A Destiny Realized: A Timeline of Afsharid Iran and Beyond

kholieken

Banned
A partially related question Kholieken, but I've always wondered how conversion to Christianity for Han Chinese differs from conversion to Islam. As far as I'm aware, there is no separate "Christian" grouping for ethnically Chinese Christians as there is for Muslims. Is this due to the larger influence of Islam in China's history or something else ?

No one exactly know, there could be many cause :
- Muslim marriage rules, which ban Muslim woman marrying non-Muslim
- large number of Muslims, even in China, Chinese Hui could easily maintain religious tie with Turkic-Uighur or other Muslims, these especially so in Indonesia and Malaysia. while Christian community is small and minority.
- modern Christianity contact with China is after Christianity already dealt with Modernity and Secularism, so they could absorb modernizing impulse while respecting of old tradition.
- modern Christianity contact with China is carried by numerous protestant groups, who accept Chinese priest and more tolerant to tradition
- Modern Muslims, since 1920s rather more politically connected to Muslim world and failed to embrace modernity, secularism and nationalism
- Hajj, ties through pilgrimage made inter-Muslims ties far stronger
- the separated nature of numerous different Church, making convert must deal with people on different Church and non-Christian Chinese, while Muslims convert had large community which he could enter and be embraced.
- Chiang Kai Shek, and many Christian Chinese leaders during tumoltuous time in 20th centuries. making Christianity part of 'history of China'
 
Can we have a new map please? I'm not quite sure exactly what territories this new resurgent Iran has atm.
I've just about finished the updated world map which will be posted with the next uodate.
The only one with 'evidence' remaining? Crud, sounds like something real nasty happened in TTL's future at some point.
Sometimes records just don't survive, even without catastrophic events. So something big could happen, or not.
So long as they use the types that have a high melting point, or it will be like that Chocalate Mosque in Charlie and the Chocolate Factory.:closedeyesmile:

I am keen to see which ethnic group comes to benefit the most in this region in terms of population growth. With my view being the Assyrians, as the economic prosperity and political stability will allow them to develop without much disturbance.
A chocolate mosque sounds like something the Daily Mail would disapprove of...

Minorities are likely to do better than OTL under a government which has established a somewhat more thorough rule of law than existed OTL, but things may change in the 19th century as the position of Christians within the Iranian Empire shifts as European power grows. They may well act as conduits of European influence and attract some, shall we say unwanted attention. This isn't necessarily a given however, and depends on what form European influence takes and how the Iranian government and society reacts.
Oh, re: legal reform l have an idea or two.
Well I would always be happy to hear some suggestions.
Lovely to see TTL Iran is in much better position and not doing too bad for themselves, comparing to OTL. However, it's not really good time to rest their laurels on the throne, certain forces in the West and the certain Northern Bear will definitely turned their sights towards Persia in the age of Imperialism. With TTL's Iran remaining strong, they might refrained from trying to exerting their influences. That's assuming Iran remained strong.

On different topic, what happens to Egypt in the meantime?
Well, considering that at this point in OTL, Iran was a shrunken, half-nomadic state which was still in the midst of unrest, they are doing better indeed. The Age of Imperialism hasn't quite begun yet, and with Britain not gaining supremacy in India it is likely to look very different, especially in Iran and Central Asia. Iran could of course do worse than OTL, bit considering the loss of economic control and eventual de-facto partition she suffered, along with Russian occupation, she has room to do much better.

Egypt is still within the Ottoman Empire. I might look into certain provinces of the Ottoman Empire in more detail in an upcoming update, as the Empire is arguably the second-most affected country by the POD so far.
No one exactly know, there could be many cause :
- Muslim marriage rules, which ban Muslim woman marrying non-Muslim
- large number of Muslims, even in China, Chinese Hui could easily maintain religious tie with Turkic-Uighur or other Muslims, these especially so in Indonesia and Malaysia. while Christian community is small and minority.
- modern Christianity contact with China is after Christianity already dealt with Modernity and Secularism, so they could absorb modernizing impulse while respecting of old tradition.
- modern Christianity contact with China is carried by numerous protestant groups, who accept Chinese priest and more tolerant to tradition
- Modern Muslims, since 1920s rather more politically connected to Muslim world and failed to embrace modernity, secularism and nationalism
- Hajj, ties through pilgrimage made inter-Muslims ties far stronger
- the separated nature of numerous different Church, making convert must deal with people on different Church and non-Christian Chinese, while Muslims convert had large community which he could enter and be embraced.
- Chiang Kai Shek, and many Christian Chinese leaders during tumoltuous time in 20th centuries. making Christianity part of 'history of China'
This is all quite interesting. I wonder to what extent Chinese Christianity is syncretic with existing beliefs.
 
Europe After the Seven Years War - 1763 to 1783
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Europe’s Diplomatic History After the Seven Years War


The Treaty of Paris, as well as the associated treaties which brought the Seven Years War to a close, had on the face of it brought Europe back into the equilibrium she had enjoyed before the War of Austrian Succession. France was confirmed as the primary European power, with both the ability to fight well and the ability to financially back a partner. Austria had regained Silesia and had dismantled Prussia, sending the remnant of Brandenburg backing to the ranks of the middle German powers, leaving her as Central Europe’s greatest power once again. Britain maintained her naval supremacy and had leveraged her losses within Europe itself with triumphs in North America. Examining some of the aspects of the post-war settlement, one could be forgiven for thinking it was a return to the situation which Europe had found itself in since the death of Louis XIV.


However, this would be to ignore the great changes that had in fact taken place. Russia, previously assumed to be a backwater and a small player in the game of European great-power politics had impressed the other courts of Europe with her performance against Frederick the Great’s army. Although she had not gained a great deal of territory from the war, questions now seemed to arise over her influence in Poland, as well as further expansionist ambitions to her west. France had in fact gained little from the war, and the strain of disasters such as Rossbach weighed heavily on French honour. It was now apparent to some in the French government that far from being Europe’s primary power, that she could barely hold her own against Great Britain, and would be vulnerable to a combination of Britain and Austria in the future. France was also left with a great deal of debt which she could ill-afford. And although Sweden had gained significant territories in Germany, her performance had been disappointing to say the least. The situation that Europe found itself in was in fact, a highly unstable one which almost invited attempts from each great power to become the primary power.


Having proved her military might, Russia now concentrated on the expansion of her territory and influence. When Russia found herself at war it the Ottoman Empire to the south, she attempted to gain lands around the Black Sea, as well as navigation rights for her merchants. However, Russian ambitions floundered on surprisingly stiff resistance on the part of the Ottomans, and in return for three years of costly war, Russia had nothing to show for her efforts [1]. Likewise, in the West, when the Russian Tsar Peter III attempted to advance the candidacy of Henry of Brandenburg for the Polish throne, his machinations were thwarted by the Franco-Austrian alliance, who preferred a Wettin candidate for the throne. In Sweden, Russia’s attempts to influence a divided administration proved more successful even in the wake of Sweden’s gains in the Seven Years War, but with the accession of Gustav III and the resulting absolutism of the Swedish government, it appeared that even here Russian interests had encountered a setback. Having opened a number of doors through her victory in the Seven Years War, Russia had largely seen them shut again by the machinations of France, and as a result began to take the consideration of an alliance with Great Britain more seriously.


The improvement in Anglo-Russian relations was to prove profitable indeed for the United Kingdom. In the wake of upheaval following her defeat in the Seven Years War, Pitt’s government collapsed and was replaced by a government headed by the King’s favourite Bute. The British government now aimed to maintain its defence expenditure, determined to emerge as the victor in any future war with France. British governments tended towards a policy which prioritised gains outside of Europe while attempting to break the alliance of France and Austria. In the Anglo-Dutch War of 1777-78, Britain appeared to recover some of the honour which had been lost in the Seven Years War. Taking advantage of a growing rift between Austria and France over the former’s attempts to trade Bavaria for the Austrian Netherlands, launched a war against the Netherlands, supposedly to prevent the latter from falling into the French sphere of influence. In reality, Britain warred to gain a number of the Netherland’s colonies, most notably Ceylon and Malacca. Britain’s naked aggression as well as her success both shocked and impressed the other Great Powers respectively, and she was once again taken seriously into consideration on the Continent.


Britain’s expansionist success once again pushed France and Austria together, with the former concerned about British territorial ambitions overseas and the latter concerned with British overtures toward Russia. France acquiesced to the Austrian exchange of the Southern Netherlands for Bavaria, a move which increased the latter’s power within the German territories of the Holy Roman Empire, in exchange for a renewal of the Franco-Austrian alliance which now guaranteed support in the event of a Russian move into Poland. While both powers had gained a great deal of power and influence in the years following the Seven Years War, this was not enough to prevent the general feeling of encirclement which both powers now faced. Despite their differences, both recognised that against the threat that the growing power of both Russia and Britain presented, cooperation was preferable to rivalry in Central Europe.


[1] – What Russia managed to gain in OTL of course were ports on the Black Sea, as well as the destruction of Ottoman influence in the Pontic Steppe, as well as navigation rights in the Black Sea and the Bosporus.


France


France’s “close call” in the Seven Years War, which had verged dangerously close to defeat at some points, had produced an increased desire for reform in France. The energetic Choiseul focused primarily on developing France’s naval strength, to ensure that in any future conflict she would be better placed to defend her territories overseas, while Louis XV continued to guarantee the weaker European powers of Poland, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. There was a recognition that French objectives required both a powerful army and navy, though despite France’s large economy, she did not have the resources for both. Indeed, in the period following the Seven Years War, the maintenance of her position in Europe was thanks as much to her continued alliance with Austria as much as any other factor. Various chief ministers attempted to strengthen the financial basis of France’s government, introducing new taxes and rationalising the existing system. By the time that Turgot was replaced as Chief Minister, France’s budget now ran a small surplus, and was able to begin paying down the government’s enormous debt burden [2].


Behind this rosy picture of course, problems brewed. The increased tax burden disproportionately fell on the lower classes. Regular consumer goods were taxed as much as luxury goods, making the lot in life of France’s peasantry and poorer classes more difficult, while the well-off consumers of luxury goods (who could well afford to pay more tax) largely escaped tax increases. An increase in the number of landless peasants were only partially offset by an increase in cultivated land and relatively small amounts of migration to New France. France was becoming an increasingly unequal society, in which the wealthier classes were amassing more and more wealth, in contrast to a lower class which saw living standards decline in the period. Unlike in Russia, France saw no great outbreaks of discontent among the people, but resentment was beginning to brew not only among the peasantry but among the more prosperous members of the “Third Estate”, who resented the injustice of the Ancien Regime. To other nations in Europe, France still appeared to be something of a colossus, but more than effort this was a colossus with feet of clay.


[2] In OTL, it perhaps goes without saying, the French national debt was measured in billions of livres by this point as she ran an enormous deficit. This was mainly due to French efforts in the American War of Independence, but losses in OTL’s Seven Year War may have contributed.



Austria


Austria had perhaps gained more than any other European Power from its victory in the Seven Years War. As well as the destruction of Prussia as a threat, Austria had also regained the rich province of Silesia, which would enable Austria to greatly improve its financial position which had been much worsened by the war. Unlike in France, the Austrian Government attempted to tax the wealthier orders of society in order to increase revenues, and after years of political struggle with the Hungarian Diet had managed to both increase the tax paid by the upper classes of Hungary, but to also reduce the burden on the peasantry. While Maria Theresa did not manage to abolish serfdom in the way that her son and successor Joseph suspected she desired to, she had nevertheless done much to improve the lot of the peasantry in Austria. This occurred simultaneously with a growth in Austrian government revenues and a growth in the army, which was by the late 1770s strong enough to make France think twice about the prospect of war with Austria.


Austria’s acquisition of Bavaria in 1778 pointed toward a new direction in Hapsburg development, as Joseph desired Austria to become a more “German” power, incorporating more of the Empire’s German population into Austria proper. An admirer of the late Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph had, following the death of his mother and co-monarch, pursued an army-first policy, while attempting to rationalise administration and taxation within Austria itself. Although he encountered much in the way of opposition from the Magnates of Austria’s Empire, especially in the eastern territories outside of the Holy Roman Empire, Joseph’s early success in Bavaria paid off as he was seen as a strong monarch by the nobility, as well as by foreign rulers. The success of Austria in strengthening her position had even led some philosophes to speculate whether it was she rather than France who was becoming the primary power of Central Europe. Although unrealistic in light of France’s larger economy and far superior naval strength, it was testament enough to the strides that Austria had made in the wake of the Seven Years War in establishing her position in the European order.


Russia


Russia’s performance in the Seven Years War had proved to the rest of Europe that she was just as capable of any other European power when it came to the business of warfare. Indeed, she had impressed Europe greatly with the bravery of her troops and the effectiveness of her cavalry and skirmishers. However, with the death of Elizabeth soon after the war came the new Tsar Peter III, who was significantly more controversial than many both before and after him [3]. From the beginning of his reign, he had more seriously than any other of his European counterparts pushed to weaken the privileged classes. Within a year of becoming Tsar, he had taken steps to reform the judiciary, proclaimed religious freedom and a measure of secularisation, and had even gone so far as to criminalise the murder of serfs by their masters, although these measures were somewhat softened by the ending of compulsory service for the nobility. To compound this, he had increased the wariness of the other great powers toward him with a ham-fisted attempt to restore parts of Schleswig to his Duchy of Holstein.


The seemingly radical actions of Peter had created a great deal of resentment amongst Russia’s nobility. Just how far did Peter intend to take his programme of reform, and what would this mean for the position of Russia’s nobility? Although the pace of change slowed down somewhat as Peter’s reign went on, he was nevertheless seen as threatening by the church and the nobility, both of whom considered Peter to be something of a radical. An attempted rebellion in 1768 was despatched fairly easily, though it did indirectly lead to the less successful war with the Ottoman Empire, which saw a great amount of blood and treasure expended for meagre gain. Between this and Peter’s failure at increasing Russia’s influence elsewhere, he built on existing relations with his wife’s homeland of Britain while concentrating on internal reform. Peter died in 1781, though despite the failures of his foreign policy and his unpopularity among the nobility, he was remembered fondly by Russia’s peasantry who remembered his reign as a time of relative peace and prosperity in comparison to the tumult that followed him.


[3] – So what happened to Catherine the Great of OTL? I figure that by this point the butterflies would have affected marriages, so she happily doesn’t marry the future Tsar Peter III, who has instead married the daughter of King George II, Louisa.

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The world circa 1780 (Full sized map found here)​

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - A brief skim of how Europe is doing since the Seven Years War. Pushed out of India, Britain has took to taking what she can from the Netherlands, though Indonesia remains outside of her grasp for the time being. Austria appears to be one of the big winners so far, holding onto Silesia and successfully trading the Southern Netherlands (now its own kingdom ruled by Charles Theodore, whose attempt to bequeath areas to his bastards did not end as he had wanted it to).

There will likely be a few oversights on the map, but it should be a good look onto the political situation in the Middle East and beyond. The next update will be the last of this "cycle", and then we will be onto the last stretch of the 19th century.
 
Having proved her military might, Russia now concentrated on the expansion of her territory and influence. When Russia found herself at war it the Ottoman Empire to the south, she attempted to gain lands around the Black Sea, as well as navigation rights for her merchants. However, Russian ambitions floundered on surprisingly stiff resistance on the part of the Ottomans, and in return for three years of costly war, Russia had nothing to show for her efforts [1].
The seemingly radical actions of Peter had created a great deal of resentment amongst Russia’s nobility. Just how far did Peter intend to take his programme of reform, and what would this mean for the position of Russia’s nobility? Although the pace of change slowed down somewhat as Peter’s reign went on, he was nevertheless seen as threatening by the church and the nobility, both of whom considered Peter to be something of a radical. An attempted rebellion in 1768 was despatched fairly easily, though it did indirectly lead to the less successful war with the Ottoman Empire, which saw a great amount of blood and treasure expended for meagre gain. Between this and Peter’s failure at increasing Russia’s influence elsewhere, he built on existing relations with his wife’s homeland of Britain while concentrating on internal reform. Peter died in 1781, though despite the failures of his foreign policy and his unpopularity among the nobility, he was remembered fondly by Russia’s peasantry who remembered his reign as a time of relative peace and prosperity in comparison to the tumult that followed him.

I am wondering if this will make future Tsars adopt a Eastern Focused foreign policy. Which could have a lot implications for North America and pacific as a whole
 
I forget, is there a particular reason why the American Revolution hasn't happened yet, or is it just butterflies delaying it?

One of the reasons the American Revolution happened was because the spectre of French invasion came to an end thanks to the SYW and Americans no longer required British protection. ITTL, the spectre of French invasion still exists.
 
I see a Russian-less Alaska and a British-less Australia.

It'll be interesting to see how these two places fare.

EDIT: I shall also await the rise of the Maori superpower. :openedeyewink:
 
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I am wondering if this will make future Tsars adopt a Eastern Focused foreign policy. Which could have a lot implications for North America and pacific as a whole
It's definitely a possibility. That being said, the lack of a Prussia in Germany may make Russian advances westward a more realistic possibility in the years to come. While the Ottoman Empire won't be the direction of relatively easy pickings that she was in OTL from 1774 onward, there is still the possibility for expansion in that direction, but is more likely to be balanced.
I forget, is there a particular reason why the American Revolution hasn't happened yet, or is it just butterflies delaying it?
One of the reasons the American Revolution happened was because the spectre of French invasion came to an end thanks to the SYW and Americans no longer required British protection. ITTL, the spectre of French invasion still exists.
What Indicus said, more or less. This isn't to say that there isn't satisfaction within the Colonies at their situation, but with France remaining a major presence on the North American Continent, they aren't about to spurn the protection of the mother country. This could lead to a number of interesting options for British America in the future as her population and economic power vis-a-vis the mother country, as well as French North America grows.
I see a Russian-less Alaska and a British-less Australia.

It'll be interesting to see how these two places fare.

EDIT: I shall also await the rise of the Maori superpower. :openedeyewink:
Both colonies were established after the current point in the TL, 1784 and 1788 respectively.
While both of these were indeed colonised later than the current point in the timeline, Australia is not likely to be colonised for some time yet due to the continuing British hold of the Thirteen Colonies. There is likely to be contact due to whalers and other such ocean-going travellers as there is in New Zealand, but settlement of Australasia will likely be delayed, leading to huge butterflies in the region.

Also, I'll just confirm right here that Aotearoa will be the sole superpower by 2018 in the timeline.
 
Africa - 1750 to 1783
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The Birth of the Sultanate of Zanzibar and its Effects

The final conquest of Fort Jesus in 1729 marked the end of Portuguese influence in the Swahili Coast of Africa, and seemed to suggest a new beginning of Omani influence in the region. However, as the Iranians intervened in a Civil War in Oman, her attention was distracted and she was ultimately left as a satellite state of the Iranian regime. The supporters of the Busaidis, who had been defeated in their attempts to rule Oman, relocated far beyond the reach of Iranian influence in the Omani-ruled islands of Zanzibar off the coast of East Africa. By the 1760s, the town of al-Laja had grown to one of several thousand inhabitants, the majority of whom had fled Oman when Iran had taken control of the country [1]. Originally political refugees escaping Iranian domination, the Arab community of Zanzibar had quickly took to the role of traders, continuing Oman’s tradition of maritime trade and acting as the entrepôt between the Swahili Coast and the rest of the world.


The emerging Sultanate of Zanzibar was not the most important state in the region politically however, and had lost much of its influence in the wake of its separation from Oman. The importance of Mombasa as the linchpin of the trade in goods from the interior had given it a great deal of economic power and clout. In a region that had far more links to the other regions of the Indian Ocean rather than to the interior of Africa, this was something of a unique advantage. Goods such as slaves and ivory were funnelled onto the rest of the Indian Ocean through Zanzibar and Mombasa, which made the rulers of both places particularly wealthy. By the 1760s, both had become the primary powers of the Swahili Coast, and growing tensions led to an indecisive war, whose main effect was to force the smaller states of the Swahili Coast under the tutelage either Mombasa or Zanzibar.


The growing role of trade in the East African economy was welcome not just to the Swahili States of the coast and Zanzibar, but to some kingdoms in the interior who were able to provide some of the goods that found themselves in demand in the coast. Chief among these kingdoms was Buganda, which had been steadily expanding since the 17th century, which fought the larger state of Bunyoro for control of the trade routes. The Buganda Kings had already begun to enact centralising reforms, and were able to enforce a royal monopoly of the export of ivory, as well as the import of manufactured goods from the coast. Although the routes through sparsely populated territory between the Great Lakes region and the coast were difficult, this limited commercial intercourse permitted the spread of ideas to some extent, and it appears that Islam was beginning to win its first converts in the interior by the late 18th century. Although its influence was limited at this point, it would prove to be the basis for deeper changes later on, and accompanied the shift toward centralisation in the political culture of Buganda.


In Ethiopia however, centrifugal forces proved to be more powerful than elsewhere. The migrations of Oromo peoples had led to the degeneration of the Ethiopian Empire, and contributed to the power struggles between princes that became known as the “Age of Princes” [2]. This period of disunity left the Emperors of Ethiopia powerless, instead empowering regional rulers as well as Oromo chieftains. This was dangerous in itself, though the growth of trade in the Indian Ocean brought an increasing amount of wealth to the Muslim rulers of the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa. A greater number of Oromo chiefs converted to Islam in the period as well, not only due to the animosity held for the Christian religion of their Amharic enemies, but due to the greater amount of cohesion and trade contacts that the religion offered for Oromo chiefs [3]. Toward the end of the 18th century, much of the South of Ethiopia was inhabited by Oromo peoples, and was increasingly Islamic in its religious character.


[1] – al-Laja is roughly where Stone Town is in OTL.

[2] – The Oromo are sometimes referred to as the “Galla” in historical texts, but this is something of a pejorative term.

[3] – Due to somewhat larger demand, there is a stronger slave trade from Ethiopia than this point in OTL, empowering Oromo and Somali chiefs who are able to acquire Christian and Animist slaves.

* * * * * *

Muslim West Africa

With the Moroccan defeat of the Songhai came the end of hegemonic empires in the Sahel. The states that predominated in the region following the Moroccan expedition to Timbuktu tended to be of a smaller scale, though states such as Bornu were still considerable in size. In the 18th century, the Fula people became influential, with a series of Fulani “Jihads” leading to the creation of new states such as Futa Jallon. Carved out mainly by nomadic cavalry-based armies, the Sudan seemed to buck the trend of gunpowder based warfare, as guns were still a relative rarity in the region, found only in Bornu, where musketeers were known as “Turks” despite their actual ethnic origin [4]. The settled states of the region found themselves increasingly hard-pressed against the mobile Fula Jihadis, and the success of the nomads appeared to be unstoppable. By the 1770s however, the Sultan of Kano seemed to have acquired the means to manufacture his own Middle Eastern-style firearms [5]. Local chronicles report that a Fula army was stopped by the Sultan of Kano in 1776, and that from this point on he waged a number of wars to curb the power of Fula Jihadists as well as to bring the Emirs of Hausaland under his suzerainty.


Although the Sultan of Kano had his own force of musket-wielding troops directly loyal to him, his army for the most part consisted of levies and vassal forces. This was rather unremarkable in the context of Islamic West Africa, but did leave him at a disadvantage when compared to other state-builders. Because of the relative weakness of the Sultan, Kano’s success in building a centralised state along the same lines as those that were emerging elsewhere in the Islamic world would be limited at best. Nevertheless, in halting the westward advance of Fula Jihadists and managing to extend the influence of Kano, its position was beginning to improve as the 18th century came to a close. Trade was once again increasing both south to coastal West Africa and north across the Sahara, and the production of goods such as cotton and ivory had similarly increased. The wealth that this generated would prove instrumental in the changes that swept the Sahel at the dawn of the 19th century.


[4] – What firearms were present in the Western Sudan at the time were mainly imported from the Ottoman Empire, and the weapon thus associated with Turks.

[5] – In OTL, Babba Zaki, the Sultan of Kano (1768-76), had organized his own guard of musketeers. In TTL the portion of musket-wielders in Kano’s army is somewhat larger, though it is still relatively insignificant when compared to the number of cavalry, spearmen and even bowmen in the army

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - There hasn't been a great amount of change in Africa so far, with the exception of Zanzibar, in which the Omanis were beginning to establish a real presence prior to the conquest of their country by Nader Shah. The Busaidis who in our timeline rule Oman to the present day, instead of submitting to Nader, have fled with a naval force to establish a government in exile in Zanzibar, far from the reach of the Iranian navy. The Busaidis, with something more of an Arab population that OTL, have the potential to establish Zanzibar as an important centre of trade earlier than OTL, which will have enormous consequences for East and Central Africa. Elsewhere, the pressure created by consolidating states is slow to reach the Islamic states of the Western Sahel, but forces are crossing the Sahara to change things there. Whether the Fulani Jihad that created the Sokoto will still take place or not, the forces in place may well create a consolidation that eluded the region in OTL between the defeat of the Songhai by Morocco and the rise of the Sokoto.
 
The growing role of trade in the East African economy was welcome not just to the Swahili States of the coast and Zanzibar, but to some kingdoms in the interior who were able to provide some of the goods that found themselves in demand in the coast. Chief among these kingdoms was Buganda, which had been steadily expanding since the 17th century, which fought the larger state of Bunyoro for control of the trade routes. The Buganda Kings had already begun to enact centralising reforms, and were able to enforce a royal monopoly of the export of ivory, as well as the import of manufactured goods from the coast. Although the routes through sparsely populated territory between the Great Lakes region and the coast were difficult, this limited commercial intercourse permitted the spread of ideas to some extent, and it appears that Islam was beginning to win its first converts in the interior by the late 18th century. Although its influence was limited at this point, it would prove to be the basis for deeper changes later on, and accompanied the shift toward centralisation in the political culture of Buganda.


Trade was once again increasing both south to coastal West Africa and north across the Sahara, and the production of goods such as cotton and ivory had similarly increased. The wealth that this generated would prove instrumental in the changes that swept the Sahel at the dawn of the 19th century.

These have me excited to see if any other pre colonial peoples or states will centralize before the Europeans arrive.
 
I take it Usman dan Fodio won't exist as a scholar and mallam in nearby Gobir? It would be interesting to see how Kano fares in a disunified Niger basin.

As for Buganda, here's hoping there won't be a Kababa who'll sire 98 children like what Mutesa did IOTL. (how can someone even have the energy!? :eek:)
 
These have me excited to see if any other pre colonial peoples or states will centralize before the Europeans arrive.
If there is enough time, there's certainly a good chance. Generally speaking, states that centralising produce tendencies toward centralisation within their neighbours too. Certainly as Victor Leiberman points out in his book Strange Parallels, it wasn't for nothing that the strongest pre-colonial states within Southeast Asia all emerged within about 50 years of each other.
I take it Usman dan Fodio won't exist as a scholar and mallam in nearby Gobir? It would be interesting to see how Kano fares in a disunified Niger basin.

As for Buganda, here's hoping there won't be a Kababa who'll sire 98 children like what Mutesa did IOTL. (how can someone even have the energy!? :eek:)
I mean, it's quite likely that the Fulani Jihads don't affect Hausaland in the way they do if gunpowder weapons are more common. Or indeed, it could encourage the Fulani warriors to use gunpowder from the beginning of their wars, whereas in OTL the first campaigns were fought with the sword, spear and bow.

98 children is a start I suppose, but he's got nothing on Moulay Ismail.
Perhaps I do need to start putting more Bill Wurtz into the timeline. :biggrin:
 
Prologue to Part 3
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Iran at the Accession of Shahrukh

The quarter-century that separated Nader Shah’s death from that of his second son Nasrollah, Iran had undergone great change. The centralised, expansive state which his conquests had laid the groundwork for had been realised, at least to a certain extent. Nader’s grandson Shahrukh Shah stood to inherit a sprawling empire that stretched from the Black Sea to the heartland of India, and was populated by over twenty four million people, around 5 and a half million of whom were recently conquered Punjabis. Iran’s future seemed bright as its powerful army faced weak and divided opposition to its East on the Gangetic Plain, and peace on almost every other front. First appearances of course, can always be misleading.


Iran was as wracked with division as only such a large empire could be. The traditional tribal rivalries had been lessened by years of central government policy to reduce the independent action of tribes, and in the case of some to curb their power outright, but the tribes of Iran near the dawn of the 19th century were still forces to be reckoned with. Out of Iran’s population, around four million were nomads or at the very least, semi-nomads who resented the encroachment of the central state, which re-appropriated their tribal lands, conscripted their young men and encouraged tribal leaders to settle in cities. Iran’s population was split in terms of religious allegiance, with around half of the population being Sunni Muslims, and the other half Shi’a. Both of whom were uneasy at best toward each other, and the Ulama of both were unimpressed with the credentials of the official “Jafari’” Madhab. The Shi’a population hoped for a restoration of the previous Safavids, or more ambitiously, for the coming of the Hidden Mahdi, who would establish just and fair rule. The Sunnis seemed to be somewhat more satisfied with the status quo.


Beyond these more obvious threats, deeper problems that were perhaps somewhat less obvious to early modern rulers reared their head. The loss of silver that had harmed the economy of late Safavid Iran was beginning to make itself felt again, as Nader’s loot from his Indian campaign drained back to India, and exported Iranian goods could not reverse the flow of Iran’s specie out of the country. The power of Iran’s European neighbour, Russia, increased day by day and some still dreamed of Russia’s future empire to the South, where Peter had failed to conquer [1]. Iran had indeed come far from the collapse and anarchy of the 1720s and 1730s, though no state is ever safe from the internal and external forces that threatened to pull it apart, and this was especially true for Iran at the time that Shahrukh Shah came to the throne.


However, beyond the societal, environmental and economic forces that shape history, there are too the forces of individuals and their personalities. Great conquerors may lead societies from obscurity to glory, prophets may revolutionise immoral societies and scientists may transform the way people work and live. Shahrukh Shah would prove to be none of these, but nevertheless the choices he made in his reign would transform Iran just as much as his predecessors had done.


[1] – You might remember from early on in the TL, as well as in OTL, that Russia had conquered parts of Iran as far as Mazandaran, but partially due to disease and the resurgence of the Iranian state ultimately retreated from these areas.


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“La ‘ilaha ‘illa llah, ashadu ‘an muhammadun rasulu llah, ashadu ‘an wa ‘aliyyun waliyyu-llah”. Words of great gravity can change the course of history, and undoubtedly the shahada has been among the more significant of words. When Shahrukh Afshar spoke the Shahada, but included the recognition of ‘Ali as the legitimate deputy of the Prophet as the Shi’a do, there could be no doubt that much was changed. Even if this acknowledgement had only been done in private. When Nasrollah died and Shahrukh succeed him, Iran would once again be ruled by a Shi’a rather than a Sunni Muslim.

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - Just a bit of a short update to tie things up and set the scene for the next part of the timeline. Storm clouds are appearing on Iran's horizons, and the inherent contradictions in the Afsharid Empire may well pull it apart. What kind of Iran will emerge from the coming events is still very much in the air.

Updates may slow down somewhat due to increased work commitments, but I'll aim to continue posting an update at least weekly.
 
“La ‘ilaha ‘illa llah, ashadu ‘an muhammadun rasulu llah, ashadu ‘an wa ‘aliyyun waliyyu-llah”. Words of great gravity can change the course of history, and undoubtedly the shahada has been among the more significant of words. When Shahrukh Afshar spoke the Shahada, but included the recognition of ‘Ali as the legitimate deputy of the Prophet as the Shi’a do, there could be no doubt that much was changed. Even if this acknowledgement had only been done in private. When Nasrollah died and Shahrukh succeed him, Iran would once again be ruled by a Shi’a rather than a Sunni Muslim.

I doubt the Sunni subjects of Persia will take this well.
 
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