I havr noticed that there is a really serious issue with much of this discussion, namely the "well, they can reassign the oilers from the other landings". Most of the other landings, as noted earlier didn't NEED tankers and were not supported by them. You do not need a tanker to support an invasion force that is only traveling 600 miles, that being the case, most of the Japanese actions didn't include any oiler support. The Japanese didn't mount a lot of long distance assault landing, simply because they lacked the resources to even try them.
Wake was a total shoestring operation despite the Island being the key pivot point for the entire "Defensive Perimeter" that the Japanese were attempting to create (no oiler support of any kind) all the landing were done with shockingly small number of troops. The landing that took Borneo were done with a single brigade sized force, no tanker support (although there was a collier used to provide additional heavy lift) that departed from Cam Ranh Bay (~600 miles for the landing site). Guam was also taken by a brigade size formation (the South Seas Force) which moved from the Bonin to directly attack the minuscule U.S. garrison. It did not have any oiler support (Saipan, a Japanese held "Trust Territory" was just over 100 miles away. After capturing Guam the South Seas Force moved to Turk, without any need for refueling support.
Far from having additional fleet oilers that could be diverted, moving a four or five division forces (which is what the math says would be needed to take Oahu, a thoughly fortified position with strong shore defenses, two Regular Army Divisions, and well over an additional division of basically trained Army personnel that could be used to create additional ad hoc battalions. Crews off of sunk or trapped warships could also be brought into service as static defenders, again, they had only the most basic of training with rifles, but many were thoroughly familiar with the various automatic weapons used by the Army. In static defense the lack of training in maneuver warfare would be far less of an issue (and a good number of the crews of smaller combatants had training in handling infantry weapons given the need for "showing the flag" operations, and the on-going patrols of Chinese rivers by U.S. gunboats). Realistically, even a five division landing force is too small, given American force size and the sort of strategic depth offiered by Oahu