2. needs a lot of handwave to get surprise (and possibly the Imperial Japanese army-navy cooperation necessary) but is what I figure they probably have to do if they are actually serious about a conquest.
1941 - invading Hawaii, possible?
- Thread starter Hammerbolt
- Start date
The reality is that it is impossible for Japan to talk ALL the islands. So what you have is a race to see who can put more troops and aircraft in the island(s) they control. Being as Hawaii is closer to the US. The US does not need to invade anywhere for oil or whatever so the US will be 100% in on Hawaii as Europe first is out the window. As with Hawaii being occupied this will force a Pacific first at least until Hawaii is liberated.
Also keep in mind that the US will be reinforcing a friendly island not occupying an enemy island.
And of course the US won’t being having anywhere near as many ships sunk on the way to/from the islands.
So yeah this is a good way for Japan to lose the war faster
Also keep in mind that the US will be reinforcing a friendly island not occupying an enemy island.
And of course the US won’t being having anywhere near as many ships sunk on the way to/from the islands.
So yeah this is a good way for Japan to lose the war faster
I think the "Best" (For a given distorted value of best) plan that could be done in this scenario is to take 1, and maybe take a page out of Red Storm Rising, whip up some civilian shipping, plus an ocean liner or three and have them painted up as false flags, preloaded with two divisions and positioned around the AO on the 7th. Aim to start landing operations more or less simultaneously as the first wave going in at Pearl. It's still an incredibly dumbass plan, but it's making the best you can out of a bad idea.
Yes - but I'm not sure what passenger liners might be wandering around the Pacific at that time without arousing suspicions.
Also, a passenger liner isn't exactly suited for amphibious operations but is certainly vulnerable to coastal artillery.
nbcman
Donor
None of them as there were no NYK liners that went to US ports after Oct 1941 (Hikawa Maru). The NYK line had a route that went via Hawaii to San Francisco and beyond but those sailings must have been stopped before Oct 1941.
Thanks
I suppose Japan couldn't claim to be sending a special cruise ship of tourists?? YMCA equivalent?
😀
Plus someone's gonna find it odd this passenger liner's entire compliment are all young men who are suspiciously fit with lots of locked trunks they keep careful watch on, in addition to other luggage....
Nonsense, just ram a 20,000 ton ship ashore into a rocky coast at full speed, toss nets overboard, and then our colleagues in the IJA can scramble down and get right stuck in with the weak, effeminate Americans. They'll be so surprised at our Bushido courage that they'll fold at the first bayonet charge! What could go wrong!
(Sarcastic of course, but from a certain point of view, it's actually vastly more sensible then a lot of the plans the Imperial Japanese actually carried out during the war. Who the hell thinks that it's a smart idea to send half your fleet off to attack goddamn ALASKA while leaving your remaining units scattered so far apart that not one group can possibly provide support to any other element if they are attacked. And on top of that, leave a fifth perfectly fine carrier with the mostly intact air group of a sixth carrier in port. All this during the crucial no effort spared decisive battle that will determine the fate of the Empire?)
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However by the time the fleet, transports and tankers have arrived off Hawaii know where will they get thr fuel to return home. Bunkers empty, tankers empty, they will not find fuel in Hawaii. The stores at Pearl and Honolulu will be destroyed. I'mo the navy will go after the tankers, damaged warshipswill not have access to Pearl Harbor, or Honolu.u harbor due to scuttling. The best attacks routes from the North Shore are along the narrow coast roads, or through the central valley and Fort Schafter. A slow body slog.
Imperial Japanese planners actually proposed landing troops as part of the Pearl Harbor attack. Landing sites were to be southern Kaneohe Bay and Haleiwa with 10k-15k troops in one scenario (Genda) and 30k with heavy naval support in the other (Watanabe). They correctly estimated American armor on the island (virtually none) and that an approach involving proximity to Diamond Head was impossible.
The army wasn't behind the idea and the senior officers of the Combined Fleet were against it as too dangerous. And for the Genda plan it likely was. Wanatanbe's plan probably had a chance for success, but a loss meant Tokyo was likely to require surrender by 1943 and even success would buy them a year to 18 months before the Essex class carriers come knocking. In the interim, however, Japan gains *a lot* of tech, intelligence, and if they can take Howland perhaps cut off Australia/New Zealand from a lot of reinforcements.
The army wasn't behind the idea and the senior officers of the Combined Fleet were against it as too dangerous. And for the Genda plan it likely was. Wanatanbe's plan probably had a chance for success, but a loss meant Tokyo was likely to require surrender by 1943 and even success would buy them a year to 18 months before the Essex class carriers come knocking. In the interim, however, Japan gains *a lot* of tech, intelligence, and if they can take Howland perhaps cut off Australia/New Zealand from a lot of reinforcements.
No 30,000 men that ever lived could take Hawaii in 1941. The Japanese troops would still be outnumbered by troops in prepared positions. You might as well gun them down yourself before leaving Tokyo and save yourself the fuel.
You know, honestly, given how often Oahu invasion proposals come up here, maybe we really *do* need a sticky thread to go along with the Unmentionable Sea Mammal thread.
I'm a little surprised no one has brought up Glenn239's TINKERBELL proposal, mooted over on the Axis History forums and dredged up here on numerous occasions. To Glenn's credit, he did try to do some of his homework on the obvious Achilles Heel of all IJN Oahu invasion schemes -- logistics. And as I noted at the time, I think he may have done just enough work to show that it was feasible, barely, to get a few IJA divisions ashore in the second week of December 1941 and even modestly support for them in combat ops for a spell.
The first difficulty, of course, is that Glenn conceded what @Hammerbolt does in the OP -- other IJN operations simply have to give way to get hold of the men, the transports, and the supplies you need to tackle Oahu. For Glenn, it's the Philippines that give way in Phase 1. The problems this poses should be obvious.
The second difficulty is that it is going to, at minimum, delay Japan's seizure of the DEI oil fields and facilities. And if it does so, that increases the odds of successful, truly thorough, Allied sabotage of all of this infrastructure. Glenn conceded that this was a difficulty.
The third difficulty is the greatest of all, because it is fully intrinsic to an Oahu venture: The sheer improbability that you could keep such a massive invasion effort a secret from the U.S.. It's just too many ships, too many men, coming from too many places, and all journeying at achingly slow rates across the Pacific. It was no small miracle that Japan was able to achieve complete surprise with Nagumo's force.
I'm a little surprised no one has brought up Glenn239's TINKERBELL proposal, mooted over on the Axis History forums and dredged up here on numerous occasions. To Glenn's credit, he did try to do some of his homework on the obvious Achilles Heel of all IJN Oahu invasion schemes -- logistics. And as I noted at the time, I think he may have done just enough work to show that it was feasible, barely, to get a few IJA divisions ashore in the second week of December 1941 and even modestly support for them in combat ops for a spell.
The first difficulty, of course, is that Glenn conceded what @Hammerbolt does in the OP -- other IJN operations simply have to give way to get hold of the men, the transports, and the supplies you need to tackle Oahu. For Glenn, it's the Philippines that give way in Phase 1. The problems this poses should be obvious.
The second difficulty is that it is going to, at minimum, delay Japan's seizure of the DEI oil fields and facilities. And if it does so, that increases the odds of successful, truly thorough, Allied sabotage of all of this infrastructure. Glenn conceded that this was a difficulty.
The third difficulty is the greatest of all, because it is fully intrinsic to an Oahu venture: The sheer improbability that you could keep such a massive invasion effort a secret from the U.S.. It's just too many ships, too many men, coming from too many places, and all journeying at achingly slow rates across the Pacific. It was no small miracle that Japan was able to achieve complete surprise with Nagumo's force.
The logistics are of course the Achilles Heel but if you were to go the Germans in Norway approach of a surprise landing with passenger vessels, I don't think its insane to say that islands other than Oahu might be vulnerable, at least for a time, but without a destruction in detail at Pearl of the entire fleet (plus the carriers that in this scenario aren't at sea), its unlikely that this can be held for very long.
This begs for an epic anime. Needs to be funded asap.
Yeah. 30k is simply too few, a lot more would be needed... which would make the transport and supply situation even worse. Hence my initial question.
How about something less ambitious than a full invasion and occupation of Hawaii? Just a massive 'Raid on St. Nazaire' operation to destroy the naval bases.
So, Kido Butai is accompanied by a couple of passenger liners and an extra light cruiser. When the first air strike us launched these ships and a few destroyers break off and head for Pearl Harbour at flank speed. CAP over them as possible.
Time their arrival to match that of the second wave of aircraft to distract the US ships. The liners beach themselves as near as they can get while the cruiser and destroyers try to block the entrance. By sinking US vessels in it if possible, or positioning themselves to do so if and when they are sunk.
Crack IJN troops storm ashore to finish off damaged US warships by capture and blowing up the magazines. Plus destroy the communications facilities, repair workshops and fuel tanks. IF they capture enough civilians, especially nurses, they can extort compliance with these demands on pain of committing Nanking style atrocities.
What could go wrong?
Well, probably everything. There is a huge quantity of satire in the above. But is it a plan cunning and crazy enough for the IJN?
So, Kido Butai is accompanied by a couple of passenger liners and an extra light cruiser. When the first air strike us launched these ships and a few destroyers break off and head for Pearl Harbour at flank speed. CAP over them as possible.
Time their arrival to match that of the second wave of aircraft to distract the US ships. The liners beach themselves as near as they can get while the cruiser and destroyers try to block the entrance. By sinking US vessels in it if possible, or positioning themselves to do so if and when they are sunk.
Crack IJN troops storm ashore to finish off damaged US warships by capture and blowing up the magazines. Plus destroy the communications facilities, repair workshops and fuel tanks. IF they capture enough civilians, especially nurses, they can extort compliance with these demands on pain of committing Nanking style atrocities.
What could go wrong?
Well, probably everything. There is a huge quantity of satire in the above. But is it a plan cunning and crazy enough for the IJN?
Liners are too slow for such a dash; strip a couple of older light cruisers for transport duty. Other than that, perfect plan. (for a given set of "perfect"...)
In January 1941 a Japanese army of that size probably could have, actually. About 01Dec41 the assets for the whole of the Hawaiian Department included about 36,000 troops, 6 functional B-17s (6 more were for training of air crews for MacArthur in the Phillippines, but these reportedly lacked parts and were essentially non-functional), total of 80 functional fighters (P-36 and early P-40, again, more were present but lacked for spare parts). Only 180 .50 caliber machine guns were present, twenty 37mm guns, and *no* 90mm guns.