Bicentennial Man: Ford '76 and Beyond

The Carey Doctrine Takes Shape - Part I
The Carey Doctrine Takes Shape - Part I

The formulation of a Presidential "doctrine" of foreign policy is not a formal process at all; some, such as Harry Truman, very deliberately declared one, whereas others were more the product of analysts studying for themes in the way a President approached foreign policy. Hugh Carey never outlined or articulated a definitive, clear doctrine in any major address or memorandum, but as early as the transition period and the months thereafter, his approach to international relations became quite clear, and a "Carey Doctrine" could be understood.

Carey, standing at the historical hinge-point of an Old Left and the New, was very much a Cold War liberal, though he personally described himself in a comprehensive mid-1990s biography as an "idealistic realist." Carey had supported the Vietnam War only to become one of the first Congressmen to turn against it, and he would lean on that example as his guiding light in approaching foreign policy - as he put it to Brzezinski in an early principals meeting, "A sound policy of our interests should be pursued until it no longer serves our interests, or those of our allies." The world was considerably more complicated in 1981 than it had been in 1961, with the final death-knell of colonialism and the replacement of Arab nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism in tandem with petroleum politics in the Middle East. It was for that reason that Carey's attention on foreign policy began largely with the deteriorating situation in the Gulf, and where his pragmatic but firm approach to international relations can be best seen.

Like Ford, Carey placed a great deal of value in the superstructure of the NATO alliance and the young G7, but unlike Ford, he was eager to do more with the European partners than largely contain his partnerships to the Anglosphere (it was partially Ford who had secured Canadian membership in that group, for a reason). Despite the domestic ideological differences between Republicans and the Labour Party of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, Ford had enjoyed excellent relations with his British counterparts, particularly the latter, but had never formed much of a bond with Denis Healey after his election in March of 1980, perhaps in part due to Ford's Presidency nearing its end. The relationship with Healey had been managed instead largely by George Bush, with whom the former Foreign Secretary did have good rapport with, and indeed it caused some frostiness for David Owen, Healey's Foreign Secretary, that Healey largely bypassed him to deal directly with Bush, Scowcroft or other American officials.

A new Presidential administration promised a new start. Katzenbach was in London within hours of being sworn in at Foggy Bottom to meet with the British Cabinet, and it was there that he was read into longstanding backchannel talks between the White House and Number 10 about how, exactly, to handle the crisis in Saudi Arabia. Since the terrorist attempt that blew up Saudi 770 above the Eastern Med, the situation in Riyadh and elsewhere in the Kingdom had only grown worse. Riots were a weekly occurrence, as were strikes of oilfield workers; terrorist attacks, often via teams of roving gunmen, against soldiers and policemen were commonplace in cities and towns, leaving many to refuse to come to work for fear of being killed. This led directly to a spike in both violent and petty crime, and ordinary civilians took to arming themselves with black market weaponry. A collapse in global oil prices since their summer 1980 peak and a small but unexpected glut of supply had hit Saudi state finances hard, and the lavish salaries to managerial and bureaucratic roles upon which the royal family had built its prestige with the urban middle class were frozen or in some cases cut, though no layoffs to the state sector occurred.

The response of the royal family was incoherent. King Khalid had depended upon the affluence of high oil profits to buy the compliance of the population in the first years of his reign and was genuinely flummoxed on how to respond; his brother and successor, the Prime Minister Prince Fahd, responded by tacking right, indulging clericalism while falling short of the revolutionary Islamism preferred by the Ikhwan, hoping that this indulgence would appease the radicals, but also sought to tie the regime more closely to the West, geopolitically. The tricky thing here, though, was that the West - the United States and United Kingdom in particular - had three considerably more reliable partners in the Middle East in Egypt, Israel and Iran, and developments in the late 1970s had satisfied them of the long-term stability of all three as a bulwark against the rising popularity of Arab socialist Ba'athism in Syria and Iraq, and the consequent shift in a pro-Soviet direction by those states, especially once it was clear Iran would not fall to the revolutionaries and Washington did not need a "backup" plan.

Katzenbach thus found himself seeing the outlines of a British-led agenda to reassert its influence east of the Suez in the Gulf by taking leadership of what happened next vis a vis "the Arabian Problem." Delaying action on this front was Healey's personal mistrust of Carey, and American Irish politicians in general, on the question of "full and total support on the question of Northern Ireland," which pushed a foreign trip by Carey to London all the way until late April, and a journey to Washington by Healey beyond that. Nonetheless, Katzenbach established a "clean line of communication" with Owen early on, found the trip satisfying, and they settled on continuing to support the Saudis "until it was no longer prudent" but agreed that having the Ghawar fields and the rest of eastern Arabia fall into the hands of the Ikhwan was unacceptable to global energy supplies after the great crisis of 1973 and the smaller shocks of the last few years, and began a project to connect Iranian leadership with Shia Saudi citizens along the Gulf in case a breakaway, Western-and-Iranian-backed Shia state would need to be formed to defend the world's access to oil supplies...
 
Interesting! Definitely curious to see how this pans out, Carey worrying the Saudis is interesting stuff politically wise!

I suppose the million dollar question is what does "Full and total support on the question of Northern Ireland" actually fucking mean in this context. Sans Mountbatten's death really ramping the Troubles up, the IRA is not yet public enemy number one for Britain but it's still a bugger of a thorn in the side of any British government. Healy and Carey getting along would be to their benefit in many ways but I have to understand why Healy regards Carey warily.
 
Interesting! Definitely curious to see how this pans out, Carey worrying the Saudis is interesting stuff politically wise!

I suppose the million dollar question is what does "Full and total support on the question of Northern Ireland" actually fucking mean in this context. Sans Mountbatten's death really ramping the Troubles up, the IRA is not yet public enemy number one for Britain but it's still a bugger of a thorn in the side of any British government. Healy and Carey getting along would be to their benefit in many ways but I have to understand why Healy regards Carey warily.
To be clear, Healey isn't gonna go blow up the special relationship because the US elected an Irish President, any more than a very old Etonian Tory in Macmillan did for Kennedy (Healey's gruff labor-left persona meshes well with Carey, anyways). He's just not really "there" yet on trusting Carey, a relationship that both sides know is going to define the early 80s and perhaps beyond, depending on how the 1983 UK and 1984 US elections go.
 
and began a project to connect Iranian leadership with Shia Saudi citizens along the Gulf in case a breakaway, Western-and-Iranian-backed Shia state would need to be formed to defend the world's access to oil supplies...​
Oooooh boy this could get interesting. I can't think of too many times I've seen this happen.
 
I’ll hazard a guess that the West does not want the Ikhwan in Riyadh and they plan to shepherd some mildly reformist minor royal onto the throne. Alternatively, they could just cut their losses and turn the eastern Shia state into a big military base
 
I’ll hazard a guess that the West does not want the Ikhwan in Riyadh and they plan to shepherd some mildly reformist minor royal onto the throne. Alternatively, they could just cut their losses and turn the eastern Shia state into a big military base

But as OTL Iran demonstrates what the West wants isn't necessarily what the West gets.
 
It’s been barely a week since the last chapter. This author uploads fairly consistently. Give him time, no need to badger.
I was going to say, we've gone through way longer stretches than this between updates - KingSweden has three massive timelines, each one of which could easily be considered a magnum opus, going on at the same time. It's really impressive.
 
I was going to say, we've gone through way longer stretches than this between updates - KingSweden has three massive timelines, each one of which could easily be considered a magnum opus, going on at the same time. It's really impressive.
Thank you, that is so kind!
It’s been barely a week since the last chapter. This author uploads fairly consistently. Give him time, no need to badger.
Just FYI it’s considered rude to ask when the next update is. Especially given the active status of the author.
Thank you. We'll have some updates here soon, hopefully. I got through my big push to the end of the Ford admin as I'd hoped to accomplish, mapping out 1981-82 as we speak
 
This is a great timeline! With the Ford winning in 76, giving the GOP a third consecutive win and you hinting that the Democrats would hold the Presidency for 12 years (1981-93 like the GOP of OTL did), I wonder, if assuming economic conditions stay similar to OTL and assuming a Republican victor in 1992, unlike Clinton in OTL, keeps their nose clean, we see a 3rd consecutive instance of a party keeping the White House for 12 years from 1993-2005. It would be pretty historic to say the least.
 
This is a great timeline! With the Ford winning in 76, giving the GOP a third consecutive win and you hinting that the Democrats would hold the Presidency for 12 years (1981-93 like the GOP of OTL did), I wonder, if assuming economic conditions stay similar to OTL and assuming a Republican victor in 1992, unlike Clinton in OTL, keeps their nose clean, we see a 3rd consecutive instance of a party keeping the White House for 12 years from 1993-2005. It would be pretty historic to say the least.
The nineties will probably be rougher because if I have to guess the Middle East trouble that happens to cause the mini recession in 92 will be worse than IRL because it’s setting up that Saudi Arabia is a lot more vulnerable and weaker in this TL.
 
Thank you, that is so kind!


Thank you. We'll have some updates here soon, hopefully. I got through my big push to the end of the Ford admin as I'd hoped to accomplish, mapping out 1981-82 as we speak
Sounds great. Sorry to be a bit rude, just really into this. It reminds me of "the Beaten Path", only it's High Carey instead of Jerry Litton. Your work has been fantastic so far.
 
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