1941 - invading Hawaii, possible?

It also pushes the US back - it's an awfully long way from San Diego to Pearl. Whether the operation is operationally or tactically achievable is a different matter entirely, but it makes strategic sense.
Don't think you are even remotely getting the point , strategically its impossible. Landing some troops , possible , supplying them or even enough to have a hope, not a chance. The Carriers have to head home within 24 hours so Enterprise turns up, no air cover, ,most of transports/supplies get sunk. If you don't have a port then unloading will take days , this is not D-Day with LST's and other dedicated assault ships.
 
Don't think you are even remotely getting the point , strategically its impossible.

I'm not sure you understand what "strategic" means. In this case "mak[ing] strategic sense" means "would the success of this operation strengthen Japan's perimeter around the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The answer is yes, because an occupation of the Hawaiian Islands would mean that Pearl Harbour could be used as a forward operating base for the Combined Fleet and could not be so used by the US fleet, forcing any US counter attack to start over 2000 miles further east.

Landing some troops , possible , supplying them or even enough to have a hope, not a chance. The Carriers have to head home within 24 hours so Enterprise turns up, no air cover, ,most of transports/supplies get sunk. If you don't have a port then unloading will take days , this is not D-Day with LST's and other dedicated assault ships.

All operational/tactical considerations.
 
I'm not sure you understand what "strategic" means. In this case "mak[ing] strategic sense" means "would the success of this operation strengthen Japan's perimeter around the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The answer is yes, because an occupation of the Hawaiian Islands would mean that Pearl Harbour could be used as a forward operating base for the Combined Fleet and could not be so used by the US fleet, forcing any US counter attack to start over 2000 miles further east.



All operational/tactical considerations.
Surely the greater strategic point is by “winning Hawaii“ you’ve fecked your fleet, most likely shattered your landing force and you still have to try and win the oil reserves. Evennif you take the islands you then have to defend them against US counter actions pinning down more of your fleet/forces/supplies while preventing you from achieving the core goals of securing raw materials.
 
I'm not sure you understand what "strategic" means. In this case "mak[ing] strategic sense" means "would the success of this operation strengthen Japan's perimeter around the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The answer is yes, because an occupation of the Hawaiian Islands would mean that Pearl Harbour could be used as a forward operating base for the Combined Fleet and could not be so used by the US fleet, forcing any US counter attack to start over 2000 miles further east.



All operational/tactical considerations.
I know what strategic means , there is no plan that is strategically practical ie one that gets an invasion force strong enough to have any chance of success to Hawaii. Not securing the needed oil is strategically suicidal, Hawaii does not get you a drop.

Even engaging ASB Handwavium, Americans support can just stage via Australia and Singapore if Hawaii is put out of action. The Essex pipeline is not getting delayed, the time/losses will just make defeat certain as operations can no longer be done on the bounce ( the shipping needs to supply Hawaii are implausibly large ). No one has ever launched a major amphibious operation that far from bases and succeeded.
 
Surely the greater strategic point is by “winning Hawaii“ you’ve fecked your fleet, most likely shattered your landing force and you still have to try and win the oil reserves. Evennif you take the islands you then have to defend them against US counter actions pinning down more of your fleet/forces/supplies while preventing you from achieving the core goals of securing raw materials.
I know what strategic means , there is no plan that is strategically practical ie one that gets an invasion force strong enough to have any chance of success to Hawaii.

As I said above, these are operational/tactical considerations, not strategic ones.

Not securing the needed oil is strategically suicidal, Hawaii does not get you a drop.

Hawaii secures your flank against the US counter attack when you go after the oil in phase 2.

Again, I'm not arguing whether or not the operation is doable, merely that it makes strategic sense.
 
You said "The fast oilers not assigned to fuelling up the First Air Fleet were, in the main, already assigned to invasion convoys and could not and cannot be spared from that duty."

If they're going after Oahu alone then there are no other invasion convoys they need to be spared from. Whether they're sufficient for the lift required to achieve the objective is certainly debatable, but going by the OP those other invasions aren't happening and therefore aren't a logistical factor.
I'm assuming, due to the distances involved, that oilers assigned to invasion convoys IOTL are still needed for the one giant invasion convoy heading to Hawaii.
 
Hawaii secures your flank against the US counter attack when you go after the oil in phase 2.

Again, I'm not arguing whether or not the operation is doable, merely that it makes strategic sense.
The strategic goal (as far as it vaguely exists in Japanese HQ) is to secure the oil and mineral resources of South East Asia. Taking Hawaii at the expense of everything else doesn't further that goal at all. All it does is sacrifice surprise, countless resources and operational flexibility for ...fighting America on their home turf, over a heavily fortified island with no resources and a massive population that hates you. It doesn't 'secure' anything, all it does is extend your supply lines to stupid degrees while tying down countless resources in a battle of Hawaii. Meanwhile British, Dutch and American forces are fortifying and mobilizing in the areas you actually want to take.
 
As I said above, these are operational/tactical considerations, not strategic ones.



Hawaii secures your flank against the US counter attack when you go after the oil in phase 2.

Again, I'm not arguing whether or not the operation is doable, merely that it makes strategic sense.
Not having a capability is a strategic consideration not not a operational or tactical one. The IJN/IJA don't have the resources to successfully assault Hawaii even if they stop the other invasions. They were done over much shorter distances and relied on land based air. Taking Hawaii does not secure a flank , it just alters the vector of most vulnerability ie the weak point is now via the SW Pacific not the Central Pacific.

Without any surprise and having given the defenders time to reinforce and dig in, phase two is likely to fail badly and the oilfields get wrecked even if successful. OTL Japan rolled 7's vs 1's , given at least a couple of months, with less transport that is not likely to repeat.
 

nbcman

Donor
Even if they took the troops used on the invasion of the Philippines or Malaya?

I know all of this, which is why wanted to strip all other forces (almost) and focus on Hawaii; just send enough ships to the shores of the Phillipines to destroy the airfields and, at least, damage the US fleet there. Completely ignore Malaya and other UK-owned areas, and Indonesia. Every ship and drop of fuel is aimed at Hawaii.
They can’t send the same forces thousands of km with the same number of transports. Plus the majority of the transports, escorts, and other IJN ships didn’t have the range to get to Oahu via the northern route the KB followed. Additionally the Japanese would be limited to the air support available on the Japanese carriers as Oahu is beyond the range of most of their aircraft. Finally, the US forces in Oahu are not raw colonial troops that got rolled over in the initial Japanese advance to the South IOTL. The US defense of Oahu would not be a pushover and it would be fighting a defense that they’ve prepared for years.
 
Distance San Diego - Hawaii = about 2600 miles

Distance Tokyo Bay - Hawaii = about 3900 miles

Distance Truk Lagoon to Hawaii = about 3500 miles

The USA has the bigger fleet and a far larger Merchant fleet

Its a foolish idea - they struggle to get a force to Wake and then the attempt on Midway (both forces much smaller than the one that would be required to take and hold Hawaii)

During the Aleutian campaign in its entirety the Japanese managed to send 8,500 troops (The USA Responded with 144,000)

Its a no from me
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Yep, that's the idea... on paper at least.
I havr noticed that there is a really serious issue with much of this discussion, namely the "well, they can reassign the oilers from the other landings". Most of the other landings, as noted earlier didn't NEED tankers and were not supported by them. You do not need a tanker to support an invasion force that is only traveling 600 miles, that being the case, most of the Japanese actions didn't include any oiler support. The Japanese didn't mount a lot of long distance assault landing, simply because they lacked the resources to even try them.

Wake was a total shoestring operation despite the Island being the key pivot point for the entire "Defensive Perimeter" that the Japanese were attempting to create (no oiler support of any kind) all the landing were done with shockingly small number of troops. The landing that took Borneo were done with a single brigade sized force, no tanker support (although there was a collier used to provide additional heavy lift) that departed from Cam Ranh Bay (~600 miles for the landing site). Guam was also taken by a brigade size formation (the South Seas Force) which moved from the Bonin to directly attack the minuscule U.S. garrison. It did not have any oiler support (Saipan, a Japanese held "Trust Territory" was just over 100 miles away. After capturing Guam the South Seas Force moved to Turk, without any need for refueling support.

Far from having additional fleet oilers that could be diverted, moving a four or five division forces (which is what the math says would be needed to take Oahu, a thoughly fortified position with strong shore defenses, two Regular Army Divisions, and well over an additional division of basically trained Army personnel that could be used to create additional ad hoc battalions. Crews off of sunk or trapped warships could also be brought into service as static defenders, again, they had only the most basic of training with rifles, but many were thoroughly familiar with the various automatic weapons used by the Army. In static defense the lack of training in maneuver warfare would be far less of an issue (and a good number of the crews of smaller combatants had training in handling infantry weapons given the need for "showing the flag" operations, and the on-going patrols of Chinese rivers by U.S. gunboats). Realistically, even a five division landing force is too small, given American force size and the sort of strategic depth offiered by Oahu
 

nbcman

Donor
I havr noticed that there is a really serious issue with much of this discussion, namely the "well, they can reassign the oilers from the other landings". Most of the other landings, as noted earlier didn't NEED tankers and were not supported by them. You do not need a tanker to support an invasion force that is only traveling 600 miles, that being the case, most of the Japanese actions didn't include any oiler support. The Japanese didn't mount a lot of long distance assault landing, simply because they lacked the resources to even try them.

Wake was a total shoestring operation despite the Island being the key pivot point for the entire "Defensive Perimeter" that the Japanese were attempting to create (no oiler support of any kind) all the landing were done with shockingly small number of troops. The landing that took Borneo were done with a single brigade sized force, no tanker support (although there was a collier used to provide additional heavy lift) that departed from Cam Ranh Bay (~600 miles for the landing site). Guam was also taken by a brigade size formation (the South Seas Force) which moved from the Bonin to directly attack the minuscule U.S. garrison. It did not have any oiler support (Saipan, a Japanese held "Trust Territory" was just over 100 miles away. After capturing Guam the South Seas Force moved to Turk, without any need for refueling support.

Far from having additional fleet oilers that could be diverted, moving a four or five division forces (which is what the math says would be needed to take Oahu, a thoughly fortified position with strong shore defenses, two Regular Army Divisions, and well over an additional division of basically trained Army personnel that could be used to create additional ad hoc battalions. Crews off of sunk or trapped warships could also be brought into service as static defenders, again, they had only the most basic of training with rifles, but many were thoroughly familiar with the various automatic weapons used by the Army. In static defense the lack of training in maneuver warfare would be far less of an issue (and a good number of the crews of smaller combatants had training in handling infantry weapons given the need for "showing the flag" operations, and the on-going patrols of Chinese rivers by U.S. gunboats). Realistically, even a five division landing force is too small, given American force size and the sort of strategic depth offiered by Oahu
Not to mention there were US reinforcements (another brigade of field artillery and a bunch of other supplies) relatively close at hand in the Pensacola convoy who theoretically could head back to Oahu and be there within 2 weeks to stiffen the US defenses assuming the Japanese fleet could be avoided on the way into Pearl.
 
I don't think it could happen. It would have been a logistical nightmare. Besides where would they get the men for such an invasion? Not to mention being at the very end of a long supply line.
 
As I said above, these are operational/tactical considerations, not strategic ones.



Hawaii secures your flank against the US counter attack when you go after the oil in phase 2.

Again, I'm not arguing whether or not the operation is doable, merely that it makes strategic sense.
In phase 2 --- the Brits will be on full alert, the DEI will be more ready, and the logistical issues will be slightly less FUBAR
 
In phase 2 --- the Brits will be on full alert, the DEI will be more ready, and the logistical issues will be slightly less FUBAR
Malasya would still need to be heavily reinforced, specially with modern aircraft. Would the UK be able to do this, late 1942?
 
Top