The Carey Doctrine Takes Shape - Part I
The formulation of a Presidential "doctrine" of foreign policy is not a formal process at all; some, such as Harry Truman, very deliberately declared one, whereas others were more the product of analysts studying for themes in the way a President approached foreign policy. Hugh Carey never outlined or articulated a definitive, clear doctrine in any major address or memorandum, but as early as the transition period and the months thereafter, his approach to international relations became quite clear, and a "Carey Doctrine" could be understood.
Carey, standing at the historical hinge-point of an Old Left and the New, was very much a Cold War liberal, though he personally described himself in a comprehensive mid-1990s biography as an "idealistic realist." Carey had supported the Vietnam War only to become one of the first Congressmen to turn against it, and he would lean on that example as his guiding light in approaching foreign policy - as he put it to Brzezinski in an early principals meeting, "A sound policy of our interests should be pursued until it no longer serves our interests, or those of our allies." The world was considerably more complicated in 1981 than it had been in 1961, with the final death-knell of colonialism and the replacement of Arab nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism in tandem with petroleum politics in the Middle East. It was for that reason that Carey's attention on foreign policy began largely with the deteriorating situation in the Gulf, and where his pragmatic but firm approach to international relations can be best seen.
Like Ford, Carey placed a great deal of value in the superstructure of the NATO alliance and the young G7, but unlike Ford, he was eager to do more with the European partners than largely contain his partnerships to the Anglosphere (it was partially Ford who had secured Canadian membership in that group, for a reason). Despite the domestic ideological differences between Republicans and the Labour Party of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, Ford had enjoyed excellent relations with his British counterparts, particularly the latter, but had never formed much of a bond with Denis Healey after his election in March of 1980, perhaps in part due to Ford's Presidency nearing its end. The relationship with Healey had been managed instead largely by George Bush, with whom the former Foreign Secretary did have good rapport with, and indeed it caused some frostiness for David Owen, Healey's Foreign Secretary, that Healey largely bypassed him to deal directly with Bush, Scowcroft or other American officials.
A new Presidential administration promised a new start. Katzenbach was in London within hours of being sworn in at Foggy Bottom to meet with the British Cabinet, and it was there that he was read into longstanding backchannel talks between the White House and Number 10 about how, exactly, to handle the crisis in Saudi Arabia. Since the terrorist attempt that blew up Saudi 770 above the Eastern Med, the situation in Riyadh and elsewhere in the Kingdom had only grown worse. Riots were a weekly occurrence, as were strikes of oilfield workers; terrorist attacks, often via teams of roving gunmen, against soldiers and policemen were commonplace in cities and towns, leaving many to refuse to come to work for fear of being killed. This led directly to a spike in both violent and petty crime, and ordinary civilians took to arming themselves with black market weaponry. A collapse in global oil prices since their summer 1980 peak and a small but unexpected glut of supply had hit Saudi state finances hard, and the lavish salaries to managerial and bureaucratic roles upon which the royal family had built its prestige with the urban middle class were frozen or in some cases cut, though no layoffs to the state sector occurred.
The response of the royal family was incoherent. King Khalid had depended upon the affluence of high oil profits to buy the compliance of the population in the first years of his reign and was genuinely flummoxed on how to respond; his brother and successor, the Prime Minister Prince Fahd, responded by tacking right, indulging clericalism while falling short of the revolutionary Islamism preferred by the Ikhwan, hoping that this indulgence would appease the radicals, but also sought to tie the regime more closely to the West, geopolitically. The tricky thing here, though, was that the West - the United States and United Kingdom in particular - had three considerably more reliable partners in the Middle East in Egypt, Israel and Iran, and developments in the late 1970s had satisfied them of the long-term stability of all three as a bulwark against the rising popularity of Arab socialist Ba'athism in Syria and Iraq, and the consequent shift in a pro-Soviet direction by those states, especially once it was clear Iran would not fall to the revolutionaries and Washington did not need a "backup" plan.
Katzenbach thus found himself seeing the outlines of a British-led agenda to reassert its influence east of the Suez in the Gulf by taking leadership of what happened next vis a vis "the Arabian Problem." Delaying action on this front was Healey's personal mistrust of Carey, and American Irish politicians in general, on the question of "full and total support on the question of Northern Ireland," which pushed a foreign trip by Carey to London all the way until late April, and a journey to Washington by Healey beyond that. Nonetheless, Katzenbach established a "clean line of communication" with Owen early on, found the trip satisfying, and they settled on continuing to support the Saudis "until it was no longer prudent" but agreed that having the Ghawar fields and the rest of eastern Arabia fall into the hands of the Ikhwan was unacceptable to global energy supplies after the great crisis of 1973 and the smaller shocks of the last few years, and began a project to connect Iranian leadership with Shia Saudi citizens along the Gulf in case a breakaway, Western-and-Iranian-backed Shia state would need to be formed to defend the world's access to oil supplies...