A Destiny Realized: A Timeline of Afsharid Iran and Beyond

Hope for once we have a Hindu ruled Bengal. Muslim dynasties ruled Bengal for 600 years and none of them even spoke Bengali. No ATL seems to go the other way, even though there isn't any ironclad reason why.

It would be refreshing to a see a Hindu, Bengali-speaking ruler govern a mercantile Bengal, drawing his base of support from the rich Hindu Bengali and Marwari trading class. It would both be only natural for a Hindu monarch of Bengal to do so, and would set them apart from the aristocratic 'royal' states in the rest of India. It would allow them to compete with and beat back the threat posed by European powers as well, something the land-oriented nobility never realized.
 
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I do wonder about the degree of influence of European ideals in Bengal. IOTL, soon after the British conquest of Bengal, Enlightenment ideals spread and inspired people like the great Ram Mohan Roy. ITTL, with Britain trading massively with Bengal, I wonder if we’ll see the spread of Enlightenment ideals into Bengal here as well.

It would be refreshing to a see a Hindu, Bengali-speaking ruler govern a mercantile Bengal, drawing his base of support from the rich Hindu Bengali and Marwari trading class.

I’d say that’s the most interesting thing about your scenario - an Indian ruler supported by upper bourgeois rather than aristocratic elements.
 
Sad to see Bengal suffer the fate of the Opium Wars of IOTL. Still much better than outright colonisation though. Hopefully this provides enough impetus for Bengali modernisation and militarisation, rather than further stagnation.
In order to have a fighting chance of coming out on top, Bengal needs to move beyond the system of Zamindars, something which has already been done in states such as the Punjab and Mysore, but which has yet to be done in the Gangetic Valley as well as other parts of India. If the Sultans of Bengal can modernise their system of tax collection and administration, Bengal's prospects are good but if not, things may get worse.
I'm actually surprised Hyderabad has lasted this long without getting carved up by the Mysore and Maratha states yet.

It seems history repeats itself with new actors.

Though while this is all fascinating, I am wondering if any radical anti establishment ideologies are developing to fuel future anti colonialism.
Hyderabad is one of the un-modernized states of India, and thus its days are most probably numbered. The question is whether Mysore and the Marathas will cooperate in absorbing it or whether it will result in another war between the two.

Colonialism is only starting to become a concern for the states of Asia, but as European powers become more involved and the people of the rest of the world realise what is going on, there will almost probably be anti-Colonial as well as anti-Establishment ideologies emerging. The only clue that I'll give for now is that interesting things may happen in Northern India later on in the 19th century.
Maybe anarchist ideologies such as mutualism or syndicalism might be more popular in the Islamic world than in Europe? If The Islamic world grows a strong independent intellectual base it can form such ideologies on it's own. I can see the Ottomans translating Proudhon's work or Algerians picking up some French and reading it themselves.
Though it would need to be tweaked to better respect islamic culture and customs.
Though I was thinking more for the Indian states like the Bengal Sultanate currently.
Considering that the Middle-Eastern Core of the Islamic World is far more prosperous, populated and literate than it was at this point in OTL, native ideological movements will certainly be an interesting development as the century goes on. As we will see, religious movements will crop up in response to social pressures, but as modernising movements gain steam these may be replaced by various ideological movements, some adapted and some possibly native.
Conversely, Ive always wondered if the Tanzimat's successes based off the traditional Osmanli elite structure might be able to create a middleman identity enough to buy off most would be nationalists. If anything at the very least co opt much of the middle classes who'd be eager to advance just as much as those same classes would be drawn to romantic nationalism.
There was a feeling of an "Ottoman" identity among a lot of the middle class around the core of the empire, and whether or not this will survive interference by European powers and the subsequent resentments of the Muslim population. The likely social structure of the Ottoman Empire may well, as in OTL, generate quite a bit of resentment against Christians but a wise government may avoid this. It's also worth underlining that reform in the Ottoman Empire came far early in TTL than equality for Jews and Christians did.
I hope that ITTL Bengal is as powerful as it should be IOTL. I mean, it was the richest province in the Mughal Empire. Also, I seriously hope that there is no India-Pakistan split. They should've never split.
I don’t see how it can happen, since Pakistan is divided between Punjab and Persia.
The Bengal is still incredibly wealthy, it's more that an outdated administrative system has made it very difficult for the Bengali government to form an effective army and so on.

That leads me to wonder, has there ever actually been a timeline focused on a united India? I don't think it's necessarily guaranteed superpower status, but it would certainly be an interesting read.
Thread marks.

I am very happy that the Sikh Empire is doing so well right now. It’s annexation of the rajput states and Kharak Singh’s conquest of Delhi must be doing a lot as far as spreading Sikhism through the subcontinent.

As for Bengal, the seems to have taken the role of China from OTL. Hopefully they will be able to react and westernize quickly enough to beat back the Imperial powers.
If Kharak Singh's conquests hold up, Sikhism may well spread further in Punjab as well as beyond it. How spreading far beyond Punjabis will affect Sikhism is something I'll have to do some more research on going forward however.
Nice update
Thanks!
Bengal's fate of being landed with a China-style peace is... interesting. I can see a self-strengthening movement in the near future, though here's hoping it wouldn't go all to waste like the Qing did.
I wouldn't quite say that the Qing's self-strengthening movements went totally to waste. It's fleet made excellent target practice for the Japanese...

Joking aside, Bengal may do well from having other Muslim nations to observe and emulate, such as the Ottomans and to a lesser extent, Iran. This may provide a more stable ideological basis for reform.
For me I see secularism becoming popular among the Bengali diaspora, as it would balance the religious question.
Secularism could be an interesting answer, though it is worth keeping in mind that at least at this point in OTL, a large majority of Bengalis are Muslims. Although there are a lot of Hindu Biharis in TTL's Bengal, the religious balance is still a bit more weighted toward the Muslims than is the case in the Central Gangetic Valley.
Nice update. It's pretty inevitable, whatever butterflies from the Iranian success, that different non-European nations will do better or worse in dealing with the challenges of modernization, and with Europe rapidly moving towards the capacity for full scientific-industrial warfare, room for maneuver is shrinking. Of course, success builds on success, and European expansionist ambitions may well be moderated simply due to the lack of previous successes to point to. Without the rapid post-Clive British rise to mastery in India, the notion that the whole world is destined to be carved up between Europeans is just less likely to arise.
Although Europe still has a number of great advantages, the idea of painting the map in the colours of various European nations really won't be workable. Not to spoil too much in the future, but the Europeans don't quite have the manpower to throw at various enemies as they did in OTL. Europe's social, economic and technological impact will still be great, and European powers will undoubtedly make conquests, but to speak of European "Domination" in the sense we understood it in OTL won't really make sense.
I hope Bengal is stronger ITTL than Bangladesh IOTL. I know that Bangladesh won't recognize my country, but I still feel awful for what those Pakistani bastards put them through. Welp, here's hoping that they have a Meiji and become either developed or near developed (like Turkey or Brazil level).
A Bengal developed to Turkish-Brazilian levels would definitely be a power to be reckoned with. Bengal/Bangladesh has been hobbled in OTL by poor governance among other things, and if they do manage to reform their government in a way that the British of OTL never did, things could work out well for them.
At this point, the Indian states have far more better chances to resist European colonialism than in OTL where they're conquered and ruled by the British. Although, clearly TTL India won't be the same India we know in OTL, considering the divergences.
The chances of a united India are pretty damned slim. Some Indian states such as the Marathas, Mysore and the Punjab are more or less safe from European powers due to their power and to some extent, locations. Keep in mind that some areas are ruled by European powers still (Bombay, Pondicherry, Goa) and may well remain so.
Hope for once we have a Hindu ruled Bengal. Muslim dynasties ruled Bengal for 600 years and none of them even spoke Bengali. No ATL seems to go the other way, even though there isn't any ironclad reason why.

It would be refreshing to a see a Hindu, Bengali-speaking ruler govern a mercantile Bengal, drawing his base of support from the rich Hindu Bengali and Marwari trading class. It would both be only natural for a Hindu monarch of Bengal to do so, and would set them apart from the aristocratic 'royal' states in the rest of India. It would allow them to compete with and beat back the threat posed by European powers as well, something the land-oriented nobility never realized.
I guess an important question would be when Bengal went from being majority Hindu to majority Muslim, and why that was the case. After all, areas up the Gangetic valley were ruled by Muslims just as long and retained much larger Hindu populations.

A Hindu dynasty with its base of support amongst Hindu Mercantile families however may well have the power to abrogate the existing social systems of the Bengal, allowing for actual progress.
I do wonder about the degree of influence of European ideals in Bengal. IOTL, soon after the British conquest of Bengal, Enlightenment ideals spread and inspired people like the great Ram Mohan Roy. ITTL, with Britain trading massively with Bengal, I wonder if we’ll see the spread of Enlightenment ideals into Bengal here as well.

I’d say that’s the most interesting thing about your scenario - an Indian ruler supported by upper bourgeois rather than aristocratic elements.
Enlightenment ideals will almost certainly make their mark on India, though obviously in a much different way. Although some Indian states are relatively safe from the impact of Colonialism, they nevertheless have been far more exposed to Europe than the countries of East Asia, and this will have its impact on philosophy and ideology as well as on economics.
 
I guess an important question would be when Bengal went from being majority Hindu to majority Muslim, and why that was the case. After all, areas up the Gangetic valley were ruled by Muslims just as long and retained much larger Hindu populations.

A big part of it was the settlement of eastern Bengal, which had populations similar to Northeast India until the Mughal era, and so it was largely settled by Muslims by the Mughal Empire. West Bengal is much more established and is thus more Hindu. From Muslim Civilization in India by SM Ikram (excuse the dated terminology):

The conquest and settlement of a great part of what is now East Pakistan was essentially a Mughal achievement—in a great measure, of Aurangzeb's reign. The area east of the Brahmaputra, commonly called Bang, was one of the three well-marked regions of the former province of Bengal (Varind, Radh, and Bang). Owing to its geographical situation, climate, terrain, and the ethnic origin of the population, it had remained isolated from the rest of the subcontinent. The [[192]] force of Aryan colonization and Aryan culture had spent itself before it reached this area. The people, who were related to the Mongoloid races, had retained their ancient religious customs. Without written languages, they had not shared in earlier literary movements. Even during the Hindu rule, the influence of the Hindu scholars and priests of Western Bengal was confined to the large towns and rich monasteries. After the Muslim conquest even this ceased. The people east of the Tista and the Brahmaputra were Hindus and remained Hindus, but they had no learned priesthood to maintain the purity of the tradition. During Aurangzeb's reign this isolation of the eastern area was finally broken, for once the menace of the pirates had disappeared, the jungles could be cleared and colonization begun. The Eastern Bengalis remained the butt of satire in Bengali literature (as rough, uncouth people) up to the nineteenth century, but they were no longer separated from the main stream of Indian history.​
 
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The Limits of Empire? - Siam's Reversal in Malaya

When the Siamese king Bawonratchao ascended the throne in 1828, he had a great example to emulate. His father had been the legendary king who had humbled the Burmese once and for all, establishing Siam’s position as the greatest of all the Southeast Asian powers. As well as living up to the great legacy of his father, Bawonratchao had to navigate Siam’s position in a world that was beginning to change faster than it had ever done before. While not a brilliant warrior like his father, Bawonratchao was nevertheless an intelligent ruler, if one given over to heavy drinking. In the second year of his reign, he had established a commercial treaty with the French, partially due to a desire to smooth trade with the growing economic powers of Europe but also due to the fear of the British, who besides the Spanish were the only European power with a serious territorial presence within Southeast Asia.


Siam also continued her expansion into those areas of Southeast Asia ruled by lesser states. Bawonratchao ordered a number of invasions of the Laotian states, culminating in the final defeat of Luang Prabang in 1837, which put Siamese forces in striking distance of Hanoi and ensured that the core territories of Siam would not be threatened by foreigners. The victories over the Laotians, although made more complicated by the difficult terrain east of the Mekong River, had been made easier by the lack of firearms among the Laotian armies. Reports to the Siamese king described “heaps of Laotian dead”, unable to answer the muskets of the Siamese. Buffeted by European support, as well as his victories against some of the remaining small states in Southeast Asia, the Siamese king now prepared for the war that would almost be his undoing, the Malayan War.


Malaya should not have presented a significant challenge to Siam’s armies. At the beginning of the 1840s, the Peninsula was a collection of small states which even combined had a population of less than a million. Growing prosperity in the 18th and early 19th centuries had given rise to some urban centres, but by and large Malays were sustenance farmers, with no access to the growing market economies seen in Central Siam. Although styled as Sultans, the rulers of the Malay Peninsula were glorified chieftains, with the most powerful of them ruling a mere 200,000 subjects. By this point, Siam had a population of over 7 million, and an army that was larger than the populations of the smaller Malay Sultanates. In the decades that had seen Chakri Siam transform from a small state on the Chaophraya River into the most powerful empire that Southeast Asia had yet seen, Siam had defeated enemies far more powerful than the Malays.


In comparison to the Laotians however, the Malays had a number of key advantages. While the Laotian states were by and large cut off from the rest of the world, the same was not true of the Malay Sultanates. They had long engaged in trade, and had successfully established ties with foreigners, including those from Europe and the Middle East. The British maintained a base in the old Malay trading city of Malacca, and by the 1840s was in the process of establishing closer ties with some of the Malay sultanates of the Peninsula as well as Sumatra, bringing them together in a loose informal empire. The Malays links to the outside world gave them access to guns, money and in the case of Kedah, even an old British frigate which would prove to be of great use in the war. On a psychological level, increased contact with the Middle East had produced a greater Muslim identity, particularly amongst those Malays which had traditionally been in contact with Thai Buddhists to the north.


Siam’s initial plan for the invasion was not necessarily un-sound however. The aim of Bawonratchao’s invasion was not annexation, but rather the extension of the “Bunga Mas” tribute across the whole of the Malay Peninsula, Malacca excepted, as well as the annexation of various parts of Pattani and Kedah. Two armies would make their way down the Malay Peninsula, extracting tribute from the Sultans as they made their way down the coasts. There were almost no professional soldiers standing between the Siamese Kingdom and Johor, the southernmost of the Malay Sultanates. Indeed, the task looked to be a simple one for the Siamese armies, which combined numbered around 37,000 men. By contrast, it is likely that the Malays did not anticipate an invasion at all, and there were certainly no preparations amongst any of the Malay Sultans. It was not until a Siamese force raided the town of Terang in Northern Kedah that there was any hint of the untoward happening [1]. When word spread that the Sultan of Pattani had accepted to give an enlarged tribute to Bangkok, the reality of the Siamese invasion gradually dawned on Malaya.


Initially the old Sultan of Kedah, Mohammed Jiwa Shah, wanted to find an accommodation with Siam similar to that of Pattani’s, where he could continue his rule as a Siamese vassal. His intention was not shared by his twenty-seven year old son Abdullah Tajuddin, previously a suspected Anak Raja pirate who now presented himself as a willing Ghazi. Later chronicles boasted of his bravery and piety in opposing the Siamese, though it was just as likely that he saw an opportunity to improve his position in the court. After all, a man who had proved his military prowess defensively would make a good Sultan in many people’s minds. Abdullah Tajuddin got his way, and led a small force of Kedahan warriors on the road to the Kedahan plain. Rather than stand against the much larger Siamese army, he instead led hit and run attacks which aimed to weaken the Siamese force. The sheer size of the Siamese army allowed it to enter the Kedahan plain without any real opposition however, and over the course of the next few months, over 100,000 Kedahans fled the plain to the island of Penang where the Kedahan capital was, protected by the water and Kedah’s small navy.


Unable to bring the Kedahans into total submission, the Siamese satisfied themselves with her mainland territories, and progressed down the Malay Peninsula. 1842 saw the submission of Kelantan, Perak and Selangor, and in 1843 both the Sultan of Pahang and Negeri Sembilan became vassals of the king of Siam. The Sultan of Johor, traditionally the most powerful of the Malay rulers since the fall of Malacca desperately attempted to sign a treaty with the British in Malacca but failed. Running out of options, he instead secured the aid of the King of Burma, who were themselves eager to avenge their prior defeat. Forced to divert troops to secure his northern flank, Bawonratchao’s efforts to force the submission of Penang and Johor were temporarily frustrated.


By 1846 the war was most definitely a stalemate. The Burmese had captured Chiang Mai, Siam’s northern capital but was unable to progress any further. Johor’s continued survival was precarious, but the dire situation of both her and the exiled Kedahans on Penang had aroused the attention of the British, whose chief resident in the region was concerned over the increasing influence of the French in Bangkok. When visited by a delegation from Kedah offering a naval base on Penang in return for arms and money to support their struggle against the Siamese, the offer was accepted if not without some protest from London. Their resistance now bankrolled by a much richer power, Abdullah Tajuddin was in a position to train many of the male refugees on Penang into soldiers, soon giving him the second largest force on the Malay Peninsula. Unhappy with what he saw as British interference, Bawonratchao launched a raid against the British territory of Malacca, as an attempt to dissuade them from further interference with his war in Malaya.


Of course, this gambit had the opposite effect. When word reached London that the King of Siam had attacked a British territory, the foreign office in particular called for a harsh retaliation. A force of almost 13,000 men were dispatched, with its commander ordered to “cut Siam down to size”. Although there was little in the way of British coordination with the Burmese, there was some cooperation with the remaining forces of the Malay Sultanates. A British-Kedahan intervention in Perak led to an anti-Siamese Sultan ascending to the throne, and Kedah’s sole modern ship joined the British in a bombardment of Siamese forces on the shore opposite to Penang. However in the decisive battle at Perai, it was Abdullah Tajuddin’s army which inflicted heavy losses on the Siamese force, jeopardising their position in Malaya. Although it was not until the British bombardment of Bangkok that the Siamese king was brought to the negotiating table, the victory won Abdullah Tajuddin in particular a great amount of prestige amongst the other Malay rulers, as well as with the general population even outside Kedah. When peace finally came, it had left Kedah as the dominant Malay state, and the British as the most influential European power on the Peninsula.


[1] – Modern Trang in Thailand, which in OTL remained Kedahan until the early 19th century.

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The Beginnings of Modernity in Southeast Asia - State Reform

As was the case in South Asia, it was European military achievements in Southeast Asia that seemed to herald changing times. However, unlike in Bengal, the British had only played a relatively minor role in Siam’s defeat, with the Burmese providing the majority of the manpower to defeat the armies of King Bawonratchao. Nevertheless, it was British guns and money that had enabled the tiny Malay Sultanates to hold off and then advance against Siamese forces in the south, and the British ships that shelled Bangkok certainly made their impact on more than just its buildings. The last time that enemies had reached the capital had been in the last Burmese invasion late in the 18th century, and the psychological blow that a renewed sense of vulnerability brought the concerns of both the Siamese people and nobility to the fore. As later Siamese Reformist leader Luang Bunnang put it “Previously, we had thought ourselves a great nation second only to China. After those British bombs fell on the homes of our great city, only then did we realise just how small we really were”.


There was still no question of a greater reform of the Siamese political system, but it was not long after the defeat that King Bawonratchao announced a far-reaching series of reforms known as the “New Order”, which aimed to import European (and especially French) advisors to reform Siam’s educational, administrative and especially military systems. In Malaya however, the change was very much political in its nature. The years of Siamese occupation in much of the country had devastated many of the Sultanates, and the fact that Kedah had been left as a military-heavy state with an ambitious heir to the throne seemed to be a recipe for further war and disruption. And indeed when the old Sultan of Kedah died and his son Abdullah Tajuddin became Sultan, he vowed to unite all the Muslims of the Peninsula under his rule to avoid any future subjugation. In this he was encouraged not only by the British Chief Resident in the region, who warned him that any successor was likely not to be as pre-disposed to Malayan Unification, but also by the temporarily strong position of Kedah.


Most of Malaya’s Sultanates agreed to submit to the Sultan of Kedah, who by the early 1850s was calling himself the Yang di-Pertuan of Malaya. Only Johor, the traditional power on the Malay Peninsula following the downfall of Malacca provided much in the way of resistance. Its few warriors outnumbered by Abdullah Tajuddin’s more professional army were soon crushed, and by 1854 the whole of the peninsula outside of Siamese rule was under the rule of Kedah’s Sultan. What Abdullah did not intend however was the simple extension of Kedahan rule over the other Malayan states on the peninsula, vowing to keep the other Sultans in their positions. To illustrate his point, he began the construction of a new capital on the island of Pulau Ujong, naming the city after the old Malay Kingdom known as Singapura [2]. Conscious of the many questions of his legitimacy to dominate the other Malay states in such a fashion, he commissioned a number of works to complement the Malay Annals to justify his own rule of a unified Malaya.


In Java, the largest and most significant of the Southeast Asian Muslim states, there was a great deal of change though it was not as dramatic as Malaya’s or Siam’s. Diponegoro had managed to conquer a state that encompassed most of the island of Java (the mostly Sundanese speaking areas in Western Java were under the rule of the British East India Company), yet his lack of support amongst the Javanese aristocracy continued to hamper attempts to solidify his state. To some extent, Diponegoro empowered the Ulema and gained legitimacy from his contacts with foreign Muslim rulers. However his task of firmly establishing his rule was only half-finished when he died in 1855. His successor Pakubuwono was left with a country that was still divided, despite its relative ethnic and linguistic unity. Indeed only months after the news of the succession, an uprising in Bali had managed to secure the whole of the island, and rumour had it that the self-appointed King of Bali had petitioned the British for protection.


[2] – No prizes for guessing where this is. Interestingly enough about Singapura, its very existence as described in the Malay Annals is questionable which is startling considering the time period the kingdom is supposed to have existed (1299 to 1402). Perhaps an even more extreme version of Japan, Nusantara is something of a “late bloomer” when it comes to attestable history, with legendary kingdoms appearing in the same times that we have physical documentary resources from other parts of the world.

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Author's Notes - Siam's big reversal has come, and it is due to a combination of Burmese military might, British naval might as well as a lot of luck on the side of the Malays, and the Kedahan Malays in particular. It's worth noting now that this unified Malay does not to any extent resemble a "Nation State", and the primary identity of Malays at this point is still regional and religious, and it is on this latter basis that a unified Malayan State has been founded. It's still a very minor player at the moment however, and is ultimately vulnerable to Siam.

Siam will be a big one to watch, as it is now embarking on a serious campaign of reform wider-reaching than that of OTL. Indeed, at this point in the timeline Siam's westernising reforms may well be the most extensive outside of the Ottoman Empire's, and this is going to have a major impact down the line.
 
Not to spoil too much in the future, but the Europeans don't quite have the manpower to throw at various enemies as they did in OTL.

Hm? Plague? World War I early and with knobs on?

A big part of it was the settlement of eastern Bengal, which had populations similar to Northeast India until the Mughal era, and so it was largely settled by Muslims by the Mughal Empire. West Bengal is much more established and is thus more Hindu. From Muslim Civilization in India by SM Ikram (excuse the dated terminology):

Interesting! I had not heard about this before: puts the Islamisation of east Bengal in a quite different light from what I had imagined before.
 
There was still no question of a greater reform of the Siamese political system, but it was not long after the defeat that King Bawonratchao announced a far-reaching series of reforms known as the “New Order”, which aimed to import European (and especially French) advisors to reform Siam’s educational, administrative and especially military systems.
This is bound to meet resistance in other parts of the Siamese state currently.

when the old Sultan of Kedah died and his son Abdullah Tajuddin became Sultan, he vowed to unite all the Muslims of the Peninsula under his rule to avoid any future subjugation. In this he was encouraged not only by the British Chief Resident in the region, who warned him that any successor was likely not to be as pre-disposed to Malayan Unification, but also by the temporarily strong position of Kedah.
Very interest developments in the Malay Peninsula, hope it bears fruit in the future.
 
One thing about the last update- what exactly stops the Marathas or Mysore to get a treaty port in Bengal- it’s definitely much easier for them to colonise India than any European power. The only way I think you may get a United India is Mysore colonising Bengal, then using that money to get Delhi and assuming the old Mughal authority. Although how the Sikhs and Marathas react to that will be interesting considering their identity was formed by fighting Mughals. Hey, the Sikhs committed some atrocities towards Muslims in their lands- maybe that could be grounds for a popular revolt.
 
A unified Malay peninsula under Kedah? My mother's Minang ancestry and uncles' Terengganu and Kelantanese roots would be outraged. What do this Abdullah Tajuddin know about buffalo rendang and kerabu rice!? XD

In all seriousness, this Abdullah Tajuddin seems to at least know better than to antagonize the other rulers of Malaya. Keeping them on their thrones and not imposing Kedahan laws would placate most people for the time being, though I suspect there will be problems with regionalism later on. The Building of Singapura is going to be a game-changer though! If he plays his cards right, this new capital could very well overtake Penang to become the port on the Malacca Strait. The Yang-Di-Pertuan title is also interesting, as it basically means "The most August/Leader (of others)". I can see British penny dreadfuls misinterpreting this to mean "Emperor", which would delight Tajuddin and rankle the subordinated rulers.

Speaking of which, I wonder if giving the British a base at Penang would give London ideas. Then again, the island wouldn't be seen as much of a competitive port for long once Singapura gets up and running.
 
In any case, South-East Asia is not going to be the same as we know. All of the PODs will definitely be turning out better than OTL. Malaya seems to be closer to unification. Burma is going strong. Tho' poor Siam (Thailand), they have it tough after their Malay adventures.
 
Hm? Plague? World War I early and with knobs on?

Interesting! I had not heard about this before: puts the Islamisation of east Bengal in a quite different light from what I had imagined before.
Well part of it is a lack of access to the third-world manpower that they had in OTL, particularly in Britain's case. Otherwise one could imagine something happening in Europe before the 19th century is out.
This is bound to meet resistance in other parts of the Siamese state currently.

Very interest developments in the Malay Peninsula, hope it bears fruit in the future.
On one hand the sting of defeat its likely to give some impetus to reform, though you're correct in stating that there will be a great deal of pushback, as well as the problem of implementation outside Siam's core regions where local lords have far more power.

In regards to Malaya, the question is how the unification of the peninsula will affect Malay and Malayic states in the rest of the Southeast Asian archipelago.
One thing about the last update- what exactly stops the Marathas or Mysore to get a treaty port in Bengal- it’s definitely much easier for them to colonise India than any European power. The only way I think you may get a United India is Mysore colonising Bengal, then using that money to get Delhi and assuming the old Mughal authority. Although how the Sikhs and Marathas react to that will be interesting considering their identity was formed by fighting Mughals. Hey, the Sikhs committed some atrocities towards Muslims in their lands- maybe that could be grounds for a popular revolt.
Mysore is probably the most powerful state in India at this point, though the Marathas are recovering from their internal issues and will likely be a check on Mysorean power. In part, it is this duality in the centre/south of India which prevents either power from becoming hegemonic over the rest of the Subcontinent, but if one was to land a crushing blow on the other, things could possibly change. And of course the Sikh Empire is another power to keep an eye on, especially if they end up devouring what's left of the Neo-Mughal state.
Could you possibly do a map of the world in 1850 but more importantly a list of nations by population?
I'm working on both at the moment (and you'll certainly be able to see them before this cycle of updates is completed) but between writing and IRL work, progress is slower than I would like.
Another excellent update! Cheers.
Thanks!
A unified Malay peninsula under Kedah? My mother's Minang ancestry and uncles' Terengganu and Kelantanese roots would be outraged. What do this Abdullah Tajuddin know about buffalo rendang and kerabu rice!? XD

In all seriousness, this Abdullah Tajuddin seems to at least know better than to antagonize the other rulers of Malaya. Keeping them on their thrones and not imposing Kedahan laws would placate most people for the time being, though I suspect there will be problems with regionalism later on. The Building of Singapura is going to be a game-changer though! If he plays his cards right, this new capital could very well overtake Penang to become the port on the Malacca Strait. The Yang-Di-Pertuan title is also interesting, as it basically means "The most August/Leader (of others)". I can see British penny dreadfuls misinterpreting this to mean "Emperor", which would delight Tajuddin and rankle the subordinated rulers.

Speaking of which, I wonder if giving the British a base at Penang would give London ideas. Then again, the island wouldn't be seen as much of a competitive port for long once Singapura gets up and running.
Well let's all be honest here, Penangite cuisine is the best in Malaysia. Nasi Kandar, Char Kuay Teow... and this certainly doesn't come from any pro-Penang bias on my part.

As powerful and prestigious as Kedah is, it simply doesn't have the power to impose itself on the other Malayan Sultanates in the way that it would perhaps like to. The fact that Singapura will be somewhat separated from his holdings in Kedah may eventually give some leeway toward it being something of a "federal" capital, but the idea of codified federalism is still a long way away, and an evolution toward a more complicated feudal system is more accurate.

For the time being the British still have their base in Malacca (sized from the Dutch near the turn of the century during the Revolutionary Wars) but its port isn't what it once was, and they may well be on the lookout for a more suitable commercial base. Still, it might be lessened as a priority with British control of Batavia/Jakarta.
In any case, South-East Asia is not going to be the same as we know. All of the PODs will definitely be turning out better than OTL. Malaya seems to be closer to unification. Burma is going strong. Tho' poor Siam (Thailand), they have it tough after their Malay adventures.
Considering the kind of history that some Southeast Asian countries have had in OTL, it would be difficult to imagine things going much worse. Still, assuming that European control can be avoiding in much of it, or if it's control is less disruptive to native institutions, perhaps we can see a region with more Malaysias than Cambodias.
 
Iranian Society under the Afsharids - 1800 to 1847
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A Society Transformed? - Iranian Society under the Afsharids

The first decades of Afsharid rule in Iran had seen great changes in some areas of Iran’s social structure, if not in others. Most dramatically, the growing power of the Shi’a Ulema was curbed and robbed of state support, and the army was increasingly professionalised and separated socially from the aristocracy and the tribes. As the best men of the tribes were often gone for decades in permanent military service, those left behind such as the young, the old and women tended to their flocks as best they could, or else found seasonal work on the farms of the settled. This was a tendency that only increased further on into the 18th and early 19th centuries as the Iranian population increased swiftly and more land was brought under cultivation. Although the majority of the Iranian cavalry continued to be recruited from nomadic peoples, an increasing number of soldiers whose origins were farming villages and cities made up Iranian cavalry.


To a large extent the nature of Iran’s soldiery changed as well. Nader had tribal units serve as cohesive wholes in his army, making them compete with one another to achieve his own ends. The experience of rebellion after his death as well as subsequent rebellions led his successors to pioneer different methods, often mixing various tribes and peoples with one another, and ensuring that most regiments had a strong core of Persians without the tribal loyalties that afflicted those such as the Lur and Afghans. This did achieve the aim of reducing restiveness within the Iranian military, though critics pointed toward a general lack of Iranian military success after these reforms as the abandonment of what had enabled the Afsharids to expand in the first place. By the middle of the 19th century, the majority of the Iranian army was made up of Persian conscripts from the countryside, pulled from their villages in their mid to late teens and more or less forced to serve in their regiments for at least twenty years. This usually led them to abandon many of their ties with their birthplaces, if not leading them to be somewhat detached from life in general.


Although many of the Iranian Army’s senior commanders continued to be pulled from the ranks of the nobility, amongst junior officers the ability to read and write was increasingly valued. Officers coming from the ranks of tribal nobility had almost ceased entirely by the 1830s, and now largely came from the second or third sons of prosperous commoners, as well as aristocratic families which had come upon harder times. The relatively poor pay of the army was always something of a disincentive, and the chances of loot had greatly diminished since Nader’s day, but there was at least the guarantee of a job and protection for life, as officers who reached the age of retirement were entitled to a paltry pension. For those who did distinguish themselves in conflict, especially foreign ones, the chance of promotion as well as glory also served as an incentive to remain in the army. Despite this, many took questionably legal side jobs with their soldiers providing protection for caravans travelling through their district, though this indiscipline was always kept within acceptable boundaries. For example, there were not the protection rackets present that had been run by the Ottoman Janissaries prior to their demise.


In both the cities and the countryside, the swift decline of the ulema had led to something of a power vacuum. Afsharid Iran was very much religiously heterogeneous, and a variety of Islamic religious movements thrived in the relatively tolerant atmosphere of the Early Afsharid rulers. Although Shi’a practices such as Ta’zia plays had been banned since the reign of Nader Shah to facilitate his Ja’fari Madhhab policy, the practices had gone on at the fringes of the empire that remained Shi’a such as Bahrain, as well as in private performances. There would also be a wave of revived religious movements in the mid-19th century as well including the Sufi inspired Mahdist movement of Central Persia and the rationalist Tabrizi movement. One key area which the ulema had previously dominated was that of education, which had largely been conducted in partially state-funded madrassas. Without the support from the state or from the Waqf that had previously guaranteed an income for many of the institutions, a number of madrassas in the country closed, with much of the rest owing their existences to individual merchants or the guilds. Not for nothing did an Ottoman visitor in the 19th century criticise Iran as a land of “Ignorance of all religious matters”.


What began to emerge in the place of the great madrassas were the Maktabs, or traditional elementary schools [1]. The junior religious scholars, sometimes known as Akund or Mullahs, associated with these institutions often supported themselves with fees for their teaching rather than income from Waqf and were therefore not as adversely affected by Nader’s reforms. Although Quranic instruction was a part of the education of these schools, the focus was primarily on the teaching of the alphabet, as well as rudimentary mathematics. Unlike the madrassas, women were sometimes involved in the teaching and girls would attend as well, though were instructed separately after the ages of nine or ten. Initially only the families of the rich could afford to send their children to these schools, but by the turn of the 19th century the children of artisans or small landholders were attending, and by the middle of the century even a small number of children from the lower orders of society could be found in them. More than any other factor, these schools had pushed Iran’s literacy level to around 25-30% by 1850, still fairly low by European standards but well beyond that of much of the rest of the world, with exceptions such as Japan.


What these newly literate classes could do more easily than before was communicate. The weakening of the ulema had left a gap for intellectuals, one that would eventually be filled with the Fazil, who often practiced as lawyers alongside the traditional ulema, or who otherwise served as advisors to regional governors and other state servants. Those with specific interests such as Western Science or history, could even find patronage at the court in Mashhad if the ruling Shah wanted to present himself as a patron of the arts and sciences. What these classes did lack was anything resembling the institutions of universities as found in Europe, and indeed had no madrassas that could match those further to the west of the Muslim world such as al-Azhar in Cairo. Similarly although the Fazil managed to keep fairly up to date with Western Scientific theory, if not its application, there was very little in the way of original work on any of the natural sciences.


Another important impact of the Maktabs was the limited impact it had on the position of women in Iranian society. While Orientalist images of women locked away in the gilded cage of the Harem was the reality only for the wives and concubines of the very wealthy in society, the traditional position of women in Iranian society was far from an emancipated one. Despite numerous injunctions in the Quran regarding their spiritual worth, women were in practice subordinated. In the 19th century, with the slow but steady spread of female literacy as well as an increasing diversification of religious and social thought brought ideas challenging the orthodox position of women. The Bab had underlined the need to improve women’s position in society, even if this had largely been abandoned under the Mahdists. There were also those amongst the neo-Mutazilites who had come to argue that women’s position in contemporary Muslim society had been caused in part due to questionable Hadith which were contrary to the spirit of the Quran. Despite the emergence of these new strains however, life for women in early 19th century Iran remained limited, with their social circles and often movement curtailed by their families and societal mores.


The one group who arguably did the best for themselves in the Early Afsharid era were the merchants. Unlike in some Confucian societies to the East, Iranian society and indeed Islamic societies as a whole tended to have a high regard for merchants. The Islamic Prophet Muhammad had been a merchant prior to receiving revelations, and this was religious sanction as to the value of their work. The internal security and peace that characterised Iranian society following Nader’s death enabled merchant enterprises to grow in scope, and the networks that crisscrossed Iran grew in volume. Goods from India were transported to Russia through the Amu Darya and the Caspian, and to Europe through Mesopotamia and onto Ottoman Syria. Iranian merchants also made their way in the trade of goods throughout the Indian Ocean, and were well known as far away as China. Some merchants even banded into houses and other organizations, usually based on ties of family and place of origin. Among the largest of these were based not only in the large cities of the Iranian Plateau such as Tabriz and Mashhad, but in smaller towns along the Persian Gulf such as Basra, Bushehr and Muscat.


[1] – These were a product of Qajar Iran in the 19th century, though due to the circumstances of the TL have emerged much earlier than in OTL.

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - This is more for reference for future events than anything else, but a deeper look into various social groups and how things contrast to the Iran of OTL is quite important. A larger, more prosperous Iran has of course made Iranian society rather different to that of Iran's society in the 1840s in our own world. That being said, it is far from perfect and for the vast majority of Iranians, life is still not particularly pleasant.

And a big thanks to everyone who nominated me for a Turtledove!
 
xjFOZ6U.png


A Society Transformed? - Iranian Society under the Afsharids

The first decades of Afsharid rule in Iran had seen great changes in some areas of Iran’s social structure, if not in others. Most dramatically, the growing power of the Shi’a Ulema was curbed and robbed of state support, and the army was increasingly professionalised and separated socially from the aristocracy and the tribes. As the best men of the tribes were often gone for decades in permanent military service, those left behind such as the young, the old and women tended to their flocks as best they could, or else found seasonal work on the farms of the settled. This was a tendency that only increased further on into the 18th and early 19th centuries as the Iranian population increased swiftly and more land was brought under cultivation. Although the majority of the Iranian cavalry continued to be recruited from nomadic peoples, an increasing number of soldiers whose origins were farming villages and cities made up Iranian cavalry.


To a large extent the nature of Iran’s soldiery changed as well. Nader had tribal units serve as cohesive wholes in his army, making them compete with one another to achieve his own ends. The experience of rebellion after his death as well as subsequent rebellions led his successors to pioneer different methods, often mixing various tribes and peoples with one another, and ensuring that most regiments had a strong core of Persians without the tribal loyalties that afflicted those such as the Lur and Afghans. This did achieve the aim of reducing restiveness within the Iranian military, though critics pointed toward a general lack of Iranian military success after these reforms as the abandonment of what had enabled the Afsharids to expand in the first place. By the middle of the 19th century, the majority of the Iranian army was made up of Persian conscripts from the countryside, pulled from their villages in their mid to late teens and more or less forced to serve in their regiments for at least twenty years. This usually led them to abandon many of their ties with their birthplaces, if not leading them to be somewhat detached from life in general.


Although many of the Iranian Army’s senior commanders continued to be pulled from the ranks of the nobility, amongst junior officers the ability to read and write was increasingly valued. Officers coming from the ranks of tribal nobility had almost ceased entirely by the 1830s, and now largely came from the second or third sons of prosperous commoners, as well as aristocratic families which had come upon harder times. The relatively poor pay of the army was always something of a disincentive, and the chances of loot had greatly diminished since Nader’s day, but there was at least the guarantee of a job and protection for life, as officers who reached the age of retirement were entitled to a paltry pension. For those who did distinguish themselves in conflict, especially foreign ones, the chance of promotion as well as glory also served as an incentive to remain in the army. Despite this, many took questionably legal side jobs with their soldiers providing protection for caravans travelling through their district, though this indiscipline was always kept within acceptable boundaries. For example, there were not the protection rackets present that had been run by the Ottoman Janissaries prior to their demise.


In both the cities and the countryside, the swift decline of the ulema had led to something of a power vacuum. Afsharid Iran was very much religiously heterogeneous, and a variety of Islamic religious movements thrived in the relatively tolerant atmosphere of the Early Afsharid rulers. Although Shi’a practices such as Ta’zia plays had been banned since the reign of Nader Shah to facilitate his Ja’fari Madhhab policy, the practices had gone on at the fringes of the empire that remained Shi’a such as Bahrain, as well as in private performances. There would also be a wave of revived religious movements in the mid-19th century as well including the Sufi inspired Mahdist movement of Central Persia and the rationalist Tabrizi movement. One key area which the ulema had previously dominated was that of education, which had largely been conducted in partially state-funded madrassas. Without the support from the state or from the Waqf that had previously guaranteed an income for many of the institutions, a number of madrassas in the country closed, with much of the rest owing their existences to individual merchants or the guilds. Not for nothing did an Ottoman visitor in the 19th century criticise Iran as a land of “Ignorance of all religious matters”.


What began to emerge in the place of the great madrassas were the Maktabs, or traditional elementary schools [1]. The junior religious scholars, sometimes known as Akund or Mullahs, associated with these institutions often supported themselves with fees for their teaching rather than income from Waqf and were therefore not as adversely affected by Nader’s reforms. Although Quranic instruction was a part of the education of these schools, the focus was primarily on the teaching of the alphabet, as well as rudimentary mathematics. Unlike the madrassas, women were sometimes involved in the teaching and girls would attend as well, though were instructed separately after the ages of nine or ten. Initially only the families of the rich could afford to send their children to these schools, but by the turn of the 19th century the children of artisans or small landholders were attending, and by the middle of the century even a small number of children from the lower orders of society could be found in them. More than any other factor, these schools had pushed Iran’s literacy level to around 25-30% by 1850, still fairly low by European standards but well beyond that of much of the rest of the world, with exceptions such as Japan.


What these newly literate classes could do more easily than before was communicate. The weakening of the ulema had left a gap for intellectuals, one that would eventually be filled with the Fazil, who often practiced as lawyers alongside the traditional ulema, or who otherwise served as advisors to regional governors and other state servants. Those with specific interests such as Western Science or history, could even find patronage at the court in Mashhad if the ruling Shah wanted to present himself as a patron of the arts and sciences. What these classes did lack was anything resembling the institutions of universities as found in Europe, and indeed had no madrassas that could match those further to the west of the Muslim world such as al-Azhar in Cairo. Similarly although the Fazil managed to keep fairly up to date with Western Scientific theory, if not its application, there was very little in the way of original work on any of the natural sciences.


Another important impact of the Maktabs was the limited impact it had on the position of women in Iranian society. While Orientalist images of women locked away in the gilded cage of the Harem was the reality only for the wives and concubines of the very wealthy in society, the traditional position of women in Iranian society was far from an emancipated one. Despite numerous injunctions in the Quran regarding their spiritual worth, women were in practice subordinated. In the 19th century, with the slow but steady spread of female literacy as well as an increasing diversification of religious and social thought brought ideas challenging the orthodox position of women. The Bab had underlined the need to improve women’s position in society, even if this had largely been abandoned under the Mahdists. There were also those amongst the neo-Mutazilites who had come to argue that women’s position in contemporary Muslim society had been caused in part due to questionable Hadith which were contrary to the spirit of the Quran. Despite the emergence of these new strains however, life for women in early 19th century Iran remained limited, with their social circles and often movement curtailed by their families and societal mores.


The one group who arguably did the best for themselves in the Early Afsharid era were the merchants. Unlike in some Confucian societies to the East, Iranian society and indeed Islamic societies as a whole tended to have a high regard for merchants. The Islamic Prophet Muhammad had been a merchant prior to receiving revelations, and this was religious sanction as to the value of their work. The internal security and peace that characterised Iranian society following Nader’s death enabled merchant enterprises to grow in scope, and the networks that crisscrossed Iran grew in volume. Goods from India were transported to Russia through the Amu Darya and the Caspian, and to Europe through Mesopotamia and onto Ottoman Syria. Iranian merchants also made their way in the trade of goods throughout the Indian Ocean, and were well known as far away as China. Some merchants even banded into houses and other organizations, usually based on ties of family and place of origin. Among the largest of these were based not only in the large cities of the Iranian Plateau such as Tabriz and Mashhad, but in smaller towns along the Persian Gulf such as Basra, Bushehr and Muscat.


[1] – These were a product of Qajar Iran in the 19th century, though due to the circumstances of the TL have emerged much earlier than in OTL.

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - This is more for reference for future events than anything else, but a deeper look into various social groups and how things contrast to the Iran of OTL is quite important. A larger, more prosperous Iran has of course made Iranian society rather different to that of Iran's society in the 1840s in our own world. That being said, it is far from perfect and for the vast majority of Iranians, life is still not particularly pleasant.

And a big thanks to everyone who nominated me for a Turtledove!
Fantastic update, as per usual. I can't wait to see Iran as a great power by the end of the century. Also, how large is their army? I'm guessing they have, say, 25-40 million people, so since armies in the 1800's relied a lot on conscription the army size would be about 500,000-1 million, or somewhere in that area?
 
In both the cities and the countryside, the swift decline of the ulema had led to something of a power vacuum. Afsharid Iran was very much religiously heterogeneous, and a variety of Islamic religious movements thrived in the relatively tolerant atmosphere of the Early Afsharid rulers. Although Shi’a practices such as Ta’zia plays had been banned since the reign of Nader Shah to facilitate his Ja’fari Madhhab policy, the practices had gone on at the fringes of the empire that remained Shi’a such as Bahrain, as well as in private performances. There would also be a wave of revived religious movements in the mid-19th century as well including the Sufi inspired Mahdist movement of Central Persia and the rationalist Tabrizi movement.

What began to emerge in the place of the great madrassas were the Maktabs, or traditional elementary schools [1]. The junior religious scholars, sometimes known as Akund or Mullahs, associated with these institutions often supported themselves with fees for their teaching rather than income from Waqf and were therefore not as adversely affected by Nader’s reforms. Although Quranic instruction was a part of the education of these schools, the focus was primarily on the teaching of the alphabet, as well as rudimentary mathematics. Unlike the madrassas, women were sometimes involved in the teaching and girls would attend as well, though were instructed separately after the ages of nine or ten.

These developments will cause substantial changes in Islamic culture, when these movements start getting traction elsewhere in the Islamic world.
 
I'm so happy I wasn't butterflied away( Bangladesh best Desh). As the above mentioned, Bengal was actually one of the most industrialized regions of India. Even after the Bengal Sultanate fell to the Mughals, it still remained. I can see Bengali traders creating a diaspora into other parts of India, particularly the East Coast of India.
 
This Iran won't be the same Iran we know in our world definitely. The country's religious sphere would be pretty much different rather than a Shiite state. And of course, no society is perfect. Most of all, a larger and prosperous Iran might influenced in her neighbours in more ways than one. If not, the whole Muslim world. I can see TTL Iran ended up as an inspirational role-model for non-western nations.
 
I'm so happy I wasn't butterflied away( Bangladesh best Desh). As the above mentioned, Bengal was actually one of the most industrialized regions of India. Even after the Bengal Sultanate fell to the Mughals, it still remained. I can see Bengali traders creating a diaspora into other parts of India, particularly the East Coast of India.

You think they could become an equivalent to OTL Japan?
 
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