Reading the latest post, both the British and Japanese have a problem, too many aircraft and not enough fully developed airfields. The Japanese airfields lack the hard runways that the British have. And not having the experience that Park and numerous of his senior offices have from the Battle of France and Britain, do not fully appreciate the necessity of dispersal and harding their vital facilities. Fuel, ammunition and spares, should be stored in a minimum of two ideally three separate and reinforced sites, and all aircraft in protected revetments, dispersed around the airfield. It’s one thing to have read about this in papers, it’s totally different to have experienced this first hand, as Park and numerous officers and men under his command have. There can be little doubt that Park along with the majority of his staff, are not satisfied that their preparations are anywhere near enough, and that along with more and more modern aircraft, anti aircraft weapons, they need better facilities at all the airfields under their command. Park knows from experience that in addition to all the basic preparations, that there are others less obvious that need to be implemented. Each airfield needs two Fire Brigades, one to deal with aircraft, and the other for the facilities on the airfield, you also need a runway repair team, able to quickly repair the runway, with materials, equipment and personnel on site, plus its very helpful to have a bomb disposal team available. It will also be helpful given that everyone knows that the outbreak of war is a matter of days away, to institute a standard stand to, at dawn and dusk, just like an infantry unit. In Poland, France and the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe launched dawn strikes against airfields on day one of the conflict, and Park would be a fool not to expect the Japanese to do the same. Simply by having everyone awake and at their position before dawn, and were possible a flight of fighters in position at maximum altitude over the airfield, is going to make the Japanese job much harder.
The Japanese face the problem that they too have overcrowded airfields, with poor facilities, and no experience of being subjected to deadicated attacks by a functioning opponent. They have become used to basically being able to operate with very little opposition, from secure bases, that have little to no preparation for a counterattack. Nor do they have any experience of operating against a foe that has, admittedly primitive radar systems. Yes they at command level have heard about radar from their own scientists and their German allies, but just how far this information managed to get down the chain, or if they knew about the existence of the British network, or understood what it meant. They also have the problem of which policy to adopt in their initial attack, do they go with an all out attack on a limited number of British airfields, or do they try to attack all the British airfields at one and then same time. Either way unless they reserve aircraft for supporting attacks against other military targets, they stand a good chance of leaving their army without air cover on the outbreak of hostilities. Only being able to provide such support after their initial assault against the British airfields, and once the survivors have returned to their home base and refuelled and rearmed. The British however can launch a dusk attack against the Japanese airfields, were both the aircrews and ground crews are tiered out from a long day of intense operations. Followed up by a drawn attack, which should find the Japanese ground staff shattered by the previous days dusk attack and a night spent without sleep, as they attempted to deal with the results of the previous day’s operations and British assault. The first few days will quickly establish just how successful the Japanese are going to be in establishing dominance in the air, which if they don’t, given their position so far away from the homeland and reinforcements plus facilities for aircraft repair and maintenance, never a Japanese strong point IOTL.
If the British can launch a reasonable counter attack against the Japanese Army Airforce, along with the British Armies spoiling attacks just before the upcoming Japanese assault against Malay. There is a good chance that the Japanese never achieve the aerial dominance ITTL, that they achieved IOTL. And without that dominance, and the requirements of supporting the efforts of the Army in China, Burma, and the Philippines, the Army Airforce are going to find themselves very stretched. Unlike the Anglo Americans, who are at a particular low point, and are rapidly going to be producing aircraft as good as anything the Japanese have, and shortly far better than the best the Japanese have. Both nations have established extensive aircrew training systems, and have the space and resources necessary. The Japanese have a limited time to achieve their goals, and if they fail, they are only going to be going down hill in the future. Whereas the British provided them can get through the first six months, without losing their hold on Malaya or Singapore, are comfortably looking at being able to steadily reinforce their forces. And sustaining them until their are able to launch a counter offensive, and drive the Japanese out of Malaya, and subsequently Thailand and French Indo China too. Even if the Japanese enjoy the same success that they did IOTL, in the Philippines, that will serve to only stretch them further. And reduce the resources available to them in Malaysia, and without gaining possession of the oilfields in the DEI, they will be rapidly running out of oil. While the British with access to the oilfields and refineries in Burma and Iraq, will have a vitally unlimited supply of petroleum products.
RR.