Malasya would still need to be heavily reinforced, specially with modern aircraft. Would the UK be able to do this, late 1942?
In the months it's going to take the Japanese to finish securing Hawaii and build replacement lift? Absolutely.
Malasya would still need to be heavily reinforced, specially with modern aircraft. Would the UK be able to do this, late 1942?
Something that's sort of been overlooked in this thread is that the Japanese were actually really bad at amphibious assaults against prepared defenses ... which they only really tried once (Milne Bay was a flanking maneuver), and were embarrassed at (Wake Island). All those landings all across the South Pacific and SEA were either unopposed or very, very lightly opposed. They had no real amphibious doctrine, horrible NGS doctrine, no naval CAS doctrine to brag about, and only very modestly specialized equipment and even more modestly trained forces (very few in number).
Give them all the logistics they want to land a few divisions on a Hawaiian island, and they'll get chopped up on the beaches.
Even if it's handwaved that the Imperial Japanese assault succeeds, they defeat the Americans, and that they get lucky and capture the USN's tank farms intact and full of lovely fuel which can promptly be reused to refuel the Imperial Japanese fleets, Winston Churchill had an American mother, is desperate to curry favour with the United States and may just declare war on Imperial Japan anyway.Hio. This is just an exercise in "what if". regarding a possible invasion of Hawaii by Japan, in December 1941, with the attack on Pearl Harbour as percursor. The IJN attacks Pearl, then the army invades, with the IJN covering.
Now, before you bring out the torches and pitchforks, please read on. Every related whatif I've seen shows such in invasion being carried out at the same time as all the other ops Japan did in OTL. This, afaik, is so much ASB it's laughable at best; Japan did not have the troops and logistics to carry this out, specially fuel. Some minor variations are ocasionally made but, essentially, the authors have Japan invade/attack everthing they did as well as invade Hawaii... so... yeah... hahaha.
My question is this: what if Japan doesn't do all of this? What if it's decided to stomp the US completely out of the Pacific, by taking over is primary base, Hawaii, as the only priority?
Send just enough to the Philippines to raid it, just to destroy it's aircraft, ships & facilities, ignore Guam and Wake (they are too weak and isolated to be an issue). The other major change would be not to attack the British Empire (not even Hong Kong), as well as the Dutch colony (ie, Indonesia) at this time. Any such attack would be left for latter, after the US was forced into an armistice, having lost Haway (supposedly, ofc).
So, if all those ships, troops and specially fuel was diverted, could it have been enough to support an invasion of Hawaii?
(please ignore any strategic/political consequences, such as this avoids bringing the UK a war in Asia, which they could not really afford in 41/42; I'm just trying to get a grasp on the logistics)
Something that's sort of been overlooked in this thread is that the Japanese were actually really bad at amphibious assaults against prepared defenses ... which they only really tried once (Milne Bay was a flanking maneuver), and were embarrassed at (Wake Island). All those landings all across the South Pacific and SEA were either unopposed or very, very lightly opposed. They had no real amphibious doctrine, horrible NGS doctrine, no naval CAS doctrine to brag about, and only very modestly specialized equipment and even more modestly trained forces (very few in number).
Give them all the logistics they want to land a few divisions on a Hawaiian island, and they'll get chopped up on the beaches.
Something I'd like to point out is the idea that invading Hawaii makes "sense" in any tactical or strategic way.
It flat out doesn't.
It does not offer you 'control' of the islands, as noted it would be a very hard fought offensive, at the limit of your supply lines and far from support and supply, essentially on the US doorstep and needing constant naval support. It is not 'defendable' given those long supply lines and the US ability to spam ships, submarines and aircraft out of the west coast and if needed through the Panama Canal. Meanwhile YOUR forces even assuming you can take most of the facilities at Pearl Harbor intact, (remember you just bombed the heck out of them yourself and only have whatever you can find locally to repair them unless you dedicate already limited transport capacity to the materials*) have limited ability to repair and resupply and they will be in constant operation to not only 'deter' an attack to retake the island but constant harassments and attrition attacks.
And instead of having a 'lynch pin for an extended defense parameter' you have essentially trapped the majority of your assets in the Pacific at a place where US forces can easily 'go-around' you and attack not only your supply lines but all the bases and areas your now unavailable assets can no longer defend. Hawaii is a honey-trap NOT a sensible strategic outpost.
Randy
*= And that all assumes that the US forces don't destroy everything if it looks like they might lose, which they will and which renders the situation even more untenable.
Come to think of it, that might not be a bad story line. Japan thinks the U.S. would be forced to negotiate if they take Oahu, they put all their eggs in that particular basket, and instead, get a "Screw you, we're coming at you!" response from Washington. Think of the butterflies flapping all over the world, in every theater, from that particular chosen path...and post-war, too.Maybe the Japanese could convince themselves that the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate after loosing Oahu (and it's civilian population.) I don't think the U.S. would have asked for or accepted a general cease fire but who knows what the Japanese might have thought in an alternate time line
Maybe the Japanese could convince themselves that the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate after loosing Oahu (and it's civilian population.) I don't think the U.S. would have asked for or accepted a general cease fire but who knows what the Japanese might have thought in an alternate time line
Come to think of it, that might not be a bad story line. Japan thinks the U.S. would be forced to negotiate if they take Oahu, they put all their eggs in that particular basket, and instead, get a "Screw you, we're coming at you!" response from Washington. Think of the butterflies flapping all over the world, in every theater, from that particular chosen path...and post-war, too.
Still impossible. The lift didn't exist, even if IJA was willing to provide the manpower (it wasn't, & IJN couldn't). Besides which, you'd have to have Yamamoto abandon his concept of short war to seriously contemplate it. And then persuade IJA to give up the higher-value objectives (especially oil).My question is this: what if Japan doesn't do all of this? What if it's decided to stomp the US completely out of the Pacific, by taking over is primary base, Hawaii, as the only priority?
Presuming Japan can take Pearl Harbor, which is a long shot that would make Hitler think twice, what makes you think she can hold Oahu? Short of intervention from the Romulans or somebody?occupation of the Hawaiian Islands would mean that Pearl Harbour could be used as a forward operating base for the Combined Fleet
The Pacific Fleet Sub Force will be doing it at shorter range than OTL, too: Hawaii is nearer Mare Island than the Home Islands...a place where US forces can easily 'go-around' you and attack not only your supply lines
Might be able to hold it, simply due to the distances from anywhere else involved. As long as they keep it adequately garrisoned, adequately supplied, and adequately protected by a sufficiently large fleet.Still impossible. The lift didn't exist, even if IJA was willing to provide the manpower (it wasn't, & IJN couldn't). Besides which, you'd have to have Yamamoto abandon his concept of short war to seriously contemplate it. And then persuade IJA to give up the higher-value objectives (especially oil).
This is one of those where even IJA thought it was ASB. I'll let you contemplate how high a bar that is.
Presuming Japan can take Pearl Harbor, which is a long shot that would make Hitler think twice, what makes you think she can hold Oahu? Short of intervention from the Romulans or somebody?
This scheme strikes me as a way to lose the war before the end of 1941.
Nonsense. The further from Japan, the harder it is. Japan can never take Oahu; you're nuts if you think the capacity to take any of the remaining Hawaiian Islands on top of that exists. Those "unsinkable carriers" are pure fantasy.Might be able to hold it, simply due to the distances from anywhere else involved.
...Those "unsinkable carriers" are pure fantasy...
Churchill would have declared war on Japan even without the attacks on Malaya and Hong Kong. In October he promised to do so within the hour of the outbreak of war between Japan and America.Even if it's handwaved that the Imperial Japanese assault succeeds, they defeat the Americans, and that they get lucky and capture the USN's tank farms intact and full of lovely fuel which can promptly be reused to refuel the Imperial Japanese fleets, Winston Churchill had an American mother, is desperate to curry favour with the United States and may just declare war on Imperial Japan anyway.
And it's inadvisable for Imperial Japan to give the Indian and Australian troops deployed and deploying to Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies time to acclimatise.
Edit: Sure Imperial Japan has (somehow) secured one flank by conquering Hawai'i. Imperial Japan has a serious problem if that cost them Sumatra, Malaya, and Singapore. (The former two necessary to cover approaches to the latter with its major naval base and airfields...)