A Destiny Realized: A Timeline of Afsharid Iran and Beyond

[Nassirisimo]

Natural Frontiers? The Limits of Chinese Expansion in the 18th Century
​

The Qing Campaign against the Dzungar Khanate was known as one of the “Ten Great Campaigns”, one of the Emperor Qianlong’s wars that had expanded the glory of the Qing dynasty and secured the borders of China against restless nomadic peoples. However, like the later war with Burma, the campaign was not the unqualified success that had been claimed by Qing propaganda. Although the Dzungars were eventually defeated and destroyed as a people by Chinese forces, the war had been a difficult one. The Dzungars were for a time allied with Afsharid Iran, who had swiftly recovered from collapse two decades previously and who had, like the Qing, established an empire whose borders were far more extensive than those of the previous dynasty. Nader Shah, the first of the Afsharid Shahs, was an immensely ambitious individual who had it in mind to emulate the last of the great Nomadic Leaders, Timur. By the late 1750s, his successes in Central Asia had emboldened him, and he began to draw up plans to emulate Timur’s unfinished conquest of China.​

Nader saw potential allies in the Dzungars and the Khalka Mongols, both of whom were engaged in a bitter struggle with the Chinese. Nader’s plan to conquer China was impractical even with the help of these allies and his own considerable resources, but Iranian intervention into the war nevertheless threatened to complicate the war significantly. Were the Iranians to prevent the destruction of the Dzungars, they would prove to be a threat to China’s security for years to come. Although the Chinese saw success against the Dzungars, their initial encounters with the Iranians were not promising, and they suffered a heavy defeat at Bishkek in the summer of 1758. It seemed as though Iranian forces were strong enough to push back the Chinese, though their forces in the region were saved by the assassination of the Iranian ruler Nader Shah. His successor had far more pressing concerns at home, and swiftly signed a favourable peace with China that established a border and allowed China a free hand to destroy the Dzungars, though with the promise to respect the rights of Muslim cities in the Tarim Basin.


While some of the Dzungars escaped into Iranian territory (where a number served as mercenaries in Reza Shah’s army), the majority were left powerless in the face of a renewed Chinese onslaught. The downfall of the Dzungars was bloody, but it left China’s presence in the West assured with no challenges from nomadic peoples. China’s control of the area was confirmed as the Iranians, more focused on internal challenges, neglected to aid the Muslims of the Tarim Basin in a rebellion against Qing authority which took place in the late 1760s. Though relations between the Afsharids and the Qing were never warm, the two seemed to have at least an understanding, preferring not to exhaust themselves in wars that promised little reward far away from home. It would be this understanding between the two powers that would provide the basis for Iranian-Chinese relations and interaction for many decades to come.


In Southeast Asia however, challenges to Qing expansion were more persistent. Attempts from the Burmese to extract tribute from Shan States that were tributaries of China led to all-out war between China and the Burmese. There were no convenient deaths to provide China an easy end to the war, and after 7 gruelling years of struggle, including a number of failed invasions of Burma, the Chinese were ultimately forced to acquiesce to the Burmese ruler Hsinbyushin. For a war that was intended to showcase China’s strength after an uneven performance against the Iranians in the West, it was a complete humiliation, and demonstrated the ecological unsuitability of extending the Chinese empire further south [1]. Subsequent attempts by the Qianlong Emperor to punish Burma by a commercial embargo floundered on the unwillingness of merchants in Southern China to stop the trade in goods such as Burmese Gems. It would not be until the abdication of the Qianlong Emperor in 1796 that the embargo was lifted, officially due to the requirement of Burmese cotton in Yunnan.


It were these two struggles more than any other that demonstrated the geographic limits of Qing rule. Whether it was the political/logistical barrier presented on the Western border with Iran, or the political/ecological barrier that had become apparent in the Burmese war, the last major campaigns of the Qianlong Emperor’s reign had seemingly demonstrated to the Chinese the “natural” limits of their Empire. This had little effect on Chinese political theory however, which was still fundamentally Sino-Centric. After all, Burma and even Iran were hardly the equal of China in economic or cultural terms. China may have had around 20 times the population of Iran, which does provide some credence to the Chinese view of things. Simply put, though China had suffered “reversals” in these wars, the propaganda of the Qianlong Emperor had proclaimed that he had secured all the borders he had needed to. Although the last of his “Great Campaigns” had been an unmitigated failure, the sheer scale and grandeur of the Chinese Empire at least allowed him to pretend otherwise.


[1] – The Chinese defeat has been more severe than her loss against the Burmese in OTL, partially as the Burmese have not fought a war simultaneously with Siam and have been able to concentrate their forces against China.

* * * * * *

The Chinese Diaspora in Iranian Central Asia​

For Millennia, the trade routes that linked China to the West through Central Asia had been for the most part dominated by the nomadic peoples who lived in the area. However, with the coming of “Subcontinental Empires” in the 18th Century, these people were gradually brought under the imperial systems of China, Iran, and to a lesser extent Russia. Although the importance of land-borne trade had relatively declined for China as new trade-routes were opened by sea, the revival of Iran in the middle of the 18th century had opened up new markets for both Iranian and Chinese goods that were more easily accessed by the land route of the old Silk Road. As the threat of robbery, banditry and other threats to merchants gradually receded, goods such as spices and textiles made their way between the two empires. Initially, this trade was dominated by peoples such as the Uighurs, but from the 1770s onward it was increasingly common for ethnic Iranians as well as Han and Hui to be involved more directly in the trade.


By the 1780s, small communities of merchants had sent themselves up in major cities of each empire. The small Chinese community of Mashhad remains the only one in Iran of which a considerable amount of documentary evidence remains. Initially numbering only a few families, the community had eventually grown to one of a few hundred which in 1788 was allowed to construct a small temple which can still be found in Mashhad’s Chinatown today. Despite being a diverse city, few of its inhabitants were considered to be as truly foreign as the Chinese, who were observed to be “stranger in manner and belief than the Dutch and English, though better groomed overall” as one Iranian novelist described them. And the Iranians generated a similar amount of interest in China. The majority of Iranian traders were located in the Southern port city of Guangzhou, the centre of trade for Southern China, though smaller communities were located in cities such as Lanzhou in the North as well. While the object of some suspicion, the Iranians seem to be held in a higher regard than Europeans, at least when memories of the Sino-Iranian war of the 1750s was gradually forgotten.


Despite the growth in trade that had taken place between Iran and China in the late 18th century, both were still relatively unimportant to the other. For Iran, markets in India and Europe were closer and more important, and China’s trade with Southeast Asia and Europe remained more important than her trade with Iran. However, trade between the two nations remained the basis for peace through the period, and enabled a significant amount of cultural intercourse between the two. Most famously, the Iranian Shah Shahrukh reportedly greatly enjoyed a Chinese meal that he had eaten at a court celebration in 1785. There is less evidence, however, that elements of Iranian culture had penetrated the Qing court in China. Certainly, what scraps of evidence concern the Chinese court’s perception of Iran mirrored Chinese perceptions of other areas of the world, namely that nothing they could produce would be of interest to China.

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - There haven't been a great deal of changes in China proper as of yet, but it would feel like a bit of a cop-out not to do something on what is different in China so far. The fact that there is a fairly stable border between China and Iran will definitely have its effects on both, though this will be true of Iran more than China, for the simple fact that China is so much bigger, and its core lands are so much further than Iran's. The last free nomadic peoples of Central Asia are now mostly Kazakh, and it seems like only a matter of time before they too will come under the rule of their settled neighbours.

And yes, a Chinese presence in Iran will surely lead to some interesting culinary innovations and fusions in the future.

 

[MagicalPhantom345]

The circumstances under which some of Iran's legal codes have moved toward a secular system are fairly unique to Iran. No other Muslim state has such a precarious balance between Sunni and Shi'a, and no other Muslim state has such a weak foundation of Fiqh when it comes to its laws. This isn't a conscious move toward secularism, but one that recognises the realities that Iran's government faces as it attempts to standardise its legal system. The fact that a fairly secular legal code exists could be of great significance later on however.

Definitely become a basis for other countries westernizing

 

[canute]

How much influence dose Iran have in ithe Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula? I imagine it will be limited if they dont develop some form of navy.

Are the Ottomans still a competitor in this area?

 

[Hegemon]

I like this tl. I love how it shows that somewhere outside of Europe could have modernized without being colonized by them. It must have taken a lot of effort to put together.

 

[thestickfigure]

The Iranians can't keep up this jig forever. By going into punjab (and a lot of other areas), they have effectively overstreched their empire, and will be the cause of major problems in the future. It's even questionable Reza can be in the "conquer everything" state for a long time.

 

[knifepony]

Natural Frontiers? The Limits of Chinese Expansion in the 18th Century
​

The Qing Campaign against the Dzungar Khanate was known as one of the “Ten Great Campaigns”, one of the Emperor Qianlong’s wars that had expanded the glory of the Qing dynasty and secured the borders of China against restless nomadic peoples. However, like the later war with Burma, the campaign was not the unqualified success that had been claimed by Qing propaganda. Although the Dzungars were eventually defeated and destroyed as a people by Chinese forces, the war had been a difficult one. The Dzungars were for a time allied with Afsharid Iran, who had swiftly recovered from collapse two decades previously and who had, like the Qing, established an empire whose borders were far more extensive than those of the previous dynasty. Nader Shah, the first of the Afsharid Shahs, was an immensely ambitious individual who had it in mind to emulate the last of the great Nomadic Leaders, Timur. By the late 1750s, his successes in Central Asia had emboldened him, and he began to draw up plans to emulate Timur’s unfinished conquest of China.​

Nader saw potential allies in the Dzungars and the Khalka Mongols, both of whom were engaged in a bitter struggle with the Chinese. Nader’s plan to conquer China was impractical even with the help of these allies and his own considerable resources, but Iranian intervention into the war nevertheless threatened to complicate the war significantly. Were the Iranians to prevent the destruction of the Dzungars, they would prove to be a threat to China’s security for years to come. Although the Chinese saw success against the Dzungars, their initial encounters with the Iranians were not promising, and they suffered a heavy defeat at Bishkek in the summer of 1758. It seemed as though Iranian forces were strong enough to push back the Chinese, though their forces in the region were saved by the assassination of the Iranian ruler Nader Shah. His successor had far more pressing concerns at home, and swiftly signed a favourable peace with China that established a border and allowed China a free hand to destroy the Dzungars, though with the promise to respect the rights of Muslim cities in the Tarim Basin.


While some of the Dzungars escaped into Iranian territory (where a number served as mercenaries in Reza Shah’s army), the majority were left powerless in the face of a renewed Chinese onslaught. The downfall of the Dzungars was bloody, but it left China’s presence in the West assured with no challenges from nomadic peoples. China’s control of the area was confirmed as the Iranians, more focused on internal challenges, neglected to aid the Muslims of the Tarim Basin in a rebellion against Qing authority which took place in the late 1760s. Though relations between the Afsharids and the Qing were never warm, the two seemed to have at least an understanding, preferring not to exhaust themselves in wars that promised little reward far away from home. It would be this understanding between the two powers that would provide the basis for Iranian-Chinese relations and interaction for many decades to come.


In Southeast Asia however, challenges to Qing expansion were more persistent. Attempts from the Burmese to extract tribute from Shan States that were tributaries of China led to all-out war between China and the Burmese. There were no convenient deaths to provide China an easy end to the war, and after 7 gruelling years of struggle, including a number of failed invasions of Burma, the Chinese were ultimately forced to acquiesce to the Burmese ruler Hsinbyushin. For a war that was intended to showcase China’s strength after an uneven performance against the Iranians in the West, it was a complete humiliation, and demonstrated the ecological unsuitability of extending the Chinese empire further south [1]. Subsequent attempts by the Qianlong Emperor to punish Burma by a commercial embargo floundered on the unwillingness of merchants in Southern China to stop the trade in goods such as Burmese Gems. It would not be until the abdication of the Qianlong Emperor in 1796 that the embargo was lifted, officially due to the requirement of Burmese cotton in Yunnan.


It were these two struggles more than any other that demonstrated the geographic limits of Qing rule. Whether it was the political/logistical barrier presented on the Western border with Iran, or the political/ecological barrier that had become apparent in the Burmese war, the last major campaigns of the Qianlong Emperor’s reign had seemingly demonstrated to the Chinese the “natural” limits of their Empire. This had little effect on Chinese political theory however, which was still fundamentally Sino-Centric. After all, Burma and even Iran were hardly the equal of China in economic or cultural terms. China may have had around 20 times the population of Iran, which does provide some credence to the Chinese view of things. Simply put, though China had suffered “reversals” in these wars, the propaganda of the Qianlong Emperor had proclaimed that he had secured all the borders he had needed to. Although the last of his “Great Campaigns” had been an unmitigated failure, the sheer scale and grandeur of the Chinese Empire at least allowed him to pretend otherwise.


[1] – The Chinese defeat has been more severe than her loss against the Burmese in OTL, partially as the Burmese have not fought a war simultaneously with Siam and have been able to concentrate their forces against China.

* * * * * *

The Chinese Diaspora in Iranian Central Asia​

For Millennia, the trade routes that linked China to the West through Central Asia had been for the most part dominated by the nomadic peoples who lived in the area. However, with the coming of “Subcontinental Empires” in the 18th Century, these people were gradually brought under the imperial systems of China, Iran, and to a lesser extent Russia. Although the importance of land-borne trade had relatively declined for China as new trade-routes were opened by sea, the revival of Iran in the middle of the 18th century had opened up new markets for both Iranian and Chinese goods that were more easily accessed by the land route of the old Silk Road. As the threat of robbery, banditry and other threats to merchants gradually receded, goods such as spices and textiles made their way between the two empires. Initially, this trade was dominated by peoples such as the Uighurs, but from the 1770s onward it was increasingly common for ethnic Iranians as well as Han and Hui to be involved more directly in the trade.


By the 1780s, small communities of merchants had sent themselves up in major cities of each empire. The small Chinese community of Mashhad remains the only one in Iran of which a considerable amount of documentary evidence remains. Initially numbering only a few families, the community had eventually grown to one of a few hundred which in 1788 was allowed to construct a small temple which can still be found in Mashhad’s Chinatown today. Despite being a diverse city, few of its inhabitants were considered to be as truly foreign as the Chinese, who were observed to be “stranger in manner and belief than the Dutch and English, though better groomed overall” as one Iranian novelist described them. And the Iranians generated a similar amount of interest in China. The majority of Iranian traders were located in the Southern port city of Guangzhou, the centre of trade for Southern China, though smaller communities were located in cities such as Lanzhou in the North as well. While the object of some suspicion, the Iranians seem to be held in a higher regard than Europeans, at least when memories of the Sino-Iranian war of the 1750s was gradually forgotten.


Despite the growth in trade that had taken place between Iran and China in the late 18th century, both were still relatively unimportant to the other. For Iran, markets in India and Europe were closer and more important, and China’s trade with Southeast Asia and Europe remained more important than her trade with Iran. However, trade between the two nations remained the basis for peace through the period, and enabled a significant amount of cultural intercourse between the two. Most famously, the Iranian Shah Shahrukh reportedly greatly enjoyed a Chinese meal that he had eaten at a court celebration in 1785. There is less evidence, however, that elements of Iranian culture had penetrated the Qing court in China. Certainly, what scraps of evidence concern the Chinese court’s perception of Iran mirrored Chinese perceptions of other areas of the world, namely that nothing they could produce would be of interest to China.

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - There haven't been a great deal of changes in China proper as of yet, but it would feel like a bit of a cop-out not to do something on what is different in China so far. The fact that there is a fairly stable border between China and Iran will definitely have its effects on both, though this will be true of Iran more than China, for the simple fact that China is so much bigger, and its core lands are so much further than Iran's. The last free nomadic peoples of Central Asia are now mostly Kazakh, and it seems like only a matter of time before they too will come under the rule of their settled neighbours.

And yes, a Chinese presence in Iran will surely lead to some interesting culinary innovations and fusions in the future.

And then oil is discovered.

 

[Roger II]

Fascinating update! Curious about the temple.

 

[MagicalPhantom345]

And then oil is discovered.

This has got me thinking of a Mosque made out of plastic for some reason

 

[Al-numbers]

Oooooh, I wonder if there shall be any mixed-race merchant families arising from these cultural openings. A Chinese-Iranian family could gain more trade contacts between both empires than if they were married within their own ethnicity.

 

[EmperorBuaya]

It'll be interesting to see relations between ITTL Iran and China in the modern day. I can see some sort of common ground and perhaps alliance against the western powers.

 

[kholieken]

Oooooh, I wonder if there shall be any mixed-race merchant families arising from these cultural openings. A Chinese-Iranian family could gain more trade contacts between both empires than if they were married within their own ethnicity.

No, Chinese who convert or marry Muslims become Hui. difference between Muslims and ancestor-worship/Buddhism is too large. In China, Indonesia, Malaysia or other places Chinese who become Muslims almost always counted as Hui or Malays. Conversion to Abrahamic faith is always radical, it cut off of old familial relation, new community of worship, new pool of marriage partner, etc

 

[Indicus]

If I can remember in OTL, the Sikhs did not vassalise Jammu until the 1770s meaning that they have probably not done so yet in TTL.

That’s not the same thing, as the Sikhs had multiple misls which often fought with one another and only united during Afghan invasions. Persia doesn’t have that problem.

 

[Nassirisimo]

Definitely become a basis for other countries westernizing

It will certainly prove to be a useful basis for modernising reform in the future should the situation call for it. However, the extent that the West will be secular is still up for consideration, as the French Revolution isn't exactly guaranteed.

How much influence dose Iran have in ithe Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula? I imagine it will be limited if they dont develop some form of navy.

Are the Ottomans still a competitor in this area?

As it did in OTL, Iran has actually built up a fairly significant navy already. Some of the ships actually have similar numbers of guns to European ships of the line and the navy is capable not only of patrolling the Gulf, but projecting some power into the Arabian Sea, useful as the majority of the Empire's ships have been built in Indian ports such as Surat.

Iran is the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, holding the key areas such as Bahrain and Kuwait, as well as Oman. Its influence within Central Arabia is more limited due to the rise of the Wahhabis and their skepticism regarding Iran's newfound Sunni orientation (more on that later). For their part, the Ottoman still maintain influence over the Hedjaz, but this is somewhat weakened. Due to the loss of Ottoman Iraq, their influence in the Persian Gulf has been more of less curbed entirely.

I like this tl. I love how it shows that somewhere outside of Europe could have modernized without being colonized by them. It must have taken a lot of effort to put together.

Well, we are still in the 18th century when European conquests in Asia are more due to luck than the overwhelming technical and organizational superiority that they would build up by the 19th century. This being said, European conquests may be somewhat harder as Britain will not be able to draw upon the resources of India.

I would point out that the first non-Western country to successfully modernise was Japan, which by some amazing coincidence happened to be one of the countries least affected by colonialism and its associated problems. If other countries were able to avoid this as Japan did in OTL (while avoiding the independent-in-name situation faced by Iran and the Ottomans), the chances for a successful modernization could be higher, though this was of course dependent on other factors which Iran may well lack.

The Iranians can't keep up this jig forever. By going into punjab (and a lot of other areas), they have effectively overstreched their empire, and will be the cause of major problems in the future. It's even questionable Reza can be in the "conquer everything" state for a long time.

Conquering everything is the relatively easy part, it will be holding things that are the hard part. Iranian conquests in areas such as Central Asia are more likely to be successful in the long run, as the traditional strengths of the natives of the area have been subverted by guns and forts. The same is not true of the Punjab, which although being overwhelmingly non-Sikh, have little in common with their Iranian rulers outside of the Persianate elite.

And then oil is discovered.

In relation to Chinese-Iranian relations? Perhaps the Chinese mean to bring Confucianism by bullet.

Fascinating update! Curious about the temple.

The temple in the painting? I believe the painting is of an abandoned Chinese temple in Central Asia by the rather excellent 19th century Russian artist Vasily Vereshchagin, whose paintings I've used heavily to liven things up around the timeline in various places.

This has got me thinking of a Mosque made out of plastic for some reason

Say it now, and they'll be building it in Saudi Arabia a decade or so down the line.

Oooooh, I wonder if there shall be any mixed-race merchant families arising from these cultural openings. A Chinese-Iranian family could gain more trade contacts between both empires than if they were married within their own ethnicity.

No, Chinese who convert or marry Muslims become Hui. difference between Muslims and ancestor-worship/Buddhism is too large. In China, Indonesia, Malaysia or other places Chinese who become Muslims almost always counted as Hui or Malays. Conversion to Abrahamic faith is always radical, it cut off of old familial relation, new community of worship, new pool of marriage partner, etc

Mixed relationships in terms of Persian-Hui marriages are almost certain to happen, and indeed the Hui will likely benefit greatly from the slow opening of the Muslim world to trade with China.

A partially related question Kholieken, but I've always wondered how conversion to Christianity for Han Chinese differs from conversion to Islam. As far as I'm aware, there is no separate "Christian" grouping for ethnically Chinese Christians as there is for Muslims. Is this due to the larger influence of Islam in China's history or something else?

It'll be interesting to see relations between ITTL Iran and China in the modern day. I can see some sort of common ground and perhaps alliance against the western powers.

Certainly if the West comes to dominate as it did in OTL's 19th century, there will be a great deal of sympathy between the two, and much will likely be made of these early relations.

That’s not the same thing, as the Sikhs had multiple misls which often fought with one another and only united during Afghan invasions. Persia doesn’t have that problem.

The Sikhs prior to Ranjit have always struck me as so disunited that the word "Confederacy" seems to imply far stronger ties than actually existed. Iran definitely doesn't have the problem of disunity, though there is the concern of distances.

 

[Nassirisimo]

Iran's Provinces in the Mid-18th Century​

For much of Iran, both the territories that had been a part of Iran under the Safavids as well as the newer territories acquired by Nader Shah, the reigns of Reza Shah and Nasrollah Shah represented times of recovery. The general restoration of peace and the increasing complexity of the state’s administration affected each province of Iran in different ways, but for the most part strengthened relationships between the centre and the provinces, tying regional governors ever closer to the new capital of Mashhad.

The Northwest​

Most of Iran’s Northern provinces had been fairly wealthy under the Safavids, being noted for their agricultural fertility as well as its silk production in Shirvan, Gilan and Mazandaran, but it had suffered greatly during the disruptions and wars of the later Safavids and the interregnum. They had seen looting and occupation by both Russian and Ottoman forces which left cities depopulated and farmland turned to pasture for nomadic peoples. The region had been taxed heavily during Nader Shah’s reign, though with the accession of Reza Shah the tax burden of the province was lessened considerably. Within two decades of Nader’s death agricultural production seems to have reached its height under the Safavids, and the silk industry in particular had grown more swiftly, stimulated by increased demand in Russia and Northern Europe.


With the rising power of Russia, as well as continued tension with the Ottomans being a factor in the considerations of the Iranian governments, the provinces of the Northwest received a significant amount of attention from the central government due to its proximity to the two powers. Nasrollah Shah funded the construction of a network of well-maintained roads throughout the province, which both enabled Iranian troops to move quickly in the event of an attack but which also aided trade in the region. Added to the existing network of caravansaries, the road networks of Northwest Iran enabled it to become an important trade hub, seeing goods from much of the rest of Iran moving through for export to markets around the Black and Mediterranean seas. The city of Tabriz in particular prospered, becoming a centre for manufacturing and trade in the region. The population boomed, reaching once again some 100,000 by 1780, mirroring the general growth in population throughout Iran in general [1].

The South​

The territories surrounding the Persian Gulf had suffered terribly from the depredations of war. Despite its aridity, the Gulf had been a fairly wealthy region, contributing a great deal to the treasury of the Safavid Empire, though in the latter years of the dynasty Iran’s hold in the region had been weakened by a resurgent Oman, as well as tribal groups moving from Central Arabia. As with the rest of Iran, these regions were affected by depopulation, with the population of the island of Bahrain falling from perhaps as much as 30,000 to a mere 10,000 by 1750. Here, the policies of the Afsharids contributed to a remarkable turnaround in the fortunes of the region. Nader warred with the Omanis, forcing the Imam to submit, and subsequently turned Iran’s navy against the pirates and petty rulers of the coast, once again making the region safe for shipping. The relative safety of the waters of the Persian Gulf impressed both British and Dutch merchants, and Iranian merchants operating from Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Bahrain, as well as Omanis from Muscat made the Gulf the centre for trade coming from as far as Southern China.


As well as trade, the province saw increased production of export goods, whether it was the pearls that came from the sea or the dates that grew near oases in the area. Although travellers often complained of the “unhealthy” heat of the region, one of the hottest in the world, the money to be made in shipping goods from the south and centre of Iran to the rest of the Indian Ocean and beyond were too tempting. Reza Shah offered both the EIC and VOC a certain level of toll-free trading, and extended this offer to the French who set up a factory in Bandar Abbas in 1781, which not only allowed the export of Iranian goods to Europe but saw luxury products from the Dutch East Indies in particular such as sugar, spices and coffee to be imported. Sugar was also cultivated in Khuzestan, though compared to the amount imported this production was rather insignificant, and Iran remained a net importer of cash crops. Despite this, the export of spices such as Saffron increased in the period, acting as a salve on Iran’s trade deficit to some extent.


Although the native rulers of the region submitted quickly and became assimilated into the administrative structure of the Iranian Empire, challenges to Iranian rule came from tribal confederations that moved east from the Najd in Central Arabia. In particular the Bani Utbah, who had been active on the coast of the Persian Gulf since the time of the Safavids, presented at times a serious challenge to Iranian garrisons in the region [2]. An unsuccessful attempt to seize the island of Bahrain in 1769 alerted the Iranian government to the danger posed by the Bani Utbah, and prompted an increase in the size of the garrisons stationed at Bahrain, Qatif and Kuwait, the latter of which the Bani Utbah were expulsed from. Although the challenge presented by Arab tribal confederations would peak only at the turn of the 19th century, the fact that the central government took actions to combat the threat presented demonstrates the relative importance that the region held for the Afsharids in relation to the previous Safavids.

The East​

The East of the country had long been a peripheral region for Iran’s rulers. Control of Eastern Iran had been contested with the Mughal Emperors, who held Kabul and who’s reach sometimes extended as far as Kandahar. The destruction of old Kandahar was a watershed for the rise of Iranian dominance in the region, side-lining both the Mughals and eventually the Afghan tribes who had previously be preeminent in the region. With the attempted uprising of Ahmad Abdali the Afghan tribes were placed under increasingly harsh measures, with forced settlement policies viewed by the Iranian government as a way to reduce tribal power. The Persian-speaking cities of the East however, flourished, with both Herat and Kabul growing rapidly even in comparison to other Iranian cities. Although trade and agriculture was somewhat more difficult in the region than elsewhere, due in part to the restiveness of the Afghan tribesmen and the limitation of agricultural areas to isolated valleys, the establishment of a secure administration did go some way toward improving stability and encouraging prosperity in the region.


The Iranian government took on a policy in the region that more than anywhere else, promoted “Persian” language and culture to the Afghan tribesmen. Although the Persian speakers of the region spoke for the most part a heavy dialect with a significant Turkic influence, the Iranian government saw the best hope for the future stability of the region as strengthening their political and economic influence over that of the Pashto-speaking Afghan tribesmen, who following the Abdali rebellion were systematically removed from positions of influence both locally and within central institutions such as the army. This policy provoked a number of rebellions, though none of these were able to present the same kind of threat that Ahmad Abdali’s had managed to. Although less marked than in other regions, both productivity and population steadily managed to grow, though for the most part this was focused on urban centres as opposed to the countryside where farming techniques remained primitive and populated areas remained isolated.

The North​

The vast deserts of Central Asia were not a traditional part of Iran. Iranians around the Oxus (Amu Darya) river were largely supplanted by Turkic peoples in the first millennium AD, and was largely considered to be outside of the “Iranian Sphere” for much of the Islamic era. During the Safavid Empire, much of Central Asia was ruled by the Shaybanids, a Turko-Persianate dynasty of Mongol extraction. With the breakdown of Shaybanid authority, a number of smaller Khanates ruled, which proved to be easy pickings for Nader Shah and his Afsharid successors. By the latter part of the 18th century, Iranian rule had been cemented in much of Central Asia, from the Syr Darya, down the Amu Darya and into the Eastern Mountains that separated the region from Qing China. Initially, the Afsharids ruled with a relatively light hand, continuing existing ruling methods, incorporating Uzbek and Turkmen horsemen into their armies and governing through the largely Persian-speaking urban populace [3].


However, as the region’s administration increasingly adhered to a centralised model, subtle changes were taking place. The dialect of Persian began to more closely resemble that of Western Iran, Turkic tribal leaders were increasingly choosing to have their sons educated in Persian, and to an even greater extent than before, Persian was seen as the language of prestige. The area as a whole remained largely Turkic in population, whether it be the nomadic population or the agricultural population of the river valleys, but with the supplanting of political power by an Iranian-speaking bureaucracy, the demographic balance of power was beginning to shift. This accompanied greater economic integration to the rest of Iran and beyond. To a large extent, the practice of slave-trading had ceased, increasing the value of more productive economic enterprises. Although entirely for domestic purposes, an increasing number of people in the region were involved in the textile industry, and the region seems to have increased its importation of Persian Carpets from Khorasan. Despite this, integration to the rest of the Empire remained limited, and in the Iranian “mind”, Central Asia remained as a largely Turkic Other.

Mesopotamia​

The Iranian conquest of Mesopotamia from the Ottoman Empire had been previously emulated under the Safavid dynasty. However, unlike these previous attempts, the Afsharid conquest of Mesopotamia proved far more durable. Initially the administration of the new province change little, with Ahmad Pasha swearing allegiance to the Iranian Shah. With the death of Nader, Ahmad Pasha imprudently assumed independence from both the Ottoman Sultan and Iranian Shah, and lost his throne and his head. From this point on, Mesopotamia was reorganized and integrated more closely into the Iranian administrative system. Through the latter half of the 18th century, the Mamluk soldiers were replaced with Iranian conscripts, Ottoman tax-farmers were replaced with Iranian tax collectors and Persian was encouraged as the language of administration.


Despite these changes, life remained unchanged for the majority of the people in the region. Semi-nomadic Arab and Kurdish tribesmen remained dominant, especially in rural areas. Regional Ayan (notables) were instrumental in the running of the provinces, and for all the desire of the Iranian administration to establish itself as the unquestioned authority in the region, its rule there depended on the consent of these powerful notables. More important changes took place in regards to trade. Insomuch as there was an Iranian “National Market”, the cities of Mesopotamia proved keen to trade with their newfound countrymen, exporting cotton and finished textile products to the rest of Iran, as well as acting as an entrepôt for goods coming into Syria and Anatolia from the East. Towards the end of the 18th century, the beginnings of a cash-crop economy were emerging from Mesopotamia, which was better-watered than much of the rest of Iran, and benefited from easier river transport. Despite these advantages, economic development was hampered by the low population, many of whom were economically unproductive nomads.


[1] – In OTL, hit by Earthquakes, war and other such disruptions, Tabriz’s population was probably around 30,000 by this point. Iran's cities are doing far better than their OTL counterparts.

[2] – The Bani Utbah gave rise to the ruling families of Bahrain and Kuwait in OTL, arguably the two most important Arab states in the Gulf in the 19th century with Oman excepted.

[3] – It serves noting here that in OTL, Nader saw his Central Asian conquests as sources of grain and manpower more than integral parts of his state, and maintained previous rulers in the area.

* * * * * *

Author's Notes - Just wanted to have a bit of a closer look at different regions of Iran, some of which were not part of Iran in OTL by this point and most of whom did not have a particularly good 18th century. Particularly for Bahrain, the 18th century is seen as an unsettled time which saw the supplanting of the native peoples by newcomers from Central Arabia. While the disruptions that accompanied the fall of the Safavids have still happened, the fact that there has been stability for the second half of the 18th century has led to recovery in many parts of Iran.

 

[agisXIV]

Can we have a new map please? I'm not quite sure exactly what territories this new resurgent Iran has atm.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

How do the Armenians and Georgians find their current rulers?

 

[generalurist]

The small Chinese community of Mashhad remains the only one in Iran of which a considerable amount of documentary evidence remains.

The only one with 'evidence' remaining? Crud, sounds like something real nasty happened in TTL's future at some point.

 

[MagicalPhantom345]

Say it now, and they'll be building it in Saudi Arabia a decade or so down the line.

So long as they use the types that have a high melting point, or it will be like that Chocalate Mosque in Charlie and the Chocolate Factory.

Despite these changes, life remained unchanged for the majority of the people in the region. Semi-nomadic Arab and Kurdish tribesmen remained dominant, especially in rural areas. Regional Ayan (notables) were instrumental in the running of the provinces, and for all the desire of the Iranian administration to establish itself as the unquestioned authority in the region, its rule there depended on the consent of these powerful notables. More important changes took place in regards to trade. Insomuch as there was an Iranian “National Market”, the cities of Mesopotamia proved keen to trade with their newfound countrymen, exporting cotton and finished textile products to the rest of Iran, as well as acting as an entrepôt for goods coming into Syria and Anatolia from the East. Towards the end of the 18th century, the beginnings of a cash-crop economy were emerging from Mesopotamia, which was better-watered than much of the rest of Iran, and benefited from easier river transport. Despite these advantages, economic development was hampered by the low population, many of whom were economically unproductive nomads

I am keen to see which ethnic group comes to benefit the most in this region in terms of population growth. With my view being the Assyrians, as the economic prosperity and political stability will allow them to develop without much disturbance.

 

[Roger II]

Oh, re: legal reform l have an idea or two.

 

[EmperorBuaya]

Lovely to see TTL Iran is in much better position and not doing too bad for themselves, comparing to OTL. However, it's not really good time to rest their laurels on the throne, certain forces in the West and the certain Northern Bear will definitely turned their sights towards Persia in the age of Imperialism. With TTL's Iran remaining strong, they might refrained from trying to exerting their influences. That's assuming Iran remained strong.

On different topic, what happens to Egypt in the meantime?