12.31 The fall of Greece, Truly a Greek Tragedy
The meetings with the Greek government in February had resulted in Sir Antony Eden making a pledge that the British and their allies would hold Crete as a base from which the Greek government could fight on if the mainland and the Peloponnese fell to the Germans and the Italians. To this end confidential arrangements had been made to evacuate government institutions in the event that Athens was threatened and to lift off as much of the Greek Army as possible. Plans were also made conversely for Greek soldiers to disappear into their native land with arms and ammunition cached for a guerrilla war.
Fifty thousand Greek recruits were in the Peloponnese under training and forty thousand volunteered to go to Crete or Egypt when asked by their officers to form the core of a new army. Of these almost thirty thousand were shipped to Crete and Egypt prior to the final collapse of the Greek defence and within a month a further five thousand Greek soldiers had arrived via vessels large and small. A large proportion of these men were from the Greek Fifth Division from Crete, These men formed a cadre for the rebuilding of a Cretan Division.
Another pledge to Greece had been to supply as many arms as possible to them. These were principally Italian small arms recently captured in North Africa along with copious amounts of ammunition. Also handed over were several dozen of the small Italian L3/35 Tank these were to be sent to Crete where they would be used to train Greek troops and provide some much needed defensive fire power as mobile machine gun posts. In early march the Greek government requested a further twelve thousand Rifles and as many sub machine guns and light machine guns from Italian captured stocks for the arming of call up of older and younger men on Crete to form local defence companies. The RAF were particularly interested in this development as it was hoped that these men could be used to increase the security around the RAF installations and take a measure of the burden of guarding, if not defending, these assets from the limited number of RAF personnel currently available for the task.
Back in Benghazi a number of Italian M 13 tanks were being refurbished ready for shipping to the Greek mainland early in April.
Whilst British diplomats, including Antony Eden during his tour, had acted as intermediaries between the Greeks and the Yugoslavs, no coordinated defence plan had been agreed between the two countries and precious little liaison undertaken by the end of March. The Greeks had still not decided to withdraw from Albania or Thrace and were relying on the Yugoslavs to hold or at least slow any German assault, without any real knowledge of the Yugoslavian defence posture. The Greeks just did not seem willing to comprehend how difficult it would be for the Yugoslavs to mount a viable defence when they could be attacked simultaneously, having common frontiers with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Germany and Italy, by axis forces from five different directions. Any assault into Yugoslavia would in simple terms be overwhelming.
As the AOC in Greece for the RAF D’Albiac had been given intelligence appraisals for the aircraft available to his allies and enemies. Combined the Greek and Yugoslavian air forces could muster less than one hundred aircraft whereas the best estimate for the German Luftflotte 4 alone was some twelve hundred aircraft without calling on the one hundred and fifty Italian aircraft based in Albania or Luftwaffe assets already in Italy.
Against this D’ Albiac could field a total of ten squadrons spread throughout Greece amounting to less than two hundred aircraft of which often less than half were operational. The northern airfields were still little more than quagmires having not yet dried from the winter rains and spring thaw, this situation would not improve for some weeks and D’Albiac was only too well aware that those were weeks he was unlikely to be given. One improvement at least for the fighters working further south, was that an AMES/GCI unit had been set up to the North of Kalabanka, this now afforded the fighters based at Trikala at least some warning of approaching enemy aircraft. D’Albiac conscious of how vulnerable and precious the AMES units were had ensured with Tedder’s support that there were firm plans in place to at least evacuate the precious personnel from the AMES station even if the equipment had to be abandoned and destroyed. With another AMES unit to the south covering Athens and its cluster of airfields the air defence should have been fairly adequate unfortunately the poor state of communications existing even in central Greece was a huge impediment to the efficacy of the system.
So it was that at five fifteen on April the sixth that the Axis hammer fell on both Yugoslavia and Greece.
The defence of Greece depended on the defence of Yugoslavia and this collapsed so that by the end of the second day Axis forces had crossed the Vader and straddled it. By the ninth of April German forces had thrust down the river to the city and port of Salonika. This cut off the entire Greek Army in Eastern Macedonia and would force those units to surrender. Further to the west through Yugoslavia another German thrust was aimed at the Monastir gap, this gap was not just a geographical feature but also a genuine gap between the Greek forces on the west in Albania and those to the East in Thrace and Macedonia. Militarily being unable to close this gap the fate of Greece was already sealed.
Under D’Abiac’s control the RAF squadrons in Greece attempted heroically to slow the German advance by both attacking the bridges over the Vader river and the routes leading to the Monastir gap. However even the weather was against then blanketing the intended targets in cloud and mist. Despite great sacrifices by the bomber crews the RAF had little success until the fourteenth of April when Wellington bombers from Thirty Eight squadron managed to drop a vital bridge over the Vardar river, unfortunately in reality this was a week to late if it was to help the Greeks in Thrace.
On the fifteenth of April Luftwaffe aircraft operating from forward bases had attacked the airfields at Niamata, Despite the AMES station north of Kalabaka directing a squadron of Hurricanes to defend the bomber airfield every aircraft from One One Three squadron was destroyed on the ground. By the nineteenth the position was untenable, the AMES unit sited north of Kablaka had had to pack up and withdraw hastily the day before to avoid being overrun. This left Thirty Three squadron and it’s Hurricanes based just south at Trikala very exposed and they were duly heavily strafed on the nineteenth. Having put up a valiant defence, D’Albiac ordered all remaining Squadrons to fly back to the airfields around Athens. The Ground personnel executed their pre-planned withdrawal, utterly destroying anything that could not be taken with them. With the prior permission of the Greek Government this including using explosives to crater the landing fields. On the Bomber bases this was expediently achieved by burying any unused bombs and detonating them remotely. On other airfields demolition charges had been accumulated and prepared in advance.
Evacuated with the RAF personnel were as many of the survivors of the Royal Helenic Airforce as could be persuaded to go. Unfortunately precious few of the gallant Greek fighter pilots who had been flying a mixed bag of Polish built PZL P24 fighters, Gloster Gladiator mark ones and the few Bloch MB 151’s delivered before the fall of France had survived to fight again.
The battle had not so far been totally one sided with the RAF Hurricane squadrons taking a steady toll of the enemy fighters and bombers and by the best assessments available at the time were actually keeping the balance sheet in the allies favour. Unfortunately in this theatre of operations at this time the Luftwaffe again enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in numbers and was in the short term able to shrug off the losses as they gained local air superiority.
With all the remaining fighter squadrons now being concentrated around Athens, D’Albiac could quickly call in reinforcements from as far as Egypt via the airfields on Crete. The AMES unit from Kalabaka had somehow made it back to the area south of the Thermopylae line and proceeded to set up to provide additional RDF/GCI cover for Attica.
It was the air battles fought by the RAF over Athens in this period up until the twenty sixth of April that came to define the RAF’s role in the defence of Greece. The effort and sacrifice made in these days came to lay the lie to the later accusation that Britain and her allies had simply abandoned the Greek people to their fate. The continued use of the port of Piraeus for the evacuation of both civilians and military personnel was only made possible by the presence of the RAF Hurricane fighters defending the city and port. Whilst the RDF stations to the north of the city remained in place and operational the majority of the attacking formations could be intercepted, even if the odds were unfavourable.
Notable air battles took place on the nineteenth of April when three major attacks on Athens and Piraeus were made, each attack was over fifty aircraft in a mixed bomber and fighter force, no attack reached its target and through the day the RAF lost two Hurricanes with three damaged whilst claiming twelve enemy destroyed (later verified as ten confirmed kills). The next day a raid of Me 110’s on Tatoi airfield to the north of Athens at four thirty in the morning caught and destroyed a full dozen Blenheims on the grass. Three subsequent attacks that day on the airfields and Athens were all intercepted and driven off with more losses inflicted than received.
The last raid of the day was by far the largest and was a fitting climax to this pivotal day of air fighting. Over a hundred enemy aircraft comprising Ju. 88’s, Me. 110’s and Me. 109’s headed to attack the harbour at Piraeus and the shipping therein. Hurricanes from both 80 and 33 squadron numbering a total of twenty one fighters directed by RDF managed a text book interception with the 33 squadron Hurricanes attacking the escorting Me. 109’s and the aircraft of 80 Squadron concentrating on the Ju. 88’s and Me. 110’s. Again the loss ratio was over four to one in favour of the RAF in this last raid of the day, the RAF lost five hurricanes shot down and a further two written off on landing. One of the damaged aircraft was flown by the badly injured squadron Leader of 33 squadron, who was escorted back to a crash landing by his wingman Flight Officer Roald Dahl who had only joined the squadron a day before from sick leave.
Squadron Leader ‘Pat’ Pattle had put his wingman in for a DFC for saving his life by shooting down no less than two Me 109’s that were attacking the squadron leader’s damaged aircraft, this damage having been inflicted by the rear gunner of a Me. 110 even as it was hit and destroyed by the rounds of 20mm cannon shells fired from the squadron leaders Hurricane. Though he would recover Pattle would be out of action for weeks due to his wounds and injuries.
Soon afterwards with the loss of the RDF stations D’Albiac was left with no choice but to send his remaining aircraft south to the airfield at Argos.
Under Tedder’s directions Argo as an airfield had under gone a transformation in the prior weeks. Local labour had been mobilise and tens of thousands of sand bags had been filled to build revetments to protect the aircraft in dispersals around the field. Camouflage netting and other devises had been used to help hide the extent of the airfields facilities. Emplacements for AA guns had been built even though at the time there were precious few, now those emplacements were being filled by those guns that had made it over the Corinth canal in the withdrawal from the north.
The airfield at Argos had taken on a key role in the channelling of these transient reinforcements and also acted as a staging post for the now accelerating stream of aircraft carrying essential personnel and VIP’s out of Greece. Bristol Bombays, Dehaviland Flamingos and some RAF Loadstars carried the bulk of these evacuees but incredible work was also done under the auspices of the RAF by two BOAC flying boats. These two Sunderlands had been co-opted from the airline and were crewed by the BOAC crews taken from the Horseshoe service to the Far East. As the Flying boat on the Horseshoe service landed on the Nile at Cairo it’s crew were met, bundled into a car and taken to Alexandria. There they would change places on either “Cambria” or “Coorong” with the now exhausted crew who had been doing the Crete to Greece shuttle. This crew would be driven back to Cairo and would then crew the aircraft on the next leg of the Horseshoe route. This Cretan ‘service’ commenced on the twenty second of April and came to a halt on the fifth of May. Combining with the RAF Sunderlands, which specialised in picking up parties from remote bays and other little known corners of Greece, these two BOAC aircraft lifted off some four hundred and sixty nine persons of the total of a total of just short of nine hundred evacuated by this means. Included those evacuated were the King of Greece and other invaluable people. Though not recorded in the aircrafts logbook one RAF Sunderland was reported to have disembarked the incredible figure of eighty four passengers on arrival at Suda bay, as opposed to the aircrafts stated maximum emergency capacity of thirty. Later when asked how he knew when the BOAC aircraft had reached its load capacity one crewman quipped “when the water started lapping over the door cill, ‘dear chap,’ then I would slam the door shut and the pilot would set off”
Compared to those brought off by ship the numbers carried by the flying boats was a ‘drop in the Aegean sea’, but a very important drop indeed.
Not only did the RN make runs to small ports and harbours using MTB’s and Destroyers but also any available Greek ship was encouraged and in some cases coerced into heading for Crete and North Africa. The Vessels themselves were as valuable to the allies as any content and the RAF on Crete was stretched to the limit providing not only air cover but also tracking the myriad vessels whilst trying to differentiate friend from foe.
On April the twenty Sixth soon after first light The Argos RDF AMES unit picked up several large formations of Enemy aircraft approaching. Scrambling the duty squadron of Hurricane’s they had hardly taken off before calling ‘Tally Ho’ and informing their controllers that gliders and paratroopers were landing at both end of the Corinth Canal Bridge barely thirty miles from Argos. Every available fighter was then scrambled and the remaining bombers loaded in their revetments ready for a quick take off.
The Greek AA guns at the bridge were preoccupied with the Ju.87’s that were doing their best to silence the guns, dividing his squadron the Co sent half after the Stukas and their escort and ordered the rest to concentrate on the Ju. 52’s and the gliders. Despite the best efforts of the Greek AA guns and the Fighters it was soon apparent that the Greek defenders would be driven from the northern end of the bridge. By mid morning the last of the defenders on the canals northern bank set the fuses and retreated over the bridge. Which was dropped by a series of demolition charges that sent the entire metal span plunging to the bottom of the deep canal cut. Despite this action the German managed to force a crossing at Patras further to the west making the fall of the Peloponnese inevitable. The airfield had Argos would be abandoned and the aircraft flown out as the remaining ground staff headed for Nauplia and other small harbours where the navy awaited them.
The loss of five complete AMES units equipment during the Greek campaign and withdrawal was serious but the retrieval of nearly all the skilled AMES personnel was in itself a vital success.
By the end of April Greece had fallen and Germany and her allies were cementing their control on the country whilst the Greek Government in exile tried to sort out the chaos caused by the evacuation. A large portion of the evacuees both military and civilian would need to be transhipped to Egypt to lessen the burden on Crete.
