in US history up to this point
     
    A Hundred Days of Action - Part II
  • A Hundred Days of Action - Part II

    The retirement of Byron White in order to serve as Attorney General had been in many ways engineered to give Carey a seat to fill with a younger, more liberal jurist right off the bat. White, nobody's fool, understood this better than most, and made it plain as day to Carey that while he wasn't opposed to such an obvious maneuver to try to offset the remarkable impact the Nixon-Ford years had left on the Court and shifting it firmly to the right, he had a price like everybody else - in his case, he expected a Westerner like himself appointed and was clear that he wanted a fair deal of influence with the White House Counsel's office on selecting not just his replacement but future judicial appointments as well. Carey was amenable to the first piece and shrugged at the second one, with both men leaving their first one-on-one meeting after inauguration with substantially different definitions of the word "influence." The choice was easy for Carey and White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler - Ninth Circuit Judge Shirley Hufstedler, who had been born in White's home state of Colorado and lived basically everywhere in the West since then before settling in California. She was a trailblazer for women attorneys and regarded as a mainstream liberal, perhaps a notch left of the typical Democratic appointee but less progressive than Thurgood Marshall or, increasingly, William Brennan. The only downside to her was that she was not the first woman appointee - that was Justice Carla Anderson Hills - but with Reagan outperforming even the typically strong Republican baseline with women voters in 1980, particularly married women which was one of the few demographic groups he won outright, Carey and other chief advisors knew that Democrats needed to stanch the bleeding and Hufstedler made a world of sense. That she did not have very many controversial rulings to attack helped a fair bit, though the issue became instead that her nomination instead emerged as a bargaining chip in the Senate as the ESA neared passage.

    O'Neill lost only 32 Congressmen, almost all Southerners or rural conservatives from out West, in the whip count for the Economic Stabilization Act and thirty-three Republicans crossed the floor to vote for it. While not as polarized as signature legislation would be in later years, the whip count in the House demonstrated the unusual regional and ideological coalitions underpinning both parties. What created issues in the Senate was that any one Senator could hold it up in committee or on the floor, and the biggest antagonist emerged not as one of the "usual suspects," as White House staffer and future Senate Majority Leader Andrew Cuomo phrased it, but rather Robert Byrd, the Senate Majority Leader.

    Small, petty issues had already bogged down the ESA. The White House had elected to largely box out the Republican Party on crafting the bill, and though there was nothing that constituted a red line for most of the Senate Republican conference, Baker had elected to leave the vote as a "conscience call" for his caucus while announcing that due to the White House's decision to "go it alone" he would personally vote against. Internally, Baker and his chief aides - namely Ted Stevens of Alaska and rising star Alan Simpson of Wyoming - had resigned themselves to the ESA passing, likely by broad margins, but wanted to keep Democrats guessing until the very end how much Republican support it would win on the floor and thus rather than whipping against the bill like Minority Leader John Rhodes had done in the House instead elected to keep their powder dry for what was expected to be a titanic fight over healthcare in the fall, but instead deployed what Simpson jokingly called in later years "the whip of silence," telling their conference to refuse to state how they will vote and instead see what happened if Democrats had to negotiate primarily with themselves and then take advantage however they could of the fallout, suspecting for a variety of reasons that doing this would probably encourage Southern Democrats to shift the bill rightwards. [1]

    The gamble didn't quite go as Baker and Simpson expected it, largely because Byrd threw himself into the process late and demanded his own contributions to the act. Several Southern Senators had already chafed at the imperious attitude Chief of Staff Paterson had shown in negotiations [2] and Byrd took advantage of this by informing the White House that he had a "Gang of Twelve" including himself that wanted to see some small concessions on the act, most prominently subsidies for coal matching what was being plowed into nuclear, natural gas and "new energy." "Do not leave our miners behind, or they will leave us," he warned Paterson. To make his point even blunter, Byrd surprised the Washington press corps by announcing that a floor vote on Hufstedler's nomination would be held over until after the passage of the ESA, even though Eastland's Judiciary Committee had already voted to approve her passage to the full floor with several Republican votes in favor for the relatively uncontroversial nominee.

    Alarmed, Carey decided to involve himself in the negotiations directly, bringing Senate leadership to Camp David for the first time of his Presidency. What exactly occurred at Camp David in late March of 1981 has been described differently by different parties, but Carey was able to quietly knock heads together, particularly the feuding Kennedy and Byrd (Byrd being completely convinced that Kennedy still wanted his job), and get a final compromise bill hashed out. The proposed Department of Education would not have influence over primary and secondary schooling, which eliminated bitter memories of busing, and Carey agreed to appoint Terry Sanford, a former North Carolina Governor and beloved President of Duke University, as its first head. Coal miner pensions would be bailed out and coal liquification technology would receive a boost in funding. More money would be spent on port dredging and modernization in Southern states. And in return for sending this reworked package to a conference committee with the House, Byrd would move Hufstedler through immediately.

    It was good that he did, because conservative activists led by Phyllis Schlafly had taken advantage of the lull between her clearing committee and her eventual floor vote to start a public relations campaign against her, accusing her of being a radical feminist, describing her as an abortionist lesbian and calling her "Justice ERA." The campaign didn't work - Hufstedler was voted through 94-0 - and two days later Byrd brought the ESA to the floor, and after three days of spirited debate it passed 82-17, and when re-voted in the House fewer Southern defections were noted, though two liberal Democrats decided to vote against it this time around in a surprise. The episode had proven, though, that the constellation of emerging media-savvy and interconnected conservative activist groups that had moved the party right in the late 1970s and powered Ronald Reagan's two Presidential campaigns wasn't going anywhere and was now repositioning itself for a different purpose - that of a true opposition, perhaps to both established parties.

    The ESA was the first major piece of economic legislation passed in close to a decade, a comprehensive injection of money into infrastructure and research with backstops for unemployment. The third quarter of 1981 saw the first positive economic growth since early 1979, and 1982 would see low but tangible growth across all four quarters and unemployment shifted below double digits for the first time in two years. Economists have debated to this day how much the tax and unemployment provisions really helped; while the 1978-81 recession ended earlier in the United States than elsewhere, the decline in inflation was much slower there than every OECD country save Canada and the United Kingdom, leading to questions about whether something was wrong with the "Anglo Model", and steel and automobile employment never recovered to pre-crisis levels. Tax code changes built into the act encouraged commercial real estate in city centers, leading to an unprecedented boom in office construction that changed many blighted downtowns into office meccas but ghost towns at night, with many stating that cities had seen little than shiny new skylines but no tangible changes to the underlying issues of their declining residential tax bases or rising crime. [3] The one undeniable benefit of course was the energy provisions, which helped see dozens of additional nuclear reactors that would not have been finished otherwise completed, but no new build nuclear began in the course of the 1980s as natural gas, wind and solar projects took immediate precedence, leading to an electricity glut by 1990 in tandem with the collapse of world oil prices that led to a commensurate boom in more efficient automotive sales and "leisure driving." Mortgage reform provisions were left out of the act, and with the shift of many firms to the commercial space the decline in homebuilding begun at the start of the 1978 supply shock would persist through almost the entire following decade.

    Nonetheless, the worst of the economic travails in the United States seemed to be in the rearview, and the ESA was trumpeted by the Carey administration from high and low as part of the reason...

    [1] To put it mildly, there's a lot of way this strategy can go wrong for the Senate GOP
    [2] I'll leave it to you to guess what problem Southern Senators might have with the first Black chief of staff
    [3] Like the OTL mid-to-late 1980s, just without all those junk bond casinos and shopping malls
     
    French Presidential election, 1981
  • French Presidential election, 1981

    Nobody would describe French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing as a charismatic man, and as a President of France, he was not particularly beloved. His political program had been one of cautious but inventive economic conservatism and incremental social liberalism, describing himself and his Union Democratique Francaise as of the broad center, a thinly inhabited and politically brittle place to stand in any country. He had begun the process of major public infrastructure projects such as a breakneck expansion of France's nuclear energy fleet and massive investments into high-speed rail, while surprising many political observers by pushing hard to legalize abortion, which had collapsed his credibility with the Gaullist right and social conservatives he would need after his excruciatingly narrow 1974 victory over Francois Mitterrand. The position of the UDF as a catch-all centrist liberal party left it exposed to the rhetorical artillery of both left and right, and Giscard - known colloquially as VGE - had seemed a few years earlier to be limping into the 1981 elections, especially as the decent economy of the 1970s eroded once again in the second inflation crisis of 1978-90 mere years after the heels of the traumatic 1973 oil embargo and subsequent energy price shock that had ended France's Treinte Gloriouses. VGE was not a canny politician and though the French economy had held up better than several Western peers (most notably Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom), stubbornly high unemployment and inflation continued to dog his administration as the May 1981 elections loomed; more than a few detractors derisively called him "France's Gerald Ford." Six months before voters headed to the polls, VGE's chief confidant and Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, made insensitive remarks after a bomb exploded in a Parisian synagogue and killed sixty people, the worst terrorist attack in French history, and the campaign was considered stillborn before it even began after Barre was not cashiered by the UDF. [1]

    That all said, VGE was down, but not out. He had one major advantage that in the spring of 1979 one would never have expected - the effective removal of his two most formidable opponents from the political scene. Mitterrand had died of cancer the previous June less than a year after fending off a challenge from the PS's moderate faction, led by Michel Rocard, who while more popular with the general public was disliked by the PS's traditional left-wing base. Efforts to mend fences had begun in earnest in the wake of the Metz Congress, most notably Mitterrand finding a role for Rocard's close ally Pierre Mauroy, but now with his death it appeared to be a clear path for the Rocardiens to take over the party, particularly with Mauroy still in the catbird seat thanks to his installation there by Mitterrand before his death, and Rocard was duly made the PS's standard bearer against VGE. Rocard effectively abandoned Mitterrand's soft-socialist Common Programme for a narrow, targeted Keynesian platform that was more or less just a slightly red-tinted version of VGE's own policy platform with a number of market capitalist and social democratic reforms, aiming for what he called a "new path" between socialism and capitalism that would take the best from both worldviews. [2] This approach was met with skepticism if not hostility by prominent mitterandistes such as Lionel Jospin or Laurent Fabius, and much of the private sniping spilled out into public view through juicy newspaper scoops which hobbled Rocard's campaign and boosted the fortunes of the Parti Communiste Francaise at the PS's expense. The "De Gaulle of the Left" having died had left a leadership vacuum among French social democrats, socialists, and communists, and Rocard in the spring of 1981 was the standard-bearer so many came to very reluctantly.

    VGE's bigger concern had always been to his right, however, what with French Presidents in the Fifth Republic having consistently come from some form of conservative background. Despite the narrow win in 1974, men such as outside advisor and European Parliamentarian Jean Lecaunet or young strategist Francois Bayrou considered Mitterrand a washed-up creature of the past irrelevant to the 1980s and actually worried more about the resurgent Gaullist right which had consolidated into the RPR party, led by VGE's former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. Chirac was, by French political standards, a young rising star, the hard-charging and bombastic Mayor of Paris who had been sacked from the Ministry in 1976 over disagreements with VGE and replaced by Barre, and had since then used his platform outside the broad center-and-center-right coalition to promote himself, first into the Mayoralty where he had a large and very public platform in the capital and then trying to launch himself into the Presidency in 1981 to vanquish both VGE's tepid centrism and then the left on behalf of the Gaullist movement. Things went awry for the conservative champion, however, when he suffered a devastating car accident in December of 1978 which left him paralyzed from the waist down; [3] while he had initially used it as a rallying cry, issuing the Call of Cochin (named after the hospital of his convalescence) - a nationalist and euroskeptic policy program intended to imply VGE cared more about European integration than the French people - he had clearly lost a step once wheelchair bound and his long recovery from severe internal injuries blunted his momentum through much of 1979 and the political celebrity he had been rapidly accruing seemed lost.

    It was through this remarkably lucky confluence of events that VGE won the most votes in the first round and Rocard narrowly placed ahead of Chirac, who despite a longtime leadership of the RPR would not appear on a Presidential ballot again; in the second round, VGE triumphed by nearly a million votes, with Chirac giving a begrudging endorsement and many more left-wing voters, not seeing any particular difference between the incumbent and the challenger, failing to turn out. A man who had seemed to be a walking corpse politically just a year earlier had earned another term in the Palais d'Elysees, a remarkable achievement in a country that famously despises its Presidents and where the political spectrum had been polarizing through the 1970s towards two personalities much bigger than his own that he did not have to face head-to-head. The French right had a hobbled champion, and the French left had its feuding factions - it seemed, at least for the short-term, that Valery Giscard d'Estaing's bland, pro-European liberal centrism in the meantime would have to do...

    [1] The insensitive remarks are real, but like the Munich bombing the attack here is worse than IOTL, where the bomb went off in the street before it could be placed inside the synagogue
    [2] You can make a very credible argument that Rocard was the first person to articulate what in the 1990s became known as Third Way liberalism, and in many ways the Mitterrand of the 1980s IOTL actually did implement a much more moderate, Third Way-adjacent political program to the surprise of his supporters on the left, though that's more because the Mauroy ministry put most of its focus on making welfare programs more accessible/universal than stuff like nationalizations etc like the French left wanted
    [3] A real accident, but killing off Chirac too felt cheap to me after doing that with Mitterrand, so wheelchair it is
     
    Fission Fizzle?
  • Fission Fizzle?

    One of the sources of great optimism across the West in the early 1970s - particularly in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo in 1973 - was the potential for nuclear power to revolutionize energy. Fission power plants had been invented in the 1950s and gone through several experimental phases, and by the dawn of the 1970s had gone from a science fiction technology to something that was scalable at a massive level, with many reactors having nameplate outputs of as high as 1,200 megawatts. The benefits of nuclear energy were clear beyond just diminishing dependence on volatile oil and gas prices that were geopolitically fragile - the environmental movement had matured and come into its own in the early 1970s, moving merely beyond conservation as its primary goal but also starting to focus on broader environmental degradation, particularly pollution, which had led to environmental management becoming an often cabinet-level post in many democracies and the passage of laws in the vein of the United States' Clean Air Act, which had been amended numerous times on a bipartisan basis to expand the ability to combat air pollution, or its companion the Clean Water Act, passed by large majorities in a Democrat Congress and signed by a Republican President. Nuclear energy did not pollute the air and indeed did not give off any emissions other than water steam into the air and hot water discharge into adjacent bodies of water, and the promise of clean power that could lead to clear skies was appealing in addition to the broader strategic factors.

    The "Fission Fizzle," as detractors came to call it, reared its head by the end of the 1970s, when the Energy Policy Act was signed into law by Gerald Ford in the fall of 1979 and included billions to "expedite and complete ongoing nuclear energy projects," dismissed as a bailout for a major boondoggle - while this was perhaps harsh, it was not incorrect that without the capital injections of the EPA in 1979 and the ESA in 1981, a huge number of nuclear projects would have been severely delayed or outright cancelled. A variety of factions had coalesced by the end of the decade to pop the bubble of optimism around nuclear power. Plants saw bloated cost spirals, both from construction costs but also permitting difficulties and ratcheting regulations from the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Commission and equivalent agencies in Europe, which factored into the other component - public opposition. Partially, the opposition was due to the storage of nuclear waste, an understandably controversial subject that provoked "not-in-my-backyard" backlashes, but in large part it stemmed from a generation having grown up fearing nuclear bombs and apocalyptic war coming to believe that the risks of nuclear power were similar, in part thanks to the film The China Syndrome, which had been a huge hit and depicted a disastrous nuclear meltdown making much of Ohio uninhabitable. [1] Environmental groups, increasingly militant, protested nuclear power and tried to get projects blocked. In the United States, utilities often threw up their hands from financial strain, but in Europe, the ballot box became the preferred tool.

    There was a very real risk that nuclear energy could have been banned in several countries across Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s thanks to popular referenda, but the price spikes of 1978-80 took a lot of the wind out of those sails, creating a muddled result across the continent. Inspired by protests securing the cancellation of the Whyl plant in West Germany, activists turned to sponsoring a referendum to ban nuclear power in Austria before the single-reactor Zwentendorf plant could be finished narrowly failed, but the government never approved any additional plants; referenda in Sweden and Belgium fell shy, too. The Carnsore Point referendum in Ireland was thus seen as the last best hope for the total ban wing of the movement, trying to see to it that Ireland's first nuclear plant, planned for the eponymous point that was the southermost headland in southeast Ireland's County Wexford, placing it favorably near Cork and Dublin to provide power to both. The narrow failure of the referendum was the last time that nuclear energy was put to popular vote in Europe, but much like in Austria, Carnsore would be the only one of what had once been four planned nuclear energy plants in Ireland to ever be built, and like its Austrian cousin it would be shuttered in the mid-2010s, well before the end of its practical life after opening in 1992.

    Such issues did not of course concern Eastern Bloc states and they continued apace building nuclear energy plants through the 1980s, and wanting to keep pace on nuclear energy tech was a concern for both parties in the United States. Despite opposition from coal and oil interests, including Senators representing states strong in those industries, the Economic Stabilization Act went above and beyond the Energy Policy Act in providing financing for existing and proposed nuclear projects. In the end, it was mostly under-construction plants that were completed, most prominently the two-reactor Bellefonte Plant in Alabama, two-reactor Marble Hill in Indiana, two-reactor Yellow Creek in Mississippi, two-reactor Black Fox in Oklahoma, three-reactor Cherokee in Upstate South Carolina, the Satsop and Columbia River projects with two reactors apiece in Washington, and most importantly the four-reactor Hartsville Site in Tennessee, which duly became one of the largest power plants in the world with its completion, producing close to 5,000 megawatts of electricity for the TVA. While exciting projects such as the Alan Barton Plant in Alabama with its four 1,400 megawatt reactors had been cancelled earlier, in total, the EPA-ESA injection of capital into the nuclear energy industry saved 38 reactor projects at new or existing sites that otherwise would have been at risk of cancellation or suspension, a total of roughly 41,800 megawatts added to the national grid that would have been cancelled otherwise at "large or very large reactor"-class plants, primarily in the South. Most importantly, with the extra financial cushion, strategically important energy resiliency projects were now more immune to NIMBY activism and legal maneuvering, which allowed thousands of miles of new high-voltage power lines to be built to connect the new plants to population centers.

    Still, the promise of nuclear that had been dreamed of decades earlier did not come into being - by the time the last permitted nuclear plant began operations in 1993, there were 142 active reactors in the United States, about 40% more than would have existed without intervention but well shy of the nearly three hundred proposed reactors since 1953, with the majority failing to pan out. In total, a little less than three-tenths of American energy came from nuclear sources, well below what proponents had pushed for [2], compared to Eastern Bloc countries, or France, where the power type soon produced more than half if not more than two-thirds of total baseline energy. Still, though the nuclear revolution had perhaps not arrived at the baseline scale, the "Fission Fizzle" had fizzled; small, “breeder” reactors were tested at Clinch River, Tennessee by the Department of Energy throughout the 1980s and by the early 2000s were able to be deployed at existing plants to avoid the nuclear waste and expense of building larger plants and facilities, often producing 400-500 MW per reactor and requiring much less fuel while easily hooked into the existing grid infrastructure. In combination with greater efficiency and research in solar and wind power in the same decade, as well as the discovery of cheaper natural gas sources onshore, by the mid-1990s the United States had what was referred to as an "electricity glut" with some of the cheapest wholesale prices in the world, which would within the decade help drive the economic boom of the new millennium.

    [1] It of course did not help IOTL that this movie came out the same week as Three Mile Island, which ITTL is butterflied, but there's still some cultural impact and the financial difficulties of the nuclear energy industry were already pretty bad by 1977-78, with dozens of reactors cancelled in that period of time.
    [2] But better than OTL's 18-19%

    (This passage is as soap-boxy as I will probably get, but its a historical subject I feel strongly about. The failure to build a massive fleet of nuclear reactors in the 1970s and 1980s like we should have thanks to a combination of contractor bloat, regulatory creep but most importantly short-sighted 70s-style feel-good NIMBY environmentalism fueled by misinformation put us in the deep hole we're in now in trying to reconcile with climate change, which was in many ways inevitable with all the emissions since the early 19th century but was exacerbated by decisions made between 1960-90. By the late 1970s there's no way to entirely course correct mistakes made in part before the POD but ITTL things at least go somewhat better for the nuclear industry. /endrant)
     
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