32. The diplomatic quandary: the neutrals.
When the war broke out, the Russian Empire and Romania declared their neutrality. Although nominally allied with the German Empire, Russia did not join Berlin in the fight. Saint Petersburg stated that, as the Alliance was of a defensive nature and Germany had attaked France without consultation, Russia was not obliged to join the war. Even more: Russia was formally allied with Germany but, at the same time, it also maintained good relations with France and the United States. The Russian public opinion wanted peace, and the Czar and his ministers were aware of how poorly prepared the nation was in contrast to the empires at war. The small war party, lead by Alexander Izvolsky, the former Foreign Minister and the then Ambasador in Paris, was powerless to change this stance.
Thus, Russia remained neutral but, by late 1919, however, Prime Minister Nikolai Golitsyn and Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov decided that there were more advantages to Russia by joining the Entente. Furthermore, the war would help to calm the serious internal dissension by bringing glory to the victorious army. Thus, in early December, just as the second Battle of the Piave died, Sazonov opened negotiations with Paris while Golitsyn did the same with Berlin. They negotiated with both sides for the best deal, and got one from the Entente, which was quite willing to promise a large slice of the German Empire and Hungary, plus an access to the Dardanelless and a meaty war loan from the United States. It was agreed that Russia (Treaty of Paris, December 1919) would join the war in a month. However, this was to be delayed until March 1920.
Romania had also demanded support for its territorial claims to parts of Hungarian Transylvania, and especially those parts with a Romanian-speaking majority. However, the negotations were stalled when Russia became worried by the Romanian demands, fering that Bucharest could had territorial designs on Bessarabia, claimed by nationalist circles as a Romanian land. When the treaty of Bucharest was signed on January 1920 it was agreed that Romania would join the war at the same time of Russia, to mutually support the offensive actions of both allies, that Russia would send troops into Dobruja, and that the Romanian army would not be subordinated to Russian command. However, given Romania's historical hostility towards the Russian Empire, it was doubtful that any meaningless collaboration could exist between the two allies.
When Salih Hulusi, the Ottoman prime minister, declared the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire, he was widly applauded for this in the Parliament. The views of the piblic opinion on the war were divided as the upper classes and the Army favoured Germany, while there was a mild pro-Entente sentiment among the middle and professional classes and intellectuals. However, the strong war party led by Enver Pasha, Ahmed Izzet Pasha, Said Halim Pasha and Talaat Pasha began to conspire at once against Hulusi and to open secret negotiations with Germany, which was doubtful of the military value of the Ottomans. However, in spite of the best efforts of the war party, it was to be a foreign unwanted intervention which settled the score in their favour.
Meawnhile, the war had created a goverment crisis in the British Empire. Opinions ranged from neutrality to war, and, within the last one, from war with Germany for invading Belgium to war with France for the same. Grey, the Foreign Secretary, had warned the British ambassador in Paris, the germanophobe Francis Bertie, that the British public could not be expected to support British intervention in a quarrel that was so remote from the country’s own interests. If Grey was under pressure from his liberal imperialist ally, Richard Haldane, to find a way of preventing Britain from joining the war in either side, it is not know. A reason for Grey's attitude may lay in his anxiety about the increasing fragility of the international financial markets.
Was the prosperity of the Empire really worth risking over an issue as comparatively trivial as the neutrality of Belgium? This question laid behind the British declaration of neutrality (June 5, 1919) and became more and more divisive as time went on and the British position remained the same. As those who were in support for an alliance with Germany saw that there was no intention to going to war against the United States and France, they moved to the side of the prime minister, Lloyd George, and became fanatical supporters of continued neutrality and were to lead to heated Parlamentarian debates as the pressure that Austen Chamberlain and the Tories put upon No 10 kept going up, even more when Herberth Asquith, the Secretary for War, and Alfred Milner, Secretary of States fo the Colonies, resigned in protest and were replaced by the earl of Derby and Winston Churchill (June 10).
In those days, the Daily News expressed disgust at the notion that British lives might be sacrificed ‘for the sake of French hegemony’ and pointed out that crushing Germany would in effect establish a French dictatorship over ‘Europe and Asia’, which only helped to increase the polarisation of the British society. Even the Tory papers were unenthusiastic. The Yorkshire Post , for example, was doubtful that a German victory would leave England any worse off than a Franco-American victory and could ‘see no reason why Britain should be drawn in’. Only The Times argued consistently for British intervention. Neverhteless the rantings of Horatio Bottomley on his own John Bull ended being more damaging for his own side that for the government as he demanded, in the same article, to wipe out the "Serbian hotbed of cold-blooded conspiracy and subterfuge" and the utter ‘annihilation’ of the German fleet.
Thus, for the while, Britain remained outside of the war.
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